Monday, March 30, 2026

Trial begins over alleged hit squad network linked to French Masonic lodge

A complex criminal trial has opened in Paris, where 22 people are set to appear in court over allegations of murder, attempted murder and other serious offences linked to a Masonic lodge accused of operating as a covert mafia network.


Issued on: 30/03/2026 - RFI

Defendant Pierre Lebris arrives for the opening of the so-called Athanor trial, in which 22 people are facing a wide range of charges, including murder, centred on the Athanor Masonic lodge accused of running hit squads, at the Assize Court in the Tribunal Judiciaire courthouse in Paris, on 30 March 2026. 
AFP - THOMAS SAMSON

Court proceedings, which got underway on Monday, are expected to run for at least three months, with seven of the defendants – including former intelligence agents, soldiers and business figures – facing the possibility of life imprisonment if convicted.

At the heart of the case is the Athanor Masonic Lodge in the Paris suburb of Puteaux. Prosecutors allege that the lodge served as a hub for a tightly organised network that carried out violent acts ranging from assaults to contract killings.

Among those in the dock are at least four freemasons, alongside four officers from France’s DGSE external intelligence agency, three police officers, six business executives, and professionals including a doctor and an engineer. Most of the accused, aged between 30 and 73, have no prior criminal records – a detail that has added to the intrigue surrounding the case.

The alleged ringleaders – Jean-Luc Bagur, Frederic Vaglio and Daniel Beaulieu – are all linked to the Athanor lodge and are accused of orchestrating a series of crimes through a structured chain of command. They, along with Beaulieu’s associate Sébastien Leroy, face the most severe penalties.

From botched plot to major investigation


The case first came to light following a failed contract killing in July 2020. Two members of France’s parachute regiment were arrested near the home of business coach Marie-Helene Dini while in possession of weapons.

Under questioning, the pair claimed they believed they had been tasked by the state to eliminate Dini, alleging she had ties to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.

Investigators quickly uncovered links to Bagur, a business rival of Dini and the 69-year-old “venerable master” of the Athanor lodge. According to prosecutors, Bagur commissioned the hit for a fee of €70,000, allegedly passing the task through Vaglio to a network overseen by Beaulieu, a former agent with the French secret service.

Leroy, described as the operational leader of the group, later admitted in custody that he and his associates had carried out numerous violent acts on behalf of the network. These allegedly included robberies, assaults and at least one murder – that of racing driver Laurent Pasquali, whose body was discovered in a forest in 2018.

Prosecutors say the group’s activities escalated over time – evolving from acts of revenge to more organised and lethal operations. One alleged incident involved industrial espionage, in which a businesswoman was attacked and her computer stolen. In another, a car was set ablaze after its owner reportedly uncovered financial irregularities linked to Bagur.

Troubling questions

As the trial unfolds, it is expected to shine a light not only on the alleged crimes but also on the unusual composition of the group – which includes individuals from law enforcement, intelligence and professional sectors.

Leroy has told investigators he believed he was acting in the interests of the state throughout, claiming he had been misled by Beaulieu and encouraged to think he was working towards becoming an informant.

For Marie-Helene Dini, the intended target of the 2020 plot, the case is deeply unsettling. Her lawyer, Jean-William Vezinet, has described it as “terrifying”, noting that many of those implicated were figures entrusted with public responsibility.

Uncertainty remains over what testimony Beaulieu will be able to provide. His lawyer has said he suffered lasting impairments after an apparent suicide attempt while in custody, including difficulties with concentration.

Despite the gravity of the allegations, the trial is also being seen as an opportunity for the French justice system to demonstrate its thoroughness and independence – particularly given the sensitive roles held by some of the accused.

(with newswires)



Murder trial involving Freemasons, French secret agents opens in Paris court


A Paris court on Monday began hearings in a major trial involving 22 suspects accused of murder and other serious crimes on behalf of a mafia network inside the Athanor Masonic Lodge in the Paris suburb of Puteaux. The accused include police officers, former French intelligence agents and businessmen.


Issued on: 30/03/2026 
By: FRANCE 24

Businesswoman Marie-Helene Dini (L), the alleged target of a failed assassination attempt, enters a Paris court with her lawyer Jean-William Vezinet on March 30, 2026. © Thomas Samson, AFP

Twenty-two people went on trial in France on Monday on charges of murder and other serious crimes centred on members of a Masonic lodge accused of running hit squads.

Thirteen of the defendants face life imprisonment.

Those in the dock include four military personnel from France's foreign intelligence service (DGSE), two police officers, a retired domestic intelligence officer, a security guard and two business executives.

They are accused of the murder of a racing driver, the attempted murders of a business coach and a trade unionist, aggravated assault and criminal conspiracy – all on behalf of a mafia network inside the former Athanor Masonic Lodge in the Paris suburb of Puteaux.

Several freemasons from the 20 or so members of the lodge are in the dock.

Most of the accused, aged between 30 and 73, have no previous criminal records.

Five of the suspects are in custody and 16 are under judicial supervision, while one woman is appearing in court as a free person.

The alleged ringleaders are Athanor Freemasons Jean-Luc Bagur, Frédéric Vaglio and Daniel Beaulieu. They face life in jail if convicted.

So does Beaulieu's right-hand man Sébastien Leroy, who is accused of carrying out the trio's dirty work himself or through a hit-man network.

The case was triggered by a botched contract killing in July 2020, when two members of France's parachute regiment were arrested in possession of weapons near the home of business coach Marie-Hélène Dini.

