Thursday, April 16, 2026

 World Nuclear News


Bruce Power to share large reactor experience with SaskPower


Bruce Power has signed a memorandum of understanding with SaskPower to share its expertise in nuclear generation, project development, and long-term operations as Saskatchewan evaluates large nuclear technologies for potential use in the Canadian province.
 
The Bruce site in Ontario (Image: Bruce Power)

The provincial government of Saskatchewan and utility SaskPower announced plans in January to formally evaluate large nuclear reactor technologies for use in the province. Saskatchewan already has plans for the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs).
 
In October last year, the Government of Saskatchewan released the Saskatchewan First Energy Security Strategy and Supply Plan, setting out its vision and long-term strategy for electricity in the province. The plan sees the provincial government reiterate its commitments to nuclear power, as communicated in the provincial Growth Plan and the Interprovincial Strategic Plan on Small Modular Reactors. Specifically, it says, the Government of Saskatchewan will continue to examine the feasibility of two SMR units near Estevan, and evaluate the feasibility of large reactors and/or advanced SMRs to meet industry demand for electricity and heat to identify if either can be economically deployed in Saskatchewan.

Crown utility SaskPower has begun the formal process to evaluate large reactor technologies. The technology selection process will take place in parallel with SaskPower's existing SMR project.

The MoU with Bruce Power will "formalise information-sharing, enable alignment on federal and provincial nuclear strategy, and leverage Bruce Power's national leadership in nuclear expertise", Bruce Power said.

The Bruce Power site in Ontario was home to Canada's first commercial reactor, Douglas Point, which operated from 1967 to 1984, and its current fleet of eight Candu pressurised heavy water reactors are being refurbished to operate for several decades to come. Bruce Power is also exploring the option for a Bruce C project and up to 4,800 megawatts of new nuclear on its site. The proposed Bruce C Project is the first new nuclear development in Canada to enter the federal Impact Assessment process.

"We're uniquely positioned to collaborate with SaskPower as it explores new nuclear to power the province with clean energy for the next generation," said James Scongack, Bruce Power's Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice-President. "We will share what we've learned in 25 years of operating the Bruce site and in planning projects and planning for new nuclear."

Rupen Pandya, President and CEO of SaskPower, added: "The growing demands for reliable, baseload power, not just in Saskatchewan, but across the country, reinforce the vital role that nuclear power will play in the years ahead. Power is a key economic driver in Saskatchewan that's needed to advance critical sectors such as mining, oil and gas and agriculture."

Saskatchewan is home to the largest and highest-grade uranium mines in the world, but does not currently have any nuclear power reactors. It is working alongside the provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick and Alberta on the deployment of SMRs under a joint strategic plan released in 2022.

SaskPower has previously selected GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy's BWRX-300 SMR for potential deployment in the province in the mid-2030s. It announced in 2024 that it had identified two potential sites for SMR deployment, both in the Estevan area in the south-east of the province. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with Cameco and Westinghouse to explore technical and commercial pathways to deploy Westinghouse's reactor technology, including the advanced AP1000 reactor and AP300 SMR for long-term electricity supply planning.

"Saskatchewan's Energy Security Strategy sets out a pathway to nuclear power generation from both SMRs and large nuclear reactors to prepare for rising electricity demand and future export opportunities, including electricity and critical minerals such as potash and uranium," Minister Responsible for SaskPower Jeremy Harrison said. "Collaboration is key to ensure we make informed, future-focused decisions that benefit our provinces and our country."

Application lodged to build microreactor at US university


The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced it has received an application from the University of Illinois to construct the first research KRONOS micro modular reactor on the university's campus.
 
A rendering of the KRONOS plant at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (Image: NANO Nuclear)

The Construction Permit Application (CPA) was submitted on 31 March by The Grainger College of Engineering at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, NANO Nuclear Energy Inc's partner for the KRONOS MMR deployment at the University of Illinois (U of I).

"With this submission, NANO Nuclear becomes the first commercially-ready microreactor developer and the third commercially-ready Generation IV advanced reactor developer to submit a CPA, placing NANO Nuclear among a small group of advanced nuclear companies progressing toward commercial deployment," the company said.

It added: "The preparation of a CPA represents the culmination of years of engineering development, thousands of pages of technical documentation, coordinated input across reactor design, safety analysis, environmental review, and regulatory compliance disciplines, and establishment of a viable supply chain. In NANO Nuclear's partnership with the U of I, the CPA submission builds on an extensive body of work developed through continuous engagement with the NRC, including completion of the readiness assessment, a voluntary but highly rigorous process aimed at ensuring a complete and high-quality application. Importantly, this iterative process reflects a high level of alignment with regulatory expectations and provides strong confidence in the application's readiness for acceptance for docketing and formal NRC review."

"The NRC is reviewing the application to determine whether it is complete," the regulator said. "If accepted, the agency will begin a detailed technical evaluation of the reactor's safety and security and publish a notice of opportunity to request an adjudicatory hearing on the application before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board."

It noted that if the construction permit is granted, the university would need to submit a separate operating licence application and receive NRC approval before the reactor could begin operation.

