What is Falun Gong and why does the Chinese Communist Party want to suppress it?

(The Conversation) — An anthropologist who conducted fieldwork among Falun Gong practitioners explains the movement’s beliefs and why its followers continue to resist the Chinese government.

Falun Gong practitioners march in London, calling for an end to persecution by the Chinese Communist Party. (James Willoughby/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

Gareth Fisher

July 29, 2026

(The Conversation) — I joined members of the Falun Gong spiritual movement at Chatter Park in Hong Kong on May 13, 2000, as they celebrated World Falun Dafa Day. The annual event commemorates the anniversary of the day the group claims its leader, Li Hongzhi, first made Falun Gong practices public.

Under the hot midday sun, surrounded by police and camera-clicking journalists, we performed the five main Falun Gong body exercises.

Falun Gong, which translates as “Practice of the Law Wheel,” is also known as Falun Dafa, which means “The Great Law of the Law Wheel.” It is a spiritual movement that combines bodily exercises with lessons to help practitioners endure hardship and act ethically in what its teachings consider a spiritually polluted world.

In my conversations with the Hong Kong group’s organizers, they explained that their choice of a well-known, centrally located park for the exercises – and their invitation to journalists to cover the event – was intended to signal to Hong Kong residents and the wider world that the movement remained active despite the ban on its practice in mainland China.

As an anthropologist of Chinese religion, I conducted field research among Falun Gong practitioners in the early 2000s. My research explored why the group continued to attract and retain followers worldwide in spite of Chinese government attempts to suppress and discredit it.

Falun Gong and the qigong boom

In 1992, Li, a charismatic teacher with no known prior background in religion or health, founded Falun Gong in China’s northeast province of Jilin. Li claimed to have developed abilities and insights that put him in tune with the “law” of the universe – a principle, he said, that, when followed, could enable all people to be healthy and virtuous.

Li’s claims came at a time of heightened interest in qigong, a practice of cultivating positive bodily energies with roots in Chinese medical and martial arts traditions. In the 1960s and 1970s, during a period of radical social reform known as the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government dismissed nearly all aspects of China’s past culture as backward and feudal, and citizens were prohibited from learning about them.

In the 1980s and 1990s, however, during a period known as Reform and Opening Up, the government reversed course. At the same time, health care costs were increasing due to the loosening of the government’s social welfare net. Curious about practices that had been previously restricted and eager to seek lower-cost forms of health care, Chinese citizens grew interested in traditional methods to maintain and prolong good health.

Literally meaning the “cultivation of vital breath,” qigong practice was most popular among older adults. It features a set of special exercises to stimulate the healthy flow of qi, or breath, throughout the body.

Li’s movement built on this interest in qigong but also added a moral and religious dimension to it. He preached that the world had become polluted by greed, corruption and “bad habits.” According to Li, homosexuality, pornography and drug abuse caused people to deviate from the “law,” leading them to greater sickness and harming their spiritual development.

He also preached that following his teachings was the only way to cure health problems at their spiritual core: Doctors, particularly those who practiced Western medicine, could only treat the physical symptoms. Li taught that disease was rooted in the negative effects of moral and spiritual decline.

He preached that people could cure themselves of physical and spiritual sickness by regularly practicing Falun Gong exercises and rising above the interests of “ordinary people,” – that is, nonpractitioners. This required following the movement’s three universal principles of truthfulness, benevolence and forbearance.

Truthfulness means not only refraining from deceit but also exposing and defending the truth. Practitioners follow benevolence by striving to overcome self-centeredness and acting with compassion toward others in their daily lives. In following the principle of forbearance, Falun Gong practitioners must be willing to accept any injury without retaliation, which could mean anything from remaining calm in the face of unfair insult to actively resisting Chinese government suppression.

As in other forms of qigong, Falun Gong practitioners practice several set exercises, generally each morning. In order to integrate the physical and moral dimensions of Falun Gong practice, many practitioners also gather in the evenings and on weekends to recite Li’s writings, watch videos of his lectures and discuss their healing journeys.

Organization and leadership

By the mid-1990s, Falun Gong had grown larger and more popular than other qigong traditions. Political scientist James Tong estimated that, at its peak, followers numbered in the tens of millions.

While physically demanding, the exercises were easy to learn and repeat. Moreover, Li’s concerns about moral decline resonated with many urban Chinese: Buddhist groups that I later studied, while denouncing the Falun Gong organization, shared many similar concerns with what they saw as lowering moral standards and spiritual pollution created through modernization.

Additionally, despite its growing size, Falun Gong maintained a high degree of organizational cohesion: Local “contact people” received direct instruction from district and regional organizers, who in turn received direction from the top leadership.

Even in the 1990s, when most Chinese citizens lacked access to the internet, the top leadership was able to communicate quickly and effectively to its many members via phone lists to inform them of protest actions and other public demonstrations.

Facing a government crackdown

Falun Gong members hold a protest in Seoul, South Korea, in 2024 against what they said was the Chinese government’s policy of harassment and torture of its members in China.
Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)

By the end of the 1990s, Falun Gong practitioners faced increasing critiques in state-run newspapers. In April 1999, the movement drew over 10,000 practitioners in a mass protest for official legitimacy in front of Chinese government headquarters. However, while the group’s intention was to pressure the government into providing it with broader leeway, the approach backfired.

Alarmed by the group’s willingness and ability to defy Chinese government authority by organizing such a large, unregistered public gathering, the government moved swiftly to crack down on the group.

By July of that year, the Chinese government had banned all Falun Gong practice. Additionally, the government engaged in a massive propaganda campaign against the group: It denounced Falun Gong exercises as physically harmful, accused the group of instructing its adherents not to seek medical help for dangerous health conditions, and insisted that Li was engineering a plot to disrupt social order and challenge government rule.

However, far from ending the group’s activities, the ban spurred many Falun Gong practitioners into further action: Soon after the government declared its ban, Li began to write essays that depicted the battle between Falun Gong adherents and the state as part of a cosmic struggle between defenders of the Great Law and their enemies. To practitioners, the Chinese Communist Party itself came to represent the kind of spiritual pollution against which they should be fighting.

Their protests are heavily influenced by the notion of forbearance. As I found in my interviews with Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong, Li’s followers see the ability to forbear hardship as central to their spiritual advancement. Enduring the suffering caused by their persecution from the Chinese government, in their view, presented a particularly strong opportunity for that advancement. Similarly, when Falun Gong practitioners protest against Chinese government propaganda, it reflects their belief that they must speak out and defend the Great Law.

