Published December 25, 2024
DAWN
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor Georgetown University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow National University of Singapore
THE Trump administration is around the corner. What we know so far about its composition, ideas, and power structure can give us some sense of US-Pakistan relations, however vague at this point.
Donald Trump’s appointments reflect a broad spectrum of nepotism, patronage and loyalty, and a mixed policy agenda lacking coherence and consensus. You have China hawks in the incoming secretary of state Marco Rubio and the national security adviser Mike Waltz; a pro-China billionaire as ambassador-designate to China; a top hedge fund manager as treasury secretary; and the China-friendly Elon Musk as top Trump adviser.
That would make Trump the ultimate arbiter of policy. Critical governance institutions will bend to his will as they will be run by his loyalists. And the Republican Party, which now controls both Houses of Congress, has been tamed by him. He would thus loom large over the policy landscape as well as the political arena.
The marketing genius that he is, Trump had framed his personal quest for power as part of the broader public struggle against the governing elites and politicians, in whom the people had lost their trust. But upon coming to power the last time, he went for a hostile takeover of the institutions for his own ends. His incoming administration, like the first one, will be personalised, not institutionalised. Its symbolism will remain populist but the substance will be personalist and oligarchic.
Pakistan may have lost its importance but not its relevance.
Trump’s secretary of state last time, Rex Tillerson, once said when he was Exxon chief that US interests were not necessarily corporate America’s interests. Under Trump, corporate America’s interests will become national interests. So, in addressing the China challenge, Trump and the billionaires he has appointed to his cabinet and other key positions may break some china but are not going to bring the house down. Global disorder is not good for the US economy and for them. They are all globalist at heart. Protectionism and isolationism are not synonymous in today’s economy.
Trump is not a strategic thinker. A person so transactional cannot be. He knows the broad rules of how to deal with rivals and adversaries. He will try to unravel the Russia-China strategic partnership by reaching a deal with one. Depending on who it is will be either good news for India or bad news. That will have a ripple effect on Pakistan.
Trump will nonetheless continue the strategic competition with China, but its ‘foundational arena’ will be science and technology. Another focus will be on tariffs. A transactional and commercial challenge like Trump’s is always easier to deal with than a strategic or politico-military one like Joe Biden’s. After a recent visit to China, Thomas Friedman wrote in The New York Times that China is well-prepared to cope with Trump.
Where does that leave US-Pakistan relations? So far, there is nothing in China-Pakistan relations to alarm Washington. The China factor may not be at play yet. Other than that, Pakistan is neither an ally nor an adversary. The days of a high-profile aid relationship are gone, as they were always war-related. Not just Trump but America as a whole has turned against unnecessary wars.
Pakistan may have lost its importance but not its relevance. The US-Pakistan relationship is need-based and episodic. And each episode is a different story. The current relationship is defined by many negatives. Washington would like Pakistan not to be too close to China, not undermine the Indo-Pacific strategy and the strategic balance in South Asia, and not support jihadists. But the US needs Pakistan’s cooperation in counterterrorism and Af-ghanistan.
Whether Pakistan’s compliance or cooperation is needed, it would require engagement. As America has seen, when it comes to dealing with China’s allies, coercion does not work. It also makes sense to support nuclear Pakistan’s efforts at economic stabilisation. However, if there is a terrorist incident traceable to Pakistan, it would cause a domestic political backlash in America. And that might unleash Trump’s retribution.
The recent missile-related sanctions by the Biden administration were not surprising. Basically, America wants strategic imbalance in South Asia to relieve India of its two-front dilemma, so that it is free to concentrate on China. But designating Pakistan’s missile programme as a potential security threat to the US was vindictive.
It purposely raised a red flag for the incoming administration. Not to mention, it passes on a damning legacy of the relationship after all that it had done, despite its flaws, to benefit America — the unkindest cut of all, if not a dirty trick.
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor Georgetown University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow National University of Singapore.
