Sunday, July 27, 2025

 

Cargo Ship Evacuated After Grounding off Crete

grounded cargo ship
Sierra Leone-registered cargo ship was evacuated after grounding off Crete (Hellenic Coast Guard)

Published Jul 25, 2025 12:13 PM by The Maritime Executive

 


The Hellenic Coast Guard and local port authority are coordinating the efforts following the grounding of a general cargo ship off the northeastern coast of Crete. The crew was evacuated, and according to the Hellenic Coast Guard, the captain and bridge watch officer are being detained while the incident is investigated.

The MN Kostas (5,800 dwt) departed the port of Sitia on Crete on the evening of July 24. At 2330, the Coast Guard reports the ship informed them it had grounded in a position between about 6 nautical miles off Sitia and 3 nautical miles west of Sideros, islands at the northeast tip of Crete. The vessel, built in 1994 and registered in Sierra Leone, was bound for Lebanon with a cargo of plaster. The ship is 106 meters (348 feet) in length. Earlier this year, the same ship was cited for charges of failing to pay its crew, with the International Labour Organization reporting the crew was due nearly $18,500 in pay. It said the crew had only received half pay for four months, but that the situation was corrected.

The Coast Guard reports it sent three patrol boats, and the Sitia Port Authority sent personnel on a fishing vessel to the scene. Also, private crafts and fishing vessels approached.

The 14-member crew was evacuated from the ship. They were placed on one of the fishing vessels and sent to the port of Sitia.

The Sitia Port Authority is leading the initial investigation. The captain and watch officer are being investigated for causing a shipwreck and failing to avoid collisions, which in this case was the reef. Divers have also been sent to inspect the vessel and the reef.

Two tugs were standing by from Heraklion to assist the grounded cargo ship. A third was also expected to reach the scene on Friday.

 

Greenpeace Activists Hang from Scottish Bridge to Block Gas Carrier

protestors hanging from Scottish bridge
Greenpeace protestors are suspended below the bridge to block a tanker from traveling on the waterway (© Luca Marino courtesy of Greenpeace)

Published Jul 25, 2025 12:57 PM by The Maritime Executive

 


Scotland’s famed Forth Road Bridge, crossing the Firth of Forth near Edinburgh, is closed as Greenpeace activists attempt to block an inbound INEOS gas tanker. The protest is also timed to the arrival of Donald Trump in Scotland and is designed to call attention to the current negotiations for the Global Plastics Treaty.

Police Scotland is on scene and is advising motorists to avoid the area. They received reports of the protest around 1:00 p.m. local time.

Greenpeace reports that 10 experienced climbers “abseiled from beneath the bridge’s service walkway.” The Forth Road Bridge is nearly 2.5 kilometers, over 8,200 feet, in length, crossing one of the main waterways in the east of Scotland. The roadway is about 50 meters (164 feet) above the water. The protestors are reported to be spaced at 20-meter (65-foot) intervals and suspended about 25 meters (82 feet) below the underside of the bridge.

The protestors unfurled large banners reading “Plastics Treaty Now” to call attention to their cause. Greenpeace reports it has a rescue crew on the bridge and a boat team in the river below. It says the protestors plan to remain on the bridge for the next 24 hours.

The INEOS Independence, one of a class of specially-designed gas carriers registered in Malta, diverted into the anchorage. It was completing a 10-day trip from the Houston, Texas area and is reported to be carrying 27,500 cubic meters of ethane to the company’s plant at Grangemouth. INEOS has been importing gas aboard the tankers for nearly a decade. Greenpeace reports INEOS is the UK’s biggest plastics manufacturer, producing 30 to 35 million nurdles (pellets) a day, which is enough to make 60 million plastic bottles.

 

INEOS image showing one of its tankers with the Forth Bridge (INEOS)

 

“Plastic pollution has reached a crisis point: it’s poisoning our land, seas, air, even our bodies,” said Amy Cameron, Programme Director at Greenpeace UK. “The Global Plastics Treaty offers us a once in a generation chance to tackle the problem for good.”

The group highlights that governments are scheduled to meet between August 5 and 14 in Geneva, Switzerland, for the sixth and final round of negotiations for the Global Plastics Treaty. Greenpeace is calling for the talks to agree to a cut in global plastic production of at least 75 percent by 2040, and for the UN to exclude lobbyists from fossil fuel companies from the treaty negotiations. It contends that the plastics producers, including INEOS, have collectively sent hundreds of lobbyists to influence the negotiations.

