Recycling Ships Under Two Conventions: Misconceptions About Basel and HKC
In November 2024, BIMCO launched a Ship Recycling Alliance to help accelerate safe and environmentally sound ship recycling of ships through the coordination of the voices of the ship recycling industry and the shipping industry. The alliance was also launched to help facilitate the global implementation of the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships 2009 (HKC) prior to its entering into force in June 2025.
As both industries navigate the entering into force of the HKC and the legal inconsistencies with the “Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal” (BC), together with its “Ban” amendment, BIMCO has repeatedly called for those inconsistencies to be solved. The BC is almost universally ratified (191 Parties), its Ban amendment has been ratified by 104 countries, while the HKC has 24 Parties so far.
Meanwhile, we are repeatedly seeing misconceptions relating to the complex interrelations of the two conventions and their co-existence. The recent article entitled “Breaking Ships, Building Consensus - How the Basel Ban and HKC Can Coexist” by Prof Ishtiaque Ahmed conveys misunderstandings on some central aspects of both Conventions and as a result draws erroneous conclusions. In view of the importance and timeliness of this matter, it is essential to provide a response.
In 2004, the governing body of the BC - realizing that its convention did not work as intended on end-of-life ships - formally requested IMO to develop a purpose-built convention for the recycling of ships (decision VII/26). The BC and its Ban amendment have no cognizance of the maritime concept of “flag State,” which is embedded in all IMO conventions and in UNCLOS. Instead, BC recognises the State of export (of the wastes), the State of import, and any transit States. Conveniently, for purposes of the BC, the State of export of an end-of-life ship has been considered to be the port from which the ship commenced its last voyage, with no consideration given to the ship’s flag State or the State where the shipowner is registered or domiciled.
From 26 June 2025, with BC, the Ban amendment, and the HKC all being in force, some practical questions arise for a ship that is heading for recycling:
(a) Should HKC be the sole Convention that regulates ship recycling (being the most recently developed; being subject specific; and having been developed following the initial request of the BC’s governing body)?
(b) Should both Conventions apply fully to end-of-life ships? And if so, what happens if some of the key requirements of the two Conventions are contradictory?
(c) Did the developers of the HKC design its requirements in ignorance of the requirements of the BC and its Ban amendment, or did they account for any necessary sharing of regulatory responsibility so that there would be no conflict?
Prof. Ahmed’s article promotes the view that both Conventions must apply at the same time to end-of-life ships. It offers an interpretation as to how the division of responsibility should work between the two Conventions and states that: “In this light, Basel regulates whether and under what conditions ships may cross borders for dismantling, while HKC sets the substantive standards for dismantling once a vessel has lawfully arrived at a facility.”
In other words, the article claims that the decision of where a ship is allowed to sail to be recycled should be taken by the BC and, where applicable, by its Ban amendment. Regarding HKC, it said: “HKC governs the dismantling process itself, not what happens beyond the facility gate”. And also: “In this light, Basel regulates whether and under what conditions ships may cross borders for dismantling, while HKC sets the substantive standards for dismantling once a vessel has lawfully arrived at a facility.”
This interpretation ignores a large part of the design of the HKC, which regulates the process that has to be followed before the flag State can issue the International Ready for Recycling Certificate (IRRC) which is needed before recycling can start. This process ensures that the shipowner, the flag State, the ship recycling facility and the authorities of the recycling State are all in agreement for the recycling to take place, having taken into account the capacity of the recycling facility to accept and dispose of hazardous materials, etc.
The article in question also contains some statements that mistakenly arrive at a conclusion as to which Convention should regulate what process, stating that “By prohibiting OECD-flagged vessels from being dismantled in non-OECD states, Basel directly constrains access to the very yards where global capacity is concentrated.” This is a mistaken understanding, since the BC and its Ban amendment do not concern themselves with the flag of the ship, nor the nationality of its owner, but only with the ports of export, import and any transit States. According to the BC and its Ban amendment, a Chinese-owned, Chinese-flagged ship would be detained if it were to depart from a port in the EU to return to China for recycling. The BC would treat it as an illegal export of hazardous waste from an OECD country to a non-OECD country.