Resisting the Chinese government

Today, nonviolent resistance is an integral part of Falun Gong practice. Falun Gong followers gather each day to practice and protest outside Chinese embassies and consulates worldwide.

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Over time, Falun Gong followers have also established their own media outlet, The Epoch Times, and a performing arts company, Shen Yun, that tours cities around the world with the aim of depicting a “pure” Chinese culture free of influence from its modern Communist government.

Members of Shen Yun, a Falun Gong dance and music company, rehearse at the Long Beach Performing Arts Center in Los Angeles in 2016.
Rick Loomis/Los Angeles Times

In mainland China, many Falun Gong followers have accepted a range of punishments for their continued membership in the group. These include threats of job loss for those who simply refuse to give up their practice, imprisonment and even torture for participating in public protests or the spread of Falun Gong materials online. Group members also allege that the Chinese government has harvested the organs of incarcerated Falun Gong practitioners for sale on the international market, a claim that the government contests.

To suppress the movement, the government has made use of advanced surveillance technology, some of it developed by U.S. companies. The technology is used to track down Falun Gong practitioners in China who have defied the ban against the movement, particularly to locate and interrogate those who have distributed Falun Gong content online.

Recently, several Falun Gong practitioners unsuccessfully sued the U.S.-based corporation Cisco Systems, alleging that it developed sophisticated surveillance technology that the Chinese government used to find China-based Falun Gong practitioners. The case made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled against the practitioners, arguing that U.S. courts were not the right forum to try human rights violations that occur abroad.

What began as an exercise movement of primarily older adults in China’s northeast has proved to provide the largest, best-organized and most-sustained resistance to Chinese government rule since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

(Gareth Fisher, Associate Professor of Religion, Syracuse University. The views expressed in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of Religion News Service.)

The Conversation religion coverage receives support through the AP’s collaboration with The Conversation US, with funding from Lilly Endowment Inc. The Conversation is solely responsible for this content.

HUMAN RIGHTS = RELIGIOUS RITES

Kyrgyzstan: Five Reform Adventists Held In Pre-Trial Detention For Two Months – Analysis

The three men and two women face criminal charges of “Production and distribution of extremist materials”. If convicted as a group, each faces 5 to 7 years’ imprisonment.

June 24, 2026 
F18News
By Felix Corley

Shortly before midnight in the evening of 17 June, a Judge at Bishkek’s Birinchi May (Pervomaisky) District Court ordered five members of the now-banned True and Free Reform Seventh-day Adventist Church held in pre-trial detention for two months. The five – three men and two women – face criminal charges of “Production and distribution of extremist materials”. The case appears to relate to material the Church members had on their phones. If convicted of acting as a group, each faces a jail term of 5 to 7 years and a possible post-prison ban on specific activity.

Police are holding Yevgeny Zhuravsky, Igor Kozlov, Sergey Kozlov, Olga Selova and Valeriya Yantsen at Bishkek’s Prison No. 21 (see below).


Police Investigator Adilet Asanbayev opened the criminal investigation on 13 April, just four days after the National Security Committee (NSC) secret police deported the head of the Church in Kyrgyzstan, Pastor Pavel Shreider, after his prison term was changed to a fine. Investigator Asanbayev formally launched a criminal case against the five Adventists on 15 June. Forum 18 was unable to reach Investigator Asanbayev (see below).

Based on information from an officer of the Police Counter Extremism and Illegal Migration Service, a 28 May court decision authorising a house search claimed that True and Free Adventists continue to meet and “abide by methods of caution and conspiracy” (see below).

On Saturday 6 June, police raided at least seven homes of Church members in and around Bishkek where small groups of Church members had gathered (Saturday is a holy day for Adventists). Officers searched the homes and seized documents and mobile telephones. Officers then detained several of the Adventists and took them for questioning. They released all of them later that day (see below).

On 15 June, police summoned some of the True and Free Reform Adventists questioned earlier for further interrogation. Officers focused on whether the individuals had Church publications which officials had deemed “extremist”. Police held the five for 48 hours. Investigator Asanbayev then applied to court to have them held for two months (see below).

Investigator Asanbayev told Church members he will look into the activity of other Church members and summon them for interrogation. He said he was looking to charge suspects as a group. “This is a real threat to at least 20 others,” one Church member told Forum 18 (see below).

Another Church member describes the raids, searches and arrests as “a new wave of persecution”. “The process of overturning the decision made against a church organisation illegally accused of extremism has not yet been completed,” the Church member told Forum 18. “And now the remaining believing brothers and sisters have been subjected to further repression.”

Forum 18 asked the Interior Ministry Press Service in Bishkek why Police launched the April raids, interrogations and criminal case against True and Free Adventists who have not committed violence against anyone or called for violence against anyone. Forum 18 has received no response to its questions (see below).

Deputy Chair Meder Karabayev and Chief Specialist Alisher Alybayev of the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations in Bishkek did not answer their phones each time Forum 18 called (see below).

A Bishkek-based commentator who has been following the case warns that it “could establish a concerning precedent”. “There is a risk that such legal frameworks may be broadly applied to restrict the activities of unregistered religious minorities and penalise their members under the guise of combating extremism” (see below)

On 19 March 2025, Alamudin District Court in Chuy Region banned the True and Free Reform Adventist Church as an “extremist” religious organisation. The Supreme Court in Bishkek later rejected the Church’s appeal against the ban. Indira Aslanova, Senior Expert of the Centre for Religious Studies, an independent organisation in Bishkek, described accusing the True and Free Adventists of “extremism” as “absurd” (see below).


The NSC secret police arrested Pastor Shreider in Bishkek in November 2024. Officers searched his home and those of about 10 other church members. They seized thousands of books, including Bibles, as well as cash and mobile phones. The NSC returned the books in 2025 (see below).

After their arrest, NSC secret police officers tortured Pastor Shreider and another detained church member Igor Tsoy during interrogations. “I was given blows on my head, chest and given kicks in my spine from behind by five officers,” Pastor Shreider wrote in a November 2024 complaint. No one has been punished for the torture (see below).

On 10 July 2025, nearly three months after his criminal trial began, Bishkek’s Birinchi May District Court jailed Pastor Shreider for three years, to be followed by deportation. The Supreme Court in Bishkek changed the rest of his prison term to a fine of 3 months’ average wage on 25 March 2026. He was freed the same day but was soon deported (see below).

