PANNIER: Who’s killing Chinese workers on the Afghan-Tajik frontier?

Sparsely populated, rugged mountainous border areas between Afghanistan and Tajikistan are often a blessing for smugglers and militants but a nightmare for security. / screengrab

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By Bruce Pannier December 3, 2025

Someone in northern Afghanistan near the Tajik border is targeting Chinese workers just across the river inside Tajikistan.

On November 26, three Chinese miners were killed in an attack in which assailants used a drone equipped with firearms and grenades, while on November 30, two Chinese roadworkers were shot dead.

It is difficult to say who is behind the killings or pinpoint their motive, but the violence has led to the highest-level contact between authorities of Tajikistan and Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021.

Suspects

Right after the first attack, in Tajikistan’s southwestern Shamsiddin Shohin district, Tajik authorities blamed drug smugglers. The sparsely populated, rugged mountains along the Tajik-Afghan border are ideal territory for smuggling precious and semi-precious stones, weapons, cigarettes and narcotics.

Why smugglers would choose to kill Chinese workers at a gold extraction site was not explained, though there was some speculation the attack was made to revenge an incident that took place several days earlier.

During the night of November 20, Tajik border guards detected a group crossing from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. The guards then used an armed drone to attack the group, killing two of the intruders. Tajik border guards had never before used a drone in such a way. The day after the drone strike, the bodies and 116 packages of narcotics were found.

If revenging the deadly drone operation was the motive, it remains unclear why the perpetrators attacked a workers’ camp when a Tajik border station is not far away.

It was easier to believe the Chinese were not the intended target, but following the second attack, it became impossible to consider that the Chinese were simply collateral damage in a feud between Tajik border guards and smugglers.

In November 2024, there was an attack on a gold mining site, also in Shamsiddin Shohin district, which  left one Chinese worker dead, and four wounded. A Tajik worker was also injured. As with the November 26 attack, Tajik authorities pointed the finger at drug smugglers, without addressing how it was that such individuals, presumably trying to slip by undetected along routes known to them, ended up losing their way and firing on a gold mining camp when they were discovered.

If not them, then who?

However, if it is not drug smugglers who are behind the armed assaults, who is?

Some information emerged that two people were apprehended in Afghanistan’s Maymai district for the shooting of the two Chinese roadworkers, but details about those detained or their motives has not been provided.

 

The ISKP would be expected to claim the attacks, if it was the perpetrator (Credit: Voice of Khorasan magazine).

The two most obvious suspects are militant-terrorist groups Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP, or ISIS-K) and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).

ISKP is based in Afghanistan. In its propaganda, it condemns China’s role in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The group has carried out attacks targeting Chinese nationals in Afghanistan, most notably a December 2022 attack on a Kabul hotel where Chinese diplomats and businessmen were known to regularly stay.

In May 2022, ISKP militants launched rockets from Afghanistan into Tajikistan, but there were no casualties or damage.

Notably, ISKP usually claims responsibility for its attacks. It would almost certainly have posted something on deadly attacks made on Chinese workers if it had carried them out.

ETIM is an Uyghur separatist group that was active in the chaos of Iraq and Syria 10 years ago. It showed up in Afghanistan shortly after US and allied forces entered the country. Many of its militants left for the Middle East. Some returned to Afghanistan after groups such as ISIS and others were beaten back in Iraq ad Syria. ETIM originated in China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), which borders Central Asia. Its goal is the liberation of XUAR from China.

ETIM is an ally of the Taliban. But after the Taliban retook power just over four years ago, they promised all of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours that they would not allow any militant groups present in the country to plan or carry out attacks on them. Taliban authorities have also given guarantees to Chinese officials that ETIM will not be allowed to carry out attacks on China, or on Chinese interests in Afghanistan.

In searching for the culprit behind the five Chinese workers’ deaths, there is another possibility. On December 2, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi vaguely blamed groups trying to damage “positive relations” between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Terrorist group Jamaat Ansarullah group, which formed in Tajikistan, might be wary of improved relations between Dushanbe and Kabul leaving it high and dry (Source: social media).

There is at least one group that comes to mind here, namely Jamaat Ansarullah, a terrorist organisation from Tajikistan that allied with the Taliban to fight foreign and Afghan government forces.

At least several hundred Jamaat Ansarullah fighters are still in Afghanistan. In late 2021, when tensions between the Tajik government and Taliban were growing, some Jamaat Ansarullah militants were sent to reinforce Taliban fighters posted along the Tajik border.

