Bridging BRICS And The Asia Pacific: Vietnam’s Partner Role And The Future Of Multipolarity – Analysis

September 8, 2026

By Dr. Reena Marwah


Key Takeaways:

Vietnam joined BRICS as a partner country after Brazil backed its June 2025 bid. It crossed World Bank upper-middle-income status in July 2026 (GNI per capita $4,970 in 2025) and is now a China+1 factory hub with CSPs to 14 states plus the EU.

May 2026: ties with India rose to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (13 deals, $25bn trade target by 2030). India chairs the 18th BRICS Summit on supply chains, digital payments, AI, and climate finance. Vietnam hosts APEC 2027.

Hanoi should bank early India wins (defence, ports, green tech), use BRICS for finance without dropping ASEAN, and stay multi-aligned. India’s job as chair: a useful New Delhi Declaration, not a quarrel club.

When Brazil welcomed the decision of the Vietnamese government on June 13, 2025 to join BRICS, it acknowledged its relevance to the interests of the grouping. “Vietnam stands out as a relevant actor in Asia. Its efforts in favor of South-South cooperation and sustainable development reinforce its convergence with the interests of the group,” stated the government of Brazil. Founded in 2009 and soon expanded to add South Africa, the group included Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, making it a growing diplomatic counterweight to traditional Western powers.

Vietnam’s strategic geography and sustained economic dynamism make it a substantive addition to BRICS. Having transformed from a nation scarred by colonialism and prolonged conflict into a reformoriented economy focused on growth and poverty alleviation, Vietnam, crossed the World Bank’s uppermiddleincome threshold in July 2026, with GNI per capita rising to US$4,970 in 2025.

Forty years after the Đổi Mới reforms redirected Vietnam from central planning toward marketoriented policies, the country has integrated key elements of the East Asian development model, particularly its focus on exportled industrialisation. This transformation—driven by rising inward foreign direct investment and a structural shift from agriculture to manufacturing—has positioned Vietnam as an effective alternative manufacturing hub to China. Moreover, it is now a key node in global supply chains. Vietnam’s low labor costs, political stability, and manufacturing incentives have driven a massive wave of foreign investment in export factories. This momentum is accelerated by strategic proximity to Asian suppliers, key global trade pacts, and a growing push by multinationals to diversify their supply chains outside of China.


By 2026, Vietnam had pursued an extensive diversification of its external relations, trading with more than 50 countries and establishing Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with 14 states and the European Union. This network bridges the Global North and Global South, encompassing major powers such as the United States, China, Russia, India, Japan, and South Korea; advanced middle powers including Australia, France, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand; and key ASEAN partners—Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand.
BRICS Summit 2026: India’s focus on Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability

Although 2026 marks India’s third tenure as BRICS Chair since the grouping’s inception, this chairship of the 18th Summit unfolds amid structural realignments in geopolitics, trade, technology, energy, and supply chains that are diluting the dominance of Western-led institutions and amplifying the strategic weight of emerging economies.


Under its chairship, India is advancing an agenda focused on resilient supply chains, digital public infrastructure, local-currency settlement, AI and innovation cooperation, climate finance, and reforms to global governance—priorities that collectively seek to reposition BRICS as a platform for Global South agency rather than merely an alternative forum. The bloc’s institutional expansion—now encompassing 11 full members and a new “partner country” format that includes Vietnam—further underscores BRICS’ evolving role as a multi-speed coalition shaping norms and resources in a fragmenting global order.

For Vietnam, 2026 is a strategic inflection point that combines a qualitative upgrade in ties with India and a new institutional foothold in BRICS, offering concrete levers to diversify partnerships, de-risk supply chains, and amplify Hanoi’s voice in emerging economic and technological governance.

The context is important. Following General Secretary and President Tô Lâm’s state visit to India in May 2026, Vietnam and India elevated their relationship to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (ECSP), framed around “shared vision, strategic convergence, substantive cooperation.” The upgrade—supported by 13 cooperation agreements and a $25 billion bilateral trade target by 2030—signals a shift from broad-based engagement to prioritized, outcome-oriented collaboration in defence and maritime security, connectivity and logistics, green transition, and technology. In parallel, Vietnam’s inclusion as a BRICS Partner Country creates an additional institutional channel to access development finance, deepen South–South cooperation, and engage on supply-chain resilience, local-currency settlement, digital public infrastructure, and climate adaptation—complementing its ASEAN-centric diplomacy and upcoming 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in 2027, which Vietnam will host. Moreover, it places Vietnam within a structured track in emerging-economy coalitions.

Together, the Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (ECSP) with India, Vietnam’s regional influence within ASEAN, its upcoming role as host of APEC 2027, and its status as a BRICS Partner Country collectively expand Hanoi’s strategic optionality. These overlapping frameworks reduce over-reliance on any single great-power corridor by diversifying security, technology, and infrastructure partners across multiple minilateral and plurilateral platforms. They also create bargaining leverage in negotiating technology transfer, standards, and financing terms, allowing Vietnam to extract better conditions from both traditional and emerging partners. Most importantly, they enable Hanoi to help shape, rather than merely adapt to, evolving rules on trade, cross-border payments, and technology governance in the Indo-Pacific, positioning Vietnam as a rule-shaper in critical domains of economic and digital statecraft.

The way forward for Vietnam

To operationalise the ECSP with India, Vietnam should prioritise early-win projects in defence co-production, port and logistics connectivity, renewable energy, and digital/AI cooperation. Concrete deliverables in these areas will convert the upgraded political framework into measurable outcomes, build domestic and international confidence in the partnership, and generate momentum for deeper integration in high-value sectors.

To leverage its BRICS partner status, Vietnam should actively engage BRICS working groups on trade, finance, and technology. This includes seeking access to development finance instruments, local-currency payment mechanisms, and supply-chain resilience initiatives that align with Vietnam’s industrial strategy and reduce exposure to external shocks and currency volatility.

Finally, Vietnam must carefully calibrate its multi-alignment strategy by using the India–BRICS track to balance ASEAN priorities and major-power dynamics. The objective should be to ensure that diversification across India, BRICS, ASEAN, and other partners enhances, rather than fragments, Vietnam’s core strategic posture in the region, preserving strategic autonomy while maximising economic and security benefits.