Among other prisoners of conscience jailed for exercising freedom of religion or belief, 37-year-old Muslim prisoner of conscience Asadullo Madraimov was freed from prison on 25 March after completing his sentence. He was punished for criticising the authorities for closing Kara-Suu District’s Al-Sarakhsi Mosque in the southern Osh Region. He visited his lawyer Khusanbai Saliyev in Osh days after his release. “He told me he has lost his health, and in our country, medical rehabilitation projects have been closed,” Saliyev told Forum 18 (see below).

Others jailed for exercising freedom of religion or belief

In addition to members of the True and Free Reform Seventh-day Adventist Church, the regime has jailed others for exercising freedom of religion or belief.

Muslim prisoner of conscience Asadullo Ibrakhimovich Madraimov (born 22 July 1988) was arrested in October 2023 and jailed for three years in February 2024. He was punished for criticising the authorities for closing Kara-Suu District’s Al-Sarakhsi Mosque in the southern Osh Region. He was freed on 25 March 2026 at the end of his sentence. (Each day in pre-trial detention before a verdict comes into force counts as two days of a sentence.)

On 3 April, ten days after his release, Madraimov visited his lawyer Khusanbai Saliyev in Osh. “He told me he has lost his health, and in our country, medical rehabilitation projects have been closed,” Saliyev told Forum 18 the same day.

Another member of the Al-Sarakhsi Mosque community, Mamirzhan Tashmatov, was freed from prison in May 2024.

In July 2023, a court jailed Protestant Aytbek Tynaliyev for 6 months for allegedly “inciting religious enmity” for social media posts sharing his faith.


On 4 December 2019, the National Security Committee (NSC) secret police opened a criminal case against so far unspecified members of the Jehovah’s Witness national centre in Bishkek under Article 313, Part 2, Point 2 of the Criminal Code then in force. This punishes “Incitement of racial, ethnic, national, religious or inter-regional enmity (discord) conducted by a group of people in a prior conspiracy” with jail terms.

Forum 18 asked the NSC secret police in writing on 26 March 2026 (re-sent on 26 May):

– Whether the criminal case is continuing or has been closed;
– If it has been closed, when it was closed; and
– Why local Jehovah’s Witnesses have not been kept informed of the course of this criminal investigation.

Forum 18 had received no response by the end of the working day in Bishkek of 18 June.

Forum 18 asked the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations in Bishkek in writing on 26 March 2026 why the regime jails individuals – including Madraimov, Tashmatov and Tynaliyev – for exercising freedom of religion or belief. Forum 18 had received no answer to its question by the end of the working day in Bishkek of 18 June.
True and Free Reform Seventh-day Adventist Church among banned communities

The True and Free Reform Seventh-day Adventist Church in Kyrgyzstan is part of a reform movement within Adventism that emerged during the Soviet period. (It is separate from the Seventh-day Adventist Church, with its headquarters in the United States.) One of its leaders, prisoner of conscience Vladimir Shelkov, died in a Soviet labour camp in 1980.

The Church – which was led by Pastor Pavel Shreider – chooses not to seek state registration. Exercising freedom of religion or belief without state registration is illegal and punishable.

The Church can no longer meet for worship because of the ban. It previously met in its place of worship in the village of Lenin in Alamudun District of Chuy Region, just north of Bishkek. Officials have not seized the place of worship.

The regime has previously banned Ahmadi Muslims, and cancelled the state registration or a Falun Gong association.

The NSC secret police raided the Bishkek congregation of the Council of Churches during a harvest festival worship meeting in September 2025 and police summarily fined two congregation leaders. Officers again raided the church’s Sunday meeting for worship on 19 April 2026. Police handed a summary fine to the Pastor. NSC secret police officers have visited at least one other Council of Churches congregation in 2026.

Police raid Adventist homes

On 13 April, just four days after the secret police deported Pastor Pavel Shreider, police opened a criminal investigation related to members of the True and Free Reform Adventist Church. The Investigator is Adilet Asanbayev of the Police of Bishkek’s Birinchi May (Pervomaisky) District.

On 28 May, Judge Eldarbek Mamyrov of Birinchi May District Court approved Investigator Asanbayev’s request to conduct house searches of Church members as part of the criminal investigation, according to one of the decisions seen by Forum 18.

The court decision notes that A. Kurmanbekov, an officer of the Police Counter Extremism and Illegal Migration Service, submitted a written report to Birinchi May District Police on 13 April. He claimed he had received “operational information” that a group of people from Bishkek and the villages of Mayevka and Lenin had “spread the ideology of the extremist organisation” of the True and Free Reform Adventist Church. The criminal investigation was launched on this basis.

Kurmanbekov claimed that “operational investigative measures” had established that Church members continued to meet at Church leaders’ homes on Saturdays (the holy day for Adventists).

“To coordinate their activity,” the court decision reads, “personal contacts, messaging apps and closed communication groups are used, through which participants share information about the place and time of meetings, and abide by methods of caution and conspiracy, whereby they leave a house in small groups of two or three people with an interval, and on leaving a house they look around so as not to attract attention from a large number of people.”

On Saturday 6 June, police raided at least seven homes of Church members in and around Bishkek where small groups of Church members had gathered, those close to the Church told Forum 18. Officers searched the homes and seized documents and mobile telephones. Officers then detained several of the Adventists and took them for questioning. They released all of them later that day.

Church members then found out about the case under Criminal Code Article 332 “Production and distribution of extremist materials”.

Following the raids, several of those questioned fled the country.
Interrogations, arrests

On 12 June, the Justice Ministry’s State Service for Judicial Expert Analysis completed its “expert analysis” of books seized from Church members. This noted that Church members refuse military service. “When in the army, people cannot be simultaneously faithful to their faith and to the orders of their superiors,” the analysis quotes a Church book as declaring. It claims that a text describes Church members as the “people of God” who are “opposed to people of secular views”. It adds that “religious convictions are placed above service to the country and civic duty”.


On 15 June, police summoned some of the True and Free Reform Adventists questioned earlier for further interrogation. Officers focused on whether the individuals had Church publications which officials had deemed “extremist”.

Initially police summoned Church member Yevgeny Zhuravsky. They decided to hold him for 48 hours until a court could approve his pre-trial detention. Towards evening that day, police summoned other Church members for questioning, including Igor Kozlov, Sergey Kozlov, Olga Selova and Valeriya Yantsen. The four were similarly placed in 48-hour detention (at least one of them at 2 am on 16 June). Officers threatened to hunt down Church members who had fled abroad.

On 15 June, Investigator Adilet Asanbayev formally launched a criminal case against the five Church members, according to court documents.

Officers again searched Church members’ homes and confiscated literature. They returned most of it, but sent some for “expert analysis”.

