Iohannis: Increasing US military presence in Romania remains important objective

Thursday, January 13, 2022

Romania is concerned about the security situation in its neighbourhood, generated by the "massive" deployment of Russian troops in the vicinity of Ukraine and its implications for Euro-Atlantic stability, president Klaus Iohannis said on Wednesday, at the annual meeting with the staff of the diplomatic missions accredited in Bucharest, stressing the need for concrete de-escalation on the ground.

"Romania is actively involved in the strategic stakes processes at NATO and EU level regarding the developments in the Eastern and Black Sea Neighbourhood. We are, naturally, concerned about the security situation in our neighbourhood, generated by the massive deployment of Russian troops in the vicinity of Ukraine and its implications for Euro-Atlantic stability," the President said at the meeting at Cotroceni Palace.

He recalled that an important interaction is taking place on Wednesday, under the NATO-Russia Council, complementary to the Russian-U.S. strategic stability dialogue at the beginning of the week, about which the Romanian authorities were informed in real time.

"From our viewpoint, NATO's dual-track approach to Russia, which we have consistently supported, must consist of both firm and credible deterrence measures and the openness, on this basis, to dialogue. This dialogue must have as a permanent landmark the principles, values and commitments that represent the foundation of the Alliance. It is absolutely necessary to de-escalate the security situation on the ground. The threat with the use of force, as well as the questioning of the current parameters of the European security architecture, are unacceptable. We also support the need to continue strengthening the Allied deterrence and defense posture in a coherent and comprehensive manner throughout the Eastern Flank, including and especially in the Black Sea region," Iohannis added.

According to him, the NATO Summit in Madrid in June will be the culmination for the adoption of key decisions for the future of Alliance, and Romania is already actively and constructively involved.

"The main decision will concern NATO's new Strategic Concept, through which the Alliance will continue to adapt to the new challenges and strengthen its profile," the President stressed.

President Iohannis mentioned that at the level of the European Union, in the discussions on the Strategic Compass, Romania will pursue the maintenance of the high level commitment within the Common Security and Defense Policy.

"The deepening of NATO-EU cooperation and the complementarity of the two organizations, with the avoidance of any duplication, remain essential in this exercise. The concept of the Union's strategic autonomy must take into account these parameters and be better connected to that of the strategic resilience of the Union and its Member States," Klaus Iohannis stressed.

He mentioned, in the context, the objective of the full operationalisation of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience in Bucharest.

În this conetxt, President Iohannis stated that increasing US military presence in Romania remains an "important" objective.

"The security problem will be a priority in this period. Thus, faced with recent security challenges, it's obvious that we need a more powerful action in the realm of discouragement and defence, action which has to be articulated in the spirit of unity, transatlantic cooperation and commitments within NATO. Increasing the American military presence in Romania also remains an important objective," said, the head of state, at the meeting at the Cotroceni Presidential Palace.

Klaus Iohannis emphasized that 2021 and the security developments which can affect the Euro-Atlantic space reconfirmed the "crucial" importance of the transatlantic relations, which Romania, as a strategic partner of the United States of America, supports strongly.

He recalled the discussions he had with the US President as part of the B9 Summit hosted in Bucharest, as well as on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Brussels and which "have strengthened the reciprocal commitments for the revitalization and consolidation of the trans-Atlantic relation."

The head of state spoke at length about the objectives of the Romania - US partnership, as well as of the consolidation of cooperation in the civilian nuclear domain regarding small modular reactors, through the launching of the program in this domain.

"We encourage the involvement of the United States in major projects for regional interconnection, with a strategic impact, such as Rail2Sea and Via Carpathia. At the same time, we wish to progress in what regards in what regards the common objective of Romania's accession to the Visa Waiver program," said the President.

The head of state hopes that, this year, which will see the celebration of 25 years since the signing of the Romania-US Strategic Partnership, to bring new accomplishments and applied projects in domains such as security, energy - with emphasis on climate change - or advanced technology. 

 

În his opinion, Romania has been and will continue to be a "strong" promoter and supporter of democratic principles.

"In the current context, which involves multiple and varied challenges to the rules-based international order, I reiterate our country's deep attachment to the principles and norms of international law. Romania will continue to take firm action to combat and prevent anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, intolerance, hate speech as well as terrorism. Romania has also been and will continue to be a strong promoter and supporter of democratic principles, which it promotes in the region and globally, emphasizing the need for human rights to be respected and an inclusive, internal dialogue to be held. That is why we cannot be indifferent to situations such as those in Belarus or the latest developments in Kazakhstan. We will not give up on this approach," Iohannis said at a meeting at the Cotroceni Presidential Palace.

He also stressed that Romania will "actively" continue its efforts to ensure the rights of persons belonging to the neighboring Romanian minorities at European standard.

 

Romania stays committed to Africa through its participation alongside its main partners in UN and EU missions on the entire continent, President Klaus Iohannis added.

"We see that the number, complexity and interdependence of conflicts are rising - from Romania's neighborhood to the Mediterranean and beyond, on the African continent. Therefore, Romania stays committed alongside its main partners, throughout the African continent, by participating in UN and EU missions in countries such as Mali, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger and Somalia. We will also participate with staff officers to the recently launched EU mission in Mozambique. We have also decided to participate in the Takuba mission and we actively support the International Coalition for the Sahel," Iohannis told the meeting at the Cotroceni Presidential Palace.

Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, he said that Romania will focus this year on developing relations with countries in this area with which it shares the same vision.

"We will continue our political efforts for the advanced goal of raising bilateral relations with Japan to the level of Strategic Partnership, but also for developing the Strategic Partnership with the Republic of Korea, the Extended Partnership with India and relations with Australia and New Zealand. The policy of developing relations with the Arab states, including the Gulf and Maghreb states, will continue with a focus on the economic dimension," said Iohannis.

According to the President, another important goal for Romania's foreign policy is opening negotiations for joining the OECD. 

 

The completion of Romania's Schengen accession is "paramount", President Klaus Iohannis also said on Wednesday.

"Romania already contributes and stays committed to contributing to a safe and efficient Schengen Area. From this point of view, completing Romania's Schengen accession is paramount. Closing Romania's monitoring through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for assessing the progress made regarding judiciary independence and efficiency is another major priority. The Romanian authorities are fully committed in this respect," the President said at the Cotroceni Presidential Palace.

He went on to point out that "a fully integrated Schengen Area is essential for strengthening the internal market."

Bringing to mind that this year marks the 15th anniversary of Romania's joining the European Union, Iohannis stressed that "during this period, Romania has changed fundamentally - a clear confirmation of the European project's transformative power. Respecting and promoting European values - democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights, market economy - define Romania today."

The head of the state added that "we are further strongly committed to the efforts to strengthen the Union" and that this approach "remains the groundwork for Romania's progress and prosperity, enjoying the clear support of the majority of our citizens, as proven by the debates at the Conference on the Future of Europe."

 

Romania supports the aspirations of countries wishing to join the European Union and "strongly" supports the opening of negotiations with Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia, President Klaus Iohannis said .

"We see all around us - in the Western Balkans, in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine - at the citizens' level, the same aspirations that supported, decades ago, Romania's effort to join the European Union. Romania strongly supports these aspirations. At the same time, we strongly support the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and the Republic of North Macedonia," the head of state said at the Cotroceni Presidential Palace.