Under questioning, they said they thought they had been asked to murder Dini on behalf of the French state on the grounds that she worked for Israeli spy agency Mossad.
Escalating crimes

Investigators discovered a link to Bagur, who is a business coach rival of Dini's as well as being the 69-year-old "venerable master" of the Athanor lodge.

Investigators say Bagur asked fellow Freemason Vaglio to arrange to have his rival eliminated for a fee of €70,000 ($80,600).

Vaglio, a 53-year-old entrepreneur, allegedly acted as the intermediary between the big boss and a hit squad working for fellow Athanor Freemason Beaulieu, a retired agent for the domestic intelligence service (DGSI).

The leader of the hit squad, Leroy, admitted in police custody that he or his associates carried out most of the Athanor mafia's assaults, robberies and murders – including the killing of a racing car driver.

As time went on, the crimes ordered by the Freemason mafia escalated from petty revenge attacks to homicide.

In a case of industrial espionage, Leroy's gang allegedly assaulted a businesswoman in the street and snatched her computer.

The car of one of Bagur's associates went up in flames in 2019 after she discovered evidence of financial fraud within his company.

In 2018, the body of racing driver Laurent Pasquali was found in a forest.

He had been bumped off, according to French media, allegedly for not paying a debt he owed to friends of Vaglio's.

'Terrifying'


Leroy, who left the military to become a security guard, told police he thought he had been acting all the time on behalf of the government.

He complained that Beaulieu had "manipulated" him and dangled the idea of him becoming an informant for the DGSI spy agency.

"What my client found terrifying is the fact that the key figures in this case – police officers, former DGSI agents and Freemasons – are precisely the people who are supposed to act for the good of society," said Dini's lawyer Jean-William Vezinet.

It is unclear what information the prosecution may be able to elicit from Beaulieu.

He made an apparent attempt to kill himself in police custody, which left him disabled and with "impaired concentration", his lawyer told AFP.

The trial is expected to run for at least three months.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)



Propaganda Due was a Masonic lodge, founded in 1877, within the tradition of Continental Freemasonry and under the authority of Grand Orient of Italy.

On March 17, 1981, a significant event unfolded in Italy when the nation's financial police raided the villa of Licio Gelli, a businessman with deep ties to ...

Dec 30, 2022 ... Abstract. This paper wishes to explore some characteristics of the relevant interconnections between mafias/mafiosi and masonic ...

May 25, 1981 ... A mushrooming scandal involving a secret Masonic lodge had forced the justice minister to resign and threatened the reputations of a large group of politicians.

Jun 1, 1981 ... The scandal currently dominating Italian politics revolves around allegations that a large number of key government, military, business, ...

Jun 8, 1981 ... The bizarre scandal that rocked the country last week and toppled the four-party coalition government of Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani.

Dec 16, 2015 ... Licio Gelli, the mastermind behind a notorious Italian masonic lodge with links to some of Italy's biggest scandals of the 20th century, has died at the age of...

This paper will investigate the pathological dimension of potential interplays among deviant masons and political-institutional actors in a variety of cases ...

May 24, 1981 ... Italy's Justice Minister, Adolfo Sarti, resigned today following reports linking him to a powerful, secret Masonic lodge that has been implicated in a variety&...

Jun 16, 2025 ... In June 1982, the BBC reported on the death of Italian banker Roberto Calvi, whose body was found in central London.

Captain of Russian 'shadow tanker' sentenced to one year in French prison

A French court has handed down a one-year prison sentence and issued an arrest warrant for the Chinese captain of a tanker suspected of being part of Russia’s so-called 'shadow fleet', in a case that highlights Europe’s growing efforts to enforce sanctions at sea.



Issued on: 30/03/2026 - RFI

The Chinese captain of the Boracay, a tanker from the Russian shadow fleet that was seized in September by the French navy off the coast of Brittany, was sentenced on 30 March 2026 to one year in prison by the Brest criminal court for 'failing to comply with orders.' AFP - DAMIEN MEYER

Chen Zhangjie, 39, was sentenced in absentia on Monday after failing to comply with French naval orders to stop his vessel, the Boracay, during an incident in September.

The court in the western city of Brest also imposed a fine of €150,000, underlining the seriousness with which authorities are treating alleged sanctions evasion.

The Boracay was intercepted by the French navy before being boarded and inspected. It was later released along with its crew, prompting a sharp reaction from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who described the operation as "piracy".

Despite the diplomatic tension, the ruling signals a firm stance from French authorities as scrutiny intensifies around maritime activities linked to Moscow.

Shadow fleet under scrutiny

The tanker had claimed to be sailing under a Benin flag and is believed to be part of a network of vessels used to transport Russian oil in ways that may circumvent Western sanctions imposed following the invasion of Ukraine.

These so-called shadow fleets have become an increasing focus for European governments, who are keen to close loopholes in enforcement.

According to an informed French source and the captain’s lawyer, two employees of a Russian private security company were also on board at the time of the interception. Their reported role was to represent Russian interests and gather intelligence, adding another layer of intrigue to the case.

The European Union has already blacklisted 598 vessels suspected of participating in such operations, banning them from European ports and maritime services.

The Brest court’s decision is therefore part of a broader effort to ensure that these measures carry real consequences.

French prosecutor seeks penalty for captain in Russian shadow fleet test case

Wider security concerns

Beyond sanctions enforcement, the Boracay has also drawn attention for its alleged links to a series of unexplained drone flights over Denmark last year. These incidents formed part of a wider pattern of drone sightings and airspace violations across Europe that have often been attributed to Russian activity.

