February 11, 2026
By Ivan Eland
The upcoming negotiations between the United States and Iran may be the only way to avoid military conflict between the two countries. President Donald Trump, assuming that recent large public anti-regime protests have weakened the Iranian government, has taken what he sees as an opportunity to pressure the Iranians over their nuclear and ballistic missile programs and assistance to foreign groups in the Middle East. He has moved air and naval forces to the region and may even think such threats or actions could collapse the regime.
Trump’s military intimidation could take a couple of different paths. A politician who has campaigned on staying out of foreign bogs seems to have become drunk with the potential of military action after the U.S. military’s successful snatch of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Yet Trump avoided a sustained military action on the ground that would have been required to change the socialist regime there. Instead, he seems to have been satisfied with the surviving regime providing him protection money in the form of revenues from a prospective rejuvenation of the now-outdated and decrepit Venezuelan oil industry. (However, Trump may be out of office before such raw imperialism results in substantial payments.)
Thus, the first path the U.S. might follow in its threats or actions toward Iran is limited military strikes to coerce more concessions from Iran. The Iranians already seem willing to negotiate a deal similar to the one negotiated by Barack Obama in 2015 but loudly scrapped by the incoming Trump administration: Iran severely limits its enrichment of nuclear material and sends its stockpile of such material to a third country.
It would not be the first time that Trump has made threats and then settled for a “for-show” agreement similar to the one he could have gotten without the blustering. This outcome seems to be happening in the case of the recent Trump military threats against Greenland. Negotiations with Denmark and Greenland, a semi-autonomous region of that country, will likely arrive at a point similar to where Trump started before the threats: the ability to greatly expand the U.S. military presence on the island, with only a few legal niceties changed.
The same sleight of hand was used during the first Trump administration, after he had railed against the unfairness of the Bush I/Clinton North American Free Trade Agreement during the 2016 election campaign, only to scrap it and negotiate the only slightly modified U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) subsequently after taking office.
Thus, Trump’s threats, along with his desire for short-term, very public “wins,” might leave him satisfied with an updated, minimally modified version of Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. However, he would never admit that that was all he got.
Yet one factor looms in the background that has not been present in these other cases: Trump’s desire to be regarded as the greatest friend of Israel among U.S. presidents. In addition to the Iranians giving up their nuclear program, Israeli officials aim to limit Iran’s work on ballistic missiles that could strike their territory and its assistance to regional groups that could do the same: for example, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. Also, Israel successfully persuaded Trump to attack Iran’s nuclear program in 2025, not only to try “obliterate” it (which obviously failed, as demonstrated by the continued negotiations over it) but also to take down Iranian air defenses to allow future attacks. Israel applauds any U.S. attacks on Iran, because they weaken its primary regional foe.
However, in war, the enemy has a vote. Iran’s nuclear program is designed primarily to deter Israel, as is its ballistic missile program and aid to regional allies. With its air defenses already denuded, Iran might be especially reluctant to give up these two deterrents in any negotiations.
The second path Trump could go down is heavier military strikes to try to take out remaining deeply buried Iranian nuclear facilities, or as a final decisive blow to attempt to collapse an already weakened regime. But why expend such firepower when Iran already seems ready to severely limit its nuclear program through negotiation? Also, perversely, heavy U.S. military strikes may actually strengthen the Iranian regime by inducing the well-known “rally-around-the-flag” effect, which increases popular support when a government is attacked by an outside enemy, especially a more powerful one.
Trump still seems to want to avoid foreign quagmires, so maybe he will take path number one: negotiating a revamped Obama-style nuclear deal with Iran, selling it as something shiny and new, and then calling it a day. In contrast, the more ambitious and risky second path could lead to further unplanned escalation if the Iranians fail to capitulate or choose to go down fighting.
This article was also published at the Independent Institute
Ivan Eland
Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Ivan Eland
Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.
Iranian Regime Seeks To Reclaim Lion And Sun Symbol Embraced By Protesters – Analysis
February 11, 2026
RFE RL
By Mani Parsa
Reeling from massive demonstrations, Iran’s theocratic rulers are scrambling to reclaim the traditional Lion and Sun symbol, which has been embraced by anti-regime demonstrators.