So far, the police have only reported that they were “engaging” with the protest. A RNLI boat was also dispatched to monitor the situation and ensure safety on the river.

HIGH SEAS MISOGYNIST FEMICIDE

Icon of the Seas Crewmember Stabs Female Worker and Dies Jumping Overboard

Icon of the Seas cruise ship
Two crewmembers were in a dispute with one stabbed and the other died jumping overboard (Royal Caribbean International)

Published Jul 25, 2025 5:42 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

The Royal Bahamas Police Force provided additional details about an incident between two crewmembers on Royal Caribbean International’s cruise ship Icon of the Seas. The report clarified the widely covered media report of a crewmember “falling” overboard and being recovered by the cruise ship. 

Initial, erroneous media reports said a crewmember had “fallen” from the massive cruise ship, Icon of the Seas (248,663-gross ton cruise ship) while the ship was cruising off San Salvador in the Bahamas on Thursday, July 24. (People do not “fall” off cruise ships unless they are doing something risky and/or are extremely intoxicated, as the vessels have high rails and other precautions.) 

According to the statement from the Bahamas police, shortly before 7:30 p.m. local time, a 28-year-old female South African crewmember was allegedly stabbed multiple times by a 35-year-old male South African crewmember. Following the incident, the police were told the man had fled from the scene and jumped overboard. 

Passengers reported that crewmembers seeing the man jump threw life preservers to mark the spot. As the world’s largest cruise ship, Icon of the Seas required time to slow and turn, even though it was likely moving at a relatively low speed after a day at sea approaching the company’s private island, Coco Cay, for the Friday port stop.

The crew launched one of the vessel’s go-fast rescue boats and was able to locate the male crewmember. According to the captain’s announcement, the male was “recovered.” Later reports said he was unconscious when they found him and pronounced him deceased when they got back to the cruise ship.

The female had been stabbed multiple times in her upper body. The Royal Bahamas Police Force reports she was treated. They said she is in stable condition. The police report that an autopsy has been scheduled to determine the cause and any contributing factors for the male crewmember’s death.

Royal Caribbean International confirmed in a statement to the Florida media that there had been an incident “involving two crew members in a personal dispute,” and that its onboard security team had responded. Crewmembers work and live aboard these ships in notoriously small cabins and tight quarters. The Icon of the Seas has approximately 2,350 crewmembers onboard. When full, it can also be carrying approximately 7,600 passengers.

 

Captain of Lost Volgoneft Tanker Had Expired License Russia Says in Court

Russian oil tanker sinking
The bow of Volgoneft 212 has not been recovered and may be leaking oil (Russian social media)

Published Jul 25, 2025 4:45 PM by The Maritime Executive

 


Russia’s state environmental organization, Rosprirodnadzor, alleged in court this week that the operator of the two tankers that were lost in December 2024 had multiple violations. The latest accusations of expired licenses came as the environmental watchdog is seeking further compensation and actions from the tanker operator to address the environmental impact of the dual casualties.

The river sea tanker Volgoneft 212 sank in a wintertime storm in December 2024, transporting 4,300 tonnes of oil. A second tanker of the same operator, Volgoneft 239, ran aground around the same time in the area near the Kerch Strait. Together, the two vessels were carrying approximately 9,200 metric tons of heavy fuel oil. The authorities estimate that half of the fuel was released in the two incidents, and days later, a third Volgoneft tanker, 109, also reported a leak while it was in port.

As part of the suit, the Russian authorities told the court that the captain of Volgoneft 239 was operating the vessel with an expired license. It said the unnamed master’s license was expired for “several days” prior to the vessel getting underway and encountering a winter storm in the Kerch Strait region. Some media reports had previously claimed the helmsman aboard the tanker was operating the ship alone, something that has been repeatedly denied.

Russian authorities further said that the operator of the tankers, Volgoneft, was not certified to operate the vessels in open waters during the winter months, according to a report in the Moscow Times. The company blames heavy winter weather in the region for both of the casualties.

The reports highlight that the vessels are based on a 1950s Soviet-era design. They were primarily built for river and calm water transport. The vessels are each approximately 133 meters (435 feet) long and 4,000 to 5,000 dwt. Reports said they were originally designed for seas less than seven feet, but reports contend the 239 was encountering 25-foot waves in December 2024 when it was lost.

Rosprirodnadzor is suing the tanker operator, saying it is its responsibility to pay for the cleanup and salvage of the tankers. The bow section of 239 remains submerged, which led to a dispute over its conditions. The court reports said the bow section continues to leak oil, and the next efforts at recovery and sealing the leaks are not scheduled till October. 

The agency, however, quickly issued a denial saying that no current leaks were detected. It said, however, it remains the responsibility of the operator and acknowledged the potential environmental dangers from further leaks. Volgoneft has been suing to prevent the Russian authorities in Crimea from taking over the salvage efforts as the tanker operator contends that it would lead to inflated costs. Russian authorities wanted the remaining fuel pumped from the bow section of the vessel.

They told the court that the Anapa region has spent more than 211 million rubles (approximately $2.7 million) on cleanup efforts. It said that nearly 200,000 metric tons of contaminated sand have been removed and over 310 miles of coastline have been cleaned. The city has sued the operator separately for its costs.

Ukraine has also said it would seek to prosecute for the damages it received from the drifting oil.

The Russian authorities in February 2025 launched an inspection program for all the Soviet-era river-sea tankers. The reports said there were over 500 tankers built in the 1960s and 1970s that they would be inspecting, and none could return to service before they had been inspected.


Russia Cancels Navy Day Parade After Wave of Ukrainian Drone Attacks

Russian Navy Day parade 2019
File image courtesy Russian Navy

Published Jul 27, 2025 3:43 PM by The Maritime Executive


 

Every July since 2017, St. Petersburg has held a massive Navy Day parade for Russian President Vladimir Putin and other members of Russia's senior leadership. This year, for the first time ever, the event was called off at the last minute - likely because of the threat of Ukrainian drones. 

Dmitry Peskov, Putin's spokesman, said Sunday that the parade was canceled due to unnamed "security reasons." While Peskov did not provide further details of the rationale, the UK Ministry of Defense assesses that it is almost certain that the parade - and all larger commemorative events across Russia - have been canceled due to force protection concerns. 

"Small ceremonies will highly likely take place and Navy Day remains a Russian national holiday," the UK MOD said in an intelligence assessment. 

The Navy Day parade is among Russia's biggest and best-publicized military events, and Putin will typically take part from a shoreside reviewing stand or aboard a VIP launch. Security precautions surrounding the event are stringent. 

The cancellation follows one day after a large-scale Ukrainian drone operation over parts of Western Russia. Ukraine has developed technology and operating methods to launch long-range drone attacks on targets deep inside of Russian territory, typically targeting weapons factories, airfields, rail lines, refineries and oil and gas infrastructure. 

In the area around St. Petersburg, higher-than-normal air-defense intercepts of Ukrainian drones prompted the regional airport to cancel flights for several hours overnight Saturday. Across Russia, about 100 drones were shot down Saturday night, Russia's defense ministry claimed. 


Weakened Iran Clings to Russia in the Caspian Sea

Russian civilian rescue tug SB 738
Russian civilian rescue tug SB 738 (Tasnim - CC BY 4.0 license)

Published Jul 25, 2025 5:14 PM by The Maritime Executive


Iran and Russia have concluded a short naval exercise in the Caspian Sea, which both nations may have regarded as an opportunity to shore up relationships in a region where both have recently lost friends. Iran, in particular, felt let down by the lack of Russian support during the 12-Day War with Israel - she received some support from China, but none from Russia. Iran is also at present highly nervous about porous border security, and wants to demonstrate heft in this area.

CASAREX 2025 commenced on July 21 and concluded two days later, under the direction of Commodore Mohsen Razzaghi. He announced via IRNA that the Nedaja, the IRGC Navy (Nedsa), and Iranian law enforcement forces would take part, alongside vessels from the Russian Navy. Observers would also participate from the three other Caspian Sea littoral nations - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. 

 

 

In a video released by IRNA, the only evidence seen of Russian involvement has been the presence of the civilian rescue tug SB 738 (MMSI: 273544130). Nedaja vessels participating (at least in the end of the exercise parade) were Sina Class fast attack craft Paykan (P224), Joshan (P225), Derfash, and Separ (P234). Also present was the IRGC Navy’s Nasser Class auxiliary Martyr Basir (117), which appears to be equipped with Zafar/C704 anti-ship missiles and normally operates from the Samen al-Hojaj Naval Base at Babolsar, Mazandaran Province. 

 

The IRGC Navy’s Martyr Basir (Tasnim - CC BY 4.0)

 

There was no evidence of the participation of the observers, and the Iranians have an established record of announcing the involvement of other nations in their exercises without their consent or participation. The Caspian Post, an Azeri media outlet, covered the exercise but made no mention of Azeri participation.

Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are particularly stretched at the moment. Azerbaijan is furious about a series of arrests made of Azeris working in Russia, and still seething about the deaths of 38 passengers following the missile attack on an Azerbaijan Airline Flight 8243 coming in to land at Grozny on Christmas Day 2024, heightened by the Russians’ callous handling of the incident. Nor are Azeri relations with Iran much better, following Iranian suggestions of Azeri complicity in the Israeli air attacks on Iran during the 12-Day War.

Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have grown tired of Russian bullying. Much of this springs from the Ukraine war and Russia’s assumption that it is still owed duties by these former Soviet states. At the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2024, President Tokayev of Kazakhstan, on stage with President Putin, refused to recognize Russian annexations in Ukraine and Georgia. He also stated his country would respect Western sanctions on Russia, and he turned down a request to provide Kazakh troops to fight in Ukraine. Most of Kazakhstan’s oil production is exported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) network, which pipes through Russia and terminates at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. However, Russia also uses the CPC network to export its Urals oil from Omsk and Kazan through Kazakhstan to China. Uncomfortable in this mutual inter-dependency, the Kazakhs have been developing their capability to export instead across the Caspian from Aktau to Baku, using shallow draft tankers built with Abu Dhabi Ports Group specially for Caspian operations. From Baku, the Kazakh oil can then use the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, thereby avoiding Russian territory. 

Main Kazakh oil pipelines (data from Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP/CJRC)

The geography of the Caspian means that Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, which have not enjoyed close relations hitherto, are being drawn into closer cooperation. Controlling the middle section of the Caspian, working together these three nations could impede shipping between Iran and Russia. This is an unlikely prospect for now, but a risk with some growth potential. Ukraine would be keen to spread discontent, so as to disrupt arms supplies flowing up the Caspian from Iran into Russia. 

Russia controls the only access to the Black Sea through the Volga-Don canal. For now, the 28-strong Caspian Flotilla remains dominant, comprising the two Gepard Class frigates damaged in a Ukrainian attack on November 6 last year, plus 16 corvettes and minesweepers. The Iranian Northern Fleet, forming its 4th Naval Region, is led by Moudge Class frigate IRINS Deylaman (F78) with the four Sina Class fast attack craft, each armed with a 76mm gun and C-802 anti-ship missiles, which participated in CASAREX 2025. Together, Russia and Iran are much stronger than Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. But the Azeris have of late been militarily clever, upgrading their navy with Israeli and Turkish assistance; they also operate Triton Class midget submarines, the only such craft stationed in the Caspian.

Bilateral relations will not have been improved, and the Russians may have been tempted to return home somewhat earlier than planned, having heard the Iranian version of the Russian anthem as SB 738 was welcomed into port. Sailors worldwide will have endured similar ordeals on port visits, but this rendition of the Russian National Anthem was even more insulting (in the opinion of the Maritime Executive’s correspondent) than the famous Egyptian and Saudi salutes to President Putin in 2015 and 2019, respectively.

 

Royal Navy Plans to Withdraw its Sole Frigate in Bahrain

Lancaster
Courtesy UK MoD

Published Jul 27, 2025 4:13 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

The United Kingdom’s Royal Navy appears about to withdraw its permanently deployed frigate in the Gulf, HMS Lancaster.

HMS Lancaster (F229), a Type 23 frigate, is approaching the much-delayed end to its working life, having been the forward deployed frigate home-based at the UK’s Naval Support Facility in Bahrain. Although the UK has had a naval base in Bahrain since 1935, the facility was rebuilt at the expense of the Kingdom of Bahrain in 2018, on the basis that HMS Juffair, as it was renamed, would be the permanent home station to at least one frigate. Until recently, besides the forward deployed frigate, the base also supported minesweepers of the 9th Mine Counter-Measures Squadron and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary logistics vessel.

When HMS Lancaster returns home within the next few months to be decommissioned, the only Royal Navy operational ship remaining in Bahrain will be the Hunt-class minesweeper HMS Middleton (M34), with the Sandown Class minesweeper HMS Bangor (M109) dry-docked locally for repair after a collision with USS Gladiator (MCM-11).