NANO Nuclear acquired the Micro Modular Reactor Energy System technology through its USD85 million acquisition of Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation's nuclear technology, which was completed in January last year. At that time, NANO Nuclear renamed the technology as the KRONOS MMR. The MMR is a 45 MW thermal, 15 MW electrical high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, using TRISO fuel in prismatic graphite blocks and has a sealed transportable core.

NANO Nuclear signed a strategic collaboration agreement with the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in April 2025 to construct the first research KRONOS micro modular reactor on the university's campus. The agreement formally established the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign as a partner in the licensing, siting, public engagement, and research operation of the KRONOS MMR, while also identifying the university campus as the permanent site for the reactor as a research and demonstration installation.

The university plans to re-power partially its coal-fired Abbott power station with the KRONOS MMR, providing a zero-carbon demonstration of district heat and power to campus buildings as part of its green campus initiative. The project team aims to demonstrate how microreactor systems integrate with existing fossil fuel infrastructure to accelerate the decarbonisation of existing power-generation facilities.

"Through every step of the process thus far, we at The Grainger College of Engineering have worked diligently alongside our partners at NANO Nuclear Energy to ensure our goals in constructing the first KRONOS MMR on the university's campus can become a reality," said Caleb Brooks, Professor and Donald Biggar Willett Faculty Scholar of Nuclear, Plasma and Radiological Engineering at The Grainger College of Engineering. "By submitting the Construction Permit Application to the NRC, we are taking the next step in signifying that the work will be done correctly and precisely. And we continue to look forward to the possibilities of what can become the most advanced nuclear research platform on any US campus."

Growing recognition of nuclear fuel cycle's importance, WNFC hears



This is a significant time of change for the nuclear energy sector - and existing nuclear capacity is the bedrock for nuclear growth that could be unprecedented, according to nuclear industry leaders at the World Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2026 conference in Monaco.
 
(Image: World Nuclear Association)

Speakers at the event co-organised by the Nuclear Energy Institute and World Nuclear Association highlighted the challenges and opportunities at a time when geopolitical uncertainty means nuclear energy - underpinned by reliable fuel supplies - is more important than ever.

"Governments all over the world recognise that energy security - and the security of fuel supplies - is more important than ever," World Nuclear Association Director General Sama Bilbao y León said as she opened the conference together with Nuclear Energy Institute Vice President of Technical & Regulatory Services Jennifer Uhle. But she also called for pragmatism.

"Frankly, momentum is building all over the world, over all markets … but much of that progress is still just ambition," Bilbao y León said. 

"This really is a moment that demands much more than technical progress and technical expertise. We need to continue to ensure that policies support long-term investment, we need to ensure that finance is aligned with clean energy policies, and we need to ensure that regulation is proportional and risk-informed. We need to remember that ambition by itself will not deliver new reactors, will not mine new fuel, and won't build the supply chains that we need."

Uhle said this was a moment of profound importance for nuclear energy - and especially in times of geopolitical uncertainty, a stable fuel supply lies at its heart. "Nuclear power doesn't run just on technology, but also on trust: trust that fuel will be delivered on time and this global network will remain reliable," she said.

Director General of the nucleareurope trade association, Emmanuel Brutin, and Framatome Senior Senior Executive Vice President Lionel Gaiffe were in agreement that this is a time of change. A shift in sentiment is being seen in European institutions as well as in some countries, Brutin said, calling for support, particularly in terms of policy backing and finance, to foster this.

Now is a "good time to rediscover merits of nuclear energy", Gaiffe said - and not just in terms of new capacity. Existing reactors provide energy stability, low carbon, and grid stability. Framatome is firstly devoted to providing service to existing reactors. And those reactors need support from a reliable - and sovereign - nuclear fuel supply chain, Gaiffe said. 

Incentives

Brutin also stressed the importance of having a sovereign - and also diversified - nuclear fuel supply chain. Brussels is realising that Europe is still dependent on imported fossil energy - and that is expensive, he said. "The solution for Europe is home-grown, clean sources of energy," he said.

As a net-zero energy source with a value chain that is entirely based in Europe, nuclear is a "huge asset" to the bloc, he said, and several EU-level initiatives are recognising and providing support for this resiliency. The European Investment Bank - a key EU financial institution - has provided significant loans for fuel cycle projects such as the expansion of Orano's Georges Besse II conversion plant, and having EU financing helps attract other investors. "Even a bit of EU money can go a long way," he said.

The REPowerEU plan, which was adopted by the European Commission in 2022, aims to rapidly reduce EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The legislation defining the policy is still to be finalised.

But while nuclear generation is recognised as environmentally sustainable under the EU Taxonomy Regulation - legislation aimed at channelling finance flows towards sustainable activities - the nuclear fuel cycle itself is not yet part of the Taxonomy. Ensuring the fuel cycle is in the EU Taxonomy would help to attract investors, he said.

Policy support would incentivise fuel cycle capacity, Gaiffe said, but would need to be balanced and "realistic" to ensure capacity grows at a suitable pace to meet demand and avoid a situation of overcapacity. 