Iohannis maintained that it was "in our European interest to extend the area of prosperity, democracy and stability to those states that respect and assume common European values."

In this context, the President stated that "as a top priority of Romania's foreign policy, our country will continue to actively support the European integration efforts of the Republic of Moldova and the pro-democratic reform program, based on the Strategic Partnership for European Integration of the Republic of Moldova established on the community of language, history and culture".

At the same time, the head of state added that "for Romania, settling the protracted conflicts in the region, peacefully and sustainably, according to international law remains a matter of strategic interest".

 

Artifacts bear hallmarks of prototypes of ninja weapons

By NAOYUKI MORI/ Staff Writer

January 14, 2022 

Flat throwing stones with sharpened corners unearthed at the ruins of the Owada “jinya” administrative headquarters in Saitama. They are kept by the Saitama city board of education. (Provided by the Saitama Prefectural Ranzan Historical Museum)

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RANZAN, Saitama Prefecture--Artifacts labeled as “groundbreaking discoveries” from the ruins of structures associated with warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Siege of Odawara in 1590 could have been prototypes of ninja weapons.

Akihiro Iwata, an archaeologist and curator at the Saitama Prefectural Ranzan Historical Museum here, said the flat stones and clay balls may well have been the forerunners of “shuriken” throwing stars and “makibishi” caltrops that later made up ninja arsenals.

Iwata came to this conclusion after re-examining items from the late Warring States period (late 15th to late 16th centuries) excavated at archaeological sites in Saitama and the western Tokyo city of Hachioji.

Flat throwing stones with sharpened corners apparently to inflict damage on enemy forces were unearthed at the ruins of Iwatsuki Castle and the Owada jin’ya administrative headquarters, both in Saitama, between the 1990s and 2000s.

A hexagonal stone from the Iwatsuki Castle ruins measured 4.8 centimeters in diameter and 1 cm thick, while 17 stones from the Owada jinya measured 8 to 14 cm in diameter and 1.5 to 3 cm thick.

The Siege of Odawara forced the rival Hojo clan to hole up in Iwatsuki Castle before it fell. The Owada jinya, located about 6.5 kilometers away, may have been its branch castle.

Clay caltrops unearthed at the ruins of Hachioji Castle. They are kept by the Hachioji City Historical Museum. (Provided by the Saitama Prefectural Ranzan Historical Museum)

Four unglazed clay balls were among items excavated at the ruins of Hachioji Castle around 1960.

Each ball, measuring approximately 1 to 3 cm in diameter, has four spike-like projections so that one of them points upward, apparently to slow the advance of enemy forces.

Hachioji Castle also fell during the Siege of Odawara.

“It is possible that the Hojo clan made these getaway weapons after realizing it faced Hideyoshi’s overwhelming force,” Iwata said.

He added that the forms of these primitive tools suggest that they may have been the prototypes of shuriken and other weapons used by the feudal-era undercover agents.

Yuji Yamada, a ninja expert and professor at Mie University’s Faculty of Humanities, described the artifacts as “groundbreaking discoveries.”

“Flat throwing stones could have developed into shuriken in later years,” he said. “I had never seen clay caltrops before.”

More Than Just Jobs: Assessing the Public Finance Implications of the Energy Transition

DANIEL RAIMI


Date
JAN. 13, 2022

Image
GTSHUTTERBUG / SHUTTERSTOCK

When assessing the potential benefits and costs of the energy transition, most elected officials, advocates, and media outlets focus on one word: jobs. This focus is understandable and appropriate. Careers shape our sense of identity, create a shared sense of community, and provide for our families. What’s more, everyone can relate to the anxiety, stress, and hardship that come from losing a job—not to mention the excitement and optimism when finding a new one. But another economic issue may be just as important in the energy transition: public finance.

Putting the Pieces Together

In a new working paper from Resources for the Future (RFF), I partner with Emily Grubert of the Georgia Institute of Technology; Jake Higdon of Environmental Defense Fund; Gilbert Metcalf, a university fellow at RFF and professor at Tufts University; RFF Research Analyst Sophie Pesek; and Devyani Singh of Environmental Defense Fund to assess the scale at which fossil fuels contribute to government revenue across the United States—the most comprehensive assessment to date. We also estimate how those revenues might change over the next 30 years under different policy scenarios.

For the past 18 months, we’ve waded through hundreds, if not thousands, of federal, tribal, state, and local government documents, piecing together the myriad ways in which fossil fuels support the public services we all depend on. In total, we estimate that fossil fuels have contributed, on average, about $138 billion per year to governments across the United States between 2015 and 2019. The largest sources of these revenues are petroleum product excise taxes, which have generated $48 billion for states and $40 billion for the federal government annually. Oil and gas production (also known as upstream development) has generated $34 billion annually, led by $14 billion from production on federal, tribal, and state lands and waters; $11 billion from state severance taxes; and $6 billion from local property taxes. Other major sources of these funds include oil and gas pipelines, oil refineries, coal production, and power plants. Figure 1 illustrates our baseline results, grouping each energy type into upstream, midstream (i.e., transportation and refining), and downstream (i.e., consumption) segments.

Figure 1. Annual Average Fossil Fuel Government Revenue by Source, 2015–2019
Source: Raimi et al. (2021). “Other” includes corporate income, personal income, and sales taxes, along with the federal coal excise tax and local property taxes on natural gas distribution. Tribal petroleum product fees are for the Navajo Nation only and average $14 million annually

But how can we compare these public finance numbers with the potential impact on jobs?

Consider the following: based on the most recent data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, total earnings for all employees in oil and gas extraction, coal mining, and support activities for mining (which mostly consists of support for oil and gas extraction) totaled about $31 billion in 2020. We estimate that government revenue from the same set of activities (i.e., extraction of coal, oil, and natural gas) averages more than $37 billion—money that is vital for funding services like schools, public health, and infrastructure. In other words, government revenue may be, in crude financial terms, a more important issue in the energy transition than jobs.

Now, let’s get one thing clear: $138 billion is a big number, but it’s not a reason to avoid or delay taking actions to mitigate climate change. If we use the federal government’s interim estimate for the social cost of carbon ($51 per metric ton), annual damages from energy-sector greenhouse gas emissions in the United States amount to roughly $261 billion per year. And that number is probably too low, as much recent scholarship has pointed to a social cost of carbon that is two or three times larger. When we factor in the additional non-climate damages that fossil fuels impose on human health and the natural environment, the argument to transition quickly to a clean energy economy becomes even stronger.

Checubus / Shutterstock


Nonetheless, that transition to clean energy will create fiscal pressures, particularly in rural regions where fossil fuels are an economic and fiscal linchpin. For example, we estimate that fossil fuels account for more than 10 percent of all state and local government own-source revenue in Wyoming (59 percent), North Dakota (31 percent), Alaska (21 percent), and New Mexico (15 percent). (Own-source revenue is collected directly by local and state governments and excludes transfers from the federal government.) Five more states rely on fossil fuels for more than 5 percent of total state and local own-source revenue: West Virginia (9.4 percent), Montana (7.9 percent), Oklahoma (7.7 percent), Louisiana (7.2 percent), and Texas (7.0 percent). In some other states, such as California, Colorado, and Utah, fossil fuels don’t provide a large share of revenue for the state as a whole, but play an outsized role in local areas such as Kern County, California; Weld County, Colorado; and Uintah County, Utah.
Foreseeing the Fiscal Future of Fossil Fuels


How will these revenues change over the next 30 years? Simple: they’ll most likely decline (Figure 2). Even in a scenario with no new climate policies, we estimate that fossil fuel revenue will be $22 billion lower in 2050, mostly due to declines in gasoline and diesel consumption as the US vehicle fleet becomes more fuel efficient and electrified. Unsurprisingly, more ambitious climate scenarios reduce revenue more dramatically by 2050, with annual revenue falling by $78 billion in a scenario that limits global temperature rise in 2100 to 2°C, and dropping by $111 billion in a 1.5°C scenario.

