November 20, 2026
By Commodore (Dr.) Johnson Odakkal, I.N. (Retd.)
Key Takeaways:
By Commodore (Dr.) Johnson Odakkal, I.N. (Retd.)
Key Takeaways:
Jensen Huang’s abrupt resignation as Nvidia CEO after 33 years, amid personal and national-security scrutiny, has exposed how a fabless firm’s $6 trillion-scale valuation rests on a multi-country chain of TSMC fabs, ASML lithography tools, and Korean high-bandwidth memory.
The episode illustrates complex interdependence: multiple channels link firms and states, commercial issues rapidly become securitized, and power flows through chokepoints rather than military force, with sensitivity (sharp stock drops) distinct from vulnerability (no quick substitutes for key production nodes).
From India’s vantage, the lesson is that leverage belongs to those indispensable at one or two nodes—design talent, packaging, or rules—rather than ownership of the entire chain, while overly tight controls can accelerate rivals’ drive for self-reliance.
A social media explainer doing the rounds this week marvels that Nvidia, one of the most valuable companies on earth, “doesn’t make a single chip itself.” The post gets the business model right, even if the nearly $6 trillion valuation it cites has already slipped away. Nvidia’s shares had fallen about 30 percent from their record high of 6 October. On 12 November the company announced that Jensen Huang, its co-founder and chief executive for 33 years, had resigned with immediate effect.
His exit followed days of reports about his personal conduct and an alleged association with a woman US officials suspect of links to Chinese intelligence. Beijing has dismissed the claims as a smear campaign. Nvidia’s board opened an independent investigation on 8 November and, on 17 November, created a board-level National Security and Export Control Oversight Committee. Chief financial officer Colette Kress is now interim chief executive.
The personal story will run its course. The structural story deserves more of our attention. In a few short weeks, one corporation has shown, more vividly than any textbook, how the world of the 21st century is bound together. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye named this condition complex interdependence in 1977. The Nvidia episode suggests their idea has not faded. It has matured. Interdependence still binds states and firms together, but it has also become the instrument, and the battleground, of power.
A Chip Made in Many Countries
Nvidia is a fabless company. It designs its processors but owns no fabrication plants, and sends its designs to a foundry to be manufactured. The model became possible after Morris Chang founded Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in 1987 as a pure foundry, one that builds chips for others and sells none of its own. Nvidia’s most advanced chips are made by TSMC in Taiwan.
TSMC, in turn, cannot print those transistors without extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines that only ASML of the Netherlands produces, machines that themselves depend on German optics from ZEISS and lasers from TRUMPF. The newest High-NA version of the EUV system can cost around $400 million. The high-bandwidth memory that AI chips need comes mainly from South Korea, where SK hynix was expected to supply more than half of Nvidia’s 2026 requirement, with Samsung and Micron competing for the rest. TSMC then joins processor and memory through advanced packaging, capacity Nvidia booked early and in bulk.
Even this list understates the web. In its results on 17 November, Nvidia named further partners in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the United States to expand packaging, substrates and testing. The slogan says California designs and Asia builds. The reality is a lattice of mutual dependence in which no node, not even the most valuable one, can produce the finished product alone.
Many Channels, Many Actors
Keohane and Nye’s first characteristic of complex interdependence was the existence of multiple channels connecting societies: interstate, transgovernmental and transnational. Nvidia is a living illustration. Its chief executive dealt directly with the White House, with ministers in Taipei and Seoul, and with customers across China. Its decisions on which clients receive scarce chips, where to invest and which suppliers to favour carry consequences that once belonged only to governments.
The resignation exposed how personal some of these channels had become. Within days, analysts were asking whether Nvidia could defend its priority access to chipmaking and memory supply without Huang’s relationships in Taiwan and South Korea. The China channel tells a parallel story. In 2025 Huang said US export controls had cut Nvidia’s share of China’s AI chip market from 95 percent to 50 percent, and had pushed Beijing to build its own chips faster. Nvidia’s latest outlook now assumes no data centre compute revenue from China at all.
The lesson for students of global politics is that the multinational corporation is neither a mere instrument of its home state nor a free agent above states. It is an actor in its own right, negotiating with several governments at once, shaped by their rules and shaping their choices in return. A state-centric reading of this episode would miss most of what matters.