On-time and on-budget delivery remains the main focus for politicians, Brutin said, but building stakeholder trust in projects is an important factor to drive nuclear fuel cycle growth. "There is this new momentum for nuclear - let's use it," he said. 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 resumes commercial operation


Unit 6 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant has resumed commercial operation, becoming the first reactor owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company to do so since the accident at its Fukushima Daiichi plant.
 
The control room of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 during the comprehensive load performance test (Image: Tepco)

The 1,356 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) in Japan's Niigata Prefecture, which had been offline since March 2012, was restarted in the evening of 21 January. Tepco aimed to return the reactor to commercial operation on 18 March. However, shortly after midnight on 22 January, "an alarm was triggered in the control rod operation monitoring system for one control rod during the control rod withdrawal operation, causing the withdrawal operation to be suspended". The unit's restart was subsequently suspended while an investigation into the cause of the alarm was carried out.

After replacing parts, the reactor was again restarted on 9 February. It was taken offline between 20 and 24 February for inspections as part of procedures for its full-scale restart. The unit was taken offline again in mid-March after a damaged electric conductor was discovered.

A comprehensive load performance test was carried out on Tuesday, observed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).

"Today, following the issuance by the Nuclear Regulation Authority of a pre-operational confirmation certificate and a certificate of passing for the pre-operational inspection for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6, Tepco recommenced commercial operation at 4:00pm [local time]," Tepco said.

The seven-unit Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant was unaffected by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that damaged Tepco's Fukushima Daiichi plant, although the plant's reactors were previously all offline for up to three years following the 2007 Niigata-Chuetsu earthquake, which caused damage to the site but did not damage the reactors themselves. While the units were offline, work was carried out to improve the plant's earthquake resistance. All units have remained offline since the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

Although it has worked on the other units at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site, Tepco is concentrating its resources on units 6 and 7 while it deals with the clean-up at Fukushima Daiichi. These 1,356 MWe ABWRs began commercial operation in 1996 and 1997, respectively, and were the first Japanese boiling water reactors to be put forward for restart. Tepco received permission from the NRA to restart units 6 and 7 in December 2017. Restarting those two Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units - which have been offline for periodic inspections since March 2012 and August 2011, respectively - would increase the company's earnings by an estimated JPY100 billion (USD633 million) per year.

Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, 14 Japanese reactors have gradually resumed operation.

Bulgarian minister wants fixed price for Kozloduy 7 and 8


Minister of Energy Traycho Traykov has said Bulgaria wants its proposed new nuclear power units at the Kozloduy plant to be built at fixed prices.
 
(Image: Bulgaria's Ministry of Energy)

Traykov was speaking during a meeting with South Korea's Ambassador to Bulgaria, Dong-bae Kim, and representatives from Hyundai Engineering and Construction, which included a discussion on progress.

According to the Ministry of Energy report, Traykov "welcomed the commitment of the Korean side to assign 30% of the activities to Bulgarian companies. According to him, Bulgaria's expertise and long-term experience in the operation of nuclear power plants make it a safe and reliable partner in the implementation of such large-scale projects".

The engineering contract for the construction of the two new units was signed in November 2024. During the discussions, the two sides agreed on the terms of its extension "so that work on the project is not interrupted".

Traykov, who is energy ministry as part of the caretaker government in place ahead of elections this weekend, was reported by the ministry to have said "we have traumatic experience from other similar projects, where endless extension and lack of control over the price ultimately lead to failure" and emphasised "the need for the new capacities at the Kozloduy NPP to be built at fixed prices".

Background

Kozloduy units 1-4 were VVER-440 models which the European Commission classified as non-upgradeable and Bulgaria agreed to close them during negotiations to join the European Union in 2007. Units 5 and 6 feature VVER-1000 reactors that were connected to the grid in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Both units have been through refurbishment and life-extension programmes to enable extension of operation from 30 to 60 years. The country's two operable reactors generate about one-third of its electricity.

Westinghouse's AP1000 has been selected as the technology for the two proposed new units and in November 2024 Hyundai Engineering & Construction, Westinghouse and Kozloduy NPP-New Build signed an engineering contract for the new capacity, with ministers saying that signing the contract meant that schedule and finance details would be firmed up for the new capacity. The Ministry of Energy and the USA's Citi bank agreed on a partnership in July last year to secure funding for the construction of the new units, and site location applications were submitted.

In December Kozloduy NPP-New Build EAD and a consortium comprising Laurentis Energy Partners, its subsidiary Canadian Nuclear Partners SA (CNPSA) and BWXT Canada, signed an owner’s engineer contract to advance the two new AP1000 units.

How the two new units could look at Kozloduy (Image: Westinghouse)

The aim is for the first new Westinghouse AP1000 unit - unit 7 at Kozloduy - to be operational in 2035 and the second one - unit 8 - to be operational in 2037. The 2,300 MWe capacity of the two new units would exceed the 1,760 MWe capacity of the closed first four units. The Bulgarian government has also said that further units will be needed to replace units 5 and 6 by 2050.  It has also been considering the deployment of small modular reactors in the country.