Officers were investigating those detained under Criminal Code Article 332, Part 1. This punishes “Production, distribution, transportation or forwarding of extremist materials, or their acquisition or storage for the purpose of distribution, the use of symbols or attributes of extremist organisations, as well as through the Internet or mass media”. Punishments are a jail term of 3 to 5 years, with or without a subsequent ban on specific activity for up to 3 years.

“The Article talks about ‘storage for the purpose of distribution’,” one Church member told Forum 18. “There was no actual distribution, it’s just that they found these items on their phones. And now they’re applying this Article to it.”

The Investigator is seeking to upgrade the charges to Criminal Code Article 332, Part 2. This punishes those acting as a group and bears a prison term of 5 to 7 years, with or without a subsequent ban on specific activity for up to 3 years.

The Bishkek lawyer Janysh Barakov is defending the five Adventists.

Officials at Birinchi May District Police would not put Forum 18 through on 18 June to Investigator Adilet Asanbayev, but gave his mobile number. However, Asanbayev did not answer.

Forum 18 asked the Interior Ministry Press Service in Bishkek in writing on the afternoon of 18 June why Police launched the April raids, interrogations and criminal case against True and Free Adventists who have not committed violence against anyone or called for violence against anyone. Forum 18 also asked for contacts of the Interior Ministry’s Counter Extremism and Illegal Migration Service. The Press Service responded later in the day, asking for Forum 18 to submit its questions officially in writing. Forum 18 re-sent the questions in writing. Forum 18 had received no response by the end of the working day in Bishkek of 18 June.

Deputy Chair Meder Karabayev and Chief Specialist Alisher Alybayev of the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations in Bishkek did not answer their phones each time Forum 18 called on 18 June. An Agency official refused to give Forum 18 the direct number of the other Deputy Chair, Aybek Iminov.


“This situation warrants close monitoring, as it could establish a concerning precedent,” a Bishkek-based commentator who has been following the case told Forum 18 on 18 June. “There is a risk that such legal frameworks may be broadly applied to restrict the activities of unregistered religious minorities and penalise their members under the guise of combating extremism.”
Court orders pre-trial detention

)Police Investigator Adilet Asanbayev presented the pre-detention requests against the five True and Free Reform Adventists – Yevgeny Zhuravsky, Igor Kozlov, Sergey Kozlov, Olga Selova and Valeriya Yantsen – to Bishkek’s Birinchi May (Pervomaisky) District Court. Late in the evening of 17 June, Judge Aida Zhogoshtiyeva ordered all five held in pre-trial detention for two months as the investigation proceeds. The Judge issued the decision at about 11:30 pm.

Officials then took the five Adventists to Bishkek Prison No. 21. Their address:

720005 Bishkek,
Oktyabr District,
Geologicheskiy pereulok 2,
Uchrezhdenie No. 21 Ispolneniya Nakazaniy
“This is a real threat to at least 20 others”

Police Investigator Adilet Asanbayev told True and Free Reform Adventists on 16 June that he will look into the activity of other Church members and summon them for interrogation. He said he was looking to charge suspects as a group.

“This is a real threat to at least 20 others,” one Church member told Forum 18.
Regime crushes True and Free Reform Adventist Church

The National Security Committee (NSC) secret police arrested the head of the True and Free Adventist Church, Pavel Davidovich Shreider (born 10 January 1960), in Bishkek in November 2024. Officers searched his home and those of about 10 other church members. They seized thousands of books, including Bibles, as well as cash and mobile phones.

The NSC secret police later returned the 2,196 books they confiscated during the November 2024 raids. The NSC handed back about 80 per cent of the books in spring 2025. It returned the rest in September 2025.


After their arrest, NSC secret police officers tortured Pastor Shreider and another detained church member Igor Tsoy during interrogations. “I was given blows on my head, chest and given kicks in my spine from behind by five officers,” Pastor Shreider wrote in a November 2024 complaint to the then National Centre for the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Bishkek. Officers “hit me with an iron pipe to force me to confess that I committed crimes”.

NSC secret police officers used a stun gun to try to coerce Tsoy to write a statement against Pastor Shreider, causing multiple injuries. However, Tsoy refused to do so.

The then National Centre for the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment claimed that the torture cannot be corroborated. Officials who participated in the arrest and investigation of Pastor Shreider denied that officers tortured Pastor Shreider and church member Tsoy.

Under the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Kyrgyzstan is obliged both to arrest any person suspected on good grounds of having committed, instigated or acquiesced to torture “or take other legal measures to ensure his [sic] presence”, and also to try them under criminal law which makes “these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature”.
Court bans True and Free Reform Adventists as “extremist”

On 19 March 2025, Alamudin District Court in Chuy Region banned the True and Free Reform Adventist Church as an “extremist” religious organisation. The civil case had been brought by Chuy Region Prosecutor’s Office with the close involvement of the NSC secret police.

Indira Aslanova, Senior Expert of the Centre for Religious Studies, an independent organisation in Bishkek, told Forum 18 in July 2025 that accusing the True and Free Adventists of “extremism” is “absurd”.

On 4 August 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Court in Bishkek rejected the appeal against the ban. The Supreme Court upheld the ban permanently, and there is no possibility of challenging it in Kyrgyzstan.

In September 2025, church members lodged a further appeal to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva, church members told Forum 18.

In 2025, officials added the True and Free Adventist Church to the “list of organisations deemed terrorist and extremist by the courts” on the websites of the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Justice Ministry’s Probation Department. The General Prosecutor’s Office also includes on its list of “informational materials deemed extremist by the courts” unnamed “printed and electronic versions of materials (books)” produced by the Church, based on the March 2025 Alamudin District Court decision.


As of 18 June 2026, the True and Free Adventist Church does not appear on the list of banned “destructive, extremist and terrorist organisations” on the website of the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations. Nor does it appear on a list on the website of the National Security Committee (NSC) secret police.

Forum 18 asked the National Agency for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations in Bishkek in writing on 26 March whether the True and Free Adventist Church is still banned and, if so, why. Forum 18 pointed out that the Church is not listed on the National Agency website as banned. Forum 18 had received no answer to its questions by the end of the working day in Bishkek of 18 June.
Arrested Pastor Shreider transferred to prison medical unit because of brain damage

From his arrest in November 2024, Pastor Pavel Shreider was held for 10 months under NSC secret police supervision at Prison No. 21 in Bishkek.