The withdrawal of HMS Lancaster, notwithstanding the political ramifications, has been necessitated primarily by the withdrawal of Type 23 frigates from service before their replacements - the Type 26 Global Combat Ship and the Type 31 frigate - start coming into service in 2028. Using rotational crews, service aboard HMS Lancaster has generally been popular, as the vessel is almost continual operational - on anti-smuggling duties and committed to keeping the Straits of Hormuz open under the watchful eyes of the Iranian Navy and IRGC. HMS Lancaster has made two major drug seizures in recent months. She has also been trialling the use of Peregrine remote-controlled mini-helicopters for broadening the swathe of its surveillance sweep out to 100 miles while at sea.

HMS Lancaster's crew carries out a drug bust, May 2025 (UK MoD)

 

Undersea Sensors: A U.S. Trump Card That China Knows it Must Eliminate

USN
The U.S. Navy's sole purpose-built cable-layer, USNS Zeus (USN)

Published Jul 27, 2025 5:18 PM by The Strategist

 

 

[By David Axe]

Unseen, largely unknown and, until recently, highly classified, the US Navy’s vast network of underwater sonars is one of its greatest advantages over rival fleets. The United States can detect many, if not most, enemy submarines through much of the world’s oceans.

A sub that can be detected can also be killed. It’s a profound problem for the Chinese navy as it eyes a possible amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait. Its growing fleet of quiet attack submarines could protect the landing force—but only if they themselves can avoid detection.

The problem for the US is that the Chinese fully appreciate how vulnerable they are underwater—and they’re actively thinking about ways to end that vulnerability. The US fleet needs new and better ways of defending its underwater sensors during a seabed battle that could get very nasty, very quickly in the months and weeks leading up to a possible Chinese move against Taiwan.

In particular, the US needs more ships that can repair the sensor network at sea. ‘There are only a small handful of vessels capable of such at-sea repairs, fewer than 10 globally, and they are easy targets when on station,’ warned Chris O’Flaherty, a retired Royal Navy captain with deep experience in undersea warfare.

The US Navy was a pioneer in seabed surveillance. In 1950, the service launched the then highly secret Project Jezebel, a generational effort to lay thousands of miles of undersea cable connecting sensitive acoustic sensors to shore stations staffed by sonar analysts.

By the time the navy declassified the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System in 1991, it also included catamaran surveillance ships towing additional acoustic arrays. Today, the system—again largely cloaked in secrecy—probably also features many small drones on the surface and under the waves. Shore sensors, ocean surveillance satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, crewed and uncrewed, also complement the undersea equipment.

It’s not a totally global, totally comprehensive surveillance system—but it’s close. And it vexes naval planners of the People’s Republic of China. ‘The probability that PRC submarines are discovered when leaving port is extremely high,’ Senior Captain Zhang Ning, a faculty member at China’s Naval University of Engineering, wrote along with coauthors in a November 2023 journal article translated by Ryan Martinson, a professor at the US Naval War College.

‘There is a fairly high probability that PRC submarines will be detected and intercepted while operating in the Near Seas’ along the First Island Chain between Philippines and Japan, Zhang and his coauthors warned, according to Martinson. Cued by surveillance, US and allied anti-submarine forces—submarines, ships and aircraft—can cut off Chinese attack boats from the deep water where they could best perform their missions.

But the US surveillance system isn’t invulnerable, Zhang and his coauthors stressed. ‘The authors further argue that the location of individual “nodes” … in the U.S. undersea surveillance system can be located and “removed”,’ Martinson wrote in an analysis of Zhang and company’s own analysis, published by the Center for International Maritime Security.

O’Flaherty listed the ways Chinese forces could disable US undersea sensors. They ranged from the ‘relatively overt’—the deployment of remotely operated vehicles from unhidden surface motherships ‘to go down to almost any depth and to uncover and sever cables’—to ‘semi-covert’ methods. One semi-covert method would be sending autonomous submarines equipped with sonars to find the cables and plant explosive charges to cut them.

The Chinese may want to undertake a covert counter-cable effort far in advance of any attempt to invade Taiwan. Long-range underwater vehicles could ‘leave an explosive charge in the immediate vicinity of a cable, ready for actuation at a time of the owner’s choosing—which could be years hence,’ O’Flaherty said. ‘Actuation of such an explosive can be via a coded acoustic signal, which is very easy to achieve.’

Cables can be repaired, of course—usually by highly trained crew aboard specialized auxiliary vessels. The US Navy operates just one cable-repair ship, the 14,600-ton USNS Zeus, delivered to US Military Sealift Command in 1984. For several years now, the navy has been studying a possible replacement for the aging Zeus, but the service is still years away from signing a contract and cutting steel.