In January 2024, there were reports that a Jamaat Ansarullah commander, Muhammad Sharifov, aka Mahdi Arsalon, was missing after leaving months earlier for Kabul. Some accounts said he was taken hostage by drug traffickers. Others explaining his disappearance claimed that the Taliban had thrown Arsalon in prison or even killed him.

Then in February 2024 there were reports of secret talks between Taliban and Tajik officials where the Taliban offered to act as mediators in talks between Tajik authorities and Jamaat Ansarullah in Afghanistan. However, Tajik government sources said Dushanbe was pressing for the group’s fighters to either be extradited to Tajikistan or for the Taliban to take measures to disarm and disband the group.

Ties between Tajikistan and the Taliban are improving. Some members of Jamaat Ansarullah might wonder if their group’s continued presence in Afghanistan might become part of the Tajik-Taliban negotiations. Raising tensions along the Tajik-Afghan border could help prolong Jamaat Ansarullah’s stay in Afghanistan.

One last possibility that could explain the killing of the Chinese workers focuses on Taliban fighters present by the Tajik border. Might some of these fighters have staged the attacks on their own?

Since late August, there have been two exchanges of gunfire between Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters. Several Taliban and possibly some Tajik border guards also were left dead.

In both clashes, the Tajik border guards involved were in Shamsiddin district, the same district where the Chinese mine workers were killed on November 26.

The attack on the Chinese roadworkers, meanwhile, occurred in Darvaz district, the next district east of Shamsiddin Shohin.

It could be that some Taliban fighters who lost comrades in the recent exchanges of gunfire with the border guards decided to create some pandemonium on the Tajik side of the border.

It is interesting that there are also Chinese workers on the Afghan side of the frontier, some of whom are also mining for gold, yet they were not attacked.

A silver lining

The return to power of the Taliban greatly displeased the Tajik government. Harsh verbal exchanges became the norm, but since autumn 2024, there have been some amicable contacts.

In an unprecedented phone call, the Taliban's top diplomat Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi spoke with Tajik counterpart Sirajuddin Mehruddin (Credit: Pajhwok).

Tajikistan’s security chief Saimumin Yatimov made an unannounced visit to Kabul in September 2024. In May this year, the head of Afghanistan’s electricity utility attended a meeting in Tajik capital Dushanbe of counry representatives from the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA)-1000 power transmission project. The governor of Afghanistan’s northern province of Balkh met with Yatimov in Dushanbe in late October and a Tajik government delegation was in Kabul in mid-November.

The attacks on the Chinese workers met with condemnation from both Tajik and Taliban authorities.

The Taliban permitted a team from Tajikistan to inspect the suspected staging areas for the attacks inside Afghanistan. The Tajik and Taliban foreign ministers spoke by telephone on December 2. It was the first ever direct communication between the two.

China has called on Chinese companies and workers in Tajikistan near the Afghan border to leave the area. Beijing is waiting for answers about the perpetrators of the attacks.

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon ordered military and security forces to do everything possible to prevent another attack as Tajik authorities wait for answers from the Taliban.

Whom will the Taliban name as the culprit knowing they have to satisfy both the Tajik and Chinese authorities?

The Nuclear Chessboard: Rising Tests, Expanding Arsenals, Eroding Restraint – Analysis

December 3, 2025 
Observer Research Foundation
By Manoj Joshi

Perhaps the most alarming development amidst the swirl of wars and crises, be it Ukraine and Russia, Gaza and Israel, Iran-Israel, India and Pakistan, Thailand and Cambodia, Ethiopia and Eritrea and Sudan, is the reinsertion of the nuclear weapon factor in global concerns.

Since the launch of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly brandished the nuclear threat to warn off the West. More recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin boasted of successful tests of a new nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed Burevestnik missile, as well as of a nuclear-weapon-armed Poseidon underwater drone.

Shortly thereafter, United States (US) President Donald Trump announced that his country had decided to renew testing of nuclear weapons, which is a decision that could end a moratorium that has lasted over 30 years. Days later, Putin said that if the US resumed testing, Russia, too, would follow suit. The US has observed a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992, though it has maintained the ability to resume the tests.

What Trump meant by this announcement remains ambiguous. Specialists say that four different types of activities could be on the table. The first is a straightforward explosive test, which would result in a seismic yield and can be easily detected by the global network of seismic stations. The second is a super-critical test in which a self-sustaining chain reaction is created, but may not yield a seismic result. A third is a subcritical test, which is conducted routinely, in which nuclear powers ensure the reliability of their arsenals through lasers and supercomputers, such as those the US has in its National Ignition Facility and China has at its Mianyang facility. The fourth is, of course, the testing of nuclear delivery systems.