Hence, while members, partners, and non-members alike will scrutinise the final outcomes of the 2026 BRICS Summit—codified in the New Delhi Declaration—prospective partners will be watching closely for tangible deliverables and economic benefits that could accrue to them. The imperative for India’s chairmanship is clear: BRICS must avoid being drawn into bilateral disputes or narrow national agendas, and instead demonstrate that it can function as a resilient, issue-based coalition that offers a complementary—not confrontational—alternative to the existing global order.

About Dr. Reena Marwah
Dr. Reena Marwah has published over 20 books; she is the author of Reimagining India-Thailand Relations, published in 2020; World Scientific Publishers, Singapore. She is a Professor at Jesus and Mary College, University of Delhi and Former Senior Fellow, and Senior Academic Consultant, Indian Council for Social Science Research Ministry of Human Resource Development, Govt. of India Founding Editor, Millennial Asia- A Sage Publication (A biannual Journal of Asian studies).
View all posts by Dr. Reena Marwah →

What Does Scaling Down Joint Military Drills By US With South Korea Mean For East Asian Security? – Analysis


File photo of the 2025 US-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. Photo Credit: Army.mil

August 19, 2026

By Dr. Rajaram Panda

Key Takeaways:

The US and South Korea launched the Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026 exercises (17–27 August), expanding focus beyond conventional scenarios to counter drones, GPS disruption, electronic warfare and cyberattacks in response to North Korea’s evolving capabilities.

Pyongyang’s military experience in Ukraine, closer ties with Russia, and continued missile and nuclear development have intensified the perceived threat, while constitutional changes formalize South Korea as a separate hostile state.

President Trump’s simultaneous announcement of plans to “substantially reduce” the joint drills, citing costs and his relationship with Kim Jong-un, has unsettled Seoul and raised broader questions about alliance reliability and deterrence on the peninsula.

The United States and South Korea commenced their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise from 17 to 27 August 2026, incorporating exercises to counter drones, GSP disruption and cyberattacks as they adapt to North Korea’s evolving capabilities. The allies said in a joint statement that the UFS will test operations and support the South Korean government’s emergency readiness drills. The exercise reflects the changing character of war, including the growing use of unmanned systems, electronic warfare and cyber operations.

The perceptions in both the US and South Korea about threats from North Korea has intensified in recent times after Pyongyang established close relations with Russia following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 and Kim Jong-un’s deployment of North Korean soldiers to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine. This experience by North Korea has helped to further develop and expand its nuclear and missile capabilities and taking an increasingly confrontational position towards South Korea. It transpires therefore that the involvement of North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war against Ukraine is a factor in the changing threat environment.

The drills therefore are intended to focus on sophisticated North Korean threats to the Korean Peninsula and the defence of South Korea. The drills would reflect the growing importance of unmanned systems, electronic warfare and cyber operations. In the drills, about 18,000 South Korean troops took part, a scale similar to previous exercises. The exercise will also test South Korea’s ability to maintain government operations and emergency preparedness during a crisis. This year, the military exercise is intended to go beyond conventional battlefield scenarios.

In view of the gains North Korea earned in warfare technology from its Ukraine experience, both the US and South Korea now feel compelled to prepare for a conflict that may no longer be dominated by traditional artillery and missile exchanges. Disruption of communications, GPS systems, military networks and critical infrastructure could become equally important elements of a future confrontation. North Korean forces return from Ukraine with new battlefield knowledge. Russia too has been providing addition military or technological assistance, thereby helping Pyongyang improve aspects of its own military doctrine and capabilities. For the US and South Korea, this new situation creates a more complicated security environment.

Despite innumerable sanctions imposed against North Korea because of its relentless pursuit of nuclear and missile development programs and marching towards further sophistications, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is not bothered. Kim knows that nuclear deterrence is the only means of regime survival and in no way is willing to barter away for any incentives. Kim is aware of the fate that Iraq’s Saddam Hussain and Libya’s Mohammad Gadafy and would not like to face a similar fate. Maintaining its nuclear weapons programs and expanding ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, artillery systems and other conventional weapons are the only guarantees for keeping the regime afloat.


North Korea has demonstrated to the world that expanding ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, artillery systems and other conventional weapons are unstoppable. In early August 2026, North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile banned by the United Nations towards the sea, underscoring its continued testing and development of missile systems. Pyongyang has repeatedly condemned US-South Korean military exercises as provocative and has historically described them as preparations for an invasion. Washington and Seoul, however, maintain that the exercises are defensive and designed to strengthen their ability to respond to an attack.

The on-going drills are likely to reinforce the familiar cycle on the peninsula: North Korean weapons development prompts greater military preparedness by the allies. At the same time, these exercises provide Pyongyang with further justification for expanding its own military capabilities. Interestingly, the exercises are taking place at a time when both Koreas have hardened ties following Pyongyang abandoning previous references to reconciliation and reunification and now define South Korea as a separate and hostile entity. Pyongyang revised its constitution recently and removed references to reunification and defined North Korean territory as bordering South Korea.

At the same time, Pyongyang describes itself as a “responsible nuclear weapons state” and committed to continuing the development of its nuclear capabilities. While this shift represents more than rhetorical escalation, it indicates and vindicates Pyongyang’s views that its nuclear arsenal as a permanent element of its national security strategy rather than simply a bargaining tool for negotiations.


The larger question is, why this US-South Korea joint military exercise is important and what purpose it serves?

One thing remains undisputed, that the exercises extend beyond the number of troops participating. The exercise reflects a broader transformation in how South Korea and the US prepare for a potential conflict when that occurs. For South Korea, the stakes are particularly high. Its densely populated territory and proximity to North Korean artillery and missile systems leave little room for error during a crisis. Seoul takes comfort that the US maintains a major military presence on the peninsula and regards the defence of South Korea as a central element of its Indo-Pacific security commitments.

The truism is that the exercises risk reinforcing the security dilemma that has defined relations on the peninsula for decades. While the US and South Korea view military drills as necessary deterrence, Pyongyang interprets them as evidence of hostile intentions and responds by strengthening its own military capabilities. The latest bonhomie between North Korea and Russia further complicates the matter. This larger geopolitical realignment poses bigger challenge to both Washington and Seoul.

Trump scaling down drills upsets Seoul

Amid the ongoing joint military drills, US President shocked Seoul with his announcement that the US shall “substantially reduce” joint military exercises with South Korea, citing his “very good relationship” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. This was his way to punish Seoul after South Korea declined to join the US in the “denuclearisation” of Iran. Trump reasoned that the exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the US but sends a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile. While Trump posted an old photograph of himself and Kim from June 2019, writing the two were great friends, thereby hinting his willingness to have a fourth summit with Kim anytime soon, South Korea’s presidential Blue House said it would continue diplomatic consultations on military cooperation with the US related to the Strait of Hormuz.