Ali Akbar Salehi, director of the government-run Iranology Foundation, asserted on February 8 that the Islamic republic owns the Lion and Sun symbol — and condemned its use by “others.”
The Lion and Sun has long been one of Iran’s enduring national symbols, in use until the country’s 1979 Islamic revolution. Its origins trace back to astrology — symbolizing the sun in the Leo constellation — but from the 12th century, it became deeply embedded in Iranian art and culture.
From the 15th century onward, the symbol appeared intermittently on Iranian flags. But after the Islamic revolution, the Lion and Sun was outlawed and condemned as a vestige of the oppressive, Westernizing monarchy. As a replacement, the regime embellished Iran’s green-white-red tricolor with four crescents and a sword, surmounted by a diacritic, which formed a stylized representation of the Arabic word “Allah.”
Speaking at the First National Congress on Foreign Policy and the History of Foreign Relations, Salehi insisted that the Islamic republic of Iran owns the symbol and said that it had clear religious roots.
‘We Gave Them This Lion And Sun’
“The philosophy of the Lion and Sun is from Ali (a close companion of the Prophet Muhammad), God, and religion. We gave them this Lion and Sun, now others are using it, even though it belongs to us,” Salehi said.
The “others” Salehi was referring to are the anti-regime protesters who, in recent weeks, have hoisted the Lion and Sun flag in the streets — a symbol of national pride, secularism, and defiance of theocratic rule.
Protests in Iran erupted on December 28 over economic woes including currency collapse but morphed into anti-regime demonstrations that were met with lethal force, with thousands of people killed.
The Lion and Sun also became a prominent symbol for Iranians abroad demonstrating against the regime. As a gesture of support for the protesters, the social media platform X announced on January 9 that it was replacing the current Iranian flag emoji with the Lion and Sun.
According to Salehi, the Iranian state still has an international legal claim on the Lion and Sun symbol. In 1922, the Red Lion and Sun Society was formed, Iran’s equivalent of the Red Cross and Red Crescent humanitarian organizations. And under the 1929 Geneva Conventions, the Lion and Sun was recognized as one of three official emblems — alongside the Red Cross and Red Crescent — for safeguarding medical aid.
In the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran swapped its red Lion and Sun for the Red Crescent, in keeping with other Muslim states. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation, however, upholds Iran’s sole legal claim to the traditional emblem and its right to use it whenever it chooses.
“The philosophy of the Lion and Sun is from Ali (a close companion of the Prophet Muhammad), God, and religion. We gave them this Lion and Sun, now others are using it, even though it belongs to us,” Salehi said.
The “others” Salehi was referring to are the anti-regime protesters who, in recent weeks, have hoisted the Lion and Sun flag in the streets — a symbol of national pride, secularism, and defiance of theocratic rule.
Protests in Iran erupted on December 28 over economic woes including currency collapse but morphed into anti-regime demonstrations that were met with lethal force, with thousands of people killed.
The Lion and Sun also became a prominent symbol for Iranians abroad demonstrating against the regime. As a gesture of support for the protesters, the social media platform X announced on January 9 that it was replacing the current Iranian flag emoji with the Lion and Sun.
According to Salehi, the Iranian state still has an international legal claim on the Lion and Sun symbol. In 1922, the Red Lion and Sun Society was formed, Iran’s equivalent of the Red Cross and Red Crescent humanitarian organizations. And under the 1929 Geneva Conventions, the Lion and Sun was recognized as one of three official emblems — alongside the Red Cross and Red Crescent — for safeguarding medical aid.
In the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran swapped its red Lion and Sun for the Red Crescent, in keeping with other Muslim states. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Federation, however, upholds Iran’s sole legal claim to the traditional emblem and its right to use it whenever it chooses.
Ongoing Debate
Salehi, who has a nuclear engineering background and was once the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, is no stranger to controversy. Appointed head of the Iranology Foundation in 2025, academics from the University of Tehran wrote an open letter, calling his appointment “inappropriate” because of his lack of expertise.