Figure 2. Baseline and Projected Government Revenues Derived from Fossil Fuels under Three Scenarios

Source: Raimi et al. (2021). Scenarios are based on BP’s 2020 Energy Outlook, which we choose because other scenarios from the International Energy Agency and US Energy Information Administration do not provide sufficient data to estimate future changes under deep decarbonization scenarios in the United States. “BAU” = business as usual. “2°C” and “1.5°C” indicate scenarios that are consistent with limiting temperature rise to international targets of 2°C or 1.5°C above preindustrial levels by 2100.


There’s considerable variation across sectors and fuels under the different scenarios, and this variation has real policy implications. For example, coal revenues decline rapidly under all scenarios and approach zero by 2040 under both the 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios. These projected revenue losses will compound decades of coal-sector decline in Appalachia and exacerbate recent challenges for western coal states, primarily in Wyoming. These communities are on the front line of the energy transition and will need support to diversify their economies and revenue streams.

The implications for the oil and gas sector are more nuanced and vary across scenarios. Oil and gas production remains relatively strong over the next 20 to 30 years under the business-as-usual and 2°C scenarios, but declines more quickly under the 1.5°C scenario. This projected timeline suggests that oil and gas communities will have more time to use natural resource revenues to diversify their economies, build up permanent funds that can support future government revenues, and plan for a clean energy future. Still, the long-term challenge of economic diversification, particularly in rural, resource-dependent regions, suggests that these planning efforts should start now.

Plugging the Holes

Now to the obvious next question: How should we replace declining revenues? That depends—do you want the good news or the bad news first?

First, the good news. We have the policy tools to replace these revenues. As my RFF colleague Marc Hafstead has shown, even a moderate federal carbon price can raise hundreds of billions of dollars per year in revenue. Not all of this revenue would be directed to support government finances, but the money certainly could make a dent. To easily replace declining gasoline and diesel excise taxes, states and the federal government could apply a fee for vehicle miles traveled, which could be calibrated to address multiple externalities like emissions, congestion, accidents, and road damage.

Tweaks to existing energy fiscal policy also could raise revenue. Eliminating subsidies for coal, oil, and natural gas producers and increasing royalty rates for production on public lands could contribute a few billion dollars per year and have the added benefit of phasing out “inefficient fossil fuel subsidies,” an important outcome from this year’s COP26 climate pact finalized in Glasgow. A rapidly growing clean energy sector can help raise revenue, too, but comes with some caveats. First, federal policies continue to subsidize clean energy manufacturing and deployment—and some states and localities exempt these technologies from paying local property or other taxes. But scaling back subsidies for clean energy would come with the major downside of slowing the energy transition. In future research, we hope to better assess the mix of fiscal policies that can raise needed revenue for governments without delaying the essential transition to clean energy.

Adwo / Shutterstock


Thinking more broadly across the economy, policy options like a value-added tax, higher marginal income tax rates, and other approaches could easily raise revenues that the federal government could use to support states and localities that are struggling amid the decline of fossil fuels.

All of this brings us to the bad news, which you might have noted already as the elephant in the room. The current political climate of the United States means that prospects for economy-wide carbon pricing, taxes for vehicle miles traveled, fossil fuel subsidy reform, value-added taxes, or higher marginal income tax rates are, on a good day, precarious. Although several of these options have been proposed in Congress recently—most notably in the Build Back Better Act—none have managed to reach the 50-vote threshold in a closely divided Senate.

Could the political prospects for one or more of these reforms change in the years ahead? It’s certainly possible, but when it comes to forecasting the evolution of the median US senator—let alone the 2022 and 2024 elections—I’m out of my depth.

Summing Up

So, where does this leave us? We can distill this whole discussion down to some pretty clear takeaways:

The energy transition will have major consequences for public finances, especially in rural, fossil fuel–producing states and communities.

The reality that governments will lose revenue in a fossil fuel phaseout is not a good reason to delay the energy transition, but it is a challenge that needs to be addressed with policy—most likely including financial transfers from the federal government.
Various policy options could efficiently raise revenues to plug the fiscal holes that will result from a fossil fuel phaseout, but the politics of passing these policies range from tough to toxic.

In the months ahead, RFF’s Equity in the Energy Transition Initiative will build on this work. We’re currently cooking up projects to assess the potential for various tools—including taxes for vehicle miles traveled, clean energy sources, and more—to support public services as the United States and the world moves away from fossil fuels and toward a clean, and more equitable, energy future.

USA, Europe and Containment of China

12.01.2022
Pascal Boniface
© Reuters

It’s in the interest of the European countries that Washington not take for granted an automatic solidarity in the event of war. Their interest is to avoid a new and uncontrollable escalation of tensions. The best way for the Europeans to prevent hawks from taking the lead in Washington is to tell America that their appreciation and behaviour depends on that of the US, writes Valdai Club expert Pascal Boniface.

Before going to the G7 and NATO summits in June 2021, Biden stated, “My trip to Europe is about America rallying the world’s democracies”. Just before taking off in Air Force One, he declared that his goal was to make clear for Moscow and China that the United States and the European countries were bonded. But it was not a very easy sell.

European countries are often split between those for which solidarity with Washington is not negotiable and constitutes the axis of their diplomacy, and others, for which being an ally does not mean being aligned. The French president has commonly been one of the more vocal leaders in the latter camp. Following the end of the G7 summit, Macron said straight away that he rejected “an automatic alignment with Washington, particularly in the confrontation with Beijing... We should have our own way. Common values, but independence when our strategy on China is at stake.” To emphasise, he added that European posture regarding this matter should be neither that of a Chinese vassal, nor alignment with the US. After the NATO summit, he insisted upon a clarification of his goals: “NATO is a military organisation. The topic of the relationship with China is not only a military one. NATO is an organisation which concerns the North Atlantic, and China has little to do with the North Atlantic.”

Meanwhile, there were a lot of passages related to China in the official communiqué of the NATO summit. One of these reads: “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”

Clearly, the United States wants to create a broad alliance in order to put in place a policy to contain China.

The European countries share some concerns with Washington regarding China. They condemned the Hong Kong crackdown, are horrified by the fate of the Uyghurs, call for more freedom in China, and disapprove of the threats over Taiwan. They call for freedom of navigation to be respected in the South China Sea. They consider China’s trade policy problematic, and assert that the huge trade deficits with China aren’t just a product of its competitive advantages but also its unfair practices. They are cautious regarding the Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which could be damaging due, among other reasons, to the debt trap.

For European countries, China is sometimes a partner, sometimes a competitor, and sometimes a rival. But worldwide supremacy is not a European objective; it is an American goal, and only an American goal.

The European countries and the US can also have divergent interests.