The US walking back from the drills was never an option as the same would have carried high cost with relatively little benefit. In order to maintain peace and stability and stem tensions in the Korean peninsula, it is essential for the military forces of both the US and South Korea to remain in perpetual readiness. Therefore Trump has taken the risk of scaling down the drills, which can damage alliance coordination, slow the process of South Korea taking on greater responsibility for its own defence, and weaken deterrence against possible conflicts in Asia. While Trump need to understand that the cost saving from downsizing drills would be marginal, the diplomatic benefits for relations with Pyongyang are doubtful. Seoul would take comfort that about 28,500 American military personnel are stationed in South Korea.

Seoul faces a critical dilemma. Seoul is seized of the fact that Trump was the first ever sitting US President to set foot in North Korea when he visited seven years ago and had two summits with Kim, first in Singapore and then in Hanoi, both yielding with no result. He also crossed the DMZ a fourth time symbolically to please Kim. This time around, Seoul takes a mixed message from Trump’s statement on Kim. If Trump is really keen to bring back Kim to the table, Seoul would be too happy to support. But what would worry Seoul more is Trump’s displeasure that Seoul was unwilling to make direct military or logistical contributions to the US hostilities with Iran. At the same time Seoul would not be too disappointed given that other US allies such as Japan, France and the UK expressed unwillingness to get involved in Trump’s war with Iran.


Seoul is also aware that Trump’s move to downsize joint military exercises with South Korea is not without precedent. Trump had suspended the exercises entirely in 2018, during denuclearisation negotiations with Kim during his first term, saying that the drills were provocative towards North Korea. The exercises were again scaled back in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. It was not surprising therefore when this time too Trump announced to scale down the drills.

Trump’s downscaling threat is a part of the larger US agenda. For quite some time, Trump has been putting pressure on both allies in East Asia – Japan and South Korea – to spend more on their defences and increase their share in security burden, as he feels that the US is providing security to the allies without getting much in return. Seoul has tried to allay US concerns and committed $350 billion investment in the US.

Kim’s larger gambit is to have another summit with Kim Jong-un as soon as possible, as negotiations with Iran falter. He has asked his officials to work out a summit meeting with Kim as early as in November during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China. Trump may be still aiming at his goal for a Nobel by securing a deal with Kim on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program.

However, Trump’s desire to have a summit with Kim is likely to remain as a pipedream as Kim’s nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities have expanded since the 2018 Singapore summit and 2019 Hanoi summit. Both talks collapsed after Trump rejected Kim’s demand for sanctions relief without an agreement to dismantle all of North Korea’s nuclear activities. It is estimated that North Korea has around 60 nuclear warheads and enough fissile material for as many as 90. Pyongyang maintains these as its deterrence ability and as insurance for regime survival, and is unlikely to surrender in any circumstance.

Even when talks for a possible summit with Kim are doing the round, Trump’s downsizing the joint military drill is keenly watched by Japan, Russia and China. In particular, China and Russia are dissecting Trump’s foreign policy and how easily the US President could abandon the US allies in East Asia. The defence community in the US have expressed disappointment with Trump’s decision to scale down the drills. Even if Trump is honestly trying to have another summit with Kim, its fate could not be any different than the outcomes of Singapore and Hanoi. The collateral damage would have been he would have lost trust as a dependable ally of South Korea and Japan, compelling both to explore other ways to secure their security. There are also talks that scaling down exercises is a precondition to talks with Kim. As of now, the claim cannot be verified. At a time when both Japan and South Korea host around 54,000 and 28,500 US troops, respectively, Trump’s demands that both cough up more cash for defense, besides issuance of onerous tariffs, and now downsizing the military drills would inevitably fuel doubts about Washington’s commitment to Asia. Kim has shown virtually no interest for talks with Trump, much less on denuclearisation.

About Dr. Rajaram Panda

Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library (PMML). Earlier Dr Panda was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, JAPAN. His latest book "India and Japan: Past, Present and Future" was published in 2024 by Knowledge World. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com
View all posts by Dr. Rajaram Panda →

 

Immune 'reprogramming' could protect poultry from deadly diseases without antibiotics, study finds

University of Bristol

A naturally occurring gut molecule that could strengthen chickens’ immune response against a wide range of bacterial infections, has been identified by University of Bristol-led research.  This new breakthrough, published in The Journal of Immunology today [12 August], offers a major step forward in sustainable farming and the global fight against antibiotic resistance.

It has long been a challenge in agriculture to protect livestock from widespread pathogens like Salmonella and Avian Pathogenic E. coli (APEC) without relying heavily on antibiotics. Overuse of these drugs in farming contributes directly to the global crisis of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), which threatens both animal and human medicine.

Working with primary chicken immune cells and cell lines, the research team traced how sodium butyrate, a short-chain fatty acid naturally produced by gut bacteria, acts as an immune system programmer. By exposing developing immune cells, called macrophages, to this compound, the researchers successfully trained the chickens' natural immune defences to fight future infections.

The study found that these reprogrammed chicken immune cells showed a dramatic increase in their ability to kill a wide range of dangerous bacteria, including multiple strains of E. coli, Salmonella, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Staphylococcus aureus.

Crucially, the research found a time frame within which the immune reprogramming takes place.  The immune system upgrade only occurs if the molecule is introduced during the early, plastic stages of the immune cells' development. When applied to fully mature cells, the treatment failed to improve their disease-fighting capabilities, providing vital clues for how this method must be timed in real-world farming.

Unlike traditional immune training agents that cause high levels of tissue-damaging inflammation, sodium butyrate works through an alternative, cleaner route.  It encourages cells to use a precise two-pronged internal attack: boosting the production of destructive oxygen molecules (reactive oxygen species) and accelerating ‘autophagy’, a cellular self-cleaning process that traps and digests invading germs.

Shahriar Behboudi, Professor of Immunology in the Bristol Veterinary School and senior author of the study, said: “Our findings suggest that trained immunity exists along a much wider spectrum of phenotypes than previously thought.

“By demonstrating that a natural gut metabolite can program immune cells through an alternative, non-inflammatory axis, we open up exciting new possibilities for enhancing animal health naturally, without the collateral damage of excessive inflammation.”