The United States has accused China and Russia of conducting “supercritical” hydronuclear tests, which it argues would violate the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) because such tests involve a self-sustaining fission chain reaction and therefore constitute nuclear explosions under the treaty’s definition. The CTBT has been signed by 187 states and ratified by 178, but it has not entered into force because several of the 44 Annex-II states required for entry into force—including India, Pakistan, and North Korea, none of which have signed the treaty—have not completed the necessary ratification procedures.


The Expanding Chinese Arsenal

Nevertheless, other issues are crowding the nuclear table. Since 2020, China has more than doubled its nuclear arsenal to around 600 warheads and is adding roughly 100 warheads each year. By the beginning of 2025, China had more or less completed 350 new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos in three large fields in the northern desert part of the country and three in the mountainous areas of the east. There are nearly as many silos as in the US. The Chinese have so far not acknowledged these changes, but they have spoken of the need for a “strategic counterbalance”.

Both Allies and Adversaries on Edge

Another issue comprises nervous allies spooked by the Trump administration’s unclear alliance policy, with a president who may now be contemplating crossing the nuclear threshold. Among these could be counted countries such as South Korea, Japan, Poland, and Germany. Iran is recovering from the destruction of its nuclear facilities and is no doubt contemplating continuing its programme.

Ukraine’s plight is bound to focus minds. The country gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for guarantees from the five declared nuclear-weapon powers. The guarantors agreed not to use military force or coercion against countries like Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which surrendered their nuclear weapons in 1994 following the dissolution of the erstwhile Soviet Union.

Though the US and Russia have a total inventory of over 5,000 and a deployed inventory of 1,700 nuclear weapons each, they were essentially intended to be used against each other in the event of a nuclear war. However, the US is now confronting the growth of the Chinese arsenal and deliberating whether its own arsenal is expansive enough. Concurrently, it also has to worry about new Russian delivery systems. A Congressional Commission recommended in 2023 that the US expand its nuclear arsenal because of the Chinese buildup.

As of now, both Russia and the United States continue to abide by the New START Treaty, which expires in February 2026. Given the recent dismal record of arms-control agreements, there is little hope that the treaty will be renewed. China, for its part, has made clear that it is not interested in arms-control negotiations, as it seeks to catch up with the nuclear capabilities of Russia and the United States.

Islamabad’s Command Shake-up

Yet another development bears concerns for India. This is the passage of the 27th constitutional amendment in Pakistan, which has given exclusive control of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal to Field Marshal Asim Munir. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) was created in 2000, headed by the prime minister, and comprised the three service chiefs and the chairman of the Chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). Now, the office of the CJCSC has been abolished. Asim Munir is not only the army chief but also, in his new role as Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), outranks the other service chiefs and will recommend the commander to lead Pakistan’s newly created National Strategic Command, which has replaced the NCA. In essence, this arrangement concentrates the authority over nuclear use in a single unelected leader.

As is well known, Pakistani nuclear weapons are “India-centric”. Islamabad has adopted a “first use” doctrine which it says caters to “full spectrum deterrence” using strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for a range of contingencies — such as the loss of significant territory in a war with India, destruction of a large portion of its land or air forces, the strangulation of its economy, or the destabilisation of the Pakistani political system.
The Golden Dome Gamble

At Trump’s instance, the US is working on the Golden Dome missile defence project that would include space-based sensors and attack satellites. However, specialists argue that this could actually give a fillip to a new arms race. The threat of mutual destruction has held the nuclear peace since the beginning of the nuclear age. The effort to create a shield could negate this logic, as adversaries will try to circumvent or defeat the new capabilities. This could involve new and more missiles, decoys, and delivery systems, such as underwater autonomous torpedoes, much like the Poseidon.

Arms Control in Crisis

Earlier this month, Trump said that he was “working on a plan to denuclearize” with China, Russia, and the US. This was a passing reference, and only a few details are known. The problem is that at this stage, arms control efforts have not just ground to a halt, but there has been a steady demise of treaties once signed between the US and Russia.

Trump has been speaking of nuclear talks for quite some time. In 2020, he tried and failed to launch three-way talks involving China, Russia, and the US. Shortly after becoming president, he told the World Economic Forum that vast amounts of money were being spent on the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, and no one wanted to talk about it. “So we want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible.”

Russia’s immediate response was that it wanted to resume arms control talks as soon as possible. Dimitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, said that such negotiations were in the interests of the world and both countries, but he added that the ball was in America’s court.

