India's PM Narendra Modi and the President of Russia, Mr. Vladimir Putin witnessing the Exchange of MoUs between India and Russia in Hyderabad House, New Delhi on December 05, 2025. Photo Credit: India Prime Minister Office
July 29, 2026
By A. Jathindra
Gleb Makarevich is a Junior Research Fellow, Centre of the Indo-Pacific Region at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS) – Russia’s leading academic institute and think-tank in International Relations.
His academic interests cover Russian foreign policy towards South Asia, India-Pakistan confrontation, Pakistan’s external and internal affairs, its strategic culture, the interaction between the nation’s elites, namely, the political class, business circles and the military. Makarevich’s expertise in the analytical domain includes Indian foreign policy and Russia-India relations.
Let us begin with the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Russia is often described as a Pacific power, yet the war in Ukraine continues without resolution. It is notable that Ukraine, despite its relatively smaller size, has demonstrated remarkable military resilience, even conducting operations within Russian territory. In your view, what factors have enabled this resilience?
Gleb Makarevich
This resilience has been unabled by the following factors: unprecedented (military, economic, ideological) support by the West; Russia’s initial calculation to conduct a special military operation, rather than to be involved into a full-scale warfare – as a result, Russia initially had to confront a mobilized society and pursue its goals with means of peaceful time; as the conflict transformed into the war of attrition, Ukraine enjoys resources of the US, Europe and West-prone allies with Russia handling its issues based on its own resources.
In this context, many within the Western strategic community argue that while Russia is geographically a Pacific power, its ability and willingness to project influence in the region remain uncertain. How would you respond to this perspective?
It is fair to say that Russia does not invest enough efforts and resources into projecting its influence in the region, although it has some capacities and demonstrates its willingness. However, last 5-10 years saw tremendous rise in Russia’s activities in the region: gradual surge in trade dynamics, investments and launching joint ventures (bestly exemplified in oil and gas field – Nayara Energy brilliantly epitomizes that, expansion of Russian businesses in service sector – Yango as a primary example), joint initiatives in defense and security domain (regular military drills, development of technological cooperation in defense sector). To sum it up, Russia realizes that so far it has not accomplished all of its goals, but one should not ignore achievements in place and the fact that the work is still in progress.
Europe appears to be undergoing a process of rearmament. For example, Ukraine has sought a license to produce U.S. Patriot missile interceptors, which are widely regarded as among the most effective defenses against ballistic missiles. Does this development place Russia in a state of enduring strategic threat? How do you interpret this evolving dynamic?
Regarding Patriot missile interceptors, so far it is not clear whether Ukraine or its European allies will be able to deploy enough industrial capacities to produce this system. Discussing technological transfers to Ukraine in general, it is common understanding in Russian expert community that Russia is at war with the whole West and its cumulative resources, rather than with Ukraine itself. Consequently, this sort of escalation dynamic has been expected and Russia has enough capacities to respond to that properly.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly criticized the Indo-Pacific concept as an artificial construct advanced by the United States, Japan, and Australia—primarily aimed at deterring China and diminishing ASEAN’s central role. Western analysts contend that, beyond this critique, Russia has yet to establish itself as a credible third option in the Indo-Pacific, and that its engagement with the region increasingly depends on China. How do you respond to this assessment?
What concerns Foreign Minister’s statements, there are some opposite opinions here. For example, I personally believe that Russia should come up with its understanding of the Indo-Pacific or Indian Ocean Region framework, rather than neglecting the concept itself – and I am not alone in this regard. Coming to Russia’s dependence on China in the region, I would not agree with that. Moscow has multiple other significant partners – to name a few, India as a crucial partner in many dimensions; Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Myanmar among ASEAN countries; Iran, UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf. Even if one considers East Asia only, there is interesting dynamics with regard to South Korea (not mentioning North Korea) and even Japan. Hence, although one should not underestimate China’s significance in Russia’s foreign policy in Asia, Moscow has other important partners to rely on and demonstrates willingness to develop ties with new counterparts.