Grohnde nuclear fuel transfer completed

All the used nuclear fuel assemblies in the storage pool at Germany's Grohnde nuclear power plant have been transferred to an on-site interim storage facility, PreussenElektra announced.
 
(Image: PreussenElektra)

Grohnde was shut down on 31 December 2021. PreussenElektra - a subsidiary of EOn Group - applied for approval to decommission and dismantle the 1,360 MWe pressurised water reactor in October 2017. In December 2023, the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection issued the first decommissioning and dismantling permit to PreussenElektra for the Grohnde plant, with dismantling work beginning in the following month.

To achieve fuel-free status, a total of 694 fuel assemblies have been transferred from the plant's storage pool into CASTOR used fuel storage casks since 2023.

On 7 April, the last CASTOR container was successfully loaded, removed from the reactor building, and transferred to the Grohnde interim storage facility for used fuel elements.

"This means that the radioactive core of the plant has been completely removed – and with it, over 99% of the radioactivity," PreussenElektra said.

Plant manager Jörg Bornemann said: "The elimination of nuclear fuel is an important milestone in the decommissioning of our plant. It forms the basis for further technical and organisational adjustments. Now we can shut down and dismantle further systems and reduce staffing levels. Their valuable expertise is urgently needed elsewhere – for example, for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel internals, which will begin at the end of this year."

PreussenElektra noted that in order to carry out the fuel transfer operation, various components and plant parts had to first be removed from the area of ​​the emptied used fuel pool to create the necessary storage, handling, dismantling, and packaging areas. The newly constructed transport preparation hall is  now available for receiving the low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste from the decommissioning process. The Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection granted the necessary permit for the storage of radioactive waste and residues at the beginning of April.

Decommissioning of the Grohnde plant is scheduled for completion by 2039. Afterwards, the plant site will be available for redevelopment. About 500 people are currently employed at the site.

PreussenElektra is responsible for the decommissioning of eight nuclear power plants in Germany. Isar 2 was the last of the PreussenElektra plants to cease operations on 15 April 2023. The Brokdorf and Grohnde plants were shut down on 31 December 2021. With the already decommissioned Isar 1, Stade, Unterweser and Würgassen plants, all of PreussenElektra's nuclear facilities are now in various phases of decommissioning and dismantling. The company's goal is to dismantle its power plant fleet by 2040.

Outer dome installed at Changjiang unit 4


The outer steel dome has been installed at unit 4 of the Changjiang nuclear power plant in China's Hainan province, China National Nuclear Corporation has announced.
 
(Image: China Huaneng)

The dome - measuring 52 metres in diameter, 12 metres in height and weighing about 415 tonnes - was hoisted into place on top of the containment building using a 4,000-tonne crawler crane on 13 April. The process of raising the outer dome into position took two hours.

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) said the installation of the outer dome of unit 4 "marks the entry of the second phase of the Changjiang Nuclear Power Plant civil construction project into the final stage".


(Image: CNNC)

The Hualong One reactor design features a double-layered containment building, the main function of which is to ensure the integrity and leak tightness of the reactor building, and it plays a key role in the containment of radioactive substances.

Construction of the unit is being undertaken by CNNC subsidiary CNNC 22nd Engineering Co Ltd. "This installation was the result of a series of systematic innovations and collaborative efforts in the fields of technology and management," CNNC said. "The CNNC 22nd Engineering Co Ltd project team adopted several groundbreaking measures to build a comprehensive support system for the installation task."


(Image: CNNC)

The entire hoisting process utilised 3D modeling technology, CNNC noted. A full-size digital model of the outer dome was constructed in advance, allowing for precise simulation and collision detection of the hoisting path and key connection points, thus mitigating potential risks from the outset. Based on the 3D model, multi-level technical briefings and construction simulations were conducted, providing solid technical support for the successful one-time hoisting of the outer dome.

Two Hualong One reactors are being constructed in the second phase of the Changjiang plant. First concrete was poured for the base slab of unit 3's nuclear island in March 2021, with that of unit 4 being poured in the December of that year. Changjiang Phase II - units 3 and 4 - represents a total estimated investment of CNY40 billion (USD5.9 billion), according to China Huaneng, which holds a 51% share in the project. The construction period is expected to be 60 months. Both units are scheduled to be fully operational in early 2027.


(Image: CNNC)

"After completion, the annual power generation [by Changjiang units 3 and 4] will reach 18 billion kilowatt-hours, which is equivalent to saving 6.326 million tonnes of coal and reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 11.68 million tonnes per year," China Huaneng said.

The Changjiang nuclear site is already home to two operating CNP-600 pressurised water reactors (PWRs) - Changjiang 1 and 2 - which entered commercial operation in 2015 and 2016, respectively. In 2021, CNNC also began construction of a demonstration ACP100 small modular reactor at the site. The multi-purpose 125 MWe PWR - also referred to as the Linglong One - is designed for electricity production, heating, steam production or seawater desalination. It is currently undergoing pre-commissioning tests.

The island province of Hainan is China's southernmost point. Energy policies published in 2019 by Hainan Province Development and Reform Commission specify that nuclear power will become the primary source of electricity for the island, which has a population of close to 10 million.

