President Donald Trump’s Pentagon is reportedly preparing a potential military assault on Iran. Washington and Tehran are set to resume Omani-mediated talks on Thursday, but the threat of war is rising nonetheless. This month, the White House and Pentagon have repeatedly met with Israeli leaders who are lobbying against a deal with Iran and are in favor of launching an attack on the country of more than 90 million people.
It remains to be seen whether Trump will go forward with military action, but the White House is feeling confident after its January attack on Venezuela.
Trump recently told Israeli media that “either we reach a deal” with Iran “or we’ll have to do something very tough.” Whenever Trump speaks, it can be challenging to tell what is bombast, what to take seriously, what is pure fiction, and what is reality.
So here are five realities to keep in mind as White House officials escalate their threats.
1: Trump says he’s trying to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. But it’s the United States and its allies that are the greatest nuclear threat.
The United States, not Iran, is the country setting the worst example in promoting nuclear weapons in the world today — and making nuclear-armed conflict more possible.
Trump just let the START nuclear arms control treaty with Russia lapse, resulting in no existing bilateral agreements regarding nuclear weapons between the two countries in the world with the most warheads. The U.S. is giving unconditional backing to Israel — the only country in the Middle East that actually has nuclear weapons. And the Trump administration is now supporting the launch of a nuclear program in Saudi Arabia.
Regarding Iran, Trump pulled out of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) during his first term, which had required Iran to limit its uranium enrichment and accept extensive monitoring by the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog agency — and for the U.S. to lift some of its harsh, devastating sanctions in exchange. Iran was abiding by the terms of the deal — which ensured that its nuclear program continued developing materials only for civilian use, not weapons — and the UN certified that Iran was in compliance.
But Trump still abandoned the agreement in 2018 in favor of what he called the “Maximum Pressure Campaign,” in which the U.S. re-imposed sanctions and deployed more troops and weapons to the Middle East to threaten Iran. Then, in 2020, the U.S. assassinated Iranian General Qasem Soleimani—a key figure in Iran’s foreign policy and a popular political leader.
If the hope is that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons, Trump’s policy is pushing the country in the opposite direction. Trump’s escalation of sanctions and military hostility despite Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal only bolsters the claim of Iranian leaders who are skeptical toward negotiations that the country needs nuclear weapons as the only deterrent against aggression.
2: Trump is contributing to the suffering of ordinary Iranians, not rescuing them.
The Iranian government is carrying out a brutal crackdown on protesters and critics. Experts now put the toll at more than 7,000 killed — although given the government’s control of media and the internet, it is impossible to know the extent of the killing.
Trump has claimed that the U.S. is “coming to the rescue” of Iranians who are challenging their government. But in reality, his actions have put countless Iranians in harm’s way.
Last September, Trump deported 55 people back to Iran in a deal his administration made with the Iranian government — the same government the president is now decrying — after detaining them for months and threatening to deport them to Somalia or Sudan. In December, Trump deported 55 more back to Iran.
In January, Trump even deported a dozen people to Iran during the government’s crackdown.
Meanwhile, Trump is maintaining the decades-long U.S. policy of economic sanctions on Iran, which has crashed the country’s currency and isolated it in the world economy. This has devastated the country’s population — especially women, children, the sick, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable people. And last June, Washington joined Israel in its air war on Iran, which killed more than 1,000 people—including children — and wounded more than 5,000.
A policy that is actually guided by concern for Iranians would involve stopping the detention and deportation of Iranians in the U.S., lifting the sanctions against Iran, and refraining from further military attacks on the country.
3: The United States has shown that it is an unreliable negotiator.
Iran entered the JCPOA with the U.S., Europe, Russia, and China, and complied with it, but Trump unilaterally withdrew from it anyway. His successor, former President Joe Biden, did not seriously pursue a return to the nuclear deal while he was in office.
So how could Iran — or any country — now take the U.S. seriously at the negotiating table? What is the point in entering an agreement if the next U.S. president is going to walk away from it and return to a hostile posture?
Since Trump took office for his second term last year, his administration has vacillated between the longstanding U.S. position that Iran cannot be allowed to get a nuclear weapon, and the notion that Iran cannot have any nuclear program at all, including the kind of civilian nuclear power program explicitly allowed to all non-nuclear weapons states by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The latter, more extreme position has long been held by Israel, whose government Trump has been in close contact with throughout the negotiations with Tehran.
In its current negotiations, the U.S. keeps moving the goal posts, going from the demand that Iran not develop a nuclear weapons to saying that the country’s nuclear program, its treatment of dissidents, its relationship with regional allies, and its ballistic missile arsenal would be on the negotiating table, but without clarity about what the administration meant. As Trump put it bizarrely in an interview with FOX News, the deal he wants should have “no nuclear weapons, no missiles, no this, no that, all the different things that you want.”
4: The United States is aggressively threatening Iran, not the other way around.