Dr James Adams, a Research Fellow in the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Surrey and the first author on the paper, added: “The increasing spread of diseases amongst chickens is of great concern. Bacterial diseases cause significant animal health and welfare issues in poultry, incurring devastating economic losses and potential disruption to our food chain. 

“Antimicrobial resistance is complicating the management of disease in poultry.  Therefore, it is crucial that we develop new ways of controlling bacterial infections in poultry.”

The study’s findings offer a vital framework to help the poultry industry and policymakers design nature-positive farming systems.

As poultry is a major global food source, protecting flocks from disease using natural metabolic compounds is essential for both food security and sustainable development.

The team hopes these findings will pave the way for new gut-health strategies in everyday agriculture, improving animal welfare and reducing the world's reliance on antibiotics.

The collaborative research, led by the University of Bristol, the University of Surrey, and The Pirbright Institute, was funded by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) and the British Egg Marketing Board Research and Education Trust.

---

Journal

The Journal of Immunology

DOI

10.1093/jimmun/vkag209 

Method of Research

Experimental study

Subject of Research

Cells

Article Title

‘Innate immune reprogramming of chicken macrophages by sodium butyrate enhances ROS-mediated antimicrobial responses in vitro

Article Publication Date

12-Aug-2026

South China Sea tensions drive a quiet realignment against Beijing

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By Mark Buckton in Taipei June 4, 2026

The geopolitical map of maritime Asia is gradually changing. Not dramatically so and not by way of formal alliances, but through a steady coming together of interests among states increasingly concerned by China's growing power in the South China Sea region.

Nowhere else is that clearer than in the Philippines.

For years, Manila has maintained unofficial and close ties with Taiwan just to the north, while carefully observing Beijing’s preferred ‘One China’ policy. That position has not formally changed as was seen in late March when both countries came together in Quanzhou, Fujian Province for the 24th China–Philippines Foreign Ministry Consultations then last month when the Philippines participated in the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade meeting in Suzhou, China.

The practical relationship though is becoming steadily deeper, particularly in the fields of security and maritime affairs. To this end, recent comments from Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro mark perhaps the strongest public signal yet.

Speaking in the past week at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Teodoro said the Philippines was seeking closer ties with Taiwan as part of a broader effort to deter China's "nefarious plans". In doing so, he described Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam as part of a growing network of countries pursuing what he called a "convergence endeavour" aimed at strengthening regional security, according to Taiwan’s Taipei Times.

Speaking so openly against China is rarely done at this level.

For decades, many Southeast Asian governments have actively sought to avoid being drawn into any tensions related to the Taiwan Strait and Chinese claims on democratic Taiwan. However, today that is changing. Philippine officials increasingly view Taiwan's security as directly linked to their own. At their closest point the shortest distance between Taiwan and the Philippines is just 88 miles across the Bashi Channel between southern Taiwan and the Batanes Islands of the northern Philippines.

Geography thus explains much of this shift. Taiwan sits just north of the Philippines across the Luzon Strait – of which the Bashi Channel makes up the southern part – a waterway through which global military forces and commercial shipping move between the Pacific and the South China Sea. Because of this proximity to internationally used waterways, any conflict involving Taiwan would almost inevitably affect the Philippines, most noticeably in the form of blocking trade routes and national security.

In recent years, Manila's concerns have intensified as confrontations with Chinese vessels have become more and more frequent around disputed features in the South China Sea (see map above).

Philippine officials on an almost weekly basis warn that Chinese activities pose a significant security threat regardless of the on-again, off-again bromance between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President-for-life, Xi Jinping.

At the same time, unofficial links between Taiwan and the Philippines have broadened with trade figures pointing to Philippine imports from Taiwan rising 18.6% year-on-year to over $4.7bn in 2025 and Manila’s exports to Taiwan up 22.1% year-on-year at $3.3bn. Because of this, Taiwan is now among the Philippines’ top 10 trading partners, local Taiwanese media reports.

Bloomberg also recently reported growing exchanges involving business leaders and security officials holding discussions on coastguard cooperation and maritime security. While still falling short of formal defence cooperation in any official manner, the direction the relationship is taking is increasingly clear.

Add to this Taiwan's role in advanced semiconductor production on the global stage and the nation’s role as a tech supplier is evident for both the Philippine government in Manila and others across Asia.

In turn, Taiwanese President (William) Lai Ching-te, like his predecessor, has repeatedly argued that stability in the Taiwan Strait is critical not only for regional security but also for global supply chains.

As such, for the Philippines, attracting Taiwanese investment and in particular technology offers economic benefits alongside potentially military aid in the event of conflict with the result being a relationship that is increasingly ‘official’ in all but name.

The Philippines is not alone – other countries bordering the South China Sea are also starting to push back against China.

Surprisingly given shared Communist ideals is Vietnam, which has become one of the region's most active challengers of Chinese maritime claims. In doing so, Hanoi continues to expand facilities and reclaimed land on islands and reefs it occupies in the heavily contested Spratly chain, while at the same time it maintains extensive political and economic ties with Beijing, according to The Star.

That China and Taiwan as well as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei also claim parts of the Spratlys only complicates the issue.

Vietnam's approach though is often described as "bamboo diplomacy" in that it is highly flexible and designed to avoid choosing sides – shared border with China notwithstanding – with President To Lam of Vietnam recently indicating the importance of strong relations with China while simultaneously reaffirming Vietnam's commitment to protecting its sovereignty and maritime interests, according to Reuters.

Yet beneath the diplomatic language, Hanoi continues building on the islands it currently occupies, strengthening its position in contested waters.

This, coupled to Vietnam's decision earlier in the week to elevate relations with the Philippines to an an enhanced partnership of sorts only reflects the shared concern felt in both Manila and Hanoi as both governments declared that peace and a rules-based order in the South China Sea were "non-negotiable", according to Reuters. In the days since, China has offered little in the way of response.

Malaysia presents a different case altogether, however, as Kuala Lumpur remains much more cautious than either Manila or Hanoi. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has consistently pushed for dialogue and regional solutions rather than any form of confrontation and Malaysia continues to pursue extensive economic engagement with China while at the same time avoiding inflammatory rhetoric – in part perhaps as a result of its long-standing cultural and historical links to China with over 20% of Malaysians being ethnic Chinese.

Even so, Kuala Lumpur has quietly strengthened cooperation with Vietnam and continues to defend its own maritime claims. Bloomberg reported in late 2024 efforts by Vietnam and Malaysia to boost trade and to coordinate more closely on maintaining stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

Elsewhere around the South China Sea, a similar pattern is emerging.