How Iran and the U.S. Justify Differing Views on Freedom of Navigation

Underway merchant traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, April 15 (Pole Star)
Underway merchant traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, April 15 (Pole Star)

Published Apr 15, 2026 2:20 PM by The Conversation

 

[By Elizabeth Mendenhall]

The Strait of Hormuz exists in the eye of the beholder.

While everyone agrees that, geographically speaking, it is a strait – a narrow sea passage connecting two places that ships want to go – its political and legal status is rather more complicated.

The United States and Iran both eye the strait – a choke point through which 20% of the world’s oil passes – very differently. Washington sees the Strait of Hormuz as exclusively an international waterway, whereas Tehran sees it as part of it territorial waters.

It follows that Iran’s toll-charging of ships is seen by the U.S. as illegal. Similarly, U.S. President Donald Trump’s blockade of the passage is a “grave violation” of sovereignty to Iran.

As an expert in the law of the sea, I know part of the problem is that the U.S. and Iran are living in two different worlds when it comes to the international laws governing the strait. Further complicating matters, both are in a different legal universe than most of the rest of the world.

The law of the sea

The “law of the sea” is a network of international laws, customs and agreements that set out the foundation for rights of access and control in the ocean. The framework sits apart from the laws of warfare, which are also relevant to the Persian Gulf situation.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, is a major plank of the law of the sea. Completed in 1982 and in force since 1994, it aims to create a stable set of zones and places – like international straits – where everyone agrees on who can do what. It has been ratified by 171 countries and the European Union, but not Iran or the United States. Iran has signed it but has yet to ratify; the U.S. has done neither.

This means that the rules which almost every country in the world has consented to can’t serve as a basis of agreement over how the U.S. and Iran should govern their actions in the strait during the current war.

The view from Iran

Both Iran and the U.S. agree that under the law of the sea, the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait, but not on what kind of international strait it is. Moreover, they disagree on the relevant laws that exist, and how they apply.

For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait as set out under international law predating UNCLOS – notably the International Court of Justice’s ruling in the 1949 Corfu Channel case and the 1958 Territorial Seas Convention.

These older standards state that foreign ships have a right of “innocent passage” through international straits. Put in other terms, this means that if a ship is simply passing through, without doing anything else and without harming the security of the coastal countries, it must be allowed passage.

This gives Iran – and Oman, the strait’s other bordering country – power to make and enforce some rules over passage, such as rules for safety and the environment. They also have wide discretion to decide if passage is “non-innocent” and therefore not allowed. But it does not give them the right to impede innocent passage.

Contrary to the older standard, however, Tehran claims the right to “suspend” passage through its half of the strait, citing the waters as its territorial sea. This is a violation of the 1958 Territorial Seas Convention that Iran relies on for legal support, which says that when a territorial sea is also an international strait, innocent passage cannot be suspended.

The US interpretation

For the U.S., the Strait of Hormuz is an international strait requiring “transit passage,” as per UNCLOS. Although the United States is not a member of UNCLOS, it argues that the agreement’s updated concept of an “international strait” should apply.

Understanding a waterway as the newer type of “international strait,” which requires transit passage, shifts the balance against a coastal country’s control and toward free navigation.

Under this standard, countries bordering straits – like Iran and Oman in the case of Hormuz – must also allow overflight and submarines below the surface. Passage must be allowed so long as it is “continuous and expeditious.”

The U.S. has forcefully asserted this position at sea through regular “Freedom of Navigation” patrols through the Strait of Hormuz and other straits around the world. The patrols are a visible rejection of claims over the ocean that the U.S. deems illegal or excessive.

The basic U.S. argument is supported by some leading legal scholars, such as James Kraska, a professor of international maritime law at the U.S. Naval War College, who decries the Iranian position as “lawfare” and argues that Iran must abide by the compromises made in UNCLOS.

A ‘persistent objector’

But the U.S. is a global outlier here, and one of only a handful of countries – alongside the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Thailand and Papua New Guinea – which argue that “transit passage” is required by custom.

Custom, in this sense, is established if a practice at sea is seen as consistent and is backed by wide agreement over its legality. If something is seen as customary law, it applies to everyone. The only way to prevent a custom from applying to you is through the “persistent objection rule,” which gives a country an exemption to newly emerging standards if it has shown itself to be consistently against it.

Legal scholars are split on whether transit passage is customary law – although law of the sea specialists tend to say it is not.

Tehran argues that even if transit passage were customary international law, Iran is a “persistent objector,” and therefore, the rule doesn’t apply to them.

And it is true that Iran’s objection has been consistent. Both Iran and Oman argued in favor of innocent passage, and against transit passage, at the UNCLOS negotiations.

Iran reaffirmed its perspective upon signing UNCLOS in 1982. Tehran argues that because transit passage is tied up in the compromises made by UNCLOS, only countries that ratify the treaty can claim the right to transit passage – and neither the U.S. nor Iran has ratified it.

Navigating troubled waters

The complex military situation and economic disruption are only part of the story of the Strait of Hormuz.