It is an understatement to say that the creation of AUKUS (Australia — United Kingdom — United States), with the obvious and declared goal to contain China, was not well received in Paris. The first side effect of the creation of this alliance was the cancellation of a major sale of French submarines to Australia; US submarines would be purchased instead. On top of that, negotiations between Canberra and Washington were carried out behind closed doors. Paris was only informed once the deal was reached.

Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Foreign Minister, stated that Biden was “Trump-like without Twitter”, meaning that unilateralism remained the guiding line of US diplomacy.

CONFLICT AND LEADERSHIP

Unpacking the AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership: Politics, Proliferation and Propulsion

Andrew Futter

The AUKUS agreement, and particularly the nuclear-submarines component, appear to be part of a broader plan to bolster US capacity in the Asia-Pacific, reassure regional allies of the US commitment to defence of the region, and perhaps above all, to counter the perception of a “rising” and more assertive China. At the same time, it will look to many like US double standards and even reflective of a neo-colonial attitude to nuclear proliferation where some countries are deemed “responsible” nuclear operators and others are not, writes Valdai Club expert Andrew Futter. 

EXPERT OPINIONS

Since then, Franco-US relations have been mended. The United-States has apologised, but it is far from sure that this kind of behaviour will never happen again. The extraterritorial application of US national legislation is a weapon which has been turned against Washington’s European allies. European firms have paid 40 billion dollars to the US Treasury over the last 10 years due to decisions made by the US Department of Justice.

At the very least, it can be said that extraterritorial legislation contradicts the concerns of a true alliance. Such a relationship may only exist between a boss and his surrogates, one who is reluctant to obey international law while at the same time wanting to impose its own national law on the rest of the world.

Biden’s strategy consists of enlisting the European countries under the flag of a democratic league facing authoritarian regimes, namely China and Russia; Iran will probably be added eventually.

For some American strategists (Mearsheimer, Waltz), if China is the main challenge, it is a mistake to push Moscow into Beijing’s arms.

In 1972, Nixon and Kissinger’s gambit consisted of establishing a de facto strategic partnership with China in order to cope with the Soviet threat which was, at this time, the most important one.

However, Biden’s calculus is different. Trying to mend the relationship with Moscow in order to contain China could be efficient from a geopolitical standpoint, but would deprive Washington of a main argument, the political one.

This motion would illustrate that Washington’s motivation is grounded in geopolitical rivalry.

In this case, European and Asian allies would be less motivated to jump in Washington’s bandwagon. However, focusing on democracy and human rights makes it more difficult to refuse to be part of the posse.

Washington is, deliberately for some leaders and unconsciously for others, reinforcing the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in order to legitimise a global alliance of democracies under US leadership. This strategy is a self-fulfilling prophecy: it consists of antagonising the relationship to promote the need to be protected against a rising threat.

There is no doubt about the dire situation of human rights in China. There is absolutely no free press, the regime is a one-party system, criticising the Communist Party leadership or Xi Jinping is a risky business, and the Uyghur minority is fiercely repressed. China has mostly abolished the “one nation, two systems” policy in Hong Kong, and has instigated a crackdown of freedom of speech in the city.

While all of this may indeed be true, these facts are not the main explanation of the rise of the opposition between Beijing and Washington. They merely suit the American political legitimisation of the extant strategic rivalry.

When Nixon and Kissinger established a strategic partnership with China in 1972, China was far from democratic. At the time, it was a totalitarian regime where, even inside the family inner circle, it was dangerous to show some reluctance about Mao’s leadership.

When Clinton decided to resume economic ties with China, which were wiped out after the Tiananmen Square bloodshed, when the US accepted China’s integration into the World Trade Organization in 2001, and when Trump declared that Xi Jinping was a close friend in 2017 in his private club Mar-A-Lago, China was not a model of democracy.

Therefore, the question of democracy and human rights, despite being a real issue, is not the reason why the rivalry between Beijing and Washington is at the top of the American diplomatic agenda.

The reason is Washington’s fear, and even anxiety, about being surpassed by Beijing. The US has been the world leader since 1945 and, since the creation of the country, Americans have maintained a strong belief that their mission on Earth was to be the shining city on the hill. Therefore, it isn’t just unacceptable for the US leadership to lose that world supremacy, but for ordinary US citizens as well.

For 30 years, there has been a gentlemen’s agreements between the United States and China. Washington neglected to pry into the internal policies of Beijing, and China did not contest US international strategic supremacy. This gentlemen’s agreement is now broken.

Deng Xiaoping’s motto was: “To hide its strengths and to bide its time.” Today, Xi Jinping heralds openly that China wants and deserves to be the world’s number one power.

For the US, it is easier to gather other nations by denouncing the authoritarianism of the Chinese regime than complain about being overtaken.

The same logic prevailed after World War II. Whatever nature the Russian regime would have taken, it would have been impossible for Washington to accept that a single country controls the Eurasian continent. However, it was more comfortable to draw the attention of the world to the dangers the Soviet Union posed to freedom.

Could NATO’s Article 5 work in the Indo-Pacific? Could automatic military solidarity be relied upon if a member nation is attacked in this area? Essentially: would China be able to launch an attack against NATO countries?

It would not be automatically an attack on US interests or troops requiring European solidarity. It could also be an attack on a UK or French vessel to contest freedom of navigation in the South Chinese Sea. Regarding NATO’s Article 5, the first reaction is to think about US guarantees of European security. However, in the South China Sea, the main scenario of war is a military confrontation between the US and China.

Another question: who would be the first to open fire? Is Article 5 eligible for pre-emptive defence? If the US fears an imminent attack by China and chooses to attack first, what would happen?

It is, of course, the worst-case scenario for the European countries. For some of them, solidarity with the US must prevail, but for others, the assessment of national interest, the true responsibility of an escalation and decision to launch a war must be the key factor.

Actually, it’s in the interest of the European countries that Washington not take for granted an automatic solidarity in the event of war. Their interest is to avoid a new and uncontrollable escalation of tensions. The best way for the Europeans to prevent hawks from taking the lead in Washington is to tell America that their appreciation and behaviour depends on that of the US.

U.S. lawmakers ask IOC for assurances uniforms not made through forced labor

REUTERS

January 13, 2022 

 

Workers deliver a cart loaded with equipment to a commercial plaza at the Winter Olympic Village in Beijing on Dec. 24, 2021. (AP Photo)

The United States’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) released a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on Wednesday voicing concern over forced labor in the production of uniforms ahead of the Beijing Games.

The CECC is concerned that Anta Sports and Hengyuanxiang Group (HYX Group), with which the IOC has contracts to produce uniforms, use cotton from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

“Cotton produced in the XUAR is synonymous with forced labor and the systematic repression that takes place there,” the letter said.

“Forced labor plays an integral role in the genocide taking place against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the region.”

The IOC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The U.S. government and many rights groups say Beijing is carrying out genocide in Xinjiang. China denies the allegations of human rights abuses.

“Because Anta and HYX Group both continue to use cotton produced in the XUAR, there is a worrisome possibility that IOC personnel or others attending the 2022 Olympic Games will be wearing clothing contaminated by forced labor,” the CECC added in the letter.

Among the commission’s requests of the IOC were to make public a “certificate of origin” that HYX Group provided the IOC “that reportedly confirmed that no forced labor was used” in its production.

The CECC also asked the IOC to explain publicly “assurances” from Anta Sports that its products were not produced through forced labor.