And this isn’t the first time there has been debate about the Lion and Sun. In May 2020, parliamentary deputy Qolam Haydar Ebrahim Baysalami said: “The possibility of returning the red Lion and Sun emblem to Iran is possible through the Foreign Ministry.” “The Red Crescent,” he added, “is an Ottoman emblem and replacing it with the red Lion and Sun was a historical oversight.”
Six years earlier, in May 2014, Ali Younesi, the senior assistant for ethnic and religious minorities for former moderate President Hassan Rohani, said that the Lion and Sun in the former Iranian flag were “symbols of Ali and Muhammad” and suggested that the motif replace the Red Crescent.
At the time, Younesi’s remarks provoked strong reactions from some members of the Iranian parliament. As a response, the hard-line Mashreq news website republished part of a speech by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic, where he denounced the “ill-fated ‘Lion and Sun.'”
“The Iranian flag should not be an imperial flag, the emblems of Iran should not be imperial emblems. They should be Islamic emblems,” Khomeini said. “The works of the tyrant must go. These are the works of the tyrant…. It should be the works of Islam.”
RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.
Tehran ready for nuclear inspections, insists it is not seeking weapons
Copyright AP Photo
By Euronews
Published on
Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian said on Wednesday Tehran is ready for any verification of its nuclear programme, amid renewed talks with the US and raging internal unrest.
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said on Wednesday his country is prepared for "any verification" of its nuclear programme, insisting Tehran is not seeking atomic weapons.
"We are not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. We have stated this repeatedly and are ready for any verification," Pezeshkian said during a speech at Azadi Square in Tehran marking the 47th anniversary of Iran's Islamic Revolution.
"Our country, Iran, will not yield to their excessive demands," he added, after Tehran resumed indirect talks with Washington on its nuclear programme.
The anniversary comes as the country's ruling theocrats remain under pressure from US President Donald Trump, who suggested sending another aircraft carrier group to the Middle East.
Trump made the suggestion in an interview published Tuesday night, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prepares to come to Washington to push the US toward the strictest possible terms in any agreement reached with Tehran in the fledgling nuclear talks.
The US bombed Iranian nuclear sites last June during a 12-day Iran-Israel conflict.
IAEA access remains suspended
Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to verify the status of Iran's near weapons-grade uranium stockpile since the 12-day conflict, when Tehran suspended its cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog.
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi reached an agreement with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in September 2025 to resume inspections, but the UN reimposed sanctions on Iran that same month, leading the country to halt implementation of the agreement.
This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows the rubble of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Iran's Natanz nuclear enrichment site on 3 December 2025 AP Photo
A fresh round of indirect nuclear talks between Iran and the US concluded in Muscat on last Friday, mediated by the Sultanate of Oman.
Pezeshkian has described the talks as "a step forward," emphasising that Tehran's rationale concerning the issue is based on the rights enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Senior Iranian security official Ali Larijani travelled from Oman to Qatar on Wednesday, with Qatar hosting a major US military installation.
A country torn
The anniversary also comes as the public angrily denounced Tehran's bloody crackdown on nationwide protests that took place in late December and early January.
Protests began on 28 December 2025, sparked by a currency collapse and persistent hyperinflation, but quickly turned into nationwide anti-regime demonstrations, prompting Tehran's violent crackdown and a complete information blockade.
Human rights organisations and insiders in Iran have reported that anywhere from 6,000 to 30,000 are feared killed in the suppression, although precise casualty figures remain difficult. Authorities have also detained tens of thousands across the country.
In mid-January, the US president urged Iranians to keep protesting, stating "help is on the way".
However, Trump has held off on an intervention following a restart in US-Iran talks and what Washington said was a pledge by Tehran to halt the crackdown, including any executions of arrested demonstrators.
A member of the Revolutionary Guard flashes a victory sign at the freedom monument tower during an annual rally marking 1979 Islamic Revolution in Tehran, 11 February 2026 AP Photo
On Iranian state TV, authorities broadcast images of people taking to the streets across the country Wednesday to support the theocracy and its 86-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But on Tuesday night, as government-sponsored fireworks lit the darkened sky, witnesses heard shouts from people’s homes in the Iranian capital, Tehran, of “Death to the dictator."
