Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Sunday, October 21, 2007

Battleship Potemkin

A new restored version of the famous Russian film Battleship Potemkin by Sergei Eisenstein has been released and will be playing on Turner Classic Movies, TONIGHT for those of you who have either Star Choice of Bell Satellite TV.

If you have never seen this revolutionary movie it is not only revolutionary for it's content but for its approach to cinema. It was the first Docu-Drama ever made, covering the Russian Revolutionary uprising of 1905.

1905 was the year the 2oth Century came into being and it was the birth of modernism which would result in WWI and the Bolshevik Revolution.

Independent filmmakers, restricted to limited exhibition outlets in a world of media conglomeration, can take heart from the fact that Battleship Potemkin, one of the most renowned films in the history of cinema and containing perhaps the best known sequence in the medium's entire history, was initially seen only by small audiences of film society aficionados and trade unionists. In this sense, it represents one of the most successful instances of niche marketing the world has ever seen.

The stories of its circulation are almost as mythical as its subject matter: it was banned as subversive in England and its circulation was highly restricted in the US, even before the implementation of the Hays Code. In the US, it was seen by small groups of filmmakers and critics, and in one enticing account of a screening in the New York apartment of Gloria Swanson, it was projected onto one of Gloria's satin sheets, when the absence of an available screen threatened to disappoint the eager but select audience.

At such a screening, David O. Selznick saw the film and wrote with great enthusiasm to his boss at MGM that a print should be obtained because it would be "very advantageous to have the organisation view it in the same way that a group of artists might study a Rubens or a Raphael". It was, he thought, "unquestionably one of the greatest motion pictures ever made" (this in 1926!) and the firm "might well consider securing the man responsible for it".

Battleship Potemkin is the film which brought Eisenstein, always a citizen of the world, to world attention. This fame both protected him - up to a point - and brought him to the constant attention of the authorities, involving him in a cat and mouse game for his entire professional life.

Although it has become an orthodoxy in the West to emphasise the repressive conditions under which artists, writers and filmmakers worked in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, it is worth remembering that Eisenstein's experiences in the West were equally, if not more, frustrating creatively. Unfruitful episodes in Hollywood & Mexico left Eisenstein back in the Soviet Union with a nervous breakdown and a damaged reputation.

http://www.adliterate.com/archives/potemkin.jpg


Battleship Potemkin overcomes its ideological constraints and uses its abstract form to produce at least one scene of unquestionable power. Sergei Eisenstein’s own comparison of his style to a "kino-fist" is an apt one; the film assaults the viewer’s sensibilities with forceful melodrama and rhythmic editing. Many scenes are calculated to elicit specific responses and, in fact, succeed, but this creates a certain feeling of manipulation because of the film’s overt polemic. Obviously, political concerns of a now defunct nation from over seventy years ago are not going to hold up well. The fact that the film remains effective on some levels is impressive and testifies to Eisenstein’s influential ideas about cinema. His principles of montage were vital to the development of film language and to cinema’s separation from other art forms into its own realm. A film based largely on these editing principles sacrifices some narrative concerns and tends to distance the viewer if not continuously providing ‘attractions’ or ‘stimuli’. Despite claims mentioned by some critics about the film’s perfect and concise example of film structure, Potemkin can be an uneven viewing experience.