Major Azat Kudaybergenov, Chief of Prison No. 21, told Pastor Shreider’s family on 22 September 2025 that he had been “examined multiple times by doctors at Institution No. 21, and diagnosed with traumatic brain injury (TBI) with cephalic syndrome. Stage 2 cerebrovascular insufficiency of mixed origin, with cognitive impairment.”

The family told Forum 18 that they believe that “several factors” may have contributed to Pastor Shreider’s condition. “Firstly, he is of an older age. The prison regime is not conducive for his body movement or exercise and his blood circulation is bad. Secondly, he probably has stress every day because of his arrest. And lastly and maybe most importantly, he was beaten by the police officers when he was arrested and given blows to his head.”
Pastor Shreider’s conviction, first unsuccessful appeal

On 10 July 2025, nearly three months after his criminal trial began, Bishkek’s Birinchi May (Pervomaisky) District Court convicted Pastor Pavel Shreider on charges of “incitement of racial, ethnic, national, religious, or regional enmity”. Judge Ubaydulla Satimkulov jailed the then 65-year-old Pastor for three years in a general regime labour camp. The Judge ordered his deportation to Russia at his own cost at the end of the prison term.

Pastor Shreider’s post-prison deportation was ordered on the basis of Article 70 of the Criminal Code: “After serving their sentence, a foreign citizen or stateless person shall be deported from the Kyrgyz Republic in accordance with the procedure established by international treaties that have entered into force in accordance with the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic.”


Pastor Shreider was born in the village of Orlovka (now Ak-Dobo) in Talas Region of Soviet Kyrgyzstan. He was living in Russia at the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and gained Russian citizenship.

Pastor Shreider’s defence lawyer Akmat Alagushev lodged an appeal against his conviction and jail term to Bishkek City Court on 7 August 2025. On 23 October 2025, the Court left Pastor Shreider’s sentence unchanged.
Supreme Court changes Shreider’s jail term to a fine, deportation order unchanged

After Bishkek City Court rejected Pastor Shreider’s first appeal, he lodged a final appeal to the Supreme Court in Bishkek.

On 25 March 2026, a panel of three Judges at the Supreme Court left Pastor Shreider’s conviction unchanged, including the deportation order, according to the initial decision seen by Forum 18.

However, the Supreme Court changed the remainder of Pastor Shreider’s prison term to a fine of 150,000 Soms. This represents about three months’ average local wage for those in formal work. The hearing was open and family and church members were able to attend.

Officials prepared documentation and released Pastor Shreider later on 25 March.


Pastor Shreider reluctantly paid the fine on 9 April, hours before NSC secret police officers deported him. Only then did Supreme Court officials hand over the full 25 March written decision.
NSC secret police deports Pastor Shreider

On 9 April, officers who said they were from the National Security Committee (NSC) secret police deported Pastor Pavel Shreider. “They put him in a car, took him to the land border and banned him from re-entering the country,” someone who knows him told Forum 18 in May. “There were no deportation documents and they put no mark in his [Russian] passport.”

Pastor Shreider’s wife Nelya was not ordered deported, but chose to leave the country separately the same day.

Pastor Shreider was due to pay for his own deportation, but the NSC secret police officers did not demand any money on deportation day.
UN Special Rapporteurs’ concern over Adventists’ torture, arrests, prosecution

On 23 July 2025, five United Nations Special Rapporteurs – including Nazila Ghanea, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief – wrote to the regime (AL KGZ 4/2025) about the “arrests, detentions and alleged torture” of members of the True and Free Reform Adventist Church, as well as the subsequent criminal prosecution of Pastor Pavel Shreider.


The Special Rapporteurs also noted the 19 March 2025 court ruling banning the True and Free Reform Adventist Church as “extremist”.

“While we do not wish to prejudge the accuracy of these allegations, we wish to express our serious concerns regarding the arrest, detention and prosecution of Mr. Pavel Schreider, along with the alleged use of torture and other ill-treatment against Messrs. Pavel Schreider, Igor Tsoi, Sergei Sharvan, and Yuri Pauls,” the Special Rapporteurs wrote. They pointed out that “If the above allegations would prove to be accurate, they would be in contravention” of various articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

“Serious allegations of torture and ill-treatment have been made with regard to Mr. Schreider and the other male members of the congregation during their detention,” the Special Rapporteurs told the regime. “It is reported that the male and female members of the group witnessed SNCS officers striking the heads and bodies of the seven male members of the group, including Mr. Schreider, Mr. Pauls, Mr. Igor Tsoi, Mr. Peter Petkau, all of whom reported ill-treatment in detention. It is reported that Mr. Schreider and Mr. Tsoi were additionally subjected to strangulation with cellophane bags and the use of tasers.”

The Special Rapporteurs also asked the regime how Pastor Shreider’s prosecution and the court-imposed ban on the Church are “compatible with the international human rights obligations”, including under the ICCPR. They also asked what measures had been taken to “investigate the credible accusations” of torture against the four Church members.
Regime’s response to UN Special Rapporteurs claims actions “in accordance with national law”, international treaties

The regime’s 20 September 2025 response to the UN Special Rapporteurs merely recounted the prosecution case against Pastor Shreider and the ban on the Church. It insisted that “the ban on the activities of the aforementioned association and the criminal prosecution of its individual members are carried out in accordance with national law and the international treaties to which the Kyrgyzstan is a party”.

The regime’s response also dismissed concerns about Pastor Shreider’s health condition in prison.
Two Adventists under criminal investigation allowed to leave

In 2024, National Security Committee (NSC) secret police investigators in Bishkek launched a criminal investigation into two other members of the True and Free Adventist Church, Igor Tsoy and Yuri Pauls. Officials had tortured both men following the 2024 raids on community members (see above). The investigator banned them both from leaving the country.


Although the investigation started over alleged pressure to fraudulently acquire individuals’ property, it soon transferred to an investigation of the Church. The NSC secret police undertook an investigation into the “underground organisation”. This also involved a “religious/linguistic expert analysis”.

On 24 April 2025, Bishkek NSC secret police Investigator Siymik Bolotov issued a decision (seen by Forum 18) not to open a criminal case against Tsoy and Pauls “connected with the absence of the component of a crime”. He noted that an instruction for information from NSC secret police officers in Bishkek had not received a response.

After repeated requests, the Investigator lifted the travel bans on Tsoy and Pauls, and both left Kyrgyzstan in 2025.

“The criminal investigation into the two men has been halted, but has not been closed,” a Church member told Forum 18.

NSC Investigator Bolotov did not answer his phone each time Forum 18 called on 18 June 2026.