The Winter Olympics run from Feb. 4-Feb. 20.

US more isolated diplomatically than Iran because of Trump

TEHRAN, Jan. 13 (MNA) – US State Department Spokesman Ned Price said that the United States in some ways more isolated diplomatically than Iran because of the course that the previous administration had pursued.

"So let me take those in order. So first, on the timeframe, I would make a couple of points. You’ve heard from us that the runway is short. The runway is very, very short. We are not talking about a protracted period of time that remains. We are talking about potentially weeks, not months," said Ned Price on Thursday in a press conference in response to some questions about the Vienna talks and Iran nuclear program.

"Second, it is impossible for us, at least at this point, to point out a date on the calendar and say that is the deadline. And it is impossible for a simple reason. You’ve heard me say before, this is not a temporal clock that is ticking down. It is a clock that is based on a calendar that is based on technical assessments. And really, what we are looking at here is a very simple equation: When do the nonproliferation benefits afforded by the JCPOA – as finalized in 2015 and implemented in 2016 – when are they overcome by the advancements that Iran has made in its nuclear program since it began to break free from the limits that it previously subscribed to after the last administration left the JCPOA? That is an assessment that will be based on a whole series of inputs, what we can discern publicly and non-publicly regarding those advancements and their implications for things like Iran’s breakout time when it comes to acquiring enough fissile material needed to produce a nuclear weapon if they were to move in that direction," he added.

Ned Price blamed the US previous administration for current problems with Iran over withdrawal from the nuclear deal, saying, "That is that we inherited a situation that none of us would have wished for, a situation in which Iran had been galloping forward in its nuclear program, freed from the nuclear shackles to which it previously subscribed, with proxies that certainly were not cowed but in some ways had become even more brazen and aggressive, with Iran – I should say with the United States in some ways more isolated diplomatically than Iran because of the course that the previous administration had pursued."

"I think if you ask anyone in this administration if we would have preferred to have entered into office on January 20th with Iran’s nuclear program verifiably and permanently constrained and Iran permanently barred from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon, the answer would be a resounding yes," he noted. 

He reiterated the claim that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, saying, "Of course, we’re working now, this administration now is working very closely with them, both our European allies and our partners in this context, to see to it if we can arrive once again at a formula by which Iran is permanently and verifiably prevented from obtaining a nuclear weapon."

"This is about permanently and verifiably ensuring that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon," he claimed. 

These claims come while Tehran has repeatedly announced that it has no intention to build nuclear weapons as it has been banned by a religious Fatwa of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Khamenei.

ZZ/14001023000040

News Code 182849

Blinken: Trump JCPOA withdrawal ‘one of worst decisions in US foreign policy’

By IFP Media Wire
January 14, 2022


US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has criticized former President Donald Trump for the current situation over Iran’s nuclear programme. The top diplomat has called Trump’s move to pull Washington out of the Iran nuclear dal as ”one of the worst decisions made in recent American foreign policy”.

“We had stopped them. The nuclear agreement that was reached some years ago by the [Barack] Obama administration put Iran’s nuclear program in a box,” Blinken said in an interview with US public radio station NPR.

“And one of the worst decisions made in recent American foreign policy was to walk away from that agreement,” the secretary of state added.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was inked by Iran and six world powers in 2015. Under the deal, Tehran agreed to put limits on certain aspects of its nuclear activities in exchange for the removal of draconian international sanctions imposed against the country.

In 2018, however, the US pulled out of the pact and reinstated sanctions under the so-called ‘maximum pressure campaign’ against Tehran, effectively depriving Iran of the deal’s benefits by forcing third parties to stop doing business with Iran.

Iran remained patient for an entire year, after which it began to take incremental steps away from its nuclear obligations, especially after Europeans failed to salvage the deal under the US pressure.
The Islamic Republic’s decision to ramp up its nuclear activities prompted other parties to revive talks earlier this year.

“And as a result, we are in a challenging situation where, far from getting a new and so-called better agreement – that hasn’t happened – Iran has moved forward with its program in increasingly dangerous ways,” Blinken stated.

Tehran denies seeking nuclear weapons, stressing it wants to master nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

There are only “a few weeks” left to save the Iran nuclear deal, and the United States is ready to look at “other options” if negotiations fail, the top diplomat noted.

“We still believe that if we can get back in the weeks ahead – not months ahead, weeks ahead – to the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement, that would be the best thing for our security and the security of our allies and partners in the region. But, we’re very, very short on time. The runway is very short,” the US secretary of state said.

Iran has rejected US officials’ remarks about a deadline for reaching an agreement and stressed the country is only after a good agreement.

“So we have, I think, a few weeks left to see if we can get back to mutual compliance. That would be the best result for America’s security. But if we can’t, we are looking at other steps, other options, again, closely coordinated with concerned countries,” he added.

Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed Tehran reserves the right to respond to any adventurism by the United States and Israel.

Iran and the five remaining parties to the JCPOA — Germany, Britain, France, Russia and China — began the talks in the Austrian capital in April with the aim of removing the sanctions after the US voiced its willingness to return to the agreement.

During the seventh round of the Vienna talks, the first under President Ebrahim Raeisi, Iran presented two draft texts which address, separately, the removal of US sanctions and Iran’s return to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. Tehran also said it was preparing a third draft text on the verification of the sanctions removal.

The eighth round of talks kicked off in Vienna in late December. The negotiations seek to restore the JCPOA in its original form and bring the US back into the agreement.

Iran insists that the talks must lead to the removal of all American sanctions that were imposed against Tehran following Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the landmark agreement in May 2018. Tehran has also demanded credible guarantees that Washington will not abandon the deal again.


IFP Media Wire
Reports and views published in the Media Wire section have been retrieved from other news agencies and websites, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Iran Front Page (IFP) news website. The IFP may change the headlines of the reports in a bid to make them compatible with its own style of covering Iran News, and does not make any changes to the content. The source and URL of all reports and news stories are mentioned at the bottom of each article.

China’s trade tactics are winning out over US diplomacy and military might in Southeast Asia


As the US seeks to increase its presence in Southeast Asia through diplomacy, China prefers to put its money where its mouth is with investment and trade deals

The creation of the RCEP and rise in China-Asean trade to almost double the value of US-Asean exchanges suggest Beijing’s approach is working

Syed Munir Khasru
13 Jan, 2022

SCMP


Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi (centre) meets diplomatic envoys from the Asean states in Beijing on November 14, 2021. Photo: Xinhua

China succeeded in deepening ties with Singapore last month, signing 14 new deals at an annual bilateral cooperation meeting held on December 29.

Beijing has been active in Southeast Asia since the 1990s, becoming a dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) in 1996. In November 2020, 10 Asean members signed the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement involving several major powers, but with the notable absence of the US.

Certainly, the US remains a central geopolitical power, with allies in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and the Pacific. The absence of large military powers in Southeast Asia has also helped the US gain a geopolitical footing in the region.

On the other hand, China has unswervingly bolstered production, trade and investments both in Southeast Asia and globally, evolving into a geoeconomic power by strengthening relations through economic partnerships and trade relations.

Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”, rather than adopting an economic focus, relied more on a robust military approach aimed at containing China. Then came Donald Trump’s “America first” policy which saw the US exit the Trans-Pacific Partnership, damaging its political and economic relations with Southeast Asia.

