March 24, 2026
By Charles Walsh
The on-going conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban government of Afghanistan threatens to disrupt the efforts of the Central Asian states to develop a trade crescent stretching from the Black Sea in the west to the Arabian Sea in the south. However, conflict between the two South Asian states could also lead to trade benefits for Central Asia, specifically Uzbekistan. The conflict, which the Pakistani Defense Minister described as an “open war,” centers on Afghan-support for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region that seeks to overthrow the Pakistani government and has long-standing ties to the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan.
A Set Back for Burgeoning Regional Relations
Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Central Asia states have engaged in a policy of strategic balancing when it comes to trade relations, especially when it comes to building trade links with its southerly neighbors. Turkmenistan has invested heavily in the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Pipeline, a transport route to get the country’s abundant supply of natural gas to global consumers. Both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have also invested in ambitious railway projects linking Central Asia to Pakistani ports on the Arabian Sea. The Presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have also made recent, high-profile visits to Pakistan aimed at strengthening bilateral trade relationships.
With the Taliban and Pakistan now coming to major blows these projects have been significantly set back, at least in the immediate term. All of these projects aim to access Pakistan via Afghanistan and as such rely on a stable and peaceful situation on the border. While the conflict continues, the prospects of any serious cross-border infrastructure development – much less at the scale these projects envision – is near-impossible. This leaves billions of $ of investment from Central Asia essentially in limbo.
The potential concerns related to this conflict are not just economic. There is an ever increasing possibility of escalation, which in turn could present a security challenge for the Central Asian states, particularly those that border Afghanistan. The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), the local ISIS affiliate in the region, has been fighting the Taliban since before their return to power in 2021 and their continued insurgency had already raised concerns about the Taliban’s ability to provide security for regional infrastructure. A sustained Pakistani air campaign or further escalation in the war has the possibility to destabilize Afghanistan and thus provide more space for ISKP to operate as well as possibly resulting in an internal refugee crisis. Instability could also spill over into Central Asia itself, with the Afghan-Tajik border being of particular concern if instability increases.
Opportunity in the Face of Chaos
Admittedly, Central Asia lacks the ability to solve the immediate conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan and until the dispute can be settled permanently there will be challenges and risks associated with a southern trade corridor through the two countries to Central Asia. The cyclical nature of conflict in the region, with periods of intense conflict followed by periods of relative calm, means that without a permanent solution violence could erupt at any moment over the slightest provocation from either side. This will become more of a challenge as cross-regional infrastructure continues to develop. As such, the long-term concern for Central Asia is not necessarily with the immediate round of fighting, but rather the possibility of successive periods of violence. This threat will not just be a hindrance for existing trade and infrastructure plans, but could also turn off potential investors in the West who do not want to invest in projects that could be disrupted by new rounds of conflict.
One option is to simply push forward with what parts of these plans remain realistic given the current circumstances on the ground. Pakistani airstrikes have so far remained concentrated in the east and south of Afghanistan, relatively far from the borders with Central Asia. By developing the parts of existing projects that can be built in the northwest of the country, Central Asia can both show that it is still committed to these projects and remains proactive in their construction. Showing progress on existing infrastructure projects also makes them more tangible, perhaps changing the calculus for regional actors who seek to benefit from the influx of trade from causing disruptions through armed conflict. More infrastructure and trade development might also help in stabilizing the internal situation within Afghanistan, as local communities start to see the results of greater regional trade connections brought by, even incomplete, infrastructure.
Another option is to shift emphasis on to other proposed trade routes, such as the Middle Corridor. The Middle Corridor, a mostly land-based route that connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, is another trade route that the Central Asian states have been heavily investing in. However, while the Middle Corridor concept is more developed, it too faces its own challenges. As recent Iranian-Azerbaijani tensions have shown, critical sections of the route are still under threat from regional instability. The Middle Corridor is also longer in both length and travel time compared to the Afghanistan-Pakistan route and has bottlenecks of its own that are worth considering.
While the prospects for global trade along the southern “Afgh-Pak” route seem grim, the conflict might present an opportunity for the Central Asians – particularly Uzbekistan – to reap regional trade benefits. Several of Afghanistan’s key trade routes have been complicated by recent conflict. Afghan-Pakistan trade has been shuttered due to the fighting and trade with Iran has faced serious disruptions due to the on-going US-Israeli bombardment of the country. This means that Afghanistan could increasingly turn to Central Asia as an outlet for trade. There has already been movement in that direction, with Ministers from Uzbekistan and Afghanistan previously agreeing on a goal for increasing bilateral trade to $5bn, a significant increase from roughly $1bn of trade value at the end of 2025. Deepening the trade relationship between the two states now would provide a large benefit to both economies in the short-term, potentially reaching the $5bn target much sooner than anticipated. Stronger bilateral trade relationships between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan could also provide the foundation for stronger cross-regional trade to and from Pakistan and global markets, when conditions on the ground finally allow.
Until the fighting ends, Central Asia’s grand plans for a new trade corridor through Afghanistan and Pakistan remain in limbo, with the enduring consequences varying on how long the fighting continues. The ultimate conclusion of the war in Iran is also a factor to consider, with the outcome having the potential to alter existing plans and color whatever settlement, permanent or otherwise, comes out of the conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban. Central Asia will invariably still look to new frontiers, like in South Asia, for the opportunity to expand trade with global markets. A goal that the current conflict can only delay, not derail.
Charles Walsh
Charles Walsh is an Analyst at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, where he works at the Institute's Central Asia Center as well as leads the transnational Repression Initiative.
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