Another misconception that is likely causing confusion is the statement that: “Basel’s Ban need not mean permanent exclusion for non-OECD shipbreaking states. Rather, it creates an incentive to transform. By upgrading facilities to OECD-equivalent standards, institutionalizing strong worker protections, and establishing transparent downstream waste management systems, South Asian yards can credibly argue for “functional equivalency.” And again: “By investing in OECD-standard infrastructure, pursuing recognition and certification, and aligning domestic regimes with international best practice, non-OECD states including South Asia can maintain their central role in global recycling under both frameworks.” These statements are incorrect. There is no provisions in the BC that would allow an upgraded individual recycling facility in a non-OECD country to be recognized as “functionally equivalent”. In fact, there are already recycling facilities in South Asia that operate with better standards compared to some OECD based facilities, but the BC has no mechanism to recognize this.
The HKC’s developers accounted for sharing of regulatory responsibility with the BC in relevant domains, so that there would be no conflict between the two conventions. The BC has two main pillars to support its aims: (1) It restricts the transboundary movements of hazardous and other wastes, except where this is in accordance with the principles of environmentally sound management (ESM) and provides a regulatory system for when transboundary movements are permissible (with the process of the Prior Informed Consent – or PIC); and (2) the Convention focusses on the reduction of hazardous waste generation and the promotion of ESM of hazardous wastes, wherever the place of disposal.
HKC, in its regulation 20, makes a distinction between practices related to the environmentally sound management of wastes within and outside of the ship recycling facility. It requires the identification, labelling, packaging and removal of all hazardous materials from the ship and their ESM within the boundary of the ship recycling facility, while it states that practices related to the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes outside the recycling facility shall be done in facilities approved by the State (in line with its obligations under the Basel Convention).
However, when it comes to BC’s PIC procedure and its Ban amendment, both of which are problematic in the context of shipping’s governance and operations, HKC replaces these with a process that relies in the consent being agreed between the ship’s flag state and the recycling state. In HKC, the recycling State is responsible for authorizing (or refusing to authorize) its recycling facilities and for setting any limitations it decides on the allowed types and quantities of hazardous materials, as well as on any limitations it may wish to impose on the types and sizes of ships to be recycled. It issues the facility with the Document of Authorization to conduct Ship Recycling (DASR for short). The flag State on the other hand is responsible for the type and quantities of hazardous materials that are found onboard its ships by issuing a statutory certificate that identifies their quantities and location (International Certificate on Inventory of Hazardous Materials, or ICIHM).
Before a ship can be sent for recycling, the recycling facility must obtain approval from the recycling State for the Ship Recycling Plan (SRP) that it has produced based on the specific ship’s particulars, plans and ICIHM. If the SRP is approved, the ship’s flag State conducts a final survey on the ship to confirm that the ship fulfils its ICIHM and that the SRP accounts for all the hazardous materials in its IHM and that it has been approved by the recycling State. Then the flag State issues the International Ready for Recycling Certificate (IRRC). Without a valid IRRC no recycling can be allowed to start by the recycling State.
In conclusion, the HKC was designed to replace the PIC and the Ban amendment of the BC with the IRRC process, which ensures the informed consent of flag, transit, and importing States prior to allowing any recycling to take place. At the same time, the HKC was always intended to coexist with the Basel Convention by relying on the obligation that the Parties to the BC already have to oversee the ultimate management and disposal of hazardous wastes outside the boundaries of recycling facilities.
Dr Nikos Mikelis is an Independent Consultant and Chairman of BIMCO’s Ship Recycling Alliance.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
When Consent Isn’t Enough: What Basel’s Article 11 Means for the HKC
Debate over whether the Hong Kong Convention’s (HKC) flag-state International Ready for Recycling Certificate (IRRC) can substitute for the Basel Convention’s Prior Informed Consent (PIC) goes to the heart of how the world manages end-of-life ships. Proponents claim the HKC delivers equivalent level of environmental protection through HKC compliant yards, Inventories of Hazardous Materials (IHM), and Ship Recycling Plans (SRP) tailored to vessels followed by issuance of IRRC by the ship’s flag state administration. Critics counter that Basel’s consent system is territorially grounded, requires import-state consent and transit controls, and—under the 2019 Ban Amendment ratified by 102 states—prohibits certain export flows that HKC would still permit. The Basel Conference of the Parties (COP) has yet to recognize HKC as Article 11-equivalent. Concerns persist over reflagging, conflicts of interest when the flag and recycling states coincide, weak downstream hazardous-waste controls, and uneven enforcement.
Two global instruments now shape the fate of ships at the end of their working life. The Basel Convention governs transboundary movement of hazardous waste, imposing shared responsibility through prior informed consent among exporting, importing, and transit states. The HKC regulates how recycling itself is conducted—through national yard authorization, ship-specific planning, and flag-state certification. They aim at the same outcome but from different vantage points: Basel controls the border; HKC organizes what happens inside the yard.
Basel’s system is territorial and collective. Exporters must notify; importers and transit states must consent in writing; and the exporter remains accountable until final environmentally sound management (ESM) is achieved. Each step is documented and traceable, creating a chain of custody that deters environmental dumping.
HKC, by contrast, is operational. It depends on the recycling state’s domestic authorization and internal safety systems: a traveling IHM, an SRP for each hull, and a yard holding a Document of Authorization to conduct Ship Recycle (DASR). Once these are in place, the flag state issues an IRRC certifying the vessel “ready for recycling.” Supporters argue this package functionally mirrors Basel’s PIC protections: if the yard and plan are approved and the IHM verified, the receiving state has already ensured capacity and compliance. For vessels declaring for recycling while at sea, HKC’s structure is also far more workable than reconstructing exporter identity mid-voyage.
Critics argue that structure cannot substitute for jurisdiction. Under the Basel Convention, the PIC process is more than administrative formality—it represents a sovereign-to-sovereign deal or agreement. Consent is exchanged directly between national authorities, ensuring that the exporter’s due diligence extends through to the waste’s final disposal. In contrast, the HKC’s IRRC, however robust, functions merely as a flag-state document. When a ship’s flag state is also its recycling state, this mechanism effectively becomes self-authorization, dismantling the external oversight and balance, a cardinal principle of Basel’s regulatory framework.
The deeper gap lies downstream. Basel’s definition of Environmentally Sound Management (ESM) extends beyond shipbreaking. It demands segregation, safe transport, treatment, and disposal of residues—sludges, asbestos, PCBs, contaminated steel, e-waste—with traceability and accountability at each stage. HKC’s scope largely stops at the yard gate. That silence undermines claims of “Article 11 equivalence,” which requires proof that alternative arrangements offer an equivalent level of environmental protection.
Attempts to treat HKC’s IRRC as a standing substitute for Basel’s PIC have repeatedly failed on these grounds. To date, the Basel COP have refrained from recognizing equivalence, citing persistent deficiencies in regulatory oversight and downstream waste management practices. The recent Ban Amendment compounds the divide: the Basel Ban Amendment now prohibits certain North–South hazardous-ship movements outright, while HKC would allow them. Certification cannot reopen a door that Basel Parties have lawfully closed.
For South Asian ship-recycling nations and steel buyers, this may appear legal hair-splitting. It is not. The consequences are concrete: whether residues leave yards under licensed transport, whether manifests reconcile volumes, whether treatment capacity matches output, and whether incidents are tracked and corrected. These elements distinguish paper compliance from actual protection.
The practical path forward is to make Article 11 of Basel do the work it was designed to do—permit flexibility only where outcomes demonstrably meet Basel’s protective floor. That requires building a bridge with verifiable load-bearing pillars.