When Commerce Becomes Security
The second characteristic Keohane and Nye identified was the absence of a fixed hierarchy among issues, meaning military security does not automatically sit above trade, technology or finance. Within a fortnight, a question of corporate governance became a matter for congressional committees and a fresh argument over chip exports to China. Lawmakers are now pressing to attach bills such as the Chip Security Act, which cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee 42 to 0 in March, to the annual defence authorisation bill.
Scholars of the Copenhagen School, including Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, describe securitisation as the process by which political actors lift an issue out of normal politics and treat it as an existential threat. Semiconductors were already securitised, but the Huang episode shows how quickly a commercial or even personal matter can be pulled into that frame once a strategic technology is involved.
The third characteristic was the reduced usefulness of military force among interdependent states. Here, too, the chip chain is instructive. No state could seize it by force and make it work. A captured fab without Dutch machines, Korean memory, Japanese materials and American design software would be an expensive building. Power in this domain moves through export licences, entity lists and the allocation of scarce capacity. Taiwan is the place where that assumption faces its hardest test, and where interdependence may deter conflict or simply raise its price.
Sensitivity, Vulnerability and Structural Power
Keohane and Nye drew a useful distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is how quickly and how expensively one part of a system feels a change elsewhere. Vulnerability is the cost of adjusting when the system itself changes and no alternative is at hand.
The past week was a study in sensitivity. On 12 November Nvidia’s shares fell as much as 14.3 percent in early trading, briefly erasing more than $500 billion and pushing its value below $4 trillion, before closing 4.3 percent lower at $166.19. Five days later, under an interim chief executive, Nvidia reported record quarterly revenue of $115.8 billion, up 103 percent on a year earlier. The next day its shares still fell 2.9 percent, to $150.96, as investors weighed who would lead the company. One investment officer remarked that the market “may be confusing the value of Jensen Huang with the value of Nvidia”. The shock was sharp and costly, but it was a shock to confidence, not to capacity. Vulnerability is a different matter. If the Taiwanese or Korean nodes of the chain were disrupted, there would be no quick substitute, whoever sat in the chief executive’s chair.
Susan Strange argued that structural power, the power to shape the frameworks within which others operate, rests on four structures: security, production, finance and knowledge. Nvidia commands the knowledge structure through its designs and software. Taiwan, the Netherlands and South Korea hold decisive parts of the production structure. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have shown how states can weaponise such network positions, using chokepoints to watch or to exclude rivals, as Washington’s export controls illustrate. This is where the social media lesson, owning the design and not the factory, is right about value but incomplete about power. Value flows to the designer. Leverage flows to whoever sits at the point the system cannot route around.
Reading It from New Delhi
Seen from India, the episode offers three views at once. The United States holds the design, the software and the rule-making power of export controls, yet its leverage is partly borrowed, because the factories that give it effect lie in Asia. Washington is also pulled both ways: at the APEC summit in Shenzhen this week, President Trump said he wanted Nvidia to be able to sell to China, even as Congress moves to tighten controls. China shows the limits of denial. Controls have slowed its access to the best chips, but they have also hardened its resolve to build domestic alternatives, and Nvidia now expects nothing from a market it once dominated. Interdependence, pressed too hard, can produce the very self-reliance it was meant to prevent.
India sits in a third position. It is not yet a fabrication power, though the projects under the India Semiconductor Mission, including the Tata Electronics fab at Dholera and Micron’s assembly and test plant at Sanand, are early steps. Its strongest card is people. Around 20 percent of the world’s chip design engineers work in India, many for the very firms at the centre of this story. The lesson for a rising middle power is not that it must own the whole chain. It is that it must become indispensable at one or two nodes and trusted across several. I have written in these pages about maritime chokepoints. Silicon has its own, and the same rule applies: influence belongs to those the system cannot easily route around.
Complex interdependence has not ended. It has grown up and acquired an edge. A single resignation could wipe hundreds of billions of dollars off a company’s market value, yet the fabs, machines and memory lines on which that company depends did not move an inch. That is the paradox of our age. No chip is an island, and neither is any power that depends on one.
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About Commodore (Dr.) Johnson Odakkal, I.N. (Retd.)
Commodore (Dr.) Johnson Odakkal is a maritime scholar, strategic affairs analyst, and Indian Navy veteran. He is an IBDP Subject Specialist in Global Politics and Theory of Knowledge, and Adjunct Faculty of Maritime and Strategic Studies at Naval War College, Goa.
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