No formal connection has been established between the tanker and the drone activity, and Moscow has consistently denied any involvement. Still, the overlap of maritime and aerial security concerns has heightened unease among European officials.

While the case against Chen Zhangjie centres on non-compliance with naval orders, it reflects a much larger geopolitical picture – one in which maritime routes, energy supplies and security risks are increasingly intertwined.

(with newswires)
Amnesty warns of 'serious risks' to certain fans during 2026 World Cup

Human rights campaign group Amnesty International warned on Monday that certain fans travelling to the United States, Mexico and Canada for the World Cup face serious risks from immigration and customs officers (ICE) as well as border guards (CBP).



Issued on: 30/03/2026 - RFI

A federal agent watches as police officers respond to a protest at a warehouse purchased by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for use as a detention center, in Salt Lake City, Utah, US 18 March, 2026. REUTERS - Jim Urquhart

By: Paul Myers

In the report Humanity Must Win: defending rights, tackling repression at the 2026 Fifa World Cup, Amnesty says neither World Cup organisers Fifa nor the US authorities have provided any guarantees that supporters will be safe from ethnic profiling, indiscriminate raids, unlawful detention and deportation.

"None of the three US draft host city human rights plans so far published provide any mention of how people will be protected from such threats," the report says.

"Indeed, the acting director of Ice has told [US] Congress that the agency will be 'a key part of the overall security apparatus for the World Cup.'"

In June 2018, the US, Mexico and Canada beat off Morocco's bid to stage the 2026 World Cup.

The tournament will start on 11 June with a match between Mexico and South Africa at the Azteca Stadium in Mexico City. Two other venues in Mexico will be used along with Vancouver and Toronto in Canada and 11 in the US including the MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford which will host the final on 19 July. Some 6.5 million fans from across the globe are expected to attend the tournament.

Since Fifa awarded co-hosting rights, the administration of Donald Trump has taken power in the US and fulfilled election campaign pledges to crackdown on illegal immigration.

The Amnesty report says analysis of official government data conducted by the New York Times estimates that ICE and CBP deported more than 500,000 people in 2025 – Trump's first year as president – including 230,000 arrested inside the US and 270,000 at the border.

"As of 19 March 2026, Ice had also signed 1,544 287(g) agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, including in World Cup host cities Dallas, Houston and Miami, deputising their officers to enforce immigration law and allowing for local jails to be used for immigration detention," the Amnesty report adds.

"Amnesty International has also documented immigration detention conditions in the Krome North Service Processing Center and the Everglades Detention Facility – also known as "Alligator Alcatraz" – within 20 and 50 miles of Fifa’s Miami headquarters, respectively."

The Amnesty report also highlights the US government's attack on the rights of LGBTQI+ people, particularly in relation to transgender and gender-diverse people.
Anti-discrimination protocol

The England LGBTQI+ fans’ group and a network of European LGBTQI+ fans’ groups say they will not have a visible presence at matches in the US.

Trans youth also face persistent discrimination in Canada, says the report, while Mexico is considered to be the second most dangerous country in the world for transgender people, with 59 transfemicides recorded in 2024.

"In football, homophobic chanting has also been a persistent problem in matches involving the Mexican, US and Canadian national teams, leading to match suspensions and sanctions imposed by FIFA on the Mexican Football Federation," the report says.


Amnesty says it wants authorities to take effective measures to protect LGBTQI+ people from discrimination, harassment and abuse via anti-discrimination campaigns and proper use of Fifa’s anti-discrimination protocol during matches.

It also wants Fifa, governments and host cities to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly inside and outside World Cup venues during the tournament.

As well as calling for an end to indiscriminate raids, ethnic profiling, arbitrary arrests, mass detention and unlawful deportations in the US, Amnesty says it wants public guarantees that World Cup events, venues and gatherings will not be targeted for immigration enforcement.

It also says organisers should make sure host city human rights plans are updated and tightened up to provide comprehensive protections for fans, players, journalists, workers and local communities.

"With just weeks to go until kick-off, Fifa's claim that "Football Unites the World" sits in stark contrast to the divisive and repressive practices of governments who host its flagship tournament," the report says,

"This World Cup is very far from the "medium risk" tournament that Fifa once judged it to be, and urgent efforts are needed to bridge the growing gap between the tournament’s original promise and today’s reality."

(with newswires)
The Paradox Of Popular Mobilization: Bangladesh’s Gen Z And Electoral Reality – Analysis


Protest in Bangladesh. Photo Credit: Rayhan9d, Wikipedia Commons

March 30, 2026 
Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)
By Imran Ahmed


Bangladesh’s Gen Z-led protest movement reshaped the country’s political landscape and placed institutional reform, electoral governance and constitutional change at the centre of national political debate and public discourse. Yet despite the momentum generated by the uprising, youth-led political formations struggled to translate that energy into electoral success. The results of the February 2026 election suggest that while the protests transformed the political agenda, established political actors retained structural advantages within the electoral arena.

Established parties possess long-standing networks, disciplined party structures and well-developed grassroots mobilisation channels. The resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami illustrates this dynamic. Despite years of marginalisation, the party was able to re-enter the political arena and compete effectively once the political environment shifted. By contrast, newer formations emerging directly from protest mobilisation lacked this comparable institutional depth. The National Citizen’s Party (NCP), formed by leaders associated with the uprising, attempted to transform the legitimacy and symbolism of the protests into a political platform.