Japan and the Philippines have deepened defence ties. Australia has increased security cooperation across Southeast Asia and Canada and New Zealand are also becoming more active participants in regional maritime initiatives. None are actively looking for confrontation with Beijing and all are seeking greater resilience against potential coercion, according to Bloomberg.

China, meanwhile, is getting increasingly aggressive and continues to assert its myriad claims across the South China Sea. Part of this has seen Chinese forces increase coastguard and maritime patrol activity around disputed areas thousands of kilometres from Chinese shores. Daily air and naval intrusions into Taiwanese economic zones and airspace are the norm for the nation of 24mn.

As such, the significance of Manila's growing engagement with Taiwan extends beyond bilateral ties or agreements to work together and reflects a broader regional trend in that Asian governments are not forming an explicit anti-China bloc. Instead, most remain deeply dependent on trade with Beijing and continue to seek stable relations, but they are slowly coming together to stand up to the neighbourhood bully.

Governments around the South China Sea are increasingly coordinating with one another, in terms of trade and militarily to prepare for a future in which China's maritime ambitions may spill over into open hostilities.

For now, the Philippines has simply moved further and faster than most.

Trump suffers two huge court losses in one day as his legal nemesis hails 'landmark day'

David McAfee
May 31, 2026 

RAW STORY


U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (not pictured) on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, October 29, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein

Norman Eisen, the former White House ethics czar who has been coordinating legal challenges against the Trump administration, declared Friday a landmark day for democracy after courts handed him back-to-back wins on two of the most high-profile cases in his portfolio.

In a Substack post titled "Contrarians Strike Two Mighty Blows Against Trump," Eisen described the victories as among the biggest in his organization's more than 300 active legal cases and matters.

The first came in the Kennedy Center case, where a federal judge blocked the administration's attempt to close the venue for renovations and ordered Donald Trump's name stripped from the building and its official title within two weeks. The court ruled that only Congress has the power to change the name of the national cultural landmark. Eisen helped argue the case alongside Democracy Defenders Action, the Washington Litigation Group, and Rep. Joyce Beatty of Ohio, the lead plaintiff.

The second win came in Florida, where Judge Kathleen Williams reopened Trump's IRS lawsuit after Eisen and his partners filed a motion on behalf of 35 bipartisan former federal judges. The judges argued that Trump's $1.8 billion anti-weaponization settlement was a fraud on the court, used to funnel taxpayer money to political allies while shielding Trump, his sons, and his businesses from future prosecution. Williams launched a formal investigation into whether the court had been deceived.

Eisen noted that additional courts were also moving against the fund. A judge in the Eastern District of Virginia entered a temporary restraining order blocking the $1.8 billion fund from operating while the case is argued, and Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington filed for similar emergency relief in D.C. federal court.

"I don't think I have ever had two of my cases as the top two stories on both The New York Times and The Washington Post websites," Eisen wrote in the Substack piece, "but that happened Friday because these two wins were good news for democracy."

‘A 1-2 Punch Against Trump’s Corruption’: Judge Blocks Renaming, Closure of Kennedy Center

“Congress gave the Kennedy Center its name, and only Congress can change it.”


Workers add President Donald Trump’s name to the John F. Kennedy Memorial Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, DC on December 19, 2025.
(Photo by Heather Diehl/Getty Images)

Brett Wilkins
May 30, 2026
COMMON DREAMS


A federal judge ruled Friday that President Donald Trump’s renaming of the John F. Kennedy Memorial Center for the Performing Arts after himself is illegal and temporarily barred the president from shuttering the Washington, DC cultural institution for renovations.

Trump’s effort to rename the iconic Kennedy Center the Trump-Kennedy Center came after the president used his authority to purge the institution’s board and appoint new trustees. In an unprecedented move, the trustees then voted to make Trump the center’s board chair. Last December, the board voted unanimously to rename the institution—a move that violated federal law.

Congresswoman Joyce Beatty (D-Ohio), an ex officio member of the Kennedy Center board, sued over the name change, which outraged many Americans and, along with Trump’s addition of his name to the US Institute of Peace, sparked legislation aimed at banning the naming or renaming of federal assets after sitting presidents.

“May the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts be renamed absent Congressional authorization? The answer, plain from the face of the statute, is no,” US District Judge Christopher Cooper wrote in his ruling on Beatty’s suit. “Nor can any other individual be memorialized on the front portico of the building.”



Originally called the National Cultural Center, the Kennedy Center was renamed via an act of Congress following former President John F. Kennedy’s 1963 assassination.

“It is hard to imagine a more intentional legislative effort to call the Center by its chosen name,” Cooper—an appointee of former President Barack Obama—wrote. “The organic statute also takes pains to ensure that the Kennedy Center’s public spaces honor President Kennedy and President Kennedy alone... The prohibition is unambiguous.”

“Congress gave the Kennedy Center its name, and only Congress can change it,” the judge added.

Cooper also temporarily blocked Trump’s planned two-year closure of the Kennedy Center for renovations.

“In ratifying President Trump’s closure announcement, the Board was derelict in discharging the full range of its responsibilities to the Center,” he wrote. “More specifically, the Board based its decision on an insufficient, one-sided presentation of information and
neglected to consider the full range of its statutory obligations and potential adverse consequences of closure on programming and memorial functions.”

While Trump claimed the decision to shutter the Kennedy Center was based on input from a group of “many Highly Respected experts,” who said the center was “tired, broken, and dilapidated,” critics including John F. Kennedy’s descendants pointed to artists not wanting to perform there after the president’s takeover and purge, which resulted in programming including the world premier of a documentary film about his wife panned by one critic as “a scowling void of pure nothingness.”

Cooper said that the Kennedy Center could be allowed to close “after independently balancing its multiple obligations to the Center in a prudent fashion.”

Beatty welcomed Cooper’s ruling, which she said “rightly affirms that this administration’s efforts to rename and close the Center have no basis in law.”

“The Kennedy Center is an institution that belongs to the American people, not to Donald Trump,” she added. “He has desecrated this sacred memorial for his own vanity. I am proud to have fought for the rule of law and to protect this sacred institution.”

Trump, meanwhile, took to his Truth Social network to rail against Cooper, “a Judge appointed by Barack Hussein Obama.”

“Cooper ruled that The Kennedy Center, which was going to close in early July for largescale renovations and construction due to years of neglect, decay, and poor maintenance, and which was to be transformed by the Trump Administration into the Finest Facility of its kind, anywhere in the World, is not allowed to close for these renovations, which would not be possible to properly do without such a closure,” the president wrote.