Eisenstein freely admitted the influence of D.W. Griffith’s movies, particularly Intolerance, in his work and in the development of Soviet montage. It is not difficult to see the links between the rapid cutting in that film’s conclusion to the kinetic editing of Potemkin. For example, the numerous cuts in the Odessa steps sequence build the individual moments of terror into an almost unbearable emotional climax. Of course, Eisenstein expanded greatly on montage theory to not only build rhythm or suspense but to form intellectual concepts and associations. The dynamic editing of three lion statues to show the awakening of anger and rebellion is a simple but memorable instance of this metaphorical juxtaposition. Another apparent influence from Griffith would be the melodramatic elements that facilitate the film’s political goals. The tsarist forces are completely evil, and sympathy is evoked for the noble revolutionaries and their supporters; issues and characters are simplified for maximum emotional impact. The officers on the ship are given titles such as, roughly, "I’ll shoot them down like dogs!" when dealing with the disobedient sailors. All of the focused victims of the shocking violence on the Odessa steps are women or children. The idea of typage, casting often non-professional actors based on their physical resemblance to a character type, allows the film to forgo character development and individuality. The ship’s priest looks like a prophet from the pages of the Old Testament transplanted into the 20th Century. Additionally, the absence of a main character, except that of the collective Russian people, corresponds to the Marxist principles of the film; one of the only possible protagonists, Vakulinchuk, dies early in the film for the revolutionary cause. This aspect also is reminiscent of Intolerance’s undermining of audience identification through its large number of characters and shifting focus.

Historical Narrative in The Battleship Potemkin

"What are a few maggots?" asks Richard Hough in his book, The Potemkin Mutiny. He answers with the powerful story of the 1905 mutiny of the sailors of the Potemkin in their struggle against the repressive officers of the Russian Imperial Navy. In 1925, the Soviet government commissioned Sergei Eisenstein to direct a film commemorating the events of the 1905 revolution. Due to time constraints, he had to limit his film to just the Potemkin mutiny. His depiction of these events, in his film The Battleship Potemkin, has many significant differences with the historian's perspective that Hough offers in his book. Contrary to the belief of many modern critics, the actual historical events and details are impossible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt, but "there is no dispute on the main events, and their sequence." However, although Hough and Eisenstein differ, they both offer legitimate perspectives. Even if the events are agreed upon, "one and the same event may be incorporated in a work...in different guises: in the form of a dispassionate statement or in that of a pathetic hymn." Eisenstein is creating a narrative film, and Hough purports to write a history, but both are stories of the event with an intended audience and an intended effect. The small differences between the two perspectives offered by Hough and Eisenstein is significant and colors what the audience thinks of the mutiny and how they identify with it.


The new release of the DVD will be on Tuesday at stores like HMV. If you can't get it locally try Amazon.

No customer reviews yet. Be the first.
List Price: CDN$ 34.95
Price: CDN$ 24.47 & eligible for FREE Super Saver Shipping on orders over CDN$ 39. Details
You Save: CDN$ 10.48 (30%)

Pre-order Price Guarantee

Availability: This title will be released on October 23, 2007. Pre-order now! Ships from and sold by Amazon.ca. Gift-wrap available.



Sunday, October 21,2007 12:00 AM

The Battleship Potemkin
TCM is pleased to present the U.S. broadcast premiere of the 2005 restoration of Sergei Eisenstein’s The Battleship Potemkin (1925), accompanied by a new arrangement of Edmund Meisel’s orchestral score, which Eisenstein himself authorized for the film’s Berlin premiere in 1926. This same version will be released on DVD by Kino in a 2-disc special edition.

The Battleship Potemkin was recognized from the start as a landmark work both for its innovative use of montage and for its sheer power as propaganda. In particular, the “Odessa steps” sequence is arguably the single most famous and widely quoted passage in the history of film. But in a sense The Battleship Potemkin has been the victim of its own effectiveness. Reissued over the years in various censored and reedited versions, Eisenstein’s great vision has not been seen for several decades in anything like what the director likely intended. This new version, overseen by the film archivist and historian Enno Patalas, attempts to reconstruct, as closely as possible, the film as it was presented in Moscow during its initial release.

THE FILM AND ITS CONTEXT

The Soviets were inordinately fond of jubilees, so it was only fitting that for his second feature film Sergei Eisenstein would be commissioned to direct a multi-episode series marking the twentieth anniversary of the 1905 revolution in Russia. The first episode was originally intended to focus mainly on the strike that took place in St. Petersburg in October 1905, with the June 1905 mutiny aboard the battleship Potemkin to serve as a prologue. However, bad weather and logistical difficulties compelled Eisenstein and his crew to relocate to Odessa, and the Potemkin mutiny expanded into a full-fledged feature in its own right. (See Richard Taylor’s meticulously researched book The Battleship Potemkin: The Film Companion (2000) for further information on the film’s production history and critical reception.)