And anyway, there’s no way Zeus and its crew could perform their hard, precise work in contested waters during wartime. As O’Flaherty said, cable ships are ‘easy targets’.

It’s possible the US fleet’s single special-mission submarine—the heavily modified, 12,000-ton USS Jimmy Carter—could covertly deploy divers for select cable repairs. After all, finding, tapping and eavesdropping on the enemy’s cables is reportedly among the boat’s secret missions.

Even with Jimmy Carter on cable duty, the US Navy would be stretched thin trying to safeguard the surveillance system that lends it one of its greatest advantages in wartime. And forget hiring private companies to help. Even if they were willing to risk ships during open conflict, there’s a global shortage of commercial cable vessels. Fewer than 10 are in use, but one trade group claimed the world needs 20.

The US fleet still spends most of its nearly $40 billion annual shipbuilding budget on aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, destroyers, logistics ships and submarines. It had better start prioritizing cable vessels, too—and figure out how to protect them after the shooting starts.

David Axe is a journalist and filmmaker in South Carolina, United States.

This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

Guyana Rolls Out Sweeping Port Reforms

Berbice port
Planned port developments at Berbice, Guyana (CGX Energy)

Published Jul 27, 2025 7:40 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

In the past one decade, Guyana has become a global energy powerhouse, with the oil boom reshaping the country’s international trade. Last year, Guyana’s economy expanded by 44 percent, marking the fifth consecutive year of double-digit growth. But the growing trade is putting a strain on Guyana’s aging port infrastructure. At an event last week by Shipping Association of Guyana, the country’s President Irfaan Ali highlighted wide-ranging port reforms that his government is pursuing.

A key part of this transformation agenda is a legislative reform in the port sector. President Ali announced that a new Port Act is in the drafting process, which will streamline the maritime sector in Guyana.

“We want our ports to be competitive, reliable and future-ready. That is why we are designing a modern Port Act which will govern development, regulation and oversight of port operations. Further, it will ensure safety, efficiency and transparency in the maritime sector,” added Ali.

Currently, port regulations are scattered in several key legislations including the Maritime Zones Act (2010), the Shipping Act 1998 and the Customs Act. Apart from the legal reforms, Guyana’s government is also in the process of establishing an independent Port Authority, which will have mandate to manage ports in the country. This role is currently under the Ports and Harbors Division, within the Maritime Administration Department (MARAD). The proposed Port Authority is an attempt to corporatize port management, as Guyana positions itself as a regional logistics hub.

Other projects on course include the development of a deep-water port in Berbice. The preparations for the $285 million port project has been ongoing since 2020. Early this year, President Ali confirmed that the government is finalizing the project planning in partnership with the international engineering firm Bechtel.

Additionally, the government has invested close to $10 million to remove ship wrecks from the Demerara Harbor, an important entry into Georgetown port. The work is ongoing which includes deepening the harbor, as Guyana moves to attract larger modern vessels.

Early this month, MARAD commissioned a new $3 million tugboat, the second of such vessel to be acquired in the last two years. The new tug Arau is built by Damen Shipyards and is 16 meters long, with a beam of 6 meters. The vessel is capable of towing and maneuvering ships between 10,000-20,000 GT. The expansion of the tugboat fleet is intended to enhance operational efficiency in Guyanese ports, according to MARAD.  

 

Divers Recover the Ship's Bell of WWI Wreck HMS Vanguard

Bell HMS Vanguard
Courtesy Royal Navy

Published Jul 27, 2025 12:56 PM by Royal Navy News

 

 

For the first time in more than a century iconic artifacts from a tragic WWI battleship are above the waves – recovered from the wreck in Scapa Flow.

Divers have brought the bell, badge and tampion – gun barrel cover – of HMS Vanguard from the bed of Scapa Flow to the surface.

It’s the first – and most important – step in plans to create a new exhibition and memorial in Orkney to the 843 souls lost in a cataclysmic explosion in July 1917.

All three items now need to undergo specialist conversation – including making use of the experts who worked on the Mary Rose and its thousands of objects – so they can be seen by the public for the first time since Vanguard was afloat.

The battleship blew up for reasons never accurately determined, but it is thought that a long-smouldering fire in a coal bunker caused cordite charges in an adjacent compartment to ignite.

A series of explosions shook the dreadnought before a final blast tore her to pieces, showering Scapa Flow – the wartime anchorage of the Royal Navy – with metal and burning debris, which also set the Orkney heather alight. Just two of the 845 souls aboard survived.