The second term of President Trump is widely regarded as a period of significant change. Unexpectedly, contradictions have emerged between the United States and its European allies. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense was renamed the Department of War, and the Indo-Pacific Command reverted to its earlier designation as the Pacific Command. Some observers interpret these moves as signaling a return to a regional hegemonic posture reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine. How does Russia, as a Pacific power, view these developments?
As you rightly mentioned, many developments in current US actions stem from personal features of President Trump and his second term. So, I would consider all this renaming and rebranding related moves to be of domestic politics. Regarding US international posture in the region, Russian general calculations seem to be the same: Moscow treats Washington as a global power that pursues continuation of its hegemony in multiple domains, even though it does not seem to have enough resources to substantiate it as it did in the past. With passage of time, it will have to reassess its policies and refrain from meddling into every issue, leaving the space for rising regional powers.
India and Russia have often characterized their ties as those of ‘dear friends,’ with roots extending deep into history. At the same time, the United States has voiced concern over this partnership and continues to apply pressure on New Delhi. In this context, how would you evaluate the Indo–Russian strategic relationship, and in your view, what role does India hold in Russia’s broader strategic calculus?
Indo–Russian strategic relationship has always been among Moscow’s top priorities and certain to be even more important in years and decades to come. Russian expert community is confident that if India considers its relations with Russia to be in line with its strategic interests, New Delhi is highly unlikely to give up to American pressure. In this context, our goal is to further imbue our bilateral partnership with something mutually beneficial and strategically significant to make it both dynamic and resilient to external manupulations.
Russia’s strategic posture is often interpreted as supportive of a strong China. At the same time, another perspective underscores the importance of a strong India as a counterbalance to China. From the Russian point of view, how do you assess the emergence of a “strong India” within this wider geopolitical equation?
Russia supports the right of any regional, middle or small power to be strong. Of course, when it comes to its strategic partners – be it China or India – Moscow supports this right even more: no wonder, it is in Russia’s political, economic and security interests to have strong allies. Regarding India’s posture, Moscow always welcomed New Delhi’s s intense development in many fields. Thus, this perception is highly unlikely to change, as the more successful and credible partners Russia has, the higher chances of its own gradual development.
This resilience has been unabled by the following factors: unprecedented (military, economic, ideological) support by the West; Russia’s initial calculation to conduct a special military operation, rather than to be involved into a full-scale warfare – as a result, Russia initially had to confront a mobilized society and pursue its goals with means of peaceful time; as the conflict transformed into the war of attrition, Ukraine enjoys resources of the US, Europe and West-prone allies with Russia handling its issues based on its own resources.
In this context, many within the Western strategic community argue that while Russia is geographically a Pacific power, its ability and willingness to project influence in the region remain uncertain. How would you respond to this perspective?
It is fair to say that Russia does not invest enough efforts and resources into projecting its influence in the region, although it has some capacities and demonstrates its willingness. However, last 5-10 years saw tremendous rise in Russia’s activities in the region: gradual surge in trade dynamics, investments and launching joint ventures (bestly exemplified in oil and gas field – Nayara Energy brilliantly epitomizes that, expansion of Russian businesses in service sector – Yango as a primary example), joint initiatives in defense and security domain (regular military drills, development of technological cooperation in defense sector). To sum it up, Russia realizes that so far it has not accomplished all of its goals, but one should not ignore achievements in place and the fact that the work is still in progress.
Europe appears to be undergoing a process of rearmament. For example, Ukraine has sought a license to produce U.S. Patriot missile interceptors, which are widely regarded as among the most effective defenses against ballistic missiles. Does this development place Russia in a state of enduring strategic threat? How do you interpret this evolving dynamic?