US President Joe Biden now faces an uphill struggle to correct course. Although high-level engagement has been initiated, a lot more must be done to regain the confidence of the region in the consistency and reliability of US policies. America’s firm stance against autocracies in Southeast Asia has also indirectly benefited China, which remains unbothered by humanitarian issues.

The disputed waters of the South China Sea are another issue at play. China remains a security concern for many Asean member nations, but given the huge direct investment and development assistance flowing in from China, they are unlikely to position themselves against Beijing.

Rather, analysts have hinted at a potential comprehensive strategic partnership between Asean and China – including countries contesting Beijing’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea – that could further boost investment, trade and even military ties, while weakening US influence in the region.

Understanding that economic security created through trade lasts longer than when done through military superiority, China has deftly managed the relationship with Asean by strengthening economic ties with many traditional US allies.

RCEP: 15 Asia-Pacific countries sign world’s largest free-trade deal

Despite tensions with Vietnam, the country’s new metro system in Hanoi is Chinese made. Indonesia, considered an important ally by Washington, has also embraced China of late, propelled by the latter’s pandemic diplomacy. Last year, the two signed an agreement to promote the use of their respective currencies in trade deals, curbing dependence on the US dollar.

Australia, a historically close US ally with security partnerships like Aukus, has also ratified the RCEP. Even though Australia has banned Chinese telecommunication firms from supplying 5G technology, and Australian exports to China are facing entry-related obstructions, Chinese investment has increased over the years to make China Australia’s largest trading partner, with US$261 billion flowing annually between the two.

China has made huge strides to become a major player in the international market. Free trade agreements such as the RCEP have helped it build inroads in the Indo-Pacific region. While the US is engaged in diplomacy, China is playing its cards with infrastructure investment deals.

Asean became China’s top trading partner in 2020, beating the European Union. Asean attracts Chinese foreign direct investment in many sectors, from agriculture and manufacturing to the digital and green economies. Investment between Asean and China now exceeds US$310 billion. Total trade in 2020 rose to US$685.28 billion whereas, for US-Asean trade, the figure stood at US$362.2 billion.

Even when it comes to the Quad, which comprises the US, Japan, Australia, and India, China has a strong trade relationship with all members bar the US. Japan’s exports to China stood at US$141.4 billion in 2020, roughly one-fifth of its total exports, surpassing the US.

China also briefly overtook the US in 2020 to become India’s biggest trading partner, supplying it with heavy machinery, telecoms equipment and home appliances – although the US managed to regain its top position last year amid a slowdown in China-India bilateral trade growth.

Timeline of the US-China trade war since July 2018
30 Aug 2021


US-China trade relations, meanwhile, are increasingly under strain. Washington continues to impose tariffs on Chinese imports, thus dismantling China’s position as the US’ top trading partner.

Beijing’s diplomatic strategy cannot be viewed in isolation from its economic policy. China has attracted countries in the Indo-Pacific through large infrastructure investments deals, especially under its Belt and Road Initiative, development aid and foreign investment.


Economic blocs such as the RCEP will bring more partners to China, giving the US tough competition. China has not engaged in traditional soft/hard diplomacy but has instead adopted a strategy to boost geoeconomic relations, while following a policy of domestic non-interference.

RCEP allows Asia to step out of the US’ shadow
9 Jan 2022


The US is still playing catch-up as it works on a comprehensive Indo-Pacific framework to strengthen cooperation around trade and the digital economy, resilient supply chains, decarbonisation, infrastructure, and other areas of shared interest.

With continued domestic divisions in the US, which have frequently spilled over into trade and foreign policy, it will take more than diplomatic engagement and words of assurances for the US to match an adversary which has neither any vested-interest group to cater to at home nor any uncertainty over the continuity of its political leadership or policy consistency.


Professor Syed Munir Khasru is chairman of the international think tank, The Institute for Policy, Advocacy, and Governance (IPAG) with a presence in Dhaka, Delhi, Melbourne, Vienna and Dubai

The U.S. Directed Rebellion in Kazakhstan May Well Strengthen Russia

In early 2019 the Pentagon financed think tank RAND published an extensive plan for soft attacks on Russia.

Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground.

The 350 pages long report recommended certain steps to be taken by the U.S. to contain Russia. As its summary says:

Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, this report seeks to define areas where the United States can do so to its advantage. We examine a range of nonviolent measures that could exploit Russia’s actual vulnerabilities and anxieties as a way of stressing Russia’s military and economy and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps we examine would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps are conceived of as elements in a campaign designed to unbalance the adversary, leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, and causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence.

RAND lists economical, geopolitical, ideological and informational as well as military measures the U.S. should take to weaken Russia.

Since the report came out the first four of the six 'geopolitical measures' listed in chapter 4 of the report have been implemented.

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The U.S. delivered lethal weapons to Ukraine, it increased its support for 'rebels' in Syria. It attempted a regime change in Belarus and instigated a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The U.S. is now implementing measure 5 which aims to 'reduce Russia's influence in Central Asia'.

Kazakhstan, Russia's southern neighbor, was part of the Soviet Union. It is a mineral rich, landlocked country three times the size of Texas but with less than 20 million inhabitants. A significant part of its people are Russians and the Russian language is in common use. The country is an important link in the strategic Belt and Road Initiative between China and Europe.

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Since the demise of the Soviet Union the country has been ruled by oligarchic family clans - foremost the Nazarbayevs. As the CIA Worldfactbook notes:

Executive branch

chief of state: President Kasym-Zhomart TOKAYEV (since 20 March 2019); note - Nursultan NAZARBAYEV, who was president since 24 April 1990 (and in power since 22 June 1989 under the Soviet period), resigned on 20 March 2019; NAZARBAYEV retained the title and powers of "First President"; TOKAYEV completed NAZARBAYEV's term, which was shortened due to the early election of 9 June 2019, and then continued as president following his election victory

Over the last decade there have been several uprisings (2011, 2016 and 2019) in Kazakhstan. These were mostly caused by uneven distribution of income from its minerals including oil and gas. The oligarchs in the capital of Astana / Nur-Sultan live well while the provinces which produce the minerals, like Mangistauskaya in the south-west, have seen few developments.

Recently the price for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), used by many cars in Kazakhstan, went up after the government had liberalized the market. This caused another round of country wide protests:

The string of rallies that has torn through Kazakhstan since January 2 began in the western oil town of Zhanaozen, ostensibly triggered by anger over a sudden spike in the price of car fuel. Similar impromptu gatherings then quickly spread to nearby villages in the Mangystau region and then in multiple other locations in the west, in cities like Aktau, Atyrau and Aktobe. By January 4, people had come out onto the streets in numbers in locations many hundreds of kilometers away, in the southern towns of Taraz, Shymkent and Kyzyl-Orda, in the north, in the cities of Uralsk and Kostanai, as well as in Almaty and Nur-Sultan, the capital, among other places.

Few saw scenes as fiery as those in Almaty, though.

Clashes in Almaty continued throughout the night into January 5. After being dispersed by police from Republic Square, part of the crowd headed around two kilometers downhill, to another historic location in the city, Astana Square, where the seat of government used to be located in Soviet times.

While there is little reliable way to gauge the scale of the demonstrations, a combination of on-the-ground reporting and video footage appears to indicate that these protests may be even larger than those that brought the country to a near-standstill in 2016.