In the streets Wednesday, people waved images of Khamenei and his predecessor Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, alongside Iranian and Palestinian flags. Some chanted “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”
Others criticised Iran's exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, who had been calling for anti-government protests.
Iran: 207 Executions In Three Weeks As ‘No To Executions Tuesdays’ Expands To 56 Prisons In 107th Week – OpEd
February 11, 2026
By Mahin Horri
On Tuesday, February 10, 2026, political prisoners across Iran marked the 107th consecutive week of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign. The hunger strike, which began as a protest within prison walls, has now expanded to 56 detention facilities nationwide, including Evin, Ghezel Hesar, and prisons in major provincial capitals. This expansion comes in the immediate aftermath of the nationwide uprising in January 2026, posing a direct challenge to the clerical regime’s intensified crackdown.
In a statement released for the 107th week, the striking prisoners highlighted a dramatic surge in capital punishment aimed at quelling public dissent. According to the campaign, in the first three weeks of the current Persian month (starting January 21, 2026), the regime has executed over 207 individuals, including two women. The statement notes that thousands of detainees face the threat of execution without due process. Specifically, the prisoners raised the alarm for Kurdish political prisoner Naser Bekrzadeh, who has been sentenced to death for the third time and faces imminent execution.
The crackdown has extended beyond protesters to include professionals aiding the injured. The statement reports that security forces have arrested numerous lawyers, doctors, and medical staff, a move the prisoners describe as indicative of the regime’s “growing terror” following the January uprising.
Despite the repression, the prisoners emphasized that the path forward is resistance, not submission. “Compatriots, in these conditions, silence is not an option; the only option and path to salvation is outcry and protest,” the statement read. They further articulated their vision for the future: “In these sensitive conditions, we desire a free and equal Iran, devoid of violence and executions, and the ‘right to self-determination’ by the people.”
The campaign has transcended prison walls, finding a “new stage” of social expansion. In tandem with the hunger strikes inside, residents in dozens of cities—including Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Rasht, Zahedan, and Kermanshah—have staged protests supporting the prisoners. The slogan “No to Executions” has become a common chant in street demonstrations.
Protesters have adopted radical slogans linking the executions to the survival of the Supreme Leader’s regime. Chants documented during these protests include “Fire is the answer to execution,” “Freedom for political prisoners is the national slogan,” and “Khamenei’s crime: thousands of martyrs of the January uprising.”
Families of the incarcerated and those killed during protests have become the “stable pillars” of this movement, rallying with photos of their loved ones and chanting “Do not execute.” This solidarity has effectively bridged the gap between individual grievances and a collective national demand for the abolition of the death penalty.
The participating prisons in the 105th week of the hunger strike include: Evin Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Ghezel Hesar Prison (units 2, 3, and 4), Karaj Central Prison, Fardis Prison in Karaj, Greater Tehran Prison, Qarchak Prison, Khorin Prison in Varamin, Chobindar Prison in Qazvin, Ahar Prison, Arak Prison, Langerud Prison in Qom, Khorramabad Prison, Borujerd Prison, Yasuj Prison, Asadabad Prison in Isfahan, Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan, Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz, Sepidar Prison in Ahvaz (women’s and men’s wards), Nezam Prison in Shiraz, Adelabad Prison in Shiraz (women’s and men’s wards), Firuzabad Prison in Fars, Dehdasht Prison, Zahedan Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Borazjan Prison, Ramhormoz Prison, Behbahan Prison, Bam Prison, Yazd Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Kahnuj Prison, Tabas Prison, Birjand Central Prison, Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad, Gorgan Prison, Sabzevar Prison, Gonbad-e Kavus Prison, Qaemshahr Prison, Rasht Prison (men’s and women’s wards), Rudsar Prison, Haviq Prison in Talesh, Azbaram Prison in Lahijan, Dizel Abad Prison in Kermanshah, Ardabil Prison, Tabriz Prison, Urmia Prison, Salmas Prison, Khoy Prison, Naqadeh Prison, Miandoab Prison, Mahabad Prison, Bukan Prison, Saqqez Prison, Baneh Prison, Marivan Prison, Sanandaj Prison, Kamyaran Prison, and Ilam Prison.