About F18News
Forum 18 believes that religious freedom is a fundamental human right, which is essential for the dignity of humanity and for true freedom.
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China Seeks To Leverage Pakistan’s Strong Relationships With Middle Eastern And Islamic Countries To Bolster Its Geostrategic Influence – Interview



Dr. Nadia Helmy


March 26, 2026 

By A. Jathindra

Dr. Nadia Helmy is an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics, the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, and Asian affairs. She currently serves as Professor of Political Science at Beni Suef University, Egypt. In addition, she is a Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES), Lund University, Sweden, where she also directs the South and East Asia Studies Unit.






For much of the late 20th century, Western security services regarded Chinese intelligence as primarily focused on domestic stability. In recent years, however, allegations of espionage, cyber operations, and covert activities have reshaped this perception. Today, China’s intelligence apparatus is seen as an increasingly active global player, though far less publicly discussed than agencies like the CIA or Mossad. How should we understand Chinese intelligence—its tactics, methods, and strategic objectives?

The world’s perception of Chinese intelligence has shifted from a closed, inward-looking apparatus to a transnational superpower. To understand this entity, it must be viewed as a system that does not separate national security, economic growth, and political stability. A simplified analysis of their methods and objectives can be achieved by understanding their strategic goals, namely the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation. Chinese intelligence operates to achieve three major objectives: (Ensuring the Survival of the Regime): monitoring dissidents abroad, such as the (Falun Gong movement or Uyghur and Tibetan activists), (Technological Superiority): acquiring Western technological secrets (artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and renewable energy) to bridge the technological gap, and (Political Influence): influencing decision-making centres in Western countries to ensure pro-China policies.

To this end, Chinese intelligence agencies employ a strategy of tactics and methods known in intelligence circles as “a thousand grains of sand”. China employs a unique strategy that differs from the traditional James Bond approach,through:A whole-of-society approach: Instead of relying solely on professional officers, China leverages “non-traditional sources” such as academics, students, and businesspeople, sometimes referred to as the “thousand grains of sand” theory (collecting small pieces of information from a large number of sources to form a complete picture).
Professional cyber espionage: China possesses one of the world’s largest cyber attack armies, primarily focused on corporate espionage and intellectual property theft, not just military secrets.
Human intelligence (HUMINT): This involves cultivating long-term relationships with former officials or academics through professional networking platforms like LinkedIn to offer seemingly legitimate research or consulting services.


Finally, the (institutional structure) plays a vital role in the success of Chinese intelligence agencies. The main driving force is the (Ministry of State Security) “MSS”, which combines functions similar to those of the CIA and FBI. But what is unique is the role of the United Front Work Department, a Communist Party agency that aims to neutralize adversaries and garner support among Chinese communities abroad and foreign elites.

What makes the work of Chinese intelligence agencies “different” is that while Mossad, for example, focuses on kinetic operations and assassinations, and US intelligence focuses on military-technological superiority, China focuses on economic intelligence. They see economic power as the foundation of sovereignty, so stealing an aircraft engine blueprint or a chemical formula is no less important than stealing a war plan.
China is often portrayed as a cyber power, using dual‑purpose technologies. In this context, what role do hackers play within its intelligence system?


Cyber ​​hackers play a pivotal role in China’s strategy as a cyber superpower, serving as an operational tool within a complex intelligence system that integrates military, economic, and political objectives. As of 2026, these roles have evolved to become more specialized and integrated with artificial intelligence technologies. Their role within the intelligence system can be summarized as follows: (Economic and Industrial Espionage): Stealing intellectual property and trade secrets is a key task for Chinese hackers to support national strategies such as “Made in China 2025”. They target advanced technology sectors such as semiconductors, renewable energy, and pharmaceuticals to reduce domestic research and development costs. (Pre-positioning Critical Infrastructure): Recent reports in 2025 and 2026 (such as those concerning the “Volt Typhoon” group) reveal a shift in objectives from mere espionage to “positioning”themselves within the electricity, water, and telecommunications networks of Western countries. The goal is to possess the capability to physically disrupt these facilities in the event of a future military conflict. In addition to hybrid intelligence operations, tasks are divided among various entities, such as:The Ministry of State Security (MSS): Focuses on foreign espionage, political intelligence gathering, and targeting government institutions and global corporations.
The People’s Liberation Army Cyber ​​Force (CSF): Primarily focuses on military targets and defense networks.
The Ministry of Public Security (MPS): Handles domestic intelligence operations and surveillance of dissidents.
Exploiting dual-use technologies: Hackers use legitimate tools pre-installed on systems (a technique known as “Living off the Land”) to avoid detection, making it difficult to distinguish between ordinary cyber activity and intelligence attacks. Artificial intelligence is also integrated to automate vulnerability detection and customize phishing attacks.
Monitoring transnational opposition: Hackers are tasked with tracking and monitoring Chinese activists and dissidents abroad, such as those involved in Taiwanese and Hong Kong independence movements, to ensure the regime’s political stability.

During the ongoing conflict involving Iran, some observers suggest that China has remained relatively detached. Yet you argue that Chinese intelligence in the Middle East is actively working to counter Mossad’s operations. How do you assess China’s espionage interventions in this war?

A crucial point has been raised regarding the “silent engagement” in the region. While Beijing publicly adopts a cautious diplomacy to safeguard its economic interests, security analysts believe its behind-the-scenes intelligence activities take on a completely different character.

China’s espionage interventions in this context can be assessed from (three main angles): First, (securing the “informational Silk Road”): China is not acting on behalf of Iran as an “ideological” ally, but rather as a “geopolitical”partner. Chinese intelligence focuses on monitoring movements that could destabilize energy supplies. This requires close tracking of Mossad operations targeting Iranian facilities to prevent the region from sliding into a full-blown war that would harm Beijing’s interests. Second, (technological and cyber superiority): China is emerging as a powerful player in the field of cyber espionage. Reports indicate that Beijing shares advanced surveillance technologies with its regional partners, limiting Mossad’s ability to operate freely in the digital realm. This type of intervention is a “proxy confrontation” conducted through technological means rather than direct conflict. Third, (neutralizing influence and expanding its regional role): China views international intelligence activities in the region as part of the global balance of power. Therefore, understanding and disrupting certain intelligence operations could be seen as an indirect way to bolster Beijing’s position as an independent great power in the Middle East, thus positioning itself as an alternative “stabilizing force” focused on economic development.


In short, the Chinese position can be described as “strategic neutrality”. It maintains an equidistant military and political stance publicly, but remains actively engaged in intelligence gathering to protect its massive investments and ensure the security of international trade routes.
Building on that, do you observe any indications of collaboration between China and Pakistan in shaping intelligence strategies concerning the Middle East?