Regarding Patriot missile interceptors, so far it is not clear whether Ukraine or its European allies will be able to deploy enough industrial capacities to produce this system. Discussing technological transfers to Ukraine in general, it is common understanding in Russian expert community that Russia is at war with the whole West and its cumulative resources, rather than with Ukraine itself. Consequently, this sort of escalation dynamic has been expected and Russia has enough capacities to respond to that properly.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly criticized the Indo-Pacific concept as an artificial construct advanced by the United States, Japan, and Australia—primarily aimed at deterring China and diminishing ASEAN’s central role. Western analysts contend that, beyond this critique, Russia has yet to establish itself as a credible third option in the Indo-Pacific, and that its engagement with the region increasingly depends on China. How do you respond to this assessment?
What concerns Foreign Minister’s statements, there are some opposite opinions here. For example, I personally believe that Russia should come up with its understanding of the Indo-Pacific or Indian Ocean Region framework, rather than neglecting the concept itself – and I am not alone in this regard. Coming to Russia’s dependence on China in the region, I would not agree with that. Moscow has multiple other significant partners – to name a few, India as a crucial partner in many dimensions; Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Myanmar among ASEAN countries; Iran, UAE and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf. Even if one considers East Asia only, there is interesting dynamics with regard to South Korea (not mentioning North Korea) and even Japan. Hence, although one should not underestimate China’s significance in Russia’s foreign policy in Asia, Moscow has other important partners to rely on and demonstrates willingness to develop ties with new counterparts.
The second term of President Trump is widely regarded as a period of significant change. Unexpectedly, contradictions have emerged between the United States and its European allies. For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense was renamed the Department of War, and the Indo-Pacific Command reverted to its earlier designation as the Pacific Command. Some observers interpret these moves as signaling a return to a regional hegemonic posture reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine. How does Russia, as a Pacific power, view these developments?
As you rightly mentioned, many developments in current US actions stem from personal features of President Trump and his second term. So, I would consider all this renaming and rebranding related moves to be of domestic politics. Regarding US international posture in the region, Russian general calculations seem to be the same: Moscow treats Washington as a global power that pursues continuation of its hegemony in multiple domains, even though it does not seem to have enough resources to substantiate it as it did in the past. With passage of time, it will have to reassess its policies and refrain from meddling into every issue, leaving the space for rising regional powers.
India and Russia have often characterized their ties as those of ‘dear friends,’ with roots extending deep into history. At the same time, the United States has voiced concern over this partnership and continues to apply pressure on New Delhi. In this context, how would you evaluate the Indo–Russian strategic relationship, and in your view, what role does India hold in Russia’s broader strategic calculus?
Indo–Russian strategic relationship has always been among Moscow’s top priorities and certain to be even more important in years and decades to come. Russian expert community is confident that if India considers its relations with Russia to be in line with its strategic interests, New Delhi is highly unlikely to give up to American pressure. In this context, our goal is to further imbue our bilateral partnership with something mutually beneficial and strategically significant to make it both dynamic and resilient to external manupulations.
Russia’s strategic posture is often interpreted as supportive of a strong China. At the same time, another perspective underscores the importance of a strong India as a counterbalance to China. From the Russian point of view, how do you assess the emergence of a “strong India” within this wider geopolitical equation?
Russia supports the right of any regional, middle or small power to be strong. Of course, when it comes to its strategic partners – be it China or India – Moscow supports this right even more: no wonder, it is in Russia’s political, economic and security interests to have strong allies. Regarding India’s posture, Moscow always welcomed New Delhi’s s intense development in many fields. Thus, this perception is highly unlikely to change, as the more successful and credible partners Russia has, the higher chances of its own gradual development.
This article was published at TCSS
About A. Jathindra
A.Jathindra is a geopolitical analyst and the founding director of the Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies, an independent think tank based in the port city of Trincomalee, Sri Lanka. His work focuses on Geopolitics and International Relations, with particular emphasis on China, South Asian security challenges, regional politics, and transnational terrorism.He is an alumnus of the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), having participated in the regional initiative “U.S. Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific.”
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