On February 3, a U.S. fighter jet from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln shot down an Iranian drone that White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said was “acting aggressively.” But it is Trump’s deployment of the Abraham Lincoln itself—along with 5,700 additional U.S. troops and other warships and planes—that constitutes an act of aggression.
Trump has moved these weapons and troops to the Middle East to join the tens of thousands already stationed there. This is coming after the U.S. bombed Iran last June and carried out a major military operation in Venezuela in January, all raising the threat level of what military actions the U.S. was prepared to take. Trump has deployed a second aircraft carrier, the Gerald R. Ford—with its thousands of troops, dozens of warplanes, accompanying warships, and more — to the waters off Iran to join the USS Abraham Lincoln already deployed there.
Iran does have a recent history of deploying its military forces in the Middle East — participating in Syria’s civil war, for example. But Iran never attacked Israel directly before April 2024 and has never been anywhere close to matching Washington’s military capacity or breadth of power projection in the region. Iran’s allies have been decimated by Israel’s assaults over the last several years, and Iran’s own military power has been set back by the June 2025 Israeli-U.S. attack.
U.S. military bases across the region surround Iran with troops and weapons, but there are no Iranian troops or military assets anywhere near the United States. There is no question that the most aggressive Middle Eastern power at the moment is Washington’s ally Israel — which continues its genocide in Gaza and has attacked six countries in the last year alone — all enabled through military assistance, arms transfers, and political protection by the United States.
5: Trump’s threats against Iran — and his aggressive foreign policy generally — are unpopular with Americans.
The majority of Americans — 61 percent—disapprove of Trump’s aggressive foreign policy in general. Almost half of all Americans — 48 percent—disapprove of the U.S. attacking Iran, while only 28 percent approve. Attacking Iran is not popular, and Trump definitely does not have a mandate to do it.
The first year of this Trump administration has involved a rampage of militarism — from masked, armed ICE agents storming communities across the United States to bombings and other attacks in Somalia, Yemen, Iran, Nigeria, the Caribbean, and Venezuela. Trump has threatened Greenland and armed Israel’s violence against Palestinians.
Whatever criticisms one could have of Iran’s government, they do not justify an assault by the United States military, which would only compound the suffering of innocent Iranian civilians. As the White House beats the drums of war, we should keep in mind that it is the U.S. that is threatening the world, not Iran.
This article was jointly published by FPIF and In These Times Magazine.
Iran Attacked by the US and Israel When Peace Was Within Reach

Screengrab from Trump’s announcement of the US/Israeli attack on Iran.
US and Iranian negotiators met in Geneva earlier this week in what mediators described as the most serious and constructive talks in years. Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, spoke publicly of “unprecedented openness,” signalling that both sides were exploring creative formulations rather than repeating entrenched positions. Discussions showed flexibility on nuclear limits and sanctions relief, and mediators indicated that a principles agreement could have been reached within days, with detailed verification mechanisms to follow within months.
These were not hollow gestures. Real diplomatic capital was being spent. Iranian officials floated proposals designed to meet US political realities – including potential access to energy sectors and economic cooperation. These were gestures calibrated to allow Donald Trump to present any deal as tougher and more advantageous than the 2015 agreement he withdrew the US from in May 2018. Tehran appeared to understand the optics Washington required, even if contentious issues such as ballistic missiles and regional proxy networks remained outside the immediate framework. Then, in the middle of these talks, the bridge was shattered.
Sensing how close the negotiations were — and how imminent military escalation had become — Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, made an emergency dash to Washington in a last-ditch effort to preserve the diplomatic track.
In an unusually public move for a mediator, he appeared on CBS to outline just how far the talks had progressed. He described a deal that would eliminate Iranian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, down-blend existing material inside Iran, and allow full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — with the possibility of US inspectors participating alongside them. Iran, he suggested, would enrich only for civilian purposes. A principles agreement, he indicated, could be signed within days. It was a remarkable disclosure — effectively revealing the contours of a near-breakthrough in an attempt to prevent imminent war.
But rather than allowing diplomacy to conclude, the US and Israel have launched coordinated strikes across Iran. Explosions were reported in Tehran and other cities. Trump announced “major combat operations,”, framing them as necessary to eliminate nuclear and missile threats while urging Iranians to seize the moment and overthrow their leadership. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks targeting US bases and allied states across the region.
What is most striking is not merely that diplomacy failed, but that it failed amid visible progress. Mediators were openly discussing a viable framework; both sides had demonstrated flexibility – a pathway to constrain nuclear escalation appeared tangible. Choosing military escalation at that moment undermines the premise that negotiation is a genuine alternative to war. It signals that even active diplomacy offers no guarantee of restraint. Peace was not naïve. It was plausible.
Iran’s approach in Geneva was strategic, not submissive. Proposals involving economic incentives – including energy cooperation – were not unilateral concessions but calculated compromises designed to structure a politically survivable agreement in Washington. The core objective was clear: constrain Iran’s nuclear programme through enforceable limits and intrusive verification, thereby addressing the very proliferation risks that sanctions and threats of force were meant to prevent.