However, building durable political organisations capable of contesting elections requires time, organisational infrastructure, and local networks that protest movements often do not immediately possess. This organisational gap posed a significant obstacle for youth-led actors. When the NCP attempted to address this weakness by aligning with Jamaat-e-Islami, the move produced internal tensions, divisions and disillusionment. This weakened its ability to sustain a clear and distinct political identity in an increasingly competitive electoral field.

Secondly, the political landscape after the uprising was also highly fragmented and shaped in part by shifting alliances, the choice of some 51 different political parties and the absence of the Awami League. Moreover, youth-led groups faced competition not only from established parties and their coalitions but also from a large number of independent candidates which further dispersed political competition. This prevented the consolidation of support around any single youth-led movement and diluted the electoral impact of the protest movement’s momentum.


Thirdly, institutional features of the election itself further complicated the situation. The parliamentary election was held alongside a national referendum on constitutional reform. Voters were asked to approve or reject a package of reforms through a simple ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ vote. This design shifted attention away from individual party platforms. Instead of focusing on the minutiae of competing political programmes, the electoral debate increasingly centred on whether voters supported or opposed the broader reform agenda. In this context, the distinct political offerings of newer youth-led actors became somewhat subsumed as the election became less about competing visions from emerging actors and more about which political forces would oversee the reform process.

These dynamics do not necessarily indicate that the Gen Z protests failed. On the contrary, the decision to hold the parliamentary election alongside a national referendum on constitutional reforms reflects the extent to which these issues had moved to the centre of political debate. In this sense, the protests were so successful in redefining the political agenda that they also created opportunities for established parties to instrumentalise that agenda and use it to reinvent themselves. Jamaat-e-Islami again provides a pertinent example. The post-uprising environment allowed the party to shed its image as a controversial and, for many, sinister relic of the old political order, and present itself as a reform-minded alternative to status quo politics.

Finally, while it remains difficult to determine precisely how younger voters behaved electorally, the overall outcome of the election points to a broader pattern in voter preferences. The strong performance of an established party such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party suggests trust in actors with organisational experience and governing capacity. While support for the referendum indicates that the demand for political change is a central, defining political concern. What this reveals is that voters were not just choosing between change and continuity, but also between competing approaches to managing change.


About the author: Dr Imran Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at iahmed@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Source: This article was published by the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS),


Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)

The Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) was established in July 2004 as an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). ISAS is dedicated to research on contemporary South Asia. The Institute seeks to promote understanding of this vital region of the world, and to communicate knowledge and insights about it to policy makers, the business community, academia and civil society, in Singapore and beyond.





Sri Lanka Under Pressure Over Iranian Navy Ship Hiding From US


March 30, 2026
EurActiv
By Matthew Karnitschnig

(EurActiv) — Weeks after an Iranian vessel fleeing the US Navy sought refuge in Sri Lanka, authorities are still grappling with how to handle the uninvited guests.

The IRIS Bushehr, a logistics ship, first requested entry on 4 March following the sinking of an Iranian frigate – IRIS Dena – in the vicinity by US forces. The two Iranian ships were returning home from a naval exercise with India.

Sri Lankan authorities initially denied Bushehr’s request. The crew then issued a distress call, citing mechanical failure, though Sri Lankan naval officers found no evidence to support the claim, according to security officials who briefed Euractiv.

Despite the refusal, the ship proceeded into Sri Lankan waters carrying more than 200 Iranian crew, including armed Iranian personnel – prompting immediate concerns among local officials over sovereignty and security.

After docking near the Port of Colombo, many crew members reportedly sought asylum, according to people familiar with the situation.

Tensions between Colombo and Tehran have since escalated, security officials say. Iran’s military attaché in Sri Lanka assumed control of the vessel, limiting access for local authorities. The continued presence of armed personnel aboard has been viewed by some officials in Sri Lanka as a breach of sovereignty.

Authorities are also wary of potential pressure from Washington over the harbouring of Iranian personnel who may possess valuable intelligence, the officials added.

With the Bushehr now located at Trincomalee harbour, Sri Lanka faces mounting pressure to clarify its position – particularly regarding foreign military presence on its territory and its broader diplomatic alignment amid escalating geopolitical tensions.

Sri Lankan government officials could not immediately be reached for comment.
Responding To The US–Israel Vs Iran War: Indonesia’s Board Of Peace Dilemma Intensifies – Analysis


Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto at the inaugural meeting of the newly formed Board of Peace in Washington. Photo Credit: instagram.com/prabowo

March 30, 2026 
 360info
By Teuku Rezasyah


Indonesia faces a strategic choice as pressure mounts at home to withdraw from US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace amid the escalating US–Israel–Iran conflict. Former minister for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs and Vice President candidate Professor Mahfud MD recently noted that leaving the BoP would likely not cause significant losses and could be done easily if the government is “not being held hostage”.

President Prabowo Subianto may therefore need to reassess Indonesia’s decisions, especially as the country is increasingly viewed as aligning with US interests—from joining the BoP to signing one-sided trade agreements with Washington. This perception raises concerns that Indonesia is losing its independence in global affairs and drifting away from its long‑standing, free‑and‑active foreign policy.

At the same time, President Prabowo has expressed readiness to “evaluate” Indonesia’s role in the BoP. Indonesia has offered to mediate between the US and Iran, but the chances of success remain low. Instead, the current situation should prompt the government to reconsider whether the BoP framework is still relevant and effective for Indonesia’s foreign‑policy goals.