“Additionally, Judge Cooper ruled that the 36 Member Board of Trustees, which unanimously voted to add the name ‘TRUMP’ onto the former Kennedy Center, making it The Trump Kennedy Center, did not have the right to do such an addition, and the name, ‘TRUMP,’ must be removed,” Trump’s screed continued.

“I took great pride in taking over a losing Institution, and looked forward to making it into a Great and Prestigious WINNER for Washington, D.C., and indeed, the United States of America,” he continued. “Unfortunately, Judge Cooper and the Radical Left would rather see it DIE than have President Trump transform it into something that everyone could be proud of, much as I have done, in many cases, throughout my life.”

“Therefore, based on the fact that the Radical Left Democrats care more about opposing your favorite President, ME, than saving a dying Performing Arts Center, almost all of which lose large amounts of money throughout the Country, we are going to be working with Congress to transfer this failing Institution back to them so they can make a determination as to what to do with it,” Trump said.

“Judge Cooper should be ashamed of himself! I cannot be involved with a situation where danger to the Public is allowed to flourish in plain and open sight,” the president wrote. “Unless I am free to do what I do better than anyone else, bring this Institution back, physically, financially, and artistically, I have no interest in continuing what could only be a hopeless journey into ‘NEVER NEVER LAND.’”

“There has never been a President of the United States who has been treated so unfairly by the Courts as I,” he added, “but, that’s OK, I will continue to do, what is considered to be, a great job for the wonderful people of our Country.”

War With Iran, Phase Two: All Three Plausible Explanations Call for One Corrective Action

Thomas Knapp

 May 29, 2026

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Photograph by Nathaniel St. Clair

On May 25, US president Donald Trump went back to war with Iran, launching strikes in the southern part of that country on a laughable claim of “self-defense.”

The previous phase of the war was stupid, evil, and illegal, as is this phase.

It was and is stupid because even given Trump’s constantly shifting (and mostly themselves stupid) objectives, there was no way to “win” it other than nuking all of Iran’s major cities and sending in a massive occupation force for the foreseeable future.

It was and is evil because war is always evil. Noncombatants are killed, injured, and impoverished, purposely or accidentally. There are seldom any “good guys” on the “leadership” level of any side — it’s merely a street gang turf rumble writ large, with regular people caught in the violent middle.

It was and is illegal because here was no declaration of war, and the attack didn’t even meet the minimal  requirements of the War Powers Resolution. Additionally, even if that resolution was constitutional (it wasn’t), Trump had 60 days to get congressional approval for continuing the operations (he didn’t — and no, the clock did not magically “reset” just because he took a brief break).

Wars usually aren’t really “won” in any meaningful sense of the word, but in this war the US regime — and the American people — have clearly lost, no matter the military outcome. It’s already impoverishing us considerably, and we’re only seeing the early impact of a situation which will drag on for a long time regardless of what happens next.

The most obvious indicator, of course, is the price of gasoline at the pump, but the shortages of petroleum products and fertilizer components that usually pass through the Strait of Hormuz will soon become very real in the prices we pay for consumer goods and groceries.

So, here we are: Instead of taking his lumps, letting the war end, and hoping for an economic upturn before the midterm elections mangle his party’s present projects and future prospects, Trump is doubling down.

There are three, and only three, plausible explanations:

Explanation One is that he’s evil, hates America, and is doing his damnedest to destroy the US economy. If that’s the  case the US House of Representatives should impeach him and the US Senate should convict and remove him. His illegal war clearly meets the standard of “high crimes and misdemeanors.”

Explanation Two is that he’s stupid — whether by nature or due to his obvious cognitive decline — and just doesn’t know what he’s doing or understand its moral, political, or economic implications. If that’s the case, the vice-president and a majority of the cabinet should, per the 25th Amendment, “transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,” after which the vice-president can become “acting president” and put a stop to this nonsense.

Explanation Three is that Trump — again, possibly due to the obvious cognitive decline he’s publicly and frequently displayed since before his second inauguration — isn’t in charge; the presidency is effectively controlled by other people who happen to be evildoers. If that’s the case, and if the 25th Amendment isn’t invoked because those evildoers also control — or consist of — the vice-president and cabinet, then it’s the public’s job to shut the war machine, and the regime controlling it, down.

That might look like a general strike, or even a revolution. It wouldn’t be pretty. But Trump clearly must be removed from power, and a popular uprising would likely be less ugly than the alternative, which is that US military commanders cease obeying Trump’s unlawful orders and depose him themselves. A junta is a lateral move on the evil and stupidity metrics, not an improvement on either.

There’s no question of “winning” the war. The war is lost, and lost it shall remain. The questions are about how much longer it lasts, how many more people are killed, maimed, displaced, and impoverished, what the terms of the US surrender look like, and what comes after. The sooner Trump loses the power to babble non-answers and act on them, the better.

Thomas L. Knapp is director and senior news analyst at the William Lloyd Garrison Center for Libertarian Advocacy Journalism (thegarrisoncenter.org). He lives and works in north central Florida.

Geopolitics

Iran’s shockwave in Asia

Wednesday 27 May 2026, by Pierre Rousset

By dint of dragging on, the United States’ war against Iran seems to be becoming a real international tipping point whose scope varies according to the region. Its consequences are expected to be major in Asia. On the geopolitical terrain, of course, as illustrated by the Xi-Trump summit in Beijing on 14-15 May. But it will also aggravate the social crisis in many countries as well as boosting the global climate and ecological crisis. It is the beginning of multiple upheavals that will only be fully measured with hindsight.

Donald Trump had postponed his visit to Beijing (to the great displeasure of Xi Jinping) to give him time, he hoped, to finish with Iran and arrive in a position of strength. The opposite happened. He has come to beg the Chinese, allies of the Iranians, to help him get out of a mess for which he alone is responsible.

In the current situation, Beijing and Washington share common goals, starting with the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and gas transits. China currently imports about 40 percent of its oil from the Middle East, and many of its refineries are designed to process oil from Iran. Moreover, even if it supports Iran, the Chinese regime does not want to see a new country enter the very exclusive club of nuclear powers. This is a fact that Tehran does not seem to have understood. Possessing (or threatening to possess) the weapon certainly appears to be a guarantee of security and influence, but the great powers have tolerated the appearance of new applicants only if their own interests are at stake (for example, North Korea from Beijing’s point of view, a buffer state between South Korea and US bases and its border).