Status of Arms Control Agreements

Treaty name	Status 2025	Notes
INF Treaty	Dead	Both the US and Russia withdrew in 2019
CFE Treaty	Dead	Russia withdrew (Nov 2023), North Atlantic Treaty Organization suspended its obligations
Open Skies Treaty	Dead	Both the US and Russia withdrew in 2020-21
ABM Treaty	Dead	The US withdrew in 2002
New START	Suspended (by Russia)	Russia suspended in Feb 2023, not withdrawn. But the treaty expires in February 2026
CTBT	De-ratified (Russia)	Russia did so, citing the US’s lack of ratification
Vienna Document	Dead/Not functional	Russia stopped cooperation in March 2023

Source: Compiled by the author

However, the Chinese have been quite categorical that they will not participate in any denuclearisation efforts. The Chinese spokeswoman Mao Ning said in response to a question following Trump’s denuclearisation claim that “China’s nuclear forces are not on the same scale as those of the US and Russia; it would be unfair, unreasonable, and impractical at this stage to require China to join nuclear arms control talks.”

Clearly, in the current political climate, the prospects for arms talks are dim, while momentum appears to favour forces that are stoking a new arms race. 

About the author: Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

The EU’s Ukraine Strategy: The Worst Foreign Policy Blunder In European History Since WWII?

By Thomas E. Henökl 

November 25, 2025

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Image by European Commission (Dati Bendo), Creative Commons 4.0

For more than three and a half years now, Ukraine – and with it the so-called ‘West’ – have been paralyzed by a dreadful, protracted war of attrition against Russia, and Europe is collectively heading into a hurtful military, political and economic defeat. This article reveals a series of pitfalls of European diplomacy allowing the EU to be held hostage by U.S. great power politics. 

In a rather shortsighted move, Europe (with the sole exception of Switzerland) has aligned on a strategic path, designed by the U.S. to serve American interests and has jeopardized, if not completely relinquished, any residue of autonomous reasoning and decision-making. Of course, by building and stocking up their own arsenals, EU member states will achieve some degree of tactical leverage. However, what remains is the strategic alignment with (what used to be) US policy. In some form of collective cognitive dissonance, Europe, again, has permitted letting itself be dragged into yet another unnecessary and devastating war, causing tremendous human suffering and security risks as well as global political and economic havoc. By blindly falling in line with the Biden-administration’s provocation of this conflict, Europeans yielded their independent actorness and any remaining diplomatic clout. In conclusion, this chapter will try and point towards a potential exit strategy for the present quagmire.

Also in academic debates, we are witnessing a revival of wartime narratives, characterized by antagonistic, mutually exclusive and even hostile discussion, leaving no middle ground, no room for compromise; and that much rather displays a partisan logic, zero-sum game, and entrenched antagonism. Therefore, an underlying problem exposed by this article is the lack of debate about the scope and direction of EU foreign policy. Re-arming or militarizing Europe has become central to EU policy, with alternatives being almost instantly discounted. Accepted points of debate within the EU focus only on the most effective ways to “ReArm EU” rather than the meaning and consequences of such a strategy.

Literature on policy-making in times of crisis, connected to decision-making in EU foreign policy and “presidentialization” as a concentration of power at the top of the hierarchical level, explains the foreign policy choices by EU-leaders. The perception of crisis creates momentum for centralization of decision-making at the top of government hierarchies (Dahlström et al., 2011; Furness et al., 2019; Sperling, J., and M. Webber, 2019). The prospect of war has the effect of focussing policy debates on a narrow range of issues perceived to be at the heart of the crisis. A perceived security threat would clearly represent such a crisis, which favours the centralization of decision-making at the political helm, endowing leaders with exceptional powers – a classical feature of politics in the time of war. Leaders, on the other hand, know about and consciously use such narratives of crisis and emergencies to bestow special powers on themselves. Hence, there is a two-way centralization bias resulting from and framing political phenomena as a crisis, or a so-called “unprovoked war of aggression”.

The EU’s very own Stalingrad?

According to prominent voices, although marginalized in the dominant IR-discourse, such as John J. Mearsheimer (2014, 2022), Stephen M. Walt (2022), Jeffrey Sachs (2022, 2025), Glenn Diesen (2022, 2024), Jacques Baud, Daniele Ganser or Johannes Varwick (2023), the course of events was foreseeable, and the West has to assume its share of responsibility for Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this perspective, the present situation is the logical consequence of path-dependent behaviour, resulting in a perfect lock-in of the actors involved. Already 2008, when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance at their summit in Bucharest, Putin made it crystal clear that Russia was never going to accept this expansion of the Western military bloc right at its doorstep (Mearsheimer 2022). This unambiguous warning by Russia was simply – and shamelessly – ignored, with the catastrophic consequences the Ukrainian and the Russian people have to bear and are paying the price for with their blood. The EU got dragged into this cataclysm by US imperialist self-interest, with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) becoming a fig-leave for transatlantic great-power ambitions. If not already sufficiently demonstrated in 2008 and 2011, today the ENP turns out to be a total and utter failure, leading to a series of distressed states and societies in the Southern neighbourhood producing terror and mass-migration and a devastating war in the Eastern neighbourhood, causing immense human suffering and a black hole for billions of Euros in military and monetary aid.