Evidence points to close strategic and security cooperation between China and Pakistan, extending beyond economic aspects to include intelligence coordination. China leverages Pakistan’s historical ties in the Middle East, and the two countries are working together to enhance regional influence, secure the (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) “CPEC”, and address shared security challenges, according to strategic analyses. Key indicators of this strategic and intelligence cooperation, include: (Close security and military coordination): Both countries have pledged to strengthen cooperation in security and trade, and defense relations are developing robustly, paving the way for high-level intelligence coordination. Furthermore, (Utilizing Pakistani influence): China seeks to leverage Pakistan’s strong relationships with Middle Eastern and Islamic countries to bolster its geostrategic influence. And (Securing joint projects): The (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) “CPEC” is a central pillar of this cooperation, requiring joint intelligence to safeguard Chinese infrastructure and labor in Pakistan. With regard to coordination on important regional issues such as Afghanistan: Reports indicate Chinese mediation in bridging the gap between the Taliban and Pakistan, reflecting an exchange of information and coordination of strategies for dealing with Middle Eastern and South Asian issues. With regard to strategic trust between China and Pakistan: Pakistan affirms that its partnership with China is based on “strategic trust and alignment”, which strengthens intelligence sharing.


This cooperation is viewed within the context of “friendship under all circumstances” and the shared goal of creating a balance of regional power, particularly in the face of Western and Indian influence.
You have also noted that Chinese intelligence and defense think tanks closely study the performance of Israeli, Western, and American weapons in conflicts such as Ukraine, and now apply similar analysis to Iran. Their aim is to adapt these lessons to strengthen China’s own defense systems, particularly through artificial intelligence. In your view, does this suggest China is preparing for a military campaign against Taiwan?

Yes, this behavior indicates that China places the “military option” against Taiwan at the heart of its strategic plans, but it does not necessarily mean an imminent attack. Researchers and planners in Beijing view current conflicts as “living laboratories” to test the effectiveness of both Western and Chinese technology. Here are some key takeaways from this Chinese approach: (Bridging the technological gap through “proxy laboratories”): Chinese research centers consider current wars (Ukraine and the tensions between Iran and Israel) to provide invaluable data on how American weapons, such as: (Patriot missiles, HIMARS, and drones) perform against defensive and offensive systems similar to those possessed by China.On the Iranian side: Beijing is studying the ability of Chinese radars, such as: (the YLC-8B) to detect (American stealth fighters and the resilience of the BeiDou-3 navigation system as a Chinese alternative to GPS) against Western jamming.
On the Ukrainian front: China is analyzing the failures of joint operations and Russian logistics to avoid repeating them in the Taiwan scenario, which requires a complex amphibious landing.

Herein lies the role of artificial intelligence as a force multiplier for China. Integrating AI into Chinese defense systems is part of its “intelligentized warfare” strategy. The objectives are: (speed of decision-making): developing algorithms that surpass human commanders in managing and coordinating massive, simultaneous attacks, and (scenario simulation): using real-world data from the battlefields to feed Chinese simulation systems, thus bridging the gap resulting from the Chinese military’s decades-long lack of actual combat experience.

This is preparation for a potential Chinese military campaign against Taiwan should Taiwan persist in its secession from mainland China and deviate from the “One China” principle. These Chinese moves indicate strategic readiness rather than an announcement of an attack’s timing. Through its deterrence strategy, China hopes to convince the United States that the cost of intervening to defend Taiwan would be prohibitively high by developing systems to counter Western weapons. And (Preparing for a Protracted Conflict): China has adjusted its plans from the concept of a “rapid invasion” to preparing for a high-intensity, sustained conflict, after witnessing how the conflict in Ukraine has devolved into a war of attrition. With a (diversionary strategy): China supports its allies. such as (Iran) to keep American military and political resources stretched thin in the Middle East, thus weakening Washington’s ability to fully focus on the Pacific region.


Therefore, we can conclude that China’s meticulous study of weapons performance in Ukraine and Iran is an attempt to minimize the “unknowns” in any future conflict over Taiwan. China is not merely preparing to launch a campaign, but rather preparing to ensure victory with minimal losses and in the shortest possible time, through information and technological superiority.

This article was published at TCSS

A. Jathindra

A. Jathindra is the head of the think tank Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TSST) and a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst.

RFI   INVESTIGATION

Behind the success of Shen Yun show, former Falun Gong followers allege abuse

The stage show Shen Yun draws audiences across the world with its vision of 5,000 years of Chinese civilisation through classical dance and opera. But in an RFI investigation, former dancers and followers of the Falun Gong movement behind the production describe a very different reality – of psychological coercion, untreated injuries and forced labour involving minors.


Issued on: 15/03/2026 - RFI

Posters advertising the Shen Yun dance show in the Paris metro in March 2024. The global touring production was created by followers of the Falun Gong movement. 

AFP - DIMITAR DILKOFF

John Smithies spent 20 years following the teachings of the Chinese spiritual movement Falun Gong, and held a senior role at its newspaper Epoch Times.

At a meeting last year, he heard a dancer from the Shen Yun company, founded by followers of the movement, tell the room: “If you make a mistake during this performance, the audience will lose their chance to remain on Earth for eternity.”

“Saying that to 14 and 15-year-olds puts incredible pressure on their shoulders,” the British former follower told RFI. “It’s like mental torture.”

His account echoes two complaints filed by former dancers accusing the organisation of forced labour by minors and complaining of untreated injuries and psychological pressure that pushed teenagers to work days of more than 15 hours.

Shen Yun describes its performances as “the rebirth of 5,000 years of Chinese civilisation”. The show, lasting two and a half hours, combines lyrical singing, classical dance and a symphony orchestra.

The company now operates eight touring troupes that perform hundreds of shows each year across several continents, drawing more than a million theatre-goers annually – with tickets typically costing around €75.

Inside the Dragon Springs compound

Falun Gong is a spiritual movement founded in China in 1992 by Li Hongzhi. The practice blends elements of Buddhism with the traditional Chinese discipline of qigong, a practice combining controlled breathing, meditation and slow physical movement.

Li's book Zhuan Falun is the central text of the movement and his teachings have attracted followers among the Chinese diaspora in the US as well as in South Korea, Hong Kong, Australia and France.

After the movement was banned in China in 1999, Li settled in the United States. Shen Yun was later founded there as part of a broader network of Falun Gong cultural and media projects.