Indonesia’s options within the Board of Peace


Indonesia’s role in the BoP during the ongoing conflict in West Asia will likely follow several directions.

First, Indonesia is trying to maintain neutrality by offering to facilitate dialogue and urging all parties to prioritise diplomacy. The Iranian Embassy in Jakarta welcomed this offer, although no concrete steps have followed. Iran’s ambassador stated that both Indonesia and Iran are influential middle powers with the potential to promote peace, and that closer cooperation could strengthen regional stability.

Indonesia has also increased communication with Middle Eastern countries, shown by its intensified diplomatic engagement with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

Second, Indonesia is expected to remain in the BoP despite criticism and calls to withdraw. President Prabowo has assured local Islamic clerics that if he sees no benefit for Palestine and finds that it is not in line with Indonesia’s national interests, he will withdraw. The government views the BoP as an important platform for addressing the Israel–Palestine issue, allowing Indonesia to defend Palestinian interests even though Palestine is not represented on the board.

Third, the conflict presents an opportunity for Indonesia to strengthen its image as a peace‑oriented country. If Indonesia succeeds in facilitating dialogue, it could position itself as a balancing actor contributing to global stability. Mediation efforts may also help ease economic pressures, especially with rising oil prices.

Indonesia’s membership in the BoP as a strategic tool

Although withdrawing from the BoP may appear to be an option, Indonesia would likelylose bargaining power with the United States if it left. Indonesia’s long‑standing strategy is to avoid conflict with major powers such as China and the US while gaining selective advantages, especially in trade negotiations.

This raises a key question: would Indonesia’s geopolitical position become too closely tied to the US? The answer is complex. Indonesia’s trade, investment, and import ties with the US already limit its freedom to some extent. Its BoP membership and efforts to maintain good relations with Washington reflect a cautious approach aimed at avoiding clashes with a major power.

Openly criticising US actions in Iran could also disrupt Indonesia’s diplomatic agenda, particularly within the BoP. Offering mediation allows Indonesia to maintain balance and promote de‑escalation without directly confronting Washington.

Indonesia is navigating a difficult situation during the US-Israel vs. Iran conflict while trying to assert itself as a middle power committed to peace in BoP even as it faces criticism and economic pressures. This issue is important because Indonesia—long a supporter of Palestine and without diplomatic ties to Israel—is now part of a platform where unlikely actors appear together.

As Indonesia considers reviewing its BoP membership, the decision will shape its future position in the board and its efforts to support Palestinian self‑determination.


About the author and editors:
Teuku Rezasyah teaches International Relations at Padjadjaran University in Bandung and works as a policy consultant for the Indonesian government and parliament.

Ria Ernunsari, Sr. Commissioning Editor, 360info
Samrat Choudhury, Commissioning Editor, 360info

Source: This article was published by 360.info

360info provide an independent public information service that helps better explain the world, its challenges, and suggests practical solutions. Their content is sourced entirely from the international university and research community and then edited and curated by professional editors to ensure maximum readability. Editors are responsible for ensuring authors have a current affiliation with a university and are writing in their area of expertise.
The Royal Navy In The Gulf – Analysis


The Royal Navy's presence in the Persian Gulf typically includes a Type 45 destroyer and a squadron of minehunters supported by an RFA Bay-class mothership. 
Photo Credit: LA(Phot) Gary Weatherston, Wikimedia Commons

March 30, 2026 
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Dr. Emma Salisbury


(FPRI) — The Royal Navy is set to take a leading role in a multinational “Hormuz Coalition” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and ensure safe passage for merchant vessels. Britain brings considerable expertise to the table, particularly in the mine countermeasures capabilities that the US Navy currently lacks. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has cautioned, however, that reopening the strait is “not a simple task” and that any sustained effort would require broad coalition support given the narrow geography and residual threats from mines, drones, fast boats, and missiles. Crucially, any such plan would likely not be enacted until a cessation in hostilities.

This is not the first time that Britain has operated naval forces in the Gulf—far from it. But the Royal Navy is currently very stretched with no permanent Gulf presence, and the UK government keeps delaying decisions on defense investment. In such a context, it remains to be seen how much capability is actually deployable, and for how long.
Britain in the Gulf

Britain has a long history in the Persian Gulf that predates the formation of most of the states that now border it. For much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Royal Navy policed its waters, suppressed piracy along the Trucial Coast, and enforced the treaty relationships that bound the sheikhdoms of the lower Gulf to London. When Britain withdrew from east of Suez in 1971—one of the more consequential strategic decisions of the post-war era—it did not abandon the Gulf entirely. It simply changed the nature of its commitment, from imperial presence to expeditionary partnership.

The Armilla Patrol, established in 1980 in response to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, is a very pertinent example of that commitment. As the two Gulf powers began attacking each other’s shipping in what became known as the Tanker War, Britain deployed frigates and destroyers to protect vessels sailing under the Red Ensign. The patrol was never large—typically one or two surface combatants supplemented by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary support ship—but it was continuous, professional, and symbolically significant. It signaled that Britain regarded the free passage of Gulf shipping as a vital national interest, and that it was prepared to back that judgement with steel.


The Tanker War years produced some of the most intense operational experiences the Royal Navy has accumulated in recent decades. British warships operated in an environment where the threat came not from a peer adversary’s battle fleet but from aircraft, mines, and small craft—precisely the combination that Iran has refined and extended in the years since. The minesweepers of the Royal Navy worked in some of the most hazardous waters in the world, sweeping for Iranian mines that had been laid indiscriminately across international shipping lanes. It was unglamorous, dangerous, and essential work.