What lies beneath is a complicated legal situation. Not only do the U.S. and Iran disagree about the legal status of the strait, but the countries that flag oil tankers – and which are therefore responsible for them – must also navigate their own commitments and perspectives under the law of the sea.

Every nation wants to avoid a legal precedent that is contrary to its long-term interests. But for international law to function – to reduce conflict and enable trade – what is needed is an agreement about what rules exist, and a shared commitment to abide by them.

Only that would achieve a stable post-war status for the Strait of Hormuz. How we get there, however, requires navigating some very tricky waters.

Elizabeth Mendenhall is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Marine Affairs and Political Science at the University of Rhode Island. She received her PhD in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University in 2017.

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here

The Conversation

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

Two Sanctioned Tankers May Have Bypassed U.S. Navy Blockade on Iran

Vesselfinder
The VLCC Alicia (VesselFinder / Chinmaya Mohapatra)

Published Apr 15, 2026 6:26 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Despite U.S. Central Command's claims of a total lockdown of Iranian shipping, vessel tracking consultancies have identified Iran-linked, sanctioned tankers that appear to have transited the Strait of Hormuz without difficulty - with AIS enabled and publicly broadcasting their positions. AIS data can be manipulated, and the transits could not be immediately confirmed.

Within the last 24 hours, two sanctioned "shadow fleet" VLCCs - identified as IMO 9208215 (current name Rhn) and IMO 9281695 (current name Alicia) - appear to have transited the strait en route to Iran, according to TankerTrackers.com. Iran has officially claimed that the Alicia made a successful transit. 

Together, the VLCCs have the capacity to take on about four million barrels of Iranian oil, which would be valued at about $400 million (if they can exit the Gulf and deliver to Iran's largely Chinese customers). Even without making the return journey out of the Gulf, they would still provide Iran with extra floating storage, enabling another three days of continued production without shut-ins. 

The tankers' destination was predictable. "These two dames of steel have transported 60 million barrels of Iranian crude oil since 2023," wrote TankerTrackers.com.

CENTCOM maintains that the blockade is airtight, and says that it has already turned around about 10 outbound vessels with links to Iran. "American forces halted economic trade going into and out of Iran by sea," the command said in a statement Wednesday. "During the first 48 hours of the U.S. blockade on ships entering and exiting Iranian ports, no vessels have made it past U.S. forces."

So far, the U.S. Navy has not announced any boarding, search and seizure operations in connection with the blockade. An opposed boarding would be a step change in the campaign, and would be viewed as a violation of flag state sovereignty; the U.S. is said to be close to resuming formal peace talks with Iran, and may wish to avoid an escalatory act pending further diplomatic developments.

Shipping has been forewarned about the possibility of a boarding. U.S. forces have issued a stern notice to mariners, advising that any passing vessels could be "subject to interception, diversion, and capture" if it is discovered that they are headed to or from Iranian ports. 

"Neutral vessels may still be subject to the right of visit and search to determine the presence of contraband cargo," the NOTAM advises. "Humanitarian shipments including food, medical supplies, and other goods essential for survival of the civilian populations will be permitted, subject to inspection."

Vessels that are headed to and from ports in other GCC nations are explicitly allowed to pass the U.S. naval cordon. AIS data suggests that among neutral vessels that choose to make a Hormuz transit, many appear to be taking the Iranian-controlled "Tehran Tollbooth" route near the island of Larak, complying with the terms of the Iranian blockade as well as the U.S. blockade. This includes the first unsanctioned, "clean" supertanker to make the crossing since the start of the U.S. blockade, the Malta-flagged Agios Fanourios I, transiting in ballast and bound for Iraq.

Top image: The sanctioned VLCC Alicia (VesselFinder / Chinmaya Mohapatra)


U.S. Treasury Takes Aim at Iran's Shamkhani Shipping Network

Daphne V, one of the vessels sanctioned in Wednesday's action (VesselFinder / Giwrgos Mertis)
Daphne V, one of the vessels sanctioned in Wednesday's action (VesselFinder / Giwrgos Mertis)

Published Apr 15, 2026 10:02 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The U.S. Treasury is once again taking aim at the network of Iranian "shadow fleet" industry leader Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of senior Iranian advisor Ali Shamkhani, who was killed in an airstrike in February. The Shamkhani shipping network has moved millions of barrels of oil for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and it is a primary target of Treasury's "maximum pressure" campaign on Iran's energy exports. In the latest round announced Tuesday, the department blacklisted nine vessels and more than a dozen companies and individuals linked to Shamkhani. 

The Shamkhani network operates through reputable-looking front companies, many in the United Arab Emirates, where foreign interests intermingle in a lightly-regulated "free zone" business environment. In this new round of actions, Treasury sanctioned the holding company Oriel Group and a constellation of related Shamkhani affiliates, all based in the Emirates. These include Corplinx Consultancy; House of Shipping Investment FZCO; Meritron DMCC; Helmatic Consultancy DMCC; and Taylor Shipping FZCO. 

Treasury also targeted more shadow-fleet vessels operated by the Shamkhani network, to include Aura (IMO 9274563), Horae (IMO 9413004), Versa (IMO 9379301), Anaya (IMO 9326885), Daphne V (IMO 9321677), Silvar (IMO 9291262), Cauveri (IMO 9282508), Bellaris (IMO 9332614), and Anika (IMO 9417464). 

The new sanctions on the Shamkhani arrive just as Iran's state oil company is said to be shifting its trading and shipping operations back in-house, an adaptation to the high fatality rate among IRGC members who previously coordinated the gray-market trade. State-run news agency IRNA and Iranian outlet Tehran Times both claimed this week that the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) will take back exclusive control over the sale of the nation's oil - a shift away from the informal sales network operated by the IRGC.

As an additional action, Treasury also sanctioned an Iranian oil-for-gold trading scheme that provided support for the government of former Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro (now under arrest in the U.S.). The department identified Iranian national Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi as a facilitator for the IRGC's oil sales, the profits from which were used to underwrite Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, an IRGC proxy force. One such scheme involved shipping Iranian oil into Venezuela in exchange for gold from the Maduro regime. The gold would then be resold in overseas markets.

Treasury identified two UAE-based companies, ACS Trading and Lotus Universal, as linked to Moosavi. An additional affiliated firm, ACS Global, is based in the Netherlands, the department said. 

Top image: VesselFinder / Giwrgos Mertis


 

U.S. Navy Redeploys for Next Phase of Gulf Operations

A U.S. Navy destroyer patrols the blockade zone in the Gulf of Oman, April 2026 (CENTCOM)
A U.S. Navy destroyer patrols the blockade zone in the Gulf of Oman, April 2026 (CENTCOM)

Published Apr 15, 2026 4:50 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

The US Navy is presently navigating an intensely complex geopolitical situation, balancing its deployments not only so as to be able to resume active operations against Iran in a week’s time, if the ceasefire should not be extended, but also shuffling assets for both deterrence and other contingencies.

The world’s attention is focused on the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches, as Central Command imposes a blockade on Iranian ships and those seeking to leave or enter Iranian ports, both within the Gulf and on the Gulf of Oman coast. So far, it seems as if CENTCOM has been able to impose effective control via radio communications with potential blockade-runners, without needing to physically board ships. But the naval presence is on hand to intervene physically – and also ready to resume active war fighting, at very short notice.

The contingency reinforcement appears to have two major elements. The San Diego-based Wasp Class landing ship USS Boxer (LHD-4), with F-35Bs and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard, is a week away from reinforcing the Japanese-based USS Tripoli (LHA-7), which with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard is already in the CENTCOM area. Ready to reinforce the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CSG also already active in the Arabian Sea, the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) CSG, last seen off Namibia, appears to be heading for the Cape of Good Hope escorted by Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers USS Donald Cook (DDG-75), USS Mason (DDG-87) and USS Ross (DDG-71), supported by the fast oiler USNS Arctic (TAOE-8).

The dispatch of the USS George H.W. Bush CSG on the long route from Virginia to the Arabian Sea suggests a desire not to provoke the Houthis into closing the Bab el Mandeb. The Iranians would dearly love the Houthis to do so at this particular juncture, when they are pressured and under blockade. But the United States is maintaining the ceasefire and providing no pretext for doing so – while still advertising a capability to respond should the Houthi leadership choose to resume their attacks on shipping.

In the meantime, the United States maintains a discreet presence in the northern Red Sea with Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers USS Bainbridge (DDG-96) and USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116), supported by Poseidon P-8A surveillance flights over the area. Keeping the Red Sea open for transit of oil from Yanbu to Asia is clearly extremely important for Saudi Arabia, so a non-provocative but ready-to-respond stance is clearly what is needed.

Should the blockade of Iranian ships and ports continue successfully, the next phase is likely to be the further roll-out of the mine clearance operation in the Strait of Hormuz. This will need those additional strike assets coming into theater, to deter and provide a response to any attempt by Iran to interdict shipping, but also a specialized mine clearance capability.

This appears to be on the way in the form of two Japanese-based Avenger Class mine countermeasures ships USS Chief (MCM-14) and USS Pioneer (MCM-9), which left Singapore heading west on April 10. These two ships are of the same class as the four minesweepers which were withdrawn from Bahrain immediately prior to the war.

Minesweeping-equipped Littoral Combat Ships USS Canberra, USS Tulsa and USS Santa Barbara departed the Gulf region prior to the beginning of hostilities, the latter two vessels ending up in Singapore; Canberra is reported to be under way in the Indian Ocean, and USS Tulsa was spotted transiting the Strait of Malacca westbound on April 3. There are also reports that the Royal Navy’s RFA Lyme Bay (L3007) is preparing to forward-deploy to Duqm in Oman with remote-controlled surface and submersibles, plus the Royal Navy’s Mine and Threat Exploitation Group on board. The Lyme Bay is still in Gibraltar, 10 day’s sailing from Duqm.

Completing the precautionary deployments, in the Eastern Mediterranean the USS Gerald R Ford and her escorts - including three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers - are 175 nm south of Cyprus, ready for an escalation of fighting both in Lebanon and Israel.