A dive team from the MV Huskyan - who surveyed the site nearly a decade ago as part of 100th anniversary commemorations of the Great War - again received special permission from the Royal Navy to both dive on the Vanguard and recover objects – as an official war grave, both activities are typically illegal.


HMS Vanguard, 1909 (Royal Navy)

HMS Vanguard's ship's badge (Marjo Tynkkynen / Royal Navy)

The bell – which weighs 25 kilos and was damaged by the explosions – was the most challenging item to recover, but the divers brought all three objects to the surface in a single day’s work, despite poor visibility on the seabed.

All three objects were immediately transferred to sealed containers of salt water, which they’ll remain in while conservation work begins, while a minute’s silence was held over the wreck and wreaths dropped to conclude the operation.

“The objects are in phenomenal condition considering their age, the violent destruction of the ship and the long period of immersion,” said Nick Hewitt, naval historian and culture team leader for Orkney Council. “They are also tremendously emotive – look at the bell and you will immediately feel what happened to that ship because it is distorted by the explosion and missing the crown which should be on top. This has been an amazing journey – three years of effort to date, and the whole recovery operation has been a great success. We’re absolutely thrilled. Mission accomplished.”

It will cost around $16,000 to conserve the three objects – after a century under water, each needs to be desalinated, cleaned and carefully dried before they can go on display, hopefully in around 18 months’ time.

Once treated, the recovered objects will form the centerpiece of a new exhibition dedicated to the ship and the men who served in her at the Scapa Flow Museum, alongside the life stories of those lost as part of the Vanguard Crew Photographs Project.

“We think the museum will become a focus for Vanguard commemoration, much like the Marwick Head memorial is for Kitchener and HMS Hampshire, and the Royal Oak memorial at Scapa Beach,” Nick added.

This article appears courtesy of the Royal Navy and may be found in its original form here

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

Kazakhstan–US Tariff Question Indexes A Broader Geopolitical Pattern – Analysis

By  and 

(TCA) — When the United States announced a 25% tariff on selected imports from Kazakhstan, effective August 1, it offered little explanation beyond a vague appeal to restoring the trade balance. At first glance, this seemed routine, indeed almost perfunctory. However, the timing, context, and symbolic weight of the move suggest otherwise. Kazakhstan’s exports to the U.S. are modest, and key commodities are unaffected, yet the signal was received clearly in Astana.

What the Tariff Means in the Broader Picture

In the current phase of the international system’s evolution, tariffs no longer function solely as instruments of commercial redress. They have become vectors of strategic pressure, deployed to influence positions in a broader geopolitical context. From this perspective, Kazakhstan appears less as a trade partner than as a node within a larger and shifting strategic-connectivity network.

To interpret the tariff imposed by the United States on Kazakhstan as a bilateral irritant would be to miss its deeper significance. The target may be marginal in economic scale, but the symbolism is central. What is at stake is not merely the movement of goods, but the movement of expectations. What is at issue is how middle powers such as Kazakhstan read global cues and signal their response. The tariff is a point of entry into an evolving geoeconomic pattern.

Kazakhstan’s answer to the American move thus becomes an exercise in managing uncertainty under shifting rules. Astana has moved quickly by dispatching a delegation, issuing public reassurances, and subtly shifting its narrative. This is not a crisis for Kazakhstan, but it is not something that can be ignored either. What seems to have triggered the tariff is not the trade volume, but the context.

Kazakhstan’s longstanding ties with both Russia and China have complicated its attempts to preserve its autonomous balance in a tightening global field. The U.S. move may be part of a wider American effort to pressure states seen as too hesitant or too exposed. Kazakhstan’s early response is thus less a tactical correction than a move to preempt misunderstanding.

Background: A Cascade of Tariff Announcements

The tariff targeting Kazakhstan came at the end of a months-long sequence of trade announcements that began to accelerate in early 2025; it was not an isolated action. On April 2, under the now-familiar slogan of restoring reciprocity, the Trump administration unveiled a broad tariff package affecting more than 180 countries at a base level of 10%. Russia and Belarus were notably untouched, but Kazakhstan was singled out for a rate of 27%. No one could quite justify why, and Washington did not seem interested in explaining the move.

On July 7, Astana received a second notice: a revised tariff, now fixed at 25%, would take effect on August 1. This replaced the earlier measure and applied to a more specific set of goods. Without mentioning Kazakhstan by name, President Trump followed with a comment on social media about restoring “balanced flows” and correcting “distortions.”