Operation Granby—Britain’s contribution to the 1991 Gulf War—brought the Royal Navy into the Gulf in much greater force. A task group built around HMS Ark Royal contributed to the allied campaign to liberate Kuwait. Destroyers and frigates provided air defense and surface warfare support. Mine countermeasures vessels, working alongside allied counterparts, tackled the extensive Iraqi minefield that had been laid in the northern Gulf. The lessons of that campaign, in particular the enduring centrality of mine warfare in Gulf operations, were noted but imperfectly absorbed by the US defense establishment, which subsequently allowed the US Navy’s mine countermeasures capabilities to atrophy.


The years following the Gulf War saw presence continue in various forms, with Royal Navy frigates rotating through the Gulf on deployments that combined maritime security operations with the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq. When coalition forces returned to the Gulf in 2003, the Royal Navy again played a significant role: HMS Ark Royal led a task group that included frigates, destroyers, and submarines. Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade conducted an amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula—one of the most complex opposed landings attempted by British forces—while Royal Navy helicopters provided close air support and casualty evacuation. The integration of maritime and land power in that campaign reflected a level of joint capability that, two decades later, Britain is struggling to maintain.

The most direct confrontations with Iran in recent years have come not in open warfare but in the grey zone of maritime harassment. There were incidents in 2004 and 2007 of Iranian forces seizing small groups of Royal Navy personnel, who were safely released following negotiations. The seizure of the Stena Impero in 2019 brought tensions to a new pitch. The Swedish-owned, British-flagged oil tanker was intercepted by IRGC speedboats and a helicopter in the Strait of Hormuz and escorted to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, where it was held for over two months. HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate on duty, was close enough to hear the radio communications during the seizure but too far away to intervene in time, illustrating with uncomfortable precision the gap between presence and protection.

HMS Montrose’s deployment during this period became something of a symbol of both what the Royal Navy could do and what it was being asked to do with insufficient resources. The frigate spent the better part of three years on near-continuous deployment in the Gulf, with crew rotations flown out to relieve exhausted personnel rather than bringing the ship home. It was a testament to the professionalism and resilience of the Royal Navy’s people, and a frank acknowledgement that there were simply not enough ships to sustain a proper rotation. When HMS Montrose finally returned home, the commitment passed to other frigates on what amounted to emergency scheduling, with the Gulf queue competing directly against NATO commitments in the North Atlantic and High North. With the withdrawal of the last Royal Navy ship from Bahrain just a couple of months ago, Britain no longer has a permanent naval presence in the Gulf.

Reviews and Resources

The allied dimension of the current crisis matters enormously. The US Navy remains the anchor of any credible response, but Washington has made clear that it expects its European partners to carry more of the burden. This is not new for Britain, but it is becoming unsustainable. Across the Middle East’s maritime theatre—from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden to the Strait of Hormuz—there is a dangerous gap between the security guarantees Western nations implicitly underwrite and the actual military capacity they commit. A Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer can provide the layered air defense against missiles and drones that the current threat demands. A Type 23 frigate, with its sophisticated sonar suite, is formidable in the complex environment of the Gulf. Merlin helicopters provide the reach to prosecute both sub-surface and surface threats at range. Britain brings intelligence relationships and operational experience that few allies can match. But the Royal Navy currently has too few ships to sustain a meaningful Gulf commitment while honoring its obligations in the North Atlantic, the High North, and home waters simultaneously. The fleet stands at a historic low point—qualitatively capable, quantitatively stretched to breaking point.

The particular irony of this moment is that the problem has already been diagnosed—in public, in detail, and with the government’s own endorsement. Last year’s Strategic Defence Review (in which I had a small role) set out 62 specific recommendations to make the UK military more lethal, better integrated, and more operationally ready. Ministers accepted every one of them and pledged to act. Months later, the action has not materialized.

The mechanism for turning those recommendations into reality—the Defence Investment Plan, which is supposed to translate strategic ambition into funded, deliverable programs—was due last fall. It did not appear. Ministers gave assurances that it would arrive before Christmas. It did not. We are now well into 2026, and the country is still waiting. The reason for the delay is not procedural—it is financial. Reports have pointed to a gap of approximately £28 billion between what implementing the review’s recommendations would actually cost and what the Treasury has been willing to commit.

The result is a peculiar and deeply damaging situation: The government has accepted an ambitious and necessary vision for British defense, promised to deliver it at what it called a “wartime pace,” and then spent the better part of two years producing nothing of substance. There are no significant program commitments, no major modernization announcements, and no serious investment decisions. As the chair of the Commons Defence Select Committee has observed, the government appears to be “trundling along rather than realising the urgency of the moment.” The patience of the military, the defense industry, and the country’s allies is not infinite.
What Needs to Be Done

The path forward is not complicated, though it demands both funding and the political courage to spend it. The Defence Investment Plan must be published now, and it must be fully funded—another wish list without Treasury backing will not deter adversaries, will not reassure allies, and will not protect British interests at home and overseas. The Royal Navy must be treated as a priority: its surface fleet, its mine countermeasures capability, its submarine force, and its stewardship of the British continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent all require sustained investment. Emerging capabilities must be moved from promising experiments to fully funded programs, particularly those that will form the backbone of Atlantic Bastion. And the people who make all of this possible—the sailors, engineers, and other workers who represent the real foundation of military power—must be recruited in greater numbers, trained properly, and retained for the long haul.