Published in Dawn, December 25th, 2024
THE Trump administration is around the corner. What we know so far about its composition, ideas, and power structure can give us some sense of US-Pakistan relations, however vague at this point.
Donald Trump’s appointments reflect a broad spectrum of nepotism, patronage and loyalty, and a mixed policy agenda lacking coherence and consensus. You have China hawks in the incoming secretary of state Marco Rubio and the national security adviser Mike Waltz; a pro-China billionaire as ambassador-designate to China; a top hedge fund manager as treasury secretary; and the China-friendly Elon Musk as top Trump adviser.
That would make Trump the ultimate arbiter of policy. Critical governance institutions will bend to his will as they will be run by his loyalists. And the Republican Party, which now controls both Houses of Congress, has been tamed by him. He would thus loom large over the policy landscape as well as the political arena.
The marketing genius that he is, Trump had framed his personal quest for power as part of the broader public struggle against the governing elites and politicians, in whom the people had lost their trust. But upon coming to power the last time, he went for a hostile takeover of the institutions for his own ends. His incoming administration, like the first one, will be personalised, not institutionalised. Its symbolism will remain populist but the substance will be personalist and oligarchic.
Pakistan may have lost its importance but not its relevance.
Trump’s secretary of state last time, Rex Tillerson, once said when he was Exxon chief that US interests were not necessarily corporate America’s interests. Under Trump, corporate America’s interests will become national interests. So, in addressing the China challenge, Trump and the billionaires he has appointed to his cabinet and other key positions may break some china but are not going to bring the house down. Global disorder is not good for the US economy and for them. They are all globalist at heart. Protectionism and isolationism are not synonymous in today’s economy.
Trump is not a strategic thinker. A person so transactional cannot be. He knows the broad rules of how to deal with rivals and adversaries. He will try to unravel the Russia-China strategic partnership by reaching a deal with one. Depending on who it is will be either good news for India or bad news. That will have a ripple effect on Pakistan.
Trump will nonetheless continue the strategic competition with China, but its ‘foundational arena’ will be science and technology. Another focus will be on tariffs. A transactional and commercial challenge like Trump’s is always easier to deal with than a strategic or politico-military one like Joe Biden’s. After a recent visit to China, Thomas Friedman wrote in The New York Times that China is well-prepared to cope with Trump.
Where does that leave US-Pakistan relations? So far, there is nothing in China-Pakistan relations to alarm Washington. The China factor may not be at play yet. Other than that, Pakistan is neither an ally nor an adversary. The days of a high-profile aid relationship are gone, as they were always war-related. Not just Trump but America as a whole has turned against unnecessary wars.
Pakistan may have lost its importance but not its relevance. The US-Pakistan relationship is need-based and episodic. And each episode is a different story. The current relationship is defined by many negatives. Washington would like Pakistan not to be too close to China, not undermine the Indo-Pacific strategy and the strategic balance in South Asia, and not support jihadists. But the US needs Pakistan’s cooperation in counterterrorism and Af-ghanistan.
Whether Pakistan’s compliance or cooperation is needed, it would require engagement. As America has seen, when it comes to dealing with China’s allies, coercion does not work. It also makes sense to support nuclear Pakistan’s efforts at economic stabilisation. However, if there is a terrorist incident traceable to Pakistan, it would cause a domestic political backlash in America. And that might unleash Trump’s retribution.
The recent missile-related sanctions by the Biden administration were not surprising. Basically, America wants strategic imbalance in South Asia to relieve India of its two-front dilemma, so that it is free to concentrate on China. But designating Pakistan’s missile programme as a potential security threat to the US was vindictive.
It purposely raised a red flag for the incoming administration. Not to mention, it passes on a damning legacy of the relationship after all that it had done, despite its flaws, to benefit America — the unkindest cut of all, if not a dirty trick.
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor Georgetown University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow National University of Singapore.
Published in Dawn, December 25th, 2024
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