The presence off the coast of Ecuador of the carrier USS Nimitz (CVN-68), escorted by Arleigh Burke destroyer USS Gridley (DDG-101), raises the intriguing possibility that it too is well-positioned to act as a reinforcement for CENTCOM. The Nimitz is heading in the right direction as it is due to round the Cape of Good Horn en route to Norfolk, Virginia, and scheduled for retirement. But the US Navy has recently announced the Nimitz will be kept in service for additional 10 months due to the delayed delivery of USS John F. Kennedy, the second Ford-class carrier. 

The US Navy is certainly stretched, perhaps more so than at any time in the last 50 years. But balancing a readiness for operations with positioning to act as an effective deterrent, it is coping admirably with multiple, conflicting and sometimes unpredictable political priorities, in an exemplary manner which no doubt will feature strongly in future naval histories.


Iran-Linked Tankers Test Limits of U.S. Hormuz Blockade

While Iran-linked vessels appear to steer clear of the U.S. blockade outside the Strait of Hormuz, several ships have undertaken lengthy and winding routes in recent hours to move from the UAE coast to the actual Strait close to Iran’s shoreline.  

At least two vessels linked to Iran and sanctioned by the United States entered the Persian Gulf on Thursday through a new route, ship-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg showed.

LPG carrier G Summer, broadcasting China owner and crew, has made its way into the Gulf by passing between Iran’s Larak and Qeshm islands. The Hong Lu, another vessel under U.S. sanctions due to ties with Iran, also moved through the same route shortly after, according to the data compiled by Bloomberg. The Hong Lu is a supertanker capable of carrying up to 2 million barrels of crude and was headed into the Persian Gulf empty. The vessel had briefly signaled Iraq’s Basrah as a destination, but now indicates it is waiting for orders.


Ship-tracking has not been a reliable assessment of how and which tankers move around the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, as dark activity and spoofing have flourished since the Iran war began.

“During the first 48 hours of the U.S. blockade on ships entering and exiting Iranian ports, no vessels have made it past U.S. forces,” the U.S. Central Command said on Wednesday.

“Additionally, 9 vessels have complied with direction from U.S. forces to turn around and return toward an Iranian port or coastal area.”

Yet, observed AIS positioning and vessel traffic suggest Iran-linked vessels have been in and out of the Strait of Hormuz, maritime intelligence firm Windward said in its daily note on Wednesday.   

“Between April 14 and 15, an empty, falsely flagged, U.S.-sanctioned VLCC was observed entering the Strait inbound via Iranian territorial waters, likely using coastal positioning to reduce exposure, and is similarly assessed as a blockade-breaking movement,” the firm said.

“Iranian export activity continues, supported by loading at Kharg Island and deceptive operational patterns, including spoofing and reduced visibility.”

Concluded Windward, “The operating environment is defined by simultaneous enforcement, evasion, and selective movement, with vessel behavior evolving in real time as the practical limits of the blockade are tested.”

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com

Iran war and Indonesia nickel curbs: price and project signals for mine planners

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Reviewed by Tom Sullivan


First reported on MINING.com

30 Second Briefing

War in Iran and Indonesia’s decision to cap 2026 nickel ore quotas at 260–270 million wet tonnes, down from 379 million tonnes, are expected to support prices, with BMI lifting its 2026 forecast to $16,600/t despite a projected 324,000‑tonne global surplus. Sulphur supply disruptions from the Middle East, critical for Indonesia’s HPAL plants, have already forced several processors to cut output by at least 10%, while higher energy costs are pressuring higher‑cost producers outside Indonesia. Demand growth is seen slowing to about 3% in 2026 as lithium iron phosphate batteries displace nickel‑rich chemistries.

Technical Brief

  • Indonesia’s refined nickel output is forecast to grow 9.8% in 2026 after 9% growth in 2025.
  • BMI sees the global refined nickel surplus widening “modestly” to about 324,000 tonnes in 2026.
  • Three‑month LME nickel futures traded at $18,250/t after a 2.9% daily gain.
  • More than two‑thirds of Indonesia’s sulphur imports originate from the Middle East, exposing HPAL input costs to disruption.
  • Sulphur shortages linked to the Iran conflict have already forced several Indonesian processors to cut output by ≥10%.
  • Higher energy costs are described as particularly challenging for higher‑cost nickel operations outside Indonesia.
  • Global nickel demand growth is projected to slow from 5.8% in 2025 to about 3% in 2026.
  • BMI’s long‑term price path rises from $16,700/t next year to $19,000/t by 2030 and $22,000/t by 2032.

Our Take

The same Strait of Hormuz and China sulphur/sulphuric acid constraints flagged in our 13 April coverage are now intersecting with Indonesia’s nickel ore quota cuts, implying a double cost squeeze for high-pressure acid leach (HPAL) projects that rely on both nickel feed and sulphuric acid.

With nickel sitting alongside sulphur in 72 keyword-matched pieces in our database, the current pricing support narrative is increasingly tied to fertiliser and acid-market logistics rather than just EV demand, which gives operators in regions like Congo and Russia exposure to a wider set of supply-chain shocks than in past nickel cycles.