THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

Life After Mencho: A Shifting Landscape Of Organized Crime In Mexico – Analysis

Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (aka “el Mencho”). Image: Grok

March 4, 2026 
Geopolitical Monitor
By Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

As a phenomenon whose behavior is driven by long-range impersonal forces rather than whimsical vicissitudes, the evolution of organized crime in Mexico has proved to be quite dynamic and ductile. The latest progression of this fast-paced trajectory is the Mexican military operation in which Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (aka “el Mencho”), nominal leader of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG), was killed. As retaliation, his henchmen targeted private businesses, state-owned banks and security personnel. Cartel hitmen also disrupted transit through roadblocks in various highways, urban centers, rural communities and tourist spots across Mexico. Everyday economic cycles and recreational activities came to a halt in nearly half of the country, even in regions far away from the epicenter of these events.

This episode and its immediate aftermath have gone viral on a global scale through both mainstream channels and social media. As the dust is settling after the initial backlash wave, an atmosphere of tense calm prevails, at least for the time being, but the ghost of “el Mencho” is now haunting Mexico. To keep things in perspective, this man was no ordinary street thug. While his centrality had diminished due to ailing health, he had become Mexico’s most powerful and ruthless criminal warlord. Under his leadership, the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG) had risen —especially after the recent partition of the Sinaloa Cartel— as one of the world’s largest criminal empires. For the Mexican state, this operation represents a Zeitenwende which, after a hiatus of suspicious unresponsiveness, highlights both the material ability and the political will to engage nonstate antagonists, even if this confrontation comes with meaningful risks and costs. Once again, the gloves are off.
Profile of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel

The New Generation Jalisco Cartel was born as an offshoot of cells once tied to the Sinaloa Cartel, which later absorbed both minor regional groups from Western Mexico and paramilitary squads established to exterminate the so-called “Knights Templar.” These remnants joined forces to transform a second-rate subnational nonstate actor into a major criminal multinational empire with branches in most of Mexico, the US, Latin America, Europe, Asia, and even Africa.

The cartel’s governance model is a hybrid that integrates corporate and paramilitary components. Not unlike the diversification of the Japanese keiretsu, the CJNG was involved in various profitable operations, including drug trafficking (especially fentanyl), clandestine mining of industrial and precious metals, extortion rackets, cybercrime, fuel contraband, human trafficking, the control of cash crops, and the systematic predation of all sorts of businesses, as well as money laundering schemes. This spatial and economic expansion was facilitated by a strategy which enabled the integration of smaller surrogates. Therefore, rather than a vertical hierarchical pyramid, the CJNG is semi-decentralized network or constellation of criminal satrapies. This confederation has been strengthened through mergers, contractual partnerships and franchises. On the other hand, the CJNG has achieved substantive firepower, underpinned by the acquisition of assault rifles, RPGs, landmines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-aircraft guns, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In the hands of assassins trained by military defectors and foreign mercenaries with experience in overseas warzones such as Colombia and Ukraine, these weapons have been wielded to orchestrate attacks against the Mexican armed forces, law enforcement, rival groups, and even unarmed civilians. The cartel is also notorious for embracing technological innovations such as AI, cryptocurrencies, and social media platforms.


Although it exists primarily as a money-making machine, this organization has followed an operational playbook that borrows the asymmetric tactics of nonstate militias such as terrorists, separatists, and insurgents. In this particular arena, the CJNG shares more common denominators with the Colombian FARC, Hezbollah, Blackwater, the Wagner Group and African nonstate militias than with old-school Italian mafias, Chinese triads or the Japanese Yakuza. Through the proliferation of armed violence and psychological warfare, the growth of this group has weakened the ability of the Mexican state to ensure the monopoly of force and the full-fledged control of the country’s territorial hinterland. Based on a zero-sum logic, such development represents a threat for both national security and the Westphalian sovereignty of Mexico. Finally, the hitherto unchecked metastasis of this problem would not have been possible without the organic complicity of elite political and economic enablers. As is known, the growth of organized crime necessarily requires the secretive collaboration of “friends in high places.”
Domestic Fallout from El Mencho’s Death

The fate of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel is unclear because the governance structure of organized crime is a fertile ground for a chronic backstabbing disorder. Considering existing precedents, strategic foresight suggests that four scenarios can be envisaged: 1) a smooth consensual succession, 2) a hostile takeover, 3) a bitter power struggle followed by violent balkanization or 4) a gradual disintegration.