While the grievances that sparked the first rallies in Zhanaozen were to do with fuel prices, the sometimes rowdy demonstrations that have followed appear to be of a more general nature. Chants of “shal ket!” (“old man go!”), usually understood as a reference to former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who continues to wield significant sway from behind the scenes, have been heard at many of the demos.

The protests escalated soon with gangs of armed protesters taking control of government buildings and setting them on fire. There were also attempts to take control of radio and TV stations as well as the airport. Police, which generally did little to intervene, were gunned down.

The actions in Almaty, the country's largest city and former capital, are certainly not spontaneous reactions by a crowd of poor laborers but controlled actions by well trained groups of armed 'rebels'.

Peter Leonard @Peter__Leonard - 9:18 UTC · 6 Jan 2022
Kazakhstan: Very important and intriguing detail with strong shades of Kyrgyzstan 2020. Peaceful people initiate rallies, but shady and violent individuals turn up to sow trouble, and it is never remotely clear who they are or where they came from /1 https://t.co/qYSlUUrMVx

From one account I heard, a similar dynamic played out in Almaty on Wednesday morning. A relatively small and mild gathering formed on Republic Square, opposite city hall. All of a sudden hundreds of extremely aggressive men turned up, threatening all and sundry #Kazakhstan /2

They threatened and attacked journalists standing nearby, ordering anybody who took photographs to delete the images. It was clearly this cohort that was responsible for much of the destruction. And it is a mystery (to me) who they were /3

We have seen similar formations during the U.S. instigated uprisings in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Belarus.

NEXTA, the U.S. financed regime change media network in Poland which last year directed the failed color revolution attempt in Belarus, announced the U.S. demands:

NEXTA @nexta_tv - 13:52 UTC · Jan 5, 2022
Demands of the Protesters in #Kazakhstan
1. Immediate release of all political prisoners
2. Full resignation of president and government
3. Political reforms:
Creation of a Provisional Government of reputable and public citizens. Withdrawal from all alliances with #Russia

A more reliable source confirms these:

Maxim A. Suchkov @m_suchkov - 14:43 UST · Jan 5, 2022
The list of demands of protestors in #Kazakhstan that's been circulating is interesting, to put it mildly.
While most demands focus on bolstering social & economic support & countering corruption points #1, 7, 10, 13, 16 expose the roots of protest & who's driving them

#1 demands that #Kazakhstan should leave Eurasian Economic union.
#7 demands legalization of polygamy "for certain groups of the population" & prohibition on marriage with foreigners
#10 demands independence for Mangystau region &^that revenues of oil companies remain in Mangystau

Caveat: this list been circulating a lot on telegram - could be fake or not representative of what protestors want, thou it appears protestors are a diverse group that includes genuinely disgruntled people, political manipulators, "prof revolutionaries" (that were in UKR & BEL), etc

The government of Kazakhstan has since lowered the LPG prices. On January 5 President Tokayev relived the 'First President' Nazarbayev of his position as chairman of the Security Council and promised to act tough on armed protesters.

Kazakhstan is part of the Russian led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). On the morning of January 5 Tokayev had a phone call with the presidents of Russia and Belarus. He has mobilized airborne units of the armed forces of Kazakhstan. On the evening of January 5 he requested support from the CSTO against the 'foreign directed terrorists' which are fighting the security forces.

Russia, Belarus and other CSTO members have dedicated quick reaction forces reserved for such interventions. These will now be mobilized to regain government control in Kazakhstan. Russian CSTO forces are currently on their way to Kazakhstan. Belorussian and Armenian troops will follow soon.

They are in for some tough time:

Cᴀʟɪʙʀᴇ Oʙsᴄᴜʀᴀ ❄ @CalibreObscura - 19:50 UTC · Jan 5, 2022
#Kazakhstan: Captured arms from the National Security Committee (equivalent to Russian FSB) building by protestors in #Almaty: At least 2 PG-7V projectiles, possible boxed Glock pistol & (possibly) more in numerous scattered crates, various kit.
Anti-Armour capability in 48hrs...
Image

During the last decades the U.S. and its allies had been relatively quiet about the dictatorial leadership in Kazakhstan.

Mark Ames @MarkAmesExiled - 14:18 UTC · Jan 5, 2022
NATO's cheerleading corner of FSU "experts" already working hard to spin Kazakhstan uprisings as somehow Putin's fault or indictment of Putin—but note how quiet our media-NGO complex has been the past 20 years re: the regime's human rights abuses, corruption & "authoritarianism"

Chevron is the largest oil producer in Kazakhstan and the former British prime minister Tony Blair has previously been giving advice to then President Nursultan Nazarbayev on how to avoid an uproar over dead protesters:

In a letter to Nursultan Nazarbayev, obtained by The Telegraph, Mr Blair told the Kazakh president that the deaths of 14 protesters “tragic though they were, should not obscure the enormous progress” his country had made.

Mr Blair, who is paid millions of pounds a year to give advice to Mr Nazarbayev, goes on to suggest key passages to insert into a speech the president was giving at the University of Cambridge, to defend the action.

Times however are different now as Kazakhstan has continued to strengthen its relations with Russia and China.

The CIA offshoot National Endowment for Democracy is financing some 20 'civil society' regime change programs in Kazakhstan with about $50,000 per annum each. The involved organizations  currently seem to be mostly quiet but are a sure sign that the U.S. is playing a role behind the scenes. On December 16 details of upcoming demonstrations were announced by the U.S. embassy in Kazakhstan.

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It is likely that this pre-planned Central Asia part of the 'Extending Russia' program has been implemented prematurely as a response to Russia's recent ultimatum with regards to Ukraine and NATO. Its sole purpose is to unbalance the Russian leadership in Moscow by diverting its attention towards the south.

I however believe that Russia has prepared for such eventualities. They will not affect its plans and demands.

What is difficult to discern though is what is really happening behind the scenes in Astana/Nur-Sultan. Has Tokayev, who was previously seen as a mere puppet of Nazarbayev, really replaced him? His control of the security forces is somewhat in doubt:

Liveuamap @Liveuamap - 19:18 UTC · Jan 5, 2022
Tokayev dismissed the head of his security guard Saken Isabekov. Also, the President dismissed the Deputy Head of the State Security Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan from his post

But the outcome of the whole game is quite predictable:

Mark Ames @MarkAmesExiled - 14:31 UTC · Jan 5, 2022
The grim likelihood, given all the various "revolutions" in the FSU the past 20 years, is that Kazakhstan's street protests [will be] instrumentalized by a powerful clan to replace the ruling oligarchy with a new oligarchy.

The CSTO troops which are now landing in Almaty will take a few days to end the rebellion. The outcome is not in doubt.

Moscow, not Washington DC, will have a big say in who will come out at the top.

It is quite possible that the results of the whole affair will, like the failed U.S. regime change attempts in Belarus, not weaken but strengthen Russia:

Dmitri Trenin @DmitriTrenin - 7:57 UTC · 6 Jan 2022
#Kazakhstan is another test, after #Belarus, of RUS ability to help stabilize its formal allies w/o alienating their populations. As 1st action by CSTO since founding in 1999, it is major test for bloc. Lots of potential pitfalls around, but can be big boon if Moscow succeeds.

Posted by b on January 6, 2022 at 9:19 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/

EXPLAINER: Why didn’t China send troops to aid Kazakhstan?