Yard authorization under the HKC must be specific and conditional—anchored in verifiable accountability across the entire downstream chain not only up to the yard gate. Evidence, not assurances, should underpin compliance: executed contracts with licensed Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities (TSDFs), digital waste-tracking systems, routine audits, and clear authority to suspend or revoke authorization when controls fail. This approach aligns with one of the HKC’s own provision, which encourages Parties to adopt measures more stringent than those prescribed. The Convention’s preamble also assumes that recycling states already implement Basel-level downstream management. Given Basel’s long-standing and nearly universal implementation since 1992, making the issuance of a DASR contingent upon a verified, Basel-compliant downstream management chain merely formalizes what the framework has always presumed.
Exporting authorities, too, retain a role even under an Article 11 pathway. Joint pre-arrival inspections could confirm that HKC-authorized yards and Basel-compliant downstream chains are ready for the specific vessel and its waste profile. A unified movement document—combining HKC’s SRP with Basel’s tracking protocol—would give all parties access to identical, real-time data. Transparency is enforcement’s most cost-effective ally. Public registries of authorized yards and their downstream partners, annual residue-flow reports, and anonymized incident summaries would assure trading partners and local communities that equivalence is earned, not asserted. Mutual recognition between states should depend on such visibility and periodic performance reviews.
Critically, this model does not force a choice between the two treaties. Basel defines where and under whose consent transboundary movement occurs; HKC defines how safe and environmentally sound dismantling takes place. Harmonized, they are complementary: Basel secures fairness and accountability across borders; HKC embeds safety and environmental management within yards. The goal is not fewer rules, but interlocking ones.
Domestic courts particularly in South Asia have echoed this caution: in jurisdictions where infrastructure and enforcement are still maturing, Basel’s full safeguards remain applicable. HKC frameworks can exceed international baselines, but never undercut them. Article 11 should be used to raise standards, not lower them.
Three Principles for Lawmakers and Industry
So, what should policymakers and industry leaders take away?
First, this debate is not about penalizing recycling—it is about securing it. Sustainable ship recycling is both an environmental and economic imperative; weak governance helps no one.
Second, any credible claim of equivalence depends on downstream control. Without traceable waste management from hull to final disposal, IRRC-as-PIC is aspiration, not assurance.
Third, Parties can design verification systems that are rigorous yet practical, marrying Basel’s border discipline with HKC’s operational depth.
Article 11 of the Basel Convention should be deemed satisfied only where HKC yard authorization is explicitly tied to a fully Basel-compliant downstream chain—approved TSDFs covering all stages: segregation, storage, transport, treatment, and final disposal. This must include audited contracts, traceable manifests, reconciled movement data, and independent oversight by the importing state’s competent authority. Only under these conditions can an HKC’s IRRC be treated as a functional substitute for Basel’s PIC, aligning HKC practice with Basel’s “equivalent level of protection.” This is how the Basel framework can ultimately provide a corrective to the inherent weaknesses that the HKC incorporated at the time of its adoption in 2009. HKC certification, therefore, is valid only if Basel’s downstream compliance is demonstrably in place. Non-OECD facilities may arguably obtain EU-style exemptions from the strict enforcement of the Basel Ban only by demonstrating safeguards equivalent to those under the Basel framework and by maintaining recycling yards that conform to EU or OECD standards
The international community must now build consensus on a unified ship recycling framework, with the EU model offering a practical path forward. If adopted, HKC consent at the upstream stage could ensure Basel-level protection across the entire chain—from hull to final disposal. Without such integration, the IRRC remains a mere aspiration rather than a binding legal or environmental safeguard.
Dr. Ishtiaque Ahmed is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Law at North South University, Bangladesh. A former merchant marine engineering officer, he holds a Doctor of the Science of Law (J.S.D.) from the University of Maine School of Law, USA, where he specialized in ship recycling law and policy. Dr. Ahmed is also an active Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators in London (MCIArb.) , qualified Barrister of England and an Advocate in Bangladesh Supreme Court. His expertise lies at the intersection of maritime law, environmental regulation, and sustainable ship recycling. He can be reached at ishtiaque.ahmed@northsouth.edu
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
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