None of this is cheap, and none of it can be done without a genuine decision by the government that defense is not a discretionary item but the first obligation of the state. The world we are navigating—with Russia to NATO’s east, a deteriorating Middle East, and an increasingly assertive China reshaping the Indo-Pacific—does not offer the luxury of a long run-up. The time for warm words with no follow-through has passed. Starmer and his government must demonstrate that they can do something harder than write an encouraging response to a defense review.


About the author: Dr. Emma Salisbury is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program, an Associate Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, and a Contributing Editor at War on the Rocks.


Source: This article was published by FPRI


Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Founded in 1955, FPRI (http://www.fpri.org/) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.

EU fisheries ‘under strain’ as conflict and costs bite, warns Commissioner Kadis



By Méabh Mc Mahon
Published on 

Kadis warned of growing anxiety among EU governments as costs rise and markets remain volatile. “There’s real nervousness across the sector."

Europe’s fisheries and aquaculture sectors are facing growing strain from geopolitical tensions and rising costs, EU fisheries chief Costas Kadis has warned.

Speaking on Europe Today, Kadis said urgent support is needed to keep the industry competitive. “The challenges are mounting,” he said, pointing to the impact of Middle East conflict on seafood markets, supply chains and coastal communities.

The more pressing concern, he said, is economic pressure on the sector. Some operators have already shut down due to thin margins and soaring fuel prices.

“They were barely profitable before. Now they simply can’t absorb the extra costs,” he said.

The European Commission is considering short-term support via the bloc’s maritime funding tools, similar to measures introduced after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Kadis warned of growing anxiety among EU governments as costs rise and markets remain volatile. “There’s real nervousness across the sector,” he said.

He urged a coordinated EU response and faster progress on energy transition to reduce exposure to future shocks.

“We need a united European approach to support the sector—and we must speed up the shift away from energy dependence,” he said, adding that long-term resilience depends on cutting vulnerability to external crises.

Cyprus ‘back to normal’ after Iran drone hit

Addressing recent security concerns in Cyprus linked to the Iran conflict, Kadis said the situation had stabilised.

“Things are improving. There have been no further incidents since the initial attack, and life is returning to normal,” he said.

Some EU Council presidency events were postponed during the unrest, but Kadis expects business to resume as usual from April.

SPACE/COSMOS


Meet the Artemis II astronauts preparing for humanity's return to the Moon

Artemis 2 crew members, from left, Mission Spc. Jeremy Hansen, of Canada, Mission Spc. Christina Koch, Commander Reid Wiseman, and Pilot Victor Glover pose for a photo.
Copyright AP Photo/Chris O'Meara

By Anna Desmarais
Published on 

Four astronauts from the United States and Canada are about to take off on the Artemis II mission that will circle the Moon.

The Artemis II mission is set to take off as early as April 1, according to the US' National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

It will send four astronauts on an approximately 10-day journey around the Moon to test the Orion spacecraft, which will land on the Moon in future missions.

The astronauts who will take part will not land on the Moon this time, but their mission will take them thousands of kilometres deeper into space than the Apollo astronauts went for the original Moon landings of the 1960s and 1970s.

"We are getting very, very close [to launch], and we are ready," said Lori Glaze, acting associate administrator for NASA's Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate, in a press conference over the weekend. "All of our operations have been going smoothly, it's been going very well."

Four astronauts from the United States and Canada make up the team for the Artemis mission. Ahead of the launch, they are reviewing emergency procedures and spending time with their families at the Kennedy Space Centre in Florida.

They are also staying in quarantine to make sure they stay healthy before liftoff, which could be any day between April 1 and 6.

This is who will go on the Artemis II mission.

Commander Reid Wiseman

Reid Wiseman, a retired Navy captain, was serving as NASA's chief astronaut three years ago when he was asked to lead the crew.

Wiseman had previously spent more than five months at the International Space Station in 2014 as part of the 40th launch. But his teenage daughters had "zero interest" in seeing him launch again.

“We talked about it and I said, ‘Look, of all the people on planet Earth right now, there are four people that are in a position to go fly around the Moon,” he said. “I cannot say no to that opportunity.”

The toughest part is not leaving his family, but “it's the stress that I’m putting on them,” he said. Wiseman has been a single father since 2020, when his wife Carroll passed away from cancer.

Wiseman was selected to join NASA as one of nine candidates in 2009 to start astronaut training after his military career. At the time, he was a lieutenant commander in the US Navy.

He has often said he wanted to be an astronaut after going to a Space Shuttle launch in person as a child.

Pilot Victor Glover

Before any launch, Victor Glover makes it a point to listen to two songs: Gil Scott-Heron’s “Whitey on the Moon” and Marvin Gaye’s “Make Me Wanna Holler” from the white-dominated Apollo era.

To Glover, they are songs from the white-dominated Apollo era of US space flight that "capture what we did well, what we did poorly."

Glover, one of NASA's few Black astronauts, said that he sees his place on the mission as a "force for good," and a chance to inspire others to get into space.

In 2018, Glover was assigned to fly on the first operational flight of SpaceX's Crew Dragon capsule to the International Space Station, where he stayed at the station for more than six months. He was the first African-American crew member to stay on the ISS, local media reported at the time.

In Glover's previous career as a fighter pilot for the US Army, he logged over 3,000 flight hours in 40 different types of aircraft and flew in 24 combat missions.

Before this launch, he said he's spent more time preparing his four daughters for his launch than he has preparing himself.