Xi Jinping knows, however, that Trump is under pressure for domestic political reasons (the midterm elections are taking place in November), and he has put the deal in his hands: he must make big concessions on support for Taiwan. For the time being, he does not seem to have made any commitment to intervene vis-à-vis Iran (assuming that he can indeed change Tehran’s policy).

Dangerous uncertainty for Taiwan

Xi elaborated on his warning on 14 May, the day after Trump’s arrival, saying at a press conference that the Taiwan issue was “the most important in Sino-American relations.” Well treated, “relations between the two countries can remain stable overall.” Otherwise, they will “clash, or even come into conflict.” Trump seems to have been taken aback, as this subject is not usually dealt with in the public sphere, and he dodged journalists’ questions.

Very concretely, Xi demands that the United States replace its official position, “the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence” with “opposes Taiwan’s independence” and that it stop supplying arms to the island state.

After announcing an agreement to deliver $11 billion worth of U.S. weapons by the end of 2025, the U.S. administration is considering a new program of some $14 billion, a record amount since the United States committed in 1979 in the Taiwan Relations Act to deliver sufficient military equipment to Taiwan to defend itself. This law was passed by the U.S. Congress in the wake of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing the same year and the concomitant severing of U.S. diplomatic ties with Taipei. Since then, America has remained almost the only country to provide military aid to Taiwan. To meet Chinese demands, the US Congress would therefore have to abrogate this treaty.

The CCP would now prefer to impose a severe economic blockade of the island, rather than attempt a rather random military invasion. The invasion of Taiwan would not be an easy task. Xi Jinping promises great things to businessmen, mafiosi and politicians who would serve as his fifth column, to ensure Beijing’s stranglehold, but given the way he has been blithely purging his allies for a while, they should be wary. It also plays on soft power, with many fun shows being watched on both sides of the Strait.

Taiwan (the Republic of China) has a very special history. Beijing is playing on its internal contradictions. The Kuomintang, a counter-revolutionary party, invaded the island after its defeat on the mainland in 1949, imposing a dictatorial regime until the Sunflower Movement in 2014, which gradually led to the establishment of a democracy. The KMT nevertheless retains a social base and political weight, with the help of clientelism and corruption. Its leaders are now divided over relations with China.

However, it is difficult to see why the Taiwanese population, which enjoys a (bourgeois and imperfect) democracy, would freely opt to abandon it in favour of an opaque and super-authoritarian regime. It has the right to a self-determination exercised without external threats.

Taiwan is de facto independent, but does not officially proclaim it. The entire regional balance is due to this strategic ambiguity. Xi Jinping is once again questioning it, and Donald Trump seems to be taking his pressure into account. Just before leaving Beijing, he sent a form of warning through the Fox News channel to Taiwan against declaring independence at the cost of a distant war. “I want [Taiwan] to lower the temperature. I want China to lower the temperature.” If the statement is worrying, it is because the proclamation of independence was not on the agenda at all.

In doing this, Trump forced the Taiwanese authorities to react. The foreign minister said he took note of the remarks, noting that the arms sales were a U.S. commitment to the island’s security that was guaranteed by the Taiwan Relation Act and was a common form of deterrence in the region. The Taiwanese government, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and President Lai Ching-te, declared on May 16 that “Taiwan is a democratic, sovereign and independent nation, which is not subordinate to the People’s Republic of China,” reaffirming the traditional position: de facto independence, although not proclaimed.

Strategic Balances in East Asia

Donald Trump is therefore now helping to reopen the Taiwan issue, a veritable Pandora’s box: geostrategic balances and control of the seas in East Asia are at stake. This state is located in the middle of the first chain of islands in the Pacific Ocean. Taking possession of it would give Beijing a key point of support for controlling this international seaway of primary importance from a commercial point of view (it is one of the busiest routes), very rich in resources (including in its seabed), whose sovereignty China claims, against international law, (at least in its southern part, which it has militarized to excess, without recognising the maritime borders of the other riparian countries).

The entire region is therefore concerned, from Japan and South Korea to Vietnam, including Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines. The conquest of Taiwan would be a real earthquake whose “aftershocks”, given the geopolitical centrality of Eurasia, could affect Central Asia, the Arctic, Russia and Europe.

Donald Trump’s erraticism and his lack of regard for the interests of his allies are already having consequences. Thus, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has initiated a real strategic turning point for Japan to assert itself as a great military power. The United States had imposed a pacifist constitution on the country in 1947 (with article 9), which the population had largely accepted. The counterpart to this renunciation of war was obviously the assurance of American protection in the event of a threat. This quid pro quo no longer seems obvious and allows Tokyo to justify the acceleration of its militarist program, while the so-called Japanese Self-Defense Forces are already at the top of the basket of conventional armies (without nuclear weapons), effectively emptying the constitution of its substance.

In 1976, under prime minister Takeo Miki, the sale of arms was banned. In 2014, prime minister Shinzo Abe opened a first breach in this embargo policy. On 21 April, all the previously stated principles of the country’s foreign policy were annulled. Japan can now export weapons, including “lethal” weapons, to the 17 countries with which it has a defence agreement. One of the largest military export contracts since 1945 was signed with Australia, for Mogami-class frigates produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (these frigates have multiple functions and can operate with a short-crewed, high-quality frigate). Similarly, 1,400 soldiers are taking full part in the Balikatan (“shoulder to shoulder” in Tagalog) exercises in the Philippines, together with the United States and six other countries (China has invited itself into this area, also carrying out its own competing manoeuvres).

What does Donald Trump really want? If he allowed Beijing to conquer Taiwan in some form, the credibility of the United States in Asia would collapse, leaving the field open for China. He declared that he did not want to fight a war “9,500 miles away”. The problem is that the largest US military bases abroad are located precisely in this region: in South Korea and Japan (above all on the island of Okinawa). In the front row. Would he like to negotiate zones of influence: the south of the East Asian Seas to China, the north to the United States? It’s hard to believe. Perhaps he is simply trying to buy time given the mess he got himself into in Iran. He uses and abuses his military means and risks finding part of his armada out of service, while the refurbishment of an aircraft carrier, for example, requires a lot of time. Xi Jinping knows this perfectly well. However, the Chinese army is not operational today. Its staff has been the victim of successive purges, in all sectors. Xi’s paranoia is wreaking havoc. He also needs time. The icing on the cake is that we are dealing with two psychopaths, one cold and calculating, the other explosive, and this is not reassuring.