For the Biden administration and for the United Kingdom, Ukraine was merely a pawn in a much bigger geostrategic plot, along the tune of Lord Rothschild’s message to the UK government from 02 March 2012:

“The world order will not survive without Ukraine. We must bring Russia to its knees by any means necessary to send a clear and unambiguous signal to our enemies.”
“Ukraine is a necessary thing that we cannot afford to lose on the geopolitical chessboard. In essence, our current path of no hostilities means that our global project is dead.”
“I demand from you to send more forces against Russia and its satellites, step up the “information war” to correct public opinion and send weapons to our friends in Ukraine.”

Now that the US under President Donald Trump is oscillating between pulling out from and a somehow limited engagement in the war effort in Ukraine, the EU risks to stand alone with its support to Kiev. Trump, while struggling with US hawks, deep state and neocon war profiteers, wants to look like a “deal maker” while avoiding the impression of appearing as a weak leader, giving in to Vladimir Putin.

To explain why and how Europe (read: the EU and Norway) has got trapped in a proxy-war against Russia, one needs to adopt a realist’s perspective and soberly look at the historic context of the EU’s external policy and its relations with its wider neighbourhood over the last two decades. This lens will help understanding how dramatically the EU has changed as an actor in response to the Ukraine war. Without questioning the US premises and logics behind the war against Russia, Germany (echoed by the rest of the EU) announced “Zeitenwende”, and Europe went straight into fueling this catastrophic conflict – yielding parts of its sovereignty and acting contrary to its own best interest.

Siding with the US and UK doctrine of dealing a decisive blow to Russia can hardly be qualified “strategic autonomy”. What the EU has achieved is a subaltern autonomy, as main funder (and thereby fueller) of the war. It can now send more weapons from US manufacturers to Ukraine. What “Zeitenwende” actually meant for Europe, was some sort of silent merger between EU and NATO and acting against its own political and economic interest. The UK had been on board from the beginning, but one may merely second-guess, why Germany was so wilfully promoting war; possibly, because Germany has no room for independent foreign policy-making, at least not where it matters.

Since then, life in Europe itself is no longer as self-evident as it seemed decades ago. European values and way of life, and especially democracy as a political system, with its checks and balances, have come under attack. Shamefully, the better part of this attack on European values comes from within and from the top of the political leadership. Prosperity and a decent standard of living is becoming a fairy from the past for more and more EU citizens. In part this may be due to a decade of austerity, but this loss in standard of living has been drastically accelerated by the unconditional (financial) support of Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. According to the “Ukraine Aid Tracker” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy of June 1st 2025, Ukraine received a flabbergasting 156.1 bn Euro from the EU and its member states (compared to 114.6 bn from the US), as of 1 June 2025. (Another 335 bn Euro, left over from the Covid-recovery fund, are yet to be channeled into the conflict by the Von-der-Leyen Commission.) And the (so far) 19 packages of economic sanctions-imposed on Russia hit, first and foremost, the Europeans themselves, with energy prices soaring and entire sectors of industries tanking.

Whatever happened to the EU as a peace project?

Worst of all, the nightmare of war, which seemed unthinkable for 21^st century Europe, turned into a real possibility with all the rhetoric and even preparation in a number of EU member states. It is unforgivable that the EU did not take the security concerns repeatedly raised by Vladimir Putin serious enough – nor did it honor its own commitment vis-à-vis Russia, the Minsk agreements. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, caused in part by the economic interests of big heavily industrialized countries such as Germany, but also based on the assumption that trade with Russia could foster the development of peaceful relations in the long term, was suddenly radically aborted. At the same time, also the weakness of the EU’s own defence capacities, its vulnerability and security dependence on the US are on display. There has been presidentializaton (to put it mildly) of, amongst other, foreign policy, with Ursula von der Leyen (even though facing her second no-confidence vote by the European Parliament) exercising nearly unchecked power from the upper-most level of the executive. One might speak of anti-democratic tendencies or even an autocratic turn in the EU under Von der Leyen, that at the latest began or took a clear shape in the COVID pandemic. From this onwards, we witness an authoritarian slide of the EU.