Mahin Horri writes for the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
February 11, 2026
By Mahin Horri
On Tuesday, February 10, 2026, political prisoners across Iran marked the 107th consecutive week of the “No to Executions Tuesdays” campaign. The hunger strike, which began as a protest within prison walls, has now expanded to 56 detention facilities nationwide, including Evin, Ghezel Hesar, and prisons in major provincial capitals. This expansion comes in the immediate aftermath of the nationwide uprising in January 2026, posing a direct challenge to the clerical regime’s intensified crackdown.
In a statement released for the 107th week, the striking prisoners highlighted a dramatic surge in capital punishment aimed at quelling public dissent. According to the campaign, in the first three weeks of the current Persian month (starting January 21, 2026), the regime has executed over 207 individuals, including two women. The statement notes that thousands of detainees face the threat of execution without due process. Specifically, the prisoners raised the alarm for Kurdish political prisoner Naser Bekrzadeh, who has been sentenced to death for the third time and faces imminent execution.
The crackdown has extended beyond protesters to include professionals aiding the injured. The statement reports that security forces have arrested numerous lawyers, doctors, and medical staff, a move the prisoners describe as indicative of the regime’s “growing terror” following the January uprising.
Despite the repression, the prisoners emphasized that the path forward is resistance, not submission. “Compatriots, in these conditions, silence is not an option; the only option and path to salvation is outcry and protest,” the statement read. They further articulated their vision for the future: “In these sensitive conditions, we desire a free and equal Iran, devoid of violence and executions, and the ‘right to self-determination’ by the people.”
The campaign has transcended prison walls, finding a “new stage” of social expansion. In tandem with the hunger strikes inside, residents in dozens of cities—including Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Rasht, Zahedan, and Kermanshah—have staged protests supporting the prisoners. The slogan “No to Executions” has become a common chant in street demonstrations.
Protesters have adopted radical slogans linking the executions to the survival of the Supreme Leader’s regime. Chants documented during these protests include “Fire is the answer to execution,” “Freedom for political prisoners is the national slogan,” and “Khamenei’s crime: thousands of martyrs of the January uprising.”
Families of the incarcerated and those killed during protests have become the “stable pillars” of this movement, rallying with photos of their loved ones and chanting “Do not execute.” This solidarity has effectively bridged the gap between individual grievances and a collective national demand for the abolition of the death penalty.
The participating prisons in the 105th week of the hunger strike include: Evin Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Ghezel Hesar Prison (units 2, 3, and 4), Karaj Central Prison, Fardis Prison in Karaj, Greater Tehran Prison, Qarchak Prison, Khorin Prison in Varamin, Chobindar Prison in Qazvin, Ahar Prison, Arak Prison, Langerud Prison in Qom, Khorramabad Prison, Borujerd Prison, Yasuj Prison, Asadabad Prison in Isfahan, Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan, Sheiban Prison in Ahvaz, Sepidar Prison in Ahvaz (women’s and men’s wards), Nezam Prison in Shiraz, Adelabad Prison in Shiraz (women’s and men’s wards), Firuzabad Prison in Fars, Dehdasht Prison, Zahedan Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Borazjan Prison, Ramhormoz Prison, Behbahan Prison, Bam Prison, Yazd Prison (women’s and men’s wards), Kahnuj Prison, Tabas Prison, Birjand Central Prison, Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad, Gorgan Prison, Sabzevar Prison, Gonbad-e Kavus Prison, Qaemshahr Prison, Rasht Prison (men’s and women’s wards), Rudsar Prison, Haviq Prison in Talesh, Azbaram Prison in Lahijan, Dizel Abad Prison in Kermanshah, Ardabil Prison, Tabriz Prison, Urmia Prison, Salmas Prison, Khoy Prison, Naqadeh Prison, Miandoab Prison, Mahabad Prison, Bukan Prison, Saqqez Prison, Baneh Prison, Marivan Prison, Sanandaj Prison, Kamyaran Prison, and Ilam Prison.
Mahin Horri writes for the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
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