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A police car on fire as riot police prepare to stop protesters in the center of Almaty, Kazakhstan, on Jan. 5, 2022. China gave strong verbal backing to Kazakhstan’s leader for his deadly crackdown to quell violent unrest, but stood aside as Russia sent in special forces troops. 

(AP Photo/Vladimir Tretyakov, File)

BEIJING (AP) — China gave strong verbal backing to Kazakhstan’s leader for his deadly crackdown to quell violent unrest, but stood aside as Russia sent in special forces troops.

Resource-rich Kazakhstan, on China’s western border, has economic and strategic importance for Beijing and is an important link in its “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative to expand its global trade and political influence in rivalry with the U.S. and its allies.

China’s response to the crisis underscores how it prefers to influence outcomes with verbal assurances and offers of assistance, without committing troops.

“The growing closeness between Russia and China means we can expect more rhetorical support for Moscow’s overseas ventures, particularly when they go up against Western geostrategic aims,” said Rana Mitter, an Oxford University China expert.

“However, China remains extremely reluctant to deploy People’s Liberation Army troops outside its own territory, except in areas such as U.N. peacekeeping operations, as it would contradict its constant statements that unlike the U.S., China does not intervene in other countries’ conflicts,” Mitter said.

WHAT ARE CHINA’S GOALS IN CENTRAL ASIA?

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, China has steadily expanded its economic and political influence in a region that Russia considers its own backyard. As the largest and by far the wealthiest Central Asian state, Kazakhstan is key, acting as the buckle in China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, and its authoritarian politics act as a bulwark against democratic movements in Ukraine and elsewhere that China derides as Western-engineered “color revolutions.”

China’s ruling Communist Party, which violently repressed its own pro-democracy challenge in 1989, views such movements, whether in Georgia or Hong Kong, as a threat to its own stability. In a message to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev amid the unrest, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said his country would “resolutely oppose external forces deliberately creating turmoil and instigating a ‘color revolution’ in Kazakhstan.”

China’s position dovetails with its strident opposition to outside criticism of its policies, whether its human rights record or its expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, as meddling in its internal affairs.

China’s influence in Central Asia still has limits, however, and Kazakhstan may feel uneasy about inviting in Chinese troops, given China’s harsh treatment of ethnic Kazakhs and other Muslim minorities within its borders, said Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.

“An important element of China’s foreign policy under Xi is to make the world safe for authoritarian states and stop color revolutions from spreading,” Tsang said.

WHEN DOES CHINA INTERVENE?

China frequently vows retaliation for any criticism of its policies, especially when the offenders are the U.S. and its allies. It is far friendlier with autocrats, pledging non-interference and cooperation with whomever is in power, regardless of their records on human rights and corruption.

That’s evidenced in its dealings with regimes that others criticize, from Myanmar’s military leaders to Hungary’s Viktor Orban. While not recognizing the Taliban, it is hedging its bets in Afghanistan by working with the country’s current rulers, despite their espousal of the form of radical Islam that Beijing has sought to keep from infiltrating its restive, largely Muslim region of Xinjiang, which shares a narrow border with Afghanistan and a much larger one with Kazakhstan.

China generally reserves action, military and otherwise, for cases in which its own security is perceived as threatened, as in the 1950-53 Korean War, or more recently, in violent incidents along its disputed border with India, and especially with Taiwan, which China threatens to invade if it doesn’t agree to unite. Beijing responded with ruthless trade and diplomatic retaliation against Lithuania when the tiny Baltic nation broke with diplomatic convention by allowing Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name “Taiwan” instead of “Chinese Taipei.”

HOW DOES CHINA VIEW MILITARY ALLIANCES?

Troops, mostly from Russia, were deployed to Kazakhstan last week by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a grouping of six former Soviet states, at the president’s request amid unprecedented violence. China officially eschews such security alliances, although The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Beijing dominates along with Moscow, has a security component, currently limited to joint training and other non-combat missions.

Unlike the CSTO, there is “no agreement about sending troops from member countries of the SCO,” Chinese international security expert Li Wei said. “In addition, China sticks to the fundamental principle of not using force in other countries.”

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations remain the rare exception, and China is quick to point out that it is the largest contributor of forces to such missions among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

Given the growing might of China’s military, some experts expect Beijing to become more amenable to military interventions in the future. Oxford’s Mitter also points to a growing “grey zone” of Chinese private security enterprises that can be used to protect Chinese interests “without any formal government intervention.”

The failure of the Kazakhstan experience

January 13, 2022 

This general view shows a vehicle in front of a burnt-out administrative building in central Almaty on January 7, 2022, after violence that erupted following protests over hikes in fuel prices [ALEXANDR BOGDANOV/AFP via Getty Images]

Hamada Fara'na
January 13, 2022 

Russia thwarted an American-Israeli plan to bomb Kazakhstan the way they did with Afghanistan, which was what happened in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen, benefiting from the experience of its late intervention in Syria. It quickly responded to the request of Kazakh President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and moved rapid intervention forces under the cover of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation formed in 2002 after the American invasion of Afghanistan. It consists of six countries that were former members of the Soviet group – Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. They sent their forces to achieve two purposes: first, to protect the facilities of the Kazakh state and, second, to support the Kazakh forces to confront the invasion and intervention of armed jihadist factions.

Kazakhstan's borders with China extend 1,460 km, and with Russia 6,467 km, with an area of ​​more than 2.5 million square km. it is rich in minerals such as oil, gas, manganese, iron, chromium and coal, and it is the largest producer of uranium in the world. Therefore, it constitutes a rich productive lever for China and Russia's mineral needs. It has a population of less than 20 million, although it is the ninth largest country in the world, and it has the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which is still the most important and largest space rocket launcher in the world.

Kazakhstan is a centre of international attention, as a strategic location in Central Asia, affecting the security of China and Russia, the two rival countries of the US, which moved its focus from the Arab region to focus on East and Central Asia. This American shift is what prompted Washington to withdraw suddenly from Afghanistan and hand it over to the Taliban, with the aim of creating a circle of tension, friction and clash with China in the east, Iran in the west, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the north. This aims to ignite the Central Asian region and drain China, Russia and Iran, with guarantees that US interests will not be exposed by the Taliban and its hands.

READ: Head of Russia 'peacekeeping' mission in Kazakhstan is same general who led operations in Ukraine, Syria

The plot to bomb Kazakhstan took place in two stages:

The first was through popular protests that erupted on 2 January 2022, led by civil society organisations funded by the West, motivated by the absence of democracy and pluralism, the increase in the prices of fuel and basic commodities and the difficult economic conditions.

The second stage is the transfer of armed jihadist factions belonging to political Islam, Al-Qaeda and Daesh, equipped with combat experience that they have accumulated through their participation in jihad work in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. They are funded by an oil state and have American, Israeli and European planning.

The rapid Russian intervention on Thursday 6 January 2022, with the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation thwarted the project to make Kazakhstan the second centre of tension and attrition after Afghanistan, and to create a rear border front that drains the opponents of the US and pushing them towards instability in the Central Asian region. This is what happened in our Arab region, and they succeeded in doing so, as they destroyed Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen and weakened the rest of the Arab countries by draining their financial resources and capabilities, for the benefit of the Israeli colony and domination.

The Kazakhstan conspiracy failed. Will Washington, Tel Aviv, Europe and the financiers push to stop their plans, or will they move to plan in other countries? Which countries will those be?

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