Other actors, like the European External Action Service and its unfortunate former High Representative Josep Borrell had been largely marginalized. This changed under the leadership of Kaja Kallas, excelling in Russophobia and escalation. Among the most arduous war mongers, beside the EU Commission figure the UK, France and Germany, Poland (depending who is governing)  and the Baltic states. And they completely cancelled any record of the origins of the conflict, dating back at least to 2014. Over time, the European Union turned into a branch of NATO, and foreign policy-wise put under direct control by the United States. Democracy and accountability in the EU have been set on stand-by. Nowadays, the EU stands for limiting freedom of expression, and oppression of dissenting opinions. Today’s EU is a clear threat to democracy, and peace and prosperity. Politically, the state of the Union transpires the total absence of strategic thinking – and moral standards.

There is a gloomy scenario on the horizon, where democracy and civil liberties could succumb to the pressures of an increasingly authoritarian EU. And citizens would in large numbers begin to accept repressive structures and a clamp-down on democracy and free speech justified on the grounds of wartime priorities and prerogatives. The use of the Digital Service Act and the European Democracy Shield by the EU-Commission for the purpose of surveillance and silencing citizens is a case in point. But also, the space for academic debate has been considerably narrowed. As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling elites, so-called experts and commentators as part of struggle between democracy and autocracy (good vs. evil), the quality of discourse in the West has taken a hit. Respected academics throughout the West have been smeared and ignored. If we look at the reality, democracy is not doing so well in Ukraine either – not to mention the colossal problem of corruption in the country – as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and defamation.

Gone are the days of the EU being a credible broker in international conflicts. Instead, the EU has gotten itself involved in a devastating war, explicitly siding with and materially supporting Ukraine, more precisely its extreme right leadership. While enormous costs are inflicted on civilian populations by western-financed hostilities (at the expense of the European taxpayers), and to the benefit of the military-industrial complex, EU leaders fail to make an effort to push for immediate peace talks in both Ukraine and Israel. Is it not the first task of diplomacy to work for the non-violent resolution of conflicts? In contrast, European statesmen are piling up arsenals of deadly weapons, ultimately prolonging and intensifying the dreadful bloodshed. For those who seem to have forgotten that the EU is not NATO, and should not be instrumentalized to adopt, implement and finance US and NATO policies, they need to be reminded of the ruins of WWII from which the European idea emerged. War is not the spirit of the EU treaties, but peace, even though the EU today seems to be transitioning from being a “normative power” (Manners 2002) to a military power. In the case of Ukraine, the EU could (and should) make it a condition for any kind of further support to Kiev to engage in negotiations to end the war.

There is no doubt that the process of European integration made an important contribution to the long-lasting period of peace in Europe. To many, it seemed that the process of enlargement would take place gradually and orderly and that the sphere of peace and prosperity would continue to expand. However, the situation has changed significantly in this millennium with several crucial internal and external challenges. For the EU it has been a decade of crisis, and the war as well is taking its toll. The consequences of the sanctions packages are having a high price for Europe.  At the same time a new cluster of power centers emerges, in the shape of ascending geopolitical players (BRICS+, notably Russia, China, India, Turkey) – as well as the erratic behaviour of the EU’s transatlantic ally, the USA, e.g. President Trump’s erratic tariff policy. Even before the Russia’s arguably retaliative special military operation against Ukraine, Russia has made a systematic effort to champion a multipolar world order, which disrupts the agency of the EU and its allies. While Russia does not have the capabilities to directly oppose NATO expansion nor any interest in preventing EU expansion, it has been suspected of undermining the democratic ideals of the EU through hybrid warfare, promotion of post-truth narratives and support for reform-oriented political forces, most of which has turned out as being Western (US and EU/NATO) deception. There is no “realism à la carte”, not even for Europe.

European delusion

Russia’s leadership cannot afford losing the war it was forced into – and Russia will not lose, and literally cannot lose it, not least since it is a nuclear power. Time is on its side, and the contestation of the international liberal order by the BRICS+ countries plays in Russia’s favour. US military and financial support to Ukraine may come at a high price or even to a full stop under the presidency of Donald Trump, and the EU/NATO-alliance is facing a crushing defeat in its proxy-war. The EU and (European) NATO have virtually merged, and both of them seem to have tied their destiny entirely to Ukraine. This is a zero-sum game that is not only very harmful – but also extremely dangerous. There is the risk of a wider war with devastating consequences, and also institutionally for the EU (and NATO), since if they fail in helping Ukraine prevail, they will face an existential threat and maybe their decomposition. This connects to realist thinking in that the prime objective of states – and entities like the EU – is self-preservation, securing their own survival. EU, more so than NATO seem to have put their carriage before the horses. It clearly turns out to be rather backfiring premise to say: Putin attacks our European values in Ukraine (which he does not), and if Ukraine loses, we will be berobbed of our values.