Mission specialist Christina Koch

Christina Koch, a 47-year-old electrical engineer from North Carolina, holds the record for the longest single spaceflight by a woman at 328 days.

That mission, which saw her blast off to the International Space Station on March 14, 2019, was also when Koch was part of the all-female spacewalk. She and Jessica Meir left the ISS to do a lengthy series of upgrades to the station's power systems and physics observatories.

Koch's 328-day mission is used to study the physical, biological and mental effects of long-term space travel on women, according to Reuters.

More than any one individual, the Artemis II mission is “about celebrating the fact that we’ve arrived to this place in history” where women can fly to the Moon, she said.

Koch spent a year at a South Pole research station before getting the call from NASA. Between that and her space stint, she feels she's “inoculated” most of her family and friends.

“So far, I haven't gotten too many nerves from folks. Maybe my dog, but I've reassured her that it's only 10 days. It's not going to be as long as last time.”

Canadian fighter pilot Jeremy Hansen

Jeremy Hansen, a Canadian fighter pilot and physicist, is making his space debut.

He will also be the first Canadian to ever go to the Moon.

“Maybe I'm naive, but I don't feel a lot of personal pressure," Hanson told the Associated Press.

Hansen, 50, grew up on a farm in rural Canada before joining the Royal Canadian Air Force as a captain. He piloted aircraft such as the CF-18 from his base in Alberta. He had been promoted to the rank of colonel before getting the call from the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) in 2009.

Hansen has also undertaken NASA missions underwater, serving as an "aquanaut," to the Aquarius underwater laboratory in 2014. He lived in an underwater environment for seven days to simulate what conditions would be like in space and to test NASA's remote guidance systems.

He realises only now how much effort it took to send men to the Moon during Apollo.

“When I walk out, and I look at the moon now, it looks and feels a little bit farther than it used to be,” he said. “I just understand in the details how much harder it is than I thought it was, watching videos of it.”



Space Norway Launches Mimir 1, Giving Commercial Access to In-Orbit Testing

Space Norway

Published Mar 28, 2026 11:51 AM by The Maritime Executive


[By: Space Norway]

Rocket science for everyone? Almost. Space Norway is opening access to in-orbit testing with its new satellite, Mimir 1, launching on Sunday 29 March from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. More than a satellite, Mimir-1 is a laboratory in space, designed to test new concepts in Earth observation, communications, and navigation and accelerate innovation through flexible, cost-effective access to orbit.

Mimir 1 is Space Norway’s first in-house developed satellite, designed, owned, and operated by the company. It was built and integrated by OHB Sweden, with both payloads developed in Norway.

“Mimir 1 represents a significant milestone for Space Norway. We are excited to see how the platform will enable new capabilities and deliver value not only for us, but for partners across the space sector,” said Marte Kalveland, Director of Earth Observation and Innovation at Space Norway.

Space Norway plans to make capacity available on Mimir 1 to other space industry stakeholders as well as academia. The satellite has therefore been designed for flexibility and ease of use, enabling more companies to test promising ideas in space. The design, construction and launch of satellites is time consuming, costly and requires specialised expertise. By booking capacity on board Mimir 1, companies with strong ideas for space-based services gain the opportunity to test their concepts before investing in their own satellite development and production.

The primary payload on board is a Software Defined Radio (SDR) with several different antennas covering a wide frequency range. What makes Mimir 1 unique is that it carries an onboard computer that can be programmed from the ground while the satellite is in orbit.

For traditional satellites, mission tasks are defined prior to launch and cannot be changed once in orbit. Mimir 1 takes a different approach, serving as a development platform rather than a conventional operational satellite. Flexibility and rapid development are central to the project, enabling Space Norway to support the development of new services and more advanced, better-defined payloads in the future.

The first experiment focuses on satellite-based Internet of Things (IoT) services. Space Norway will test IoT services in new frequency bands on behalf of the European Space Agency (ESA). The Mimir project is developing a user interface for planning different types of experiments involving both the satellite and ground terminals.

The secondary payload on board is a VDES (VHF Data Exchange System) communications system, developed for data exchange between vessels and satellites or coastal stations. The difference between AIS (Automatic Identification System) and VDES is that VDES enables two-way communication, whereas AIS is limited to one-way transmission. The Mimir payload is expected to make a significant contribution to ESA’s multinational VDES cooperation project.

Mimir 1 will operate in low Earth orbit and will be separated from the launch vehicle at an altitude of approximately 600 km. The satellite weighs 93 kg, has a wingspan of 2.3 metres and a planned operational lifetime of seven years.

At the same launch, the AISSat?4 satellite will also be sent into orbit on the same rocket from Vandenberg. This satellite will be operated by StatSat, a subsidiary of Space Norway. AISSat4 is owned by the Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket), and StatSat currently operates four other satellites on behalf of them and the Norwegian Space Agency.

Follow the launch of both satellites at 12:20 CET:
www.launch.spacenorway.com

The above link will be active closer to launch.
 
AISSat?4:

  • Time from launch to separation: 55 minutes, separation at approximately 13:22
  • Time from separation to first ping (signal from the satellite): 1 hour

Mimir?1:

  • Time from launch to separation: 2 hours 18 minutes, separation at approximately 14:48
  • Time from separation to first possible ping: 1 hour 16 minutes, at approximately 16:04 

As always, satellite launches may be delayed in time and the timings may change.

The products and services herein described in this press release are not endorsed by The Maritime Executive.