More than twenty other countries — an eclectic list including Brazil, Japan, Laos, Mexico, and others — receivedsimilar notices around the same time. The criteria were opaque, with rates ranging from 20 to 50%. In most cases, there was no known dispute. What these countries seemed to share was some vague perception in Washington that they had failed to realign themselves with evolving U.S. expectations — whether on trade, supply chains, or political posture.

Kazakhstan’s inclusion in this group stood out, all the more so given its limited trade volume with the U.S. In 2024, its total exports to the American market were less than one billion dollars, most of which were concerned with commodities exempted from the new tariff. What remains is a small set of industrial exports, plus the question: Why now? The answer likely lies in the pattern of the American tariff policy, in which Kazakhstan is only one of many parts.

Tariffs, Rules, and Institutional Risk

Kazakhstan’s most significant shipments — crude oil, uranium, ferroalloys, and silver — are exempt from the new tariff. These four categories alone accounted for over 90% of total exports to the U.S. in 2024. The new tariff applies only to a narrow segment of Kazakhstan’s exports to the United States, mainly lesser-known industrial items such as steel pipes, specialty chemicals, and certain machine parts.

The real significance of the tariff lies not in revenue loss but in rules-based issues. Kazakhstan joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2015, and WTO members make commitments to stability, predictability, and non-discrimination in market access. The U.S. tariff, by contrast, was announced unilaterally, without consultation, and without any WTO process. Punitive tariffs targeting specific countries outside a formal dispute resolution framework may be incompatible with the obligations assumed under the WTO’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle.

For Kazakhstan, the question becomes a tangible reputational risk. The country has heavily invested in its image as a rules-respecting member of the global trading system, so this is not an abstract concern. The WTO’s Director-General has warned that such selective bilateral tariff approaches threaten the core MFN foundation of global trade law.

The country has spent the past decade cultivating foreign capital, especially in infrastructure, mining, and logistics. If American tariff policy starts to look erratic, then other governments and firms may begin building risk premiums into their Kazakhstan strategy.

Kazakhstan’s Countermoves and Strategic Repositioning

In this context, diplomatic action functions as a counter-signal aimed at re-establishing interpretive control. Within days of receiving the July 7 notice, the government of Kazakhstan announced that it would send a senior delegation to Washington. The purpose of this move was to reframe the situation. Kazakhstan was not looking for a public concession but rather, at a minimum, to be heard.

Part of the delegation’s strategy is to shift the conversation away from tariffs and toward strategic value. Kazakhstan has quietly become a meaningful player in the global supply of critical minerals. Its deposits of rare-earth elements, particularly in the Karaganda region, are not to be neglected. Western companies have already begun exploratory partnerships, and it is not impossible that they can tip the conversation in Kazakhstan’s favor.

At the same time, Astana has already begun to assess potential fallout at the domestic level. The exporters affected by the tariff are relatively few in number, and none appear to be existentially threatened. The government may still offer them targeted relief such as export credits, transport subsidies, or tax offsets. Legal consultations are reportedly underway to explore filing a WTO case; this, however, would be a slow process, and likely only a symbolic one.

Possible Scenarios and Their Implications

The tariff’s immediate impact is modest, but its symbolic threshold is real. It introduces friction at a moment when Kazakhstan is seeking a stable economic and diplomatic orientation without crisis. Three scenarios are plausible:

  1. Astana persuades U.S. policymakers to soften or narrow the tariff, an outcome that would validate Kazakhstan’s geoeconomic relevance and normative alignment.
  2. The tariff persists, prompting Kazakhstan to redirect exports or adapt supply chains; such realignment could accelerate its turn toward Eurasian or Southeast Asian partners, while the U.S. remains a symbolic but not a strategic partner.
  3. If similar pressures are exerted against other middle powers, the tariff pattern may herald a broader strategic realignment, as these states will hedge more aggressively as confidence in the multilateral frameworks erodes.

At present, the unfolding of events will control the narrative. The test for Kazakhstan lies not in reversing the tariff itself, but in managing its constraints with sovereign agency. Its ability to navigate this space will determine the trajectory of its profile as a strategic regional actor.

TCA

TCA is The Times of Central Asia. Founded in Bishkek in 1999 by Giorgio Fiacconi, who served as the First Honorary Consul of Italy to Kyrgyzstan for fifteen years, The Times of Central Asia was the first English language regional publication on the region. Building upon its extensive archive of stories, today the Times of Central Asia continues to cover politics, economics, culture, social issues, justice and foreign affairs across Eurasia.