And Russia is by no means isolated, it is actively engaging with the BRICS+ group countries, notably with powerful players such as China, India or Brazil. China, in turn, has long sought to reshape the primary and secondary institutions of the current international system via the promotion of a new narrative about the ideal future of a multipolar global international society. Most recently the Eastern giant became more assertive in contesting the status-quo of international relations and in proposing an alternative world order, openly challenging the ILO dominated by the Western (NATO-)powers, namely the US and its allies, most notably the UK, Norway, and the EU. It may rather be, that the US needs the Russia-threat to keep its alliance together, because an economic or political cooperation between Russia and European countries, especially Germany is not in the American interest. The destruction of the NordStream pipelines by the US (and/or its proxies) is a clear example for this neocon calculus. Russia, in close coordination with China, is also pushing for a multipolar international order and works actively towards a de-dollarization of the global economy, trading with China and others in local currencies. This could have far reaching consequences weakening the standing of the US in external trade and finance, as it would no longer be in a position to offset its fiscal deficit by limitless emission of treasury bonds, hitherto bought by economies all over the world. China alone has been selling off its dollar holdings at a value of 400 bn US$ over the last couple of months.   

However, the US are still the word’s superpower and able to impose its will economically, e.g through sanctions, tariffs and militarily, potentially projecting protection and deterrence. Europe, on the other hand, has for decades presumably benefitted from (some even say, it has been free-riding on) US military capacity and capitalized an economic peace dividend. Now, at this perceived or pretended point of “Zeitenwende” this passive approach to security and defence is said to backfire, and Europe has to move out of its comfort-zone, taking responsibility for protecting and guaranteeing the viability of its model of liberal democratic governance and economic prosperity. And in this reasoning, Europe forever vows its allegiance to the US, come hell or high water. Even if this means to wreck its own industrial base and national economies.

Concomitantly, we observe the rise of some sort of imperial attitude among EU-elites, pretending to fight what Brussels perceives as ideological extremism or anti-liberal populism that questions some elements of “European values”. This phenomenon is even more problematic since Eastern European countries frequently are still unconsolidated or ‘unsettled’ democracies as well as economically vulnerable countries, unable to defend themselves against EU feudalism and arrogance. The EU’s autocratic turn under von der Leyen disqualifies it to act as model for democracy and the rule of law. Brussels has been unmasked as a hotbed of anti-democratic rule, corruption and mismanagement, as well as meddling in national elections and circumcising national sovereignty (e.g. the Romanian presidential election of 2024/25). The feeling of institutional ineffectiveness is particularly strong in the candidate countries, where the bureaucratic burden of EU “criteria” is experienced as particularly pressing. The so-called ‘enlargement momentum’ has abated considerably, and the EU is no longer perceived as a credible crisis manager or even moderator. While measures relevant to consolidating the functioning of democratic institutions is crucial for the enlargement process, interference with democratic processes is of little help in this endeavor. The genuine political efforts to silence critical voices have fueled the resentment of Brussels and its agenda. This is why we are witnessing the decreasing power of attraction of the European model of democracy over the last decade or so. And this erosion of democracy is manifest not just within candidate countries but also in the Union itself, especially with von der Leyen’s second term. The consequence of these problematic developments is the weakening of the European Union as a global promoter of freedom and democracy, which opens room of maneuver for geopolitical actors, such as the BRICS+, to expand their influence and implement their agenda more easily.

Realism à la carte

For the past three years EU/NATO countries sent hundreds of billions’ worth of arms to Ukraine, a quantity of weapons so enormous it depleted their own reserves, and a vast undisclosed number of mercenary soldiers was deployed; and they applied the whole arsenal in terms of sanctions to cripple Russia economically. The result? It simply didn’t work. Without the US, NATO countries will now have to work on a peace deal, and Ukraine will probably end up having lost at least a fifth of its territory, half the size of the UK. All this after having been told during almost the entire duration of the war that Ukraine was winning. Of course, people will be told that it’s not a defeat, merely a “stalemate”, that NATO comes out of it reinforced with additional members, that it’s Ukraine or Zelensky’s fault anyhow. But the crux of the matter is NATO defined an extremely clear objective – which was to “drive Russians back to pre-invasion lines” to directly quote Anthony Blinken – and that failed miserably despite their unprecedented efforts. Which means that the West is much weaker than they thought they were, they just couldn’t collectively defeat Russia. This has immense implications. First of which being: if they can’t defeat Russia, what hope do they have against China which is likely – just looking at metrics (number of people, production capacity, military budget, etc.) – at least 5 times more powerful than Russia? The answer is obvious. Another one is that all those places around the world who thought they were protected by the US will start (in fact, they are already starting) to ask themselves difficult and serious questions: “Can we rely on that promise of military protection?” We will witness very significant shifts of alliances and defence arrangements. Lastly, people in Western countries will at some point wake up from their propaganda haze and ask very simple questions like: why did we ruin ourselves for Ukraine with virtually nothing to show for? Wouldn’t we and the Ukrainians have been better off if we had respected Minsk 2 and if we hadn’t tried to convert Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia? And so, this will likely serve as a hard lesson domestically that we should rather be much humbler about our geopolitical ambitions (assuming the West still is capable of learning lessons, which is far from certain). All in all, this will undoubtedly be seen by history as the defining event that signified that we moved from Western hegemony into a multipolar world. A very long chapter of our collective world history book has just been closed, 500 years of Western hegemony is about to end.