Speculation does not accomplish much, especially when one is not privy to the secrets of the Gods. However, we are living in a dangerous moment of uncertainty. In the face of militarism and great power rivalries, people-to-people solidarity remains our political compass, both in the region and internationally. For the right to self-determination (including for Taiwan), for demilitarization (especially of maritime spaces), for the seas and oceans to be freed from state borders in order to become once again common goods of humanity.

Towards a Sino-American duopoly?

What is confirmed, however, is that we are (temporarily?) moving towards a Sino-US global duopoly (necessarily very confrontational) and not towards a military confrontation between great powers in the short term. This was the hypothesis that seemed to me to have been favoured for a long time. Today, China is strengthening its hand in this duopoly in Asia, but we must not forget its impotence when Trump “co-opted” a wing of the Venezuelan regime and while he threatens Cuba, two countries that had or have Chinese support.

Beijing is certainly strengthening its global military presence thanks to its policy of purchasing ports with a dual function, economic and military. Considerable funds have been allocated for this purpose. Between 2000 and 2025, China acquired 168 ports in 90 countries, on all continents. Moreover, in Chinese companies established abroad, it is the army that ensures “security” (without displaying it). It is developing its naval base. The launch in November 2025 of its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, represents a major step forward in modernization with its electromagnetic catapult system. However, its army has never been tested in a real contemporary military conflict (reliability of armaments, capacity of the chain of command, combined arms coordination and so on). Its deployment primarily concerns Asia-Pacific.

The Indo-Pacific has become a region of major strategic importance where global balances are (also) at stake. Joe Biden understood this and one of his main successes was to have prepared, at the time of the Afghan debacle that he had inherited from Donald Trump, a deployment of politico-military, economic and diplomatic means in this region. Back in power, Trump hastened to undo this Asian “pivot”. It was a bad thing for him. It has given China the opportunity to further weave its own cooperation in this part of the world (in rivalry with India). This strengthened its hand vis-à-vis Washington. From a geopolitical point of view, beyond the seas of East Asia, it is here that the Sino-American rivalry will be most alive.

More generally, the functionality of the Sino-US duopoly will be tested in the coming months, with Trump and Xi due to meet on multiple occasions, either face-to-face (Xi’s visit to Washington at the end of September, before the US mid-term elections), or during meetings: in November, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen (China); in December, the G20 meeting in Miami (United States). If Beijing and Washington have common interests, they will rule the roost, as has been the case in the past. The areas of confrontation, on the other hand, should express themselves.

Despite Donald Trump’s cries of victory, no significant progress seems to have been made at the recent summit concerning the standards for the deployment of artificial intelligence and very high technology (superconductors), rare earths, trade deficits and so on. A truce in the tariff war had been decided until October (to the advantage of China). Its extension has not (yet) been announced. But the main if not the only tangible economic outcome of the summit may be the continuation of the fragile trade truce previously agreed in Busan, South Korea, when Trump suspended triple-digit tariffs on Chinese goods, while Xi Jinping gave up strangling U.S. supplies of critical rare earths.

Can a Sino-American duopoly last? Who lives will see. The United States is griped by a major regime crisis and this is probably also the case with China if we are to believe the extent of the purges, the disaffection of the population who no longer hope for an improvement in their standard of living, the ageing population, corruption, the environmental crisis, the growing dependence on exports and so on. In addition, the boomerang effects of the climate-ecological crisis are increasingly being felt. This increases the number of uncertainties.

An unimportant summit?

Many analysts seem to consider this summit to be of little importance. It is true that it will not have the same historical significance as the meeting in Beijing in 1972 between US President Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong, or that of Deng Xiaoping to the United States in 1979. However, this is the first visit to China by a US president since 2017, almost a decade ago – and that was during Trump’s previous term!

Xi Jinping probably aims to take advantage of the “Trump-Iran” moment to set a balance of power more to China’s advantage in view of the post-Trump era, as an established fact. This is a step in the rise of Chinese imperialism (except in the not insignificant field of finance, as Xi does not dare to make the Yuan a truly international currency) and in its desire to assert an alternative hegemony to that of the “West”.

The popular classes, inflation and ecological disaster

The inflation fuelled by the Iranian war is affecting the popular classes in Asia as elsewhere, with one particularity. In many Asian countries, the money sent by migrants allows families to survive. The Middle East is a major destination for this immigration, as far as Muslim countries are concerned. According to the International Labour Organization, the region is home to 24 million migrant workers. It is proving to be the world’s leading destination for foreign labour. Most of this comes from Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines (Mindanao), Sri Lanka. Many of these workers are in low-paying or precarious jobs and have little access to services such as health care.

The repatriation of emigrants is large scale. In the past two months, the Philippine government has secured the return of more than 9,500 of its nationals who were working in the Middle East. Many people remain blocked in unbearable conditions.

Finally, the wars in the Middle East are fuelling the climate and ecological crisis, the global crisis. A real disaster. This “polycrisis” is the greatest challenge we face. It is what makes the difference with all past periods. The number of “climate victims” is increasing exponentially in Asia, in particular.

In Asia, poverty and precariousness are spreading. However, once you have entered extreme poverty, you can no longer get out of it without long-term aid that states do not provide, but that movements try to ensure (with our help, sometimes).

The climate-ecological crisis

It’s the elephant in the china shop that no one (or almost) talks about. Debates follow one another on the economic consequences of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, without saying a word about the climate crisis or the major attacks on biodiversity. Unfortunately, the international activist press does not always escape this syndrome. Articles appear that completely obscure the subject. Others mention it, but without concluding on the campaigns to be carried out in this area. A strange self-censorship.

While Europe is warming twice as fast as the global average, the health and social consequences are particularly severe in Asia, where societies are very vulnerable. Much of Bangladesh will disappear under water, but also densely populated areas in Indonesia. When the humidity level in the air becomes too high, even a “normal” temperature can become deadly, as the body can no longer cool itself by sweating. The violence of typhoons is increasing. Massive floods follow exceptional droughts...

19 May 2026

Translated by International Viewpoint from ESSF.

• Pierre Rousset

  Pierre Rousset is a longtime activist of the Fourth International and a founding member of Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières (ESSF). He specialised in Asian revolutionary movements, particularly in China and the Philippines. He was co-director of the International Institute for Research and Education (IIRE) in Amsterdam from 1981 to 1993.