Talks had moved beyond rhetorical posturing toward concrete proposals. For the first time in years, there was credible movement toward stabilising the nuclear issue. By attacking during that negotiation window, Washington and its allies have not only derailed a diplomatic opening but have cast doubt on the durability of American commitments to negotiated solutions. The message to Tehran – and to other adversaries weighing diplomacy – is stark: even when talks appear to work, they can be overtaken by force.
Iran is not Iraq or Libya
Advocates of escalation often invoke Iraq in 2003 or Libya in 2011 as precedents for rapid regime collapse under pressure. Those analogies are misleading. Iraq and Libya were highly personalised systems, overly dependent on narrow patronage networks and individual rulers. Remove the centre, and the structure imploded.
Iran is structurally different. It is not a dynastic dictatorship but an ideologically entrenched state with layered institutions, doctrinal legitimacy and a deeply embedded security apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Its authority is intertwined with religious, political and strategic narratives cultivated over decades. It has endured sanctions, regional isolation and sustained external pressure without fracturing.
Even a previous US-Israeli campaign in 2025 that lasted 12 days failed to eliminate Tehran’s retaliatory capacity. Far from collapsing, the state absorbed pressure and responded. Hitting such a system with maximum force does not guarantee implosion; it may instead consolidate internal cohesion and reinforce narratives of external aggression that the leadership has long leveraged.
The mirage of regime change
Rhetoric surrounding the strikes has already shifted from tactical objectives to the language of regime change. US and Israeli leaders framed military action not solely as neutralising missile or nuclear capabilities, but as an opportunity for Iranians to overthrow their government. That calculus – regime change by force – is historically fraught with risk.
The Iraq invasion should be a cautionary tale. The US spent more than a decade cultivating multiple Iraqi opposition groups – yet dismantling the centralised state apparatus still produced chaos, insurgency and fragmentation. The vacuum gave rise to extremist organisations such as IS, drawing the US into years of renewed conflict.
Approaching Iran with similar assumptions ignores both its institutional resilience and the complexity of regional geopolitics. Sectarian divisions, entrenched alliances and proxy networks mean that destabilisation in Tehran would not remain contained. It could rapidly spill across borders and harden into prolonged confrontation.
A region wired for escalation
Iran has invested heavily in asymmetric capabilities precisely to deter and complicate external intervention. Its missile, drone and naval systems are embedded along the Strait of Hormuz — a chokepoint for global energy — and linked into a network of regional allies and militias.
In the current escalation, Tehran has already launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes against US military bases and allied territories in the Gulf, hitting locations in Iraq, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (including Abu Dhabi), Kuwait and Qatar in direct response to US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s cities, including Tehran, Qom and Isfahan. Explosions have been reported in Bahrain and the UAE, with at least one confirmed fatality in Abu Dhabi, and several bases housing US personnel have been struck or targeted, underscoring how the conflict has already spread beyond Iran’s borders
A full-scale regional war is now more likely than it was a week ago. Miscalculation could draw multiple states into conflict, inflame sectarian fault lines and disrupt global energy markets. What might have remained a contained nuclear dispute now risks expanding into a wider geopolitical confrontation.
What about Trump’s promise of no more forever wars?
Trump built his political brand opposing “endless wars” and criticising the Iraq invasion. “America First” promised strategic restraint, hard bargaining and an aversion to open-ended intervention. Escalating militarily at the very moment diplomacy was advancing sits uneasily with that doctrine and revives questions about the true objectives of US strategy in the Middle East.
If a workable nuclear framework was genuinely emerging, abandoning it in favour of escalation invites a deeper question: does sustained tension serve certain strategic preferences more comfortably than durable peace?
Trump’s Mar-a-Lago address announcing the strikes carried unmistakable echoes of George W. Bush before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Military action was framed as reluctant yet necessary – a pre-emptive move to eliminate gathering threats and secure peace through strength. The rhetoric of patience exhausted and danger confronted before it fully materialises closely mirrors the language Bush used to justify the march into Baghdad.
The parallel extends beyond tone. Bush cast the Iraq war as liberation as well as disarmament, promising Iraqis freedom from dictatorship. Trump similarly urged Iranians to reclaim their country, implicitly linking force to regime change. In Iraq, that fusion of shock and salvation produced not swift democratic renewal but prolonged instability. The assumption that military force can reorder political systems from the outside has already been tested – and its costs remain visible.
The central challenge now facing the US is not simply Iran’s military capability. It is credibility. Abandoning negotiations mid-course signals that diplomacy can be overridden by force even when progress is visible. That perception will resonate far beyond Tehran.
Peace was never guaranteed. It was limited and imperfect, focused primarily on nuclear constraints rather than human rights or regional proxy networks. But it was plausible – and closer than many assumed. Breaking the bridge while building it does more than halt a single agreement – it risks convincing both sides that negotiation itself is futile.
In that world, trust erodes, deterrence hardens and aggression – not agreement – becomes the default language of international power. What we are witnessing is yet another clear indication that the rules-based order has been consigned to the history books.![]()
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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