Mainstream ideas that influence EU foreign policy have always sidelined the importance of realism. With the von der Leyen Commission, the EU, at least declaratively, emphasized the importance of geopolitics. However, this implied a certain understanding of geopolitics which is somewhat patronizing and ignores the way power is distributed in the world order, as well as the claims and perspectives of other important actors, such as Russia or China. One could say the EU pretended to accept that geopolitics and realism play a key role but has not yet come to terms with the way realism shapes international relations. Rather, it ignores parts of reality that are uncomfortable and brands alternative ideas as evil, wrong, or as “misinformation”. This refers to both more intellectual voices as well as the views of other international actors. Even though the Von der Leyen Commission conceives itself as a “geopolitical Commission” and presumably adopted a realist approach to external policies, the way the EU-leadership is applying the notion of realism to its version of geopolitics, very much looks like “realism à la carte”, a menu to pick and choose from to one’s own liking, as is the case in the ENP or in the EU’s approach to the BRICS+. The consequence is a behavioural pattern that EU policy is not based on realist assessments of the distribution of power in the world but on misguided hope, arrogance, and virtue signaling. In practice, this results in a chaotic strategy, where any alternative view, both from inside the EU and more importantly outside, is seen as a threat. Hasty militarization or re-arming is a key example of this chaotic response.

Instead, the EU should accept Ukraine’s imminent defeat and demand general elections in the country. A new and legitimate leadership in Kiev could be trustworthy to enter serious peace-negotiations with Russia. Otherwise, Europe should stay out of this conflict; no more arms shipments, no more threateningRussia, no more meddling with Ukrainian politics, and no more arms race.Email

Thomas E. Henökl

Thomas E. Henökl is an Associate Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Agder (Norway) and a Senior Research Associate at the German Development Institute (Bonn). He works in research and teaching in the fields of European politics, public administration, EU foreign and security policy, international cooperation and development, and more widely on comparative politics and organization theory. Previously, Thomas Henökl worked as Security Policy Officer for the European Commission, External Relations DG (from 2011 the European External Action Service) and at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA). He holds PhD in Political Science from the University of Agder (Norway).

 BACKGROUND

A draft of the 28-point plan reviewed by AFP:

1. Ukraine's sovereignty will be confirmed.

2. A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.

3. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.


4. A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation.

5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

10. The US will receive compensation for the security guarantees it provides. If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated and recognition of its new territories and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will also be deemed invalid.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.

12. A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine will be established, including the creation of a Ukraine Development Fund, the rebuilding of Ukraine's gas infrastructure, the rehabilitation of war-affected areas, the development of new infrastructure and a resumption of the extraction of minerals and natural resources, all with a special finance package developed by the World Bank.

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy, with discussions on lifting sanctions, rejoining the G8 group and entering a long-term economic cooperation agreement with the United States.

14. Some $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine, with the US receiving 50 percent of the profits from the venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine's reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen, and the remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle.

15. A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.

16. Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine.

20. Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance.

21. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de-facto recognition along the line of contact. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, which will then be used to create a buffer zone.

22. After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.

23. Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve prisoner exchanges and the return of remains, hostages and civilian detainees, and a family reunification programme will be implemented.

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by US President Donald Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to the agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

SEE

Inside the Chaos of Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan

Ukraine Solidarity Network (US): Oppose Trump’s surrender plan for Ukraine

'For a very long time, Ukrainians have suspected that Steve Witkoff was working for the Russians'

Trump admin crafted Russia-friendly peace plan with help from Kremlin in 'secret meetings'

Trump’s ‘Munich’ agreement is nothing but Russian demands. The world must reject it.

UKRAINE CAPITULATION PLAN

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