Many of the dancers train at the Fei Tian Academy, based at Dragon Springs, a 172-hectare complex an hour and a half outside New York City.

The secluded site includes pagodas inspired by China’s Tang dynasty and Buddhist temples as well as modern buildings. Its website says the compound combines “the natural beauty of New York State with Chinese architecture”.

Dancer Li Zhuxing arrived there in 2008 at the age of 13 to begin training. “There on the mountain we lived cut off from the world, like in a bubble,” Li told RFI.

Shen Yun: Fighting Communism - and making a stack on the side

Students lived under strict rules. Boys and girls were separated, internet access was restricted and training sessions were intense.

Students were also required to hand over their passports to the administration, which the organisation claims is common practice at many private schools in the United States.

Yu Chao, a former Falun Gong member who now describes himself as a whistleblower, said the organisation restricted children’s contact with the outside world.

“Shen Yun trapped these children in a real estate complex, limiting their access to the world both physically and in terms of information,” he said.

Yu spent 10 years in Chinese prisons because of his involvement with Falun Gong, whose members have long faced persecution in China. Now a YouTuber, he said he receives many messages with testimonies about life inside Dragon Springs.

For believers, however, the complex represents the centre of the community.

“For the faithful it’s paradise, the pinnacle of the community,” said Rob Gray, who practised Falun Gong for 13 years before leaving the movement in 2024.

Having a child perform with Shen Yun is seen by Falun Gong followers as a major achievement because it offers the possibility of meeting the movement’s founder, Li Hongzhi.

“We saw him once or twice a week,” said former student Li. “When he entered the room everyone stopped what they were doing. We believed we were in the presence of a supreme divine being.”

Concerns over medical care

Daily life at the academy followed a strict routine of studying Falun Gong texts, practising meditation exercises, dance training, classes and meals.

“It was very hard. We constantly pushed our limits,” Li said, adding that many students did not initially view the physical strain as abuse. “Because of the brainwashing we went through, we saw suffering as something positive that could eliminate our karmic debt.”

Other former dancers and visitors to Dragon Springs described a similar mindset.

“It was so deeply ingrained in us to reject Western medicine that our fragile minds told us we couldn’t go to the hospital,” one former dancer told RFI. “It would disappoint Master Li. It would be a sin.”

Similar allegations have surfaced in other investigations. In August 2024, The New York Times reported accounts from former Shen Yun performers describing intense training schedules, pressure to keep performing while injured and being discouraged from seeking medical care.

Several lawsuits filed since then have repeated accusations of forced labour involving minors.

RFI’s investigation, based on interviews with former dancers and followers of the Falun Gong movement behind the show, uncovered similar claims about life inside the organisation.

Shen Yun rejects accusations that it confined performers or restricted their communication.

The company provided a statement from its troupe doctor, Damon Noto, who said claims that medical treatment was discouraged or refused do not match what he has personally observed or what appears in his medical records.

Shen Yun also published a petition signed by 1,550 current or former performers describing the allegations as “gross distortions and false stories about our work, our faith and our way of life”.

Li Hongzhi’s teachings remain unclear on the question of medical treatment.

“Refusal of treatment is extremely common in the community. Some senior members have died because of it,” Yu Chao said.

Other former followers described similar beliefs within the movement.

“Li Hongzhi says with incredible confidence that only he can heal,” Gray added.

Were human organs stolen in 20-year conflict between Beijing and Falun Gong?

Rise of the Falun Gong

At its height, Falun Gong said it had 70 million followers, although the exact number is difficult to verify.

In April 1999, tens of thousands of them gathered near Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing. At the time, Falun Gong claimed tens of millions of adherents across China, including members of the Communist Party itself.

Alarmed by the movement’s growing influence, the authorities later used the demonstration as justification to ban it. Its followers have faced persecution ever since.

Opposition to the Communist Party remains central to the movement’s message. That theme also runs through Shen Yun performances, which present a vision of China before communist rule and portray the party as an oppressive force.

“The fundamental belief of Falun Gong is that Li Hongzhi is not simply God but the Buddha Lord of all gods,” Gray said.

“He came to Earth to carry out what he calls the rectification by the Fa,” he said, describing it as the renewal of Earth and every element of the cosmos.

For Shen Yun dancers, that belief shapes their role.

“Our entire existence was dedicated to this mission – saving sentient beings,” Li Zhuxing said. “The message for us as children was that the apocalypse was coming.”

Tiananmen Square at 35: top Chinese dissident looks back
Total devotion

Some followers first encounter Falun Gong through free meditation sessions offered at practice sites. Over time many devote most of their time to the movement’s projects.

“People working on Falun Gong projects feel it is part of their divine mission,” Smithies said. “They devote 10, 12, 14 or even 16 hours a day, as much as they can.”

During certain periods he said he slept between three and five and a half hours a night.

The current number of Falun Gong followers worldwide remains hard to determine. The movement has claimed it has between 7 million and 20 million practitioners.

Followers also contribute to the organisation’s economic activities. These include the newspaper Epoch Times, which reported $126 million in revenue in 2024, New Tang Dynasty Television and Shen Yun itself, which reported $290 million in assets the same year.

“Li Hongzhi built an empire thanks to free labour,” Smithies added. A former executive at Epoch Times, he said the people who sell tickets for the show in shopping centres receive no pay.

Believers and dancers also help with practical tasks around performances.

“Once the show is over, the Shen Yun performers turn into an army,” Gray explained. “Everyone has an assigned role to pack up and clear the venue.”

Wealth and leadership

Despite the criticism, the show’s popularity and financial success are widely recognised.

Organisations linked to Falun Gong, all registered as non-profit groups, have accumulated considerable resources.

Shen Yun’s lawyer in France, Paul Mallet, rejected accusations that Li Hongzhi personally benefits from the organisation’s wealth.

“Li Hongzhi lives only from the royalties of his books,” Mallet said.

However, former followers have questioned his lifestyle. “His family loves luxury – jewellery, French perfumes, cars,” Yu Chao said – claims that are difficult to verify.

“If he truly preaches detachment from everything earthly – fame, fortune, wealth – then he should prove it,” Li Zhuxing said.

In Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi writes that what matters is not wealth itself but whether followers can detach from it.

“What matters is not whether you hold a high position or have great wealth, but whether you can abandon that attachment,” the book states.

“These are phrases open to interpretation but far from what Li says in private or how he behaves,” Gray said. “He lives like a king in his complex while followers sacrifice their lives, accumulate debts and live under constant pressure.”

This story was adapted from the original version in French by Nicolas Rocca.