What is certain is that the beheading of a large-scale criminal syndicate does not mean that the metaphorical hydra has been dismantled. After all, the removal of a CEO does not mean that the company he used to run has been extinguished. In the short term, the so-called “kingpin strategy” is useful to destabilize criminal networks and to restore deterrence through the demarcation of red lines. However, the Mexican state can leverage this turning point to undermine the cartel’s hidden financial infrastructure, introduce stricter customs enforcement mechanisms and go after the group’s “fellow travelers.”

In the long run, these measures could further the decline and fall of this particular criminal enterprise. Nonetheless, as serious security professionals know, the complete structural eradication of organized crime is unlikely because there are powerful incentives that guarantee the survival of this underworld ecosystem. In the case of Mexico, these include the gravitational pull of market forces, a dispersed geographical configuration, and a flourishing cultural industry that promotes the aspirational attractiveness of the narco lifestyle for young men and women through narratives, songs, fashion, Netflix productions, Instagram influencers, and even semi-religious rituals.

Yet the dismemberment of large organizations could de facto reshuffle the balance of power in a manner that favors the authority of the Mexican government. In the long run, the degradation and fragmentation of large criminal consortiums would make the problem more manageable through state-sanctioned coercion, containment strategies, backchannel negotiations, and informal agreements for the ordered redistribution of spheres of influence. The point is that the state can turn the tables with the ability to permanently keep in check these partially de-fanged criminal rings. Although kosher solutions (i.e. the rule of law, better policing, community crime prevention) are preferable in principle, the testament of history and Machiavellian wisdom teach that an expedient and effective pacification requires unsavory decisions. Bad must begin so that worse remains behind.

For the Mexican government, the elimination of “el Mencho” is a game-changing political triumph. This milestone represents a “clean break” from the puzzling policy of “hugs, not bullets,” followed by President Sheinbaum’s predecessor. Although the precise details remain obscure, the rationale behind the previous approach has been attributed to neglect, détente, and even transactional Faustian pacts. The liquidation of this “high-value target” is also helpful to restore the socio-political legitimacy and professional reputation of the country’s military and civilian security services.


Nevertheless, meaningful risks persist, including the prospect of asymmetric retaliatory attacks calculated to sabotage governance, public order, political stability, and economic exchanges. Military headquarters, senior policymakers, governmental facilities, foreign interests, corporate nerve centers, tourist attractions, symbolic sites, power plants, crowded entertainment venues and infrastructure projects could be targeted. The upcoming organization of three matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Mexican cities opens windows of opportunity for such malicious purposes. The materialization of these hypothetical threats would lead to the loss of political capital, diplomatic credibility, economic benefits and “soft power.”

For an organization like the CJNG, the narco-terrorist attacks launched by Pablo Escobar against Colombian government officials and civilians are perhaps precedents worth replicating, especially considering its state-of-the-art expertise in kamikaze drones and targeted assassinations. In addition, the high-profile political associates of this cartel, who are being gradually sidelined by the current Mexican government, also have incentives to seek revenge. Readiness is therefore a major challenge for Mexican intelligence services, armed forces and law enforcement. On the other hand, the removal of a senior drug lord is expected to facilitate the progress of trade negotiations and the renewal of the North American geoeconomic bloc as a strong trilateral partnership conditionally undergirded by the securitization of strategic industries, supply chains, and critical minerals. For Mexican economic statecraft, access to the US consumer market as an engine of dynamism, manufacturing productiveness, industrial policies, technology transfers, and strategic-grade “nearshoring” investments remains an imperative.
International Dimension

Based on the new prescriptive strategic guidelines for national security and defense presented by the second Trump administration, the US geopolitical perimeter in the American hemisphere is now regarded in DC as a major priority. This redefinition is not just simply a new theoretical innovation masterminded by the US strategic community. Such perception is reflected in the recent capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, the attempt to control Greenland and a hawkish foreign policy approach towards pivotal regional states with varying profiles, such as Panama, Colombia, Cuba and even Canada.

This strategic conception diagnoses that, in contemporary security environments (shaped by complex interdependence), resurgent interstate geopolitical tensions and emerging vectors of nonstate threats are increasingly entwined. In this view, Mexico is well positioned as a scalable bridge of interconnectedness through which problematic flows —synthetic opioids, illegal immigrants, triangulated Chinese goods, agents of foreign powers or nonstate actors— are infiltrating the US for hostile purposes. As US thinkers like Samuel Huntington and George Friedman have argued, the US and Mexico will likely collide due to diverging demographic and territorial interests. From this perspective, although a bit of chaos in Mexico is tolerable, a black hole of anarchy in a neighboring state with so many overlapping ties to the US is unacceptable. Washington cannot afford to let Mexico become a failed state because it fears the effects of potentially contagious spillovers, power voids and harmful externalities.

This is the context in which the official reclassification of fentanyl as a “weapon of mass destruction” and of Mexican criminal syndicates as “foreign terrorist organizations” must be understood. Under intermittent US diplomatic pressure and threats of both unilateral military interventions and coercive tariffs, the Mexican government has set aside ideological preferences and embraced a policy that blends strategic acquiescence, bilateral security collaboration, and appeasement. Out of pragmatism, the days in which there was little cooperation in the fields of defense, security, and intelligence are behind. Symbolically, the CJNG leader’s head on a silver platter is a better “sacrificial offering” than the meta-legal rendition of second-rate drug lords and has-beens. This accomplishment of this operation performatively telegraphs the US security establishment that Mexico is willing to do what is needed to restore its bona fide credentials as a reliable security partner. Furthermore, as an operational success comparable to the targeted assassinations of both Osama bin Laden or IRGC General Qassem Soleimani, the neutralization of the most wanted Mexican drug lord is a boost for the political ambitions of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. As the architects of the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, these senior GOP figures can leverage the incremental success of this new hemispheric security agenda to further their political projects.


Nevertheless, triumphalism on both sides of the border may be premature because things can get worse before they get any better. Mexican criminal organizations have proved to be exceedingly resilient. The downfall of major syndicates is usually followed by the rise of direct or indirect heirs, especially in faraway peripheral regions with a prohibitive topology. Moreover, as great powers scramble to advance their preferred versions of world order, the resulting security competition brings yet another layer of volatility and even encourages the emergence of wild cards. For example, if a regime change in Cuba occurs via a messy collapse rather than through a controlled demolition or a Richelovian deal, former regime personnel —including military and intelligence officers— may be recruited by Mexican criminal groups. Their experience with grey-zone tactics and irregular conflict in the operational theatres of contested flashpoints across the Global South (hardly transferable to legitimate business) makes them highly attractive. Aside from the self-evident economic benefits of choosing a lucrative workstream that handsomely rewards their tradecraft, there is also an incentive to join forces against the US as a common enemy.

In the worst-case scenario, such shadow symbiosis has the potential to generate a FARC-like hybrid threat in which the distinction between organized crime businesses and militant “anti-imperialist” struggle is blurred. With the firepower and cash of Mexican criminal syndicates and the Cubans’ expertise in all sorts of covert shenanigans, involvement in shady businesses and clandestine international connections, this nonstate “red menace” would be a force to be reckoned with.

For the most hardline and ideologically charged factions of the ruling coalition, increasingly alienated by the “impure” pragmatism of the Mexican head of state and the alignment of her administration to Washington’s orbit, the rise of this golem would be a good opportunity for revanchism. For extra-regional great powers interested in challenging the Americans, this revolutionary joint venture would mean a chance to fuel agitation in the most relevant state for US homeland security. This criminal mutation, under the theatrical facade of “popular resistance”, would deepen Mexico’s security crisis with a counterinsurgency nightmare. It is in Mexico’s best interest that the State Department and the upper echelons of the Cuban military apparatus manage to achieve a deal that ensures hemispheric security and regional stability.

This article was published by the Geopolitical Monitor.com

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