March 13, 2026
By Savas Savidis
When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 and toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, the military campaign lasted only a few weeks. The rapid collapse of the Iraqi state governed by Saddam created an enduring image of how quickly authoritarian systems can fall once external pressure is applied.
The Iranian regime, on the other hand, which has existed in its current form since 1979, continues to exist in 2026. However, in this year, the survival of the Iranian system is at stake. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke of regime change being pursued in Iran. In the American-Israeli war since February 28, both the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other key figures such as the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Pakpour, were killed. Other notable victims included a senior security advisor to the Ayatollah, Ali Shamkhani, and Defense Minister Asis Nassirsadeh. Even a ground invasion is reportedly being considered, according to U.S. President Trump.
Meanwhile, voices in the U.S. have drawn parallels to the Iraq war. Ted Cruz, Senator from Texas, told CNBC that it would take “a few weeks” to overthrow the Iranian regime. The Iraq war did indeed proceed quickly, but in Iran, doubts are warranted. The military analyses presented in the media over the past weeks are not the subject of this analysis. Instead, this analysis aims to show why Iran, despite numerous short-term crises – such as the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, the mass protests of 2009, or the women’s demonstrations of 2022 – has maintained remarkably high regime stability until today. It also explains why the current U.S.-Israeli war is unlikely to bring about a rapid regime collapse. The Iranian regime is unlikely to collapse within weeks as Saddam’s regime did in 2003.
Gerschewski’s Three-Pillar Model
To explain this, the article compares Iran’s regime with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
For the operationalization of regime stability in both countries, the theoretical three-pillar model of Johannes Gerschewski (2013) will be used. The political scientist argues that authoritarian regimes secure their hold on power through three pillars: legitimacy, co-optation, and repression. All three pillars complement each other and are important for maintaining existing structures. Gerschewski argues that authoritarian regimes require not only repression but also a degree of societal acceptance. He describes legitimacy, based on Max Weber’s definition, as “(…) the ‘belief in legitimacy’ in the validity of the political order by those subject to rule (…)”.
The second pillar, co-optation, refers to other relevant state actors beyond the ruling elite. These can be, as Gerschewski notes, military or economic elites of the country. These actors must be strategically integrated into political negotiation processes institutionally and economically, as they possess resources and could pose a threat to the existing regime.
Repression, the most well-known and visible form of authoritarianism, refers to the state suppression of political opponents or even the entire population. This pillar can become particularly prominent when the other two pillars falter. Gerschewski distinguishes in his model between subtle and restrictive forms of repression. The use of armed force, as in Iran during the mass demonstrations in December 2025 and January 2026, is an example of the harsher pillar of repression. According to the model, internet shutdowns in response to protests in Iran can be considered a soft form of repression.
The next step involves a brief comparison between the regimes in Iran and Iraq.
Saddam’s Iraq
Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq from 1979 until his overthrow in 2003. He came to power through a coup. The country’s dominant party, the Ba’th Party, was, alongside the military and the bureaucracy, one of the three major institutions of the country. However, since 1968, when the party came to power, it was the most important and influential. Saddam Hussein’s pillars of power shifted over the years increasingly from legitimacy toward repression and co-optation.
At the beginning of his first term as president in the 1980s, he deliberately relied on a mixture of socio-economic welfare programs and the construction of a personality cult to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime, especially during wartime with Iran. This included, as Divya Malhotra writes: “Industrial modernization, increased access to education, better infrastructure and improvement in health facilities.” Through this, he gained the support of many people in the country. At the same time, the construction of statues and the omnipresence of Saddam in public life created a fusion of personal and national identity. Ba’th nationalism, originally pan-Arab in nature, transformed into an exclusively Iraqi nationalism. The legitimacy of the regime also grew through the Iran-Iraq war, initiated by Saddam. Saddam could present himself to the population as the defender of the nation against a Persian threat. He drew historical reference to the struggle between Arab Muslims and Persian forces in the 7th century and saw his own war against the Islamic Republic as a continuation of this struggle.
This changed, however, when the war ended in 1988 with a ceasefire. The population’s belief in the strength of the regime consequently suffered, especially in the 1990s. This was also due to external stress factors such as UN sanctions, which, according to studies, cost hundreds of thousands of Iraqis their lives.
Co-optation in Saddam’s regime was based primarily on the principle of neo-tribalism. After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the regime secured the loyalty of local tribal leaders (Shaykhs) to maintain its own power base and prevent uprisings. By appointing followers from his own al-Bu Nasir tribe (Tikrit) to key positions in the military and security apparatus, he strengthened the regime. Many soldiers of the Republican Guard came from Saddam’s home region Tikrit, which also served his own protection. Saddam tied members to himself and his regime through privileges such as new cars. The Ba’th Party, as the central institution of the country, was also used as an element of co-optation. The party sought to gain large segments of the population as members, with women playing an important role. Although they lacked practical decision-making power, this way participants felt part of the state and regime.
Repression in Saddam’s regime increased particularly in the 1990s. This pillar was mainly based on the feared civilian intelligence service Mukhabarat, led by his half-brother. It ensured political and violent suppression of opponents and regime adversaries. The military, especially the Republican Guard, as well as the paramilitary militia Saddam Fedajin, were also key elements of repression. These forces were deployed to crush uprisings such as the 1991 Shiite revolt in southern Iraq, as well as Kurdish insurgencies in the north.
While the Saddam regime ultimately fell to the U.S. invasion in 2003, maintaining the system would have become increasingly difficult even without that war. As mentioned at the beginning, in the 1990s, increased reliance on the pillar of repression emerged from the strengthening of legitimacy and co-optation. This was partly due to external stress factors, such as the failed invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the resulting UN sanctions. These brought the country’s economy into serious difficulties. However, internal developments in the regime – like the sectarian divisions with Shiites – also caused increasing problems. The Anfal operation in northern Iraq, in which tens of thousands of citizens – mostly Kurds – were killed, including through use of chemical weapons, revived sectarian tensions in the country. Saddam’s plan to unite the Sunni population behind him failed as he alienated other groups in the country. Iraq’s population consisted largely of a Shiite majority ruled by a Sunni-dominated political elite under Saddam. Saddam’s Arabization policy divided the country and continues to create tensions in the multi-sectarian political system.
Saddam’s governance model relied – especially toward the end – on a personality cult, which was based on the co-optation of loyal tribes and families as well as repressive state power. The weakness of the system was the declining legitimacy of the regime over years due to external and internal factors. This was linked to a personal fixation on Saddam Hussein as the leading figure of the model. As Gerschewski’s model shows, a regime loses its binding power and thus legitimacy when – like in Iraq – Saddam, as a symbol of national strength and unity, no longer enjoys credibility. The system and the party of the regime were highly dependent on one person, making them very vulnerable to internal and external weakening.
Institutionalized Stability in Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran has existed since 1979. With the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the monarchy was replaced by a theocratic-presidential system. In this system, the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) makes all important decisions. In addition to political power – he commands the country’s armed forces and can dismiss the president – he is also the religious leader of all Shia believers in the country. Unlike Saddam’s Iraq, Iran does not have only one party to vote for, but formally offers the option of multiple candidates. This is evident, for example, in the election of the president every four years or the selection of parliament. The elections, however, are not fair, and candidates are vetted for loyalty to the religious-political ruling system before being allowed to run.
The legitimacy of the Iranian regime overlaps with Saddam’s rule in some respects, but only minimally.
Like Saddam, the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1980s -particularly due to the Iran-Iraq war – relied on nationalism. He referred to the war against Iraq as the “Holy Defense” (Defa-e Moqadas) and promoted the image of a homogeneous unity through the fusion of nation and religion. The collective identity that the young Islamic Republic consolidated also acted domestically as a bulwark against regime opponents. In this way, Khomeini was able to position the Mullah regime as the savior of Shi’ism. Unlike Saddam’s nationalism, the regime in Tehran derives its claim to power from religion. Moreover, the Iranian regime was able to portray itself, in contrast to the overthrown monarchy of the Shah and the colonial history of the Middle East, as a fighter against Western imperialism.
The personality cult is also omnipresent in Iran – photos of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Ali Khamenei hang everywhere – but the legitimacy of the Iranian system is broader, both ideologically and institutionally.
When the U.S. and Israel killed regime chief Ali Khamenei in the war at the end of February 2026, the system did not collapse, as some observers had predicted. This is because Iran’s regime stability – even despite formal concentration of power – is not dependent on a single personality. This is a key difference from Iraq, where the overthrow of Saddam triggered a de facto collapse of the regime.
While the Iranian regime initially still relied heavily on the popularity of Revolutionary Leader Ruhollah Khomeini – in a 1979 referendum, 98 percent voted for the establishment of the Islamic Republic – over the years it shifted toward repressive measures.
The co-optation pillar in Iran primarily consists of religious, economic, and security elites. While Saddam relied on neo-tribalism and tribal networks, the Iranian regime co-opts economic elites, including networks often referred to as Aghazadeh – the politically connected families of senior clerics and officials who benefit from privileged access to economic resources. Clerical elites are incorporated into the system through influential positions within the state’s religious and political institutions, such as the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. In this way, religious elites are tied to the regime both ideologically and materially, reinforcing loyalty through economic privileges. Statistical data on the political elite of the Islamic Republic indicate that more than half of Iran’s presidents and parliamentary speakers have been clerics, highlighting the central role of religious authorities in the country’s key governing institutions.
Another central power factor, for many observers even the central one in today’s regime, is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which combines military power with vast economic influence. According to media estimates, they currently control about half of the country’s economy, including ports, agriculture, and infrastructure (oil). Originally, revolutionary leader Khomeini founded the Guard to protect himself, like Saddam in Iraq, against disloyal military forces. Today, in 2026, the elite force is considered by experts to be better armed and funded than the regular army (Artesh). Among other things, they control the ballistic missile program, a central element of the regime’s defense. While the IRGC serves as a central pillar of the regime’s power, its vast autonomy and economic influence also make it a potential rival to the civilian leadership. The Mullah regime, while dependent on the Guard – both defensively and economically – can also be seen in reverse: the Guard depends on the status quo of the theocratic system and would lose its privileges in state and economy in the event of a regime collapse.
The repression pillar, which served as the backbone of Saddam’s power, has also grown in Iran over the past decades. It can first be noted that the suppression of opponents and regime adversaries is mainly carried out by two actors: the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) and the Basij militia. Here, a key parallel to Saddam’s regime emerges. He also relied on a Republican Guard and a Special Republican Guard (SRG) founded in the 1990s for his protection. The similarity between the Pasdaran and Basij in Iran and the Guards in Iraq lies primarily in unconditional ideological loyalty and dependence on the existing regime.
The Revolutionary Guards have repeatedly been deployed to suppress large protest movements. The Basij militia, on the other hand, recruits volunteers and is organized paramilitarily. For example, it monitors whether women comply with the public hijab requirement. Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), the influence of the Revolutionary Guards continued to grow. The suppression of the Green Movement in 2009, protesting election fraud, as well as the violent response to the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests across the country in 2022 (mainly led by women), led to increasing repression escalation. In the mass demonstrations of December 2025 and January 2026, again triggered by the economic crisis, thousands of people were reportedly killed violently, suppressed again by the power apparatus.
Since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, the regime has lost significant legitimacy, which can be explained using Gerschewski’s three-pillar model: the legitimacy of a regime depends on performance and “performative binding force.” Due to corruption in the state sector, where ideological loyalty rather than competence is rewarded, and international economic sanctions, the regime loses legitimacy. Increasing repression attempts to compensate for this loyalty deficit, and the co-optation pillar also appears largely intact, but it remains uncertain how long violence and suppression can maintain the existing system of rule.
From the regime’s perspective, Iran has a major advantage over Iraq: sectarian fault lines are not as pronounced, as approximately 90 percent of Iranians adhere to the Shia faith.
Unlike Saddam’s highly personalist regime, the Islamic Republic was built as a system that can absorb leadership losses without collapsing.
What distinguishes Iran from Saddam’s Iraq is not the absence of repression, but the presence of institutions that bind elites to the regime and regulate succession.
This analysis shows that the religious Mullah regime in Iran is not comparable to the personalist Saddam system in Iraq. According to research (Barbara Geddes, Beatriz Magaloni), personalist systems are more vulnerable to instability during leadership transitions. Since Saddam’s political authority was primarily legitimized through his personality cult, his regime would have faced problems even without the U.S. war upon his death. The elite cohesion that Gerschewski describes would not have existed, and an open power struggle for his position could have occurred.
In Iran, by contrast, a more institutionalized system exists. The legitimacy of the regime is not dependent on a single person. Succession mechanisms in case of need are clearer and bureaucratized, as demonstrated after the deaths of the two Ayatollahs in 1989 and 2026. Even during ongoing hostilities in February 2026 against the U.S./Israel, the regime succeeded in installing Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader. In one respect, Ted Cruz is correct: “Iran is not Iraq.”
Savas Savidis
Savas Savidis holds a Bachelor's degree in Social Sciences from the University of Augsburg and a Master's degree in Political Science from the University of Vienna. Currently, he works as a freelance journalist in Germany. His research interests include migration & integration studies, diaspora research and authoritarianism & regime stability.
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