China–North Korea Ties: Old Allies, New Calculations – Analysis

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, arrive for a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2025. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru
By Abhishek Sharma
On 4 September 2025, Kim Jong-un travelled to Beijing to commemorate the 80th Anniversary of the end of World War II. The visit marks the thawing of ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, which have been frozen since Xi’s previous visit in 2019. Building on the understanding reached at the leader level, the respective high-level meetings in Beijing and Pyongyang have taken forward the conversation, widening the discussion to strengthening comprehensive ties. Although the political leadership has initiated the process of normalising relations, it is unclear whether these efforts reflect tactical adjustment or strategic alignment.
Xi-Kim Bonhomie
Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping assumed the leadership of their respective countries around the same time in 2011 and 2013, respectively. Since taking over, both leaders have played an outsized role in the governance of their country, including driving its foreign policy. Xi was the first Chinese leader to visit North Korea in 2019, after a hiatus of 14 years, reciprocating Kim Jong-un’s first official foreign visit to Beijing in 2018. The visit emphasised the strategic importance of bilateral ties and their political intent to resolve issues through diplomatic channels. The meetings occurred against the strained relations between China and North Korea due to the former’s support for the sanctions regime.
Today, there appears to be a re-telecast of the same characters playing the same script under different circumstances, another story of Kim-Xi bonhomie. However, this time, it may turn out differently, considering the intent and substance.
Following the leader’s meeting, Choe Son Hui, North Korea’s Foreign Minister, visited Beijing, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s sojourn to North Korea to attend the 80th Anniversary of DPRK’s ruling party celebration, underscores the intent of both sides to deepen the relations, building on the strategic guidance given by the leader. Notably, the latter visit is significant, considering it is the first high-level visit after a long time and the Chinese Premier’s first visit in 16 years. The last visit was by Li Hongzhong, a Politburo member in the 2023 military parade. Choe’s statement highlighted the positive turn in ties. It stated that the recent meeting between the leaders “charted the course for the development of DPRK-China relations” and that they were committed to “enhance strategic communication, increase friendly exchanges, deepen practical cooperation.”
The intent is clear, and the substance also lives up to it. The discussion between the two sides shows that the tone and tenor are shifting. The joint statements emphasise the importance of this relationship for both sides. Reuters reported, Wang said to Choe, ‘China is willing to strengthen coordination and cooperation with [North Korea] in international and regional affairs’, and Choe reciprocated by expressing North Korea’s willingness to promote the development of bilateral ties to a ‘new and higher-level.’
Trade as the True Touchstone
Besides the political substance, the trade figures also back the assertion that ties are moving towards normalisation. Irrespective of the political friction between Beijing and Pyongyang, the bilateral trade had been mainly isolated (return to pre-COVID levels), which points to two critical reasons. First is the continued recognition of North Korea’s geopolitical and strategic relevance in Beijing; second is the importance of political stability in its immediate neighbour. This reveals Chinese foreign policy pragmatism: balancing supporting regime security and limiting Pyongyang’s adventures.
Figure 1: China and North Korea bilateral Trade statistics
Source: General Administration of Customs, China *The data presented in Figure 1 illustrates North Korea’s total trade with China and its imports from China between July 24 to August 25.According to China’s General Administration of Customs, total trade with China touched US$1.47 billion till July 2025, matching the pre-pandemic levels. At the same time, Pyongyang also achieved its fastest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 3.7 percent after eight years, driven by an increase in the manufacturing, mining, and construction industries. The economic trade between the two countries is expected to increase further as overall relations improve, driven by increasing Russian demand and imports from China. Some recent developments, such as the resumption of train, flights, labour, and land postal routes, underline the easing of goods and mobility.
For Kim, another reason for improving ties with China is its vital role in achieving his domestic goals. As Kim pushes for more development through his Regional Development 20*10 Policy (create modernised factories in 20 cities and counties every year over 10 years), as seen recently through the beach resort and domestic construction, it would require more supplies from China. Better ties will ensure Korea’s economic growth remains uninterrupted. Besides cross-border trade, North Korean workers employed in garment factories and other occupations in China will receive more relaxation, further boosting remittances.
Is this the onset of Strategic Reset?
Unlike popular perception, realistic calculations rather than ideological affinity have driven North Korea and China’s strategic ties. Irrespective of their differences and distrust, both countries have always prioritised keeping each other close. Hence, while North Korea’s neglect of Chinese concerns regarding the nuclear weapons programme was a source of irritation, it never derailed the relationship. The extension of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 2021 for another 20 years underlined the importance of North Korea for China.
This implies that the structural conditions are responsible for North Korea’s continued strategic relevance for China, and vice versa for North Korea (dependence on China for trade and stability). While leadership support plays a vital role in maintaining, strengthening, and deepening bilateral ties, its disinterest has not adversely impacted the relationship status. Nonetheless, today the situation is different. The changing political dynamics and the leadership’s support are driving factors in improving the ties. This was visible during the recent Kim-Li meeting, where Li remarked, “China-DPRK friendship is entering a new chapter of the development of relations under the strategic guidance of the top leaders [Kim and Xi].” However, what are the drivers of this tactical shift?
It is crucial to contextualise the evolving bilateral ties with three trends: the changing world order (bipolar), the regional political dynamics (multipolar), and the domestic compulsions. Today, China is forging a larger coalition of like-minded countries, including North Korea, in the East Asian region, which gives Beijing greater strategic influence. Beijing understands the strategic value of North Korea at a time when its ties with the US are at their worst. This attempt is also a way to undercut Trump’s renegotiation with Kim Jong-un.
Unlike the last time, when China actively welcomed and supported the Trump-Kim meeting, it has refused to play any role this time. Instead, China has used the opportunity to deepen its ties. For instance, in his message to Kim, Xi said, “China and the DPRK should strengthen strategic coordination and uphold common interests in international and regional affairs.” Some Chinese scholars have emphasised that Beijing will continue to support North Korea in the security and economic sectors, including investing in its economy.
On the other hand, North Korea feels that the time is opportune to mend the ties with China. Three critical factors drive Kim’s decisions: first, to achieve his objectives to revive the broken domestic economic system with the help of Chinese assistance second, to leverage its normalised ties with China (including Russia) to come out of its diplomatic isolation phase, and third, to work with China to forge a ‘fairer and more just world order’.
The benefits of this are already visible. With the participation of the Chinese Premier and the Russian President in the parade, Kim has signalled to his neighbours, Korea and Japan, and the United States (US) that their efforts to isolate Pyongyang diplomatically have failed. Furthermore, their presence also gives legitimacy to North Korea’s military modernisation, including advancing its nuclear arsenal. Kim also leverages diplomatic opportunities by piggybacking through multilateral diplomacy and meeting political leaders from Vietnam, Laos, and Iran.
Given the regional geopolitical circumstances (for China and North Korea) and the internal challenges in North Korea, it is likely that bilateral ties will continue to improve. The resumption of economic trade points to this argument. Nonetheless, to further assess the status of relations, as it is said, the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. In the China-North Korea case, the reality is hidden behind the data and figures, which currently underline the return to the status quo. However, whether this tactical shift will translate into a strategic partnership through deeper security and economic cooperation (as seen in the Russia-North Korea case) will depend on external factors, particularly the US’s allies’ security posture and military modernisation.
Source This article was published by Observer Research Foundation.

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