While Eisenstein’s debut feature Strike (1924) still dazzles through its sheer stylistic daring, in The Battleship Potemkin he consolidated his skills as a total filmmaker, demonstrating greater control over narrative structure and pacing. The film is divided into five acts--“Men and Worms,” “Drama on the Quarterdeck” “An Appeal from the Dead,” “The Odessa Steps” and “Meeting the Squadron”--its structure deliberately recalling classical tragedy.

While Eisenstein was always interested more in creating an effective and well-constructed film than in being literally faithful to the historical record, many of the key images in the script were in fact inspired by actual events associated with the Potemkin mutiny: the sailors’ refusal to eat borsch made from maggot-infested meat; the revolutionary activists Matyshenko and Vakulenchuk (spelled Vakulinchuk in the film) using that incident as a pretext to incite the other sailors to mutiny; the arrival of the battleship into the Odessa port with a red flag; the throngs of townspeople lining up to view Vakulenchuk’s corpse; and the Potemkin being greeted by cheering sailors on another ship. There was even a massacre of civilians by police on the famed steps leading down to Odessa’s port, though that was just one part of the civil strikes that occurred throughout the city and the resulting crackdown by the police and Cossacks. It should be noted that Eisenstein didn’t include at least one very significant event: the massive fire that devastated the Odessa port during the strike and claimed many lives. Neal Bascomb provides a compelling and detailed account of the mutiny in his recently published book Red Mutiny: Eleven Fateful Days on the Battleship Potemkin (2007).

In addition to its innovative and much-analyzed photography and editing, the film was noteworthy for its unusual mix of professional and non-professional actors, based on the principle of typage or casting primarily according to physical types. Eisenstein’s assistant Grigori Aleksandrov played Gilyarovsky. The role of Vakulenchuk was filled by Aleksandr Antonov, a member of the Proletkult theater troupe in which Eisenstein had worked before moving into cinema. The film director Vladimir Barsky, an important figure in early Soviet cinema, played the role of Captain Golikov. Eisenstein also challenged the norms of commercial cinema by not relying on a single protagonist or romantic coupling to shape the narrative, emphasizing the notion of a “mass protagonist” instead.

The Battleship Potemkin premiered at the Bolshoi Theater in December 1925 and was released in Moscow in January 1926. Barely completed in time for the premiere, it was initially more of a rough cut, as Richard Taylor has pointed out. The orchestral accompaniment, as was common practice at the time, was culled from pre-existing works in the classical repertoire. At its two main Moscow engagements, the theater exteriors were decorated to resemble battleships, and the staff were dressed in sailors’ outfits. Posters touted it as “the pride of Soviet cinema,” boasting of 300,000 admissions in the first three weeks alone.

POTEMKIN IN BERLIN

What really sealed the film’s success, however, was the sensational reception at its April 1926 Berlin premiere. The Soviet authorities actually sold the original negative to the Germans--a move that seems inconceivable today--but they retained the right to request new prints from it. Fearing a threat to “the public order,” the German censors initially banned the film outright but later demanded a number of cuts, mainly due to violent imagery. These included some of the shots depicting the body of young boy trampled on the Odessa steps. The film director Piel Jutzi was brought in to adapt the film for German audiences; among other things, he divided it into six parts instead of five.

Naum Kleiman, the foremost Eisenstein scholar, has speculated that Eisenstein’s trip to Germany before the premiere was in fact to oversee the film’s reediting, so he may well have had some input into the German distribution version. The director also guided Edmund Meisel’s work on the score, encouraging him to emphasize rhythm over melody. For instance, the music accompanying the battleship’s climactic meeting with the squadron has a mechanical quality that underscores the film’s ties with the Soviet artistic movement known as Constructivism.

Ultimately, cultural impact of The Battleship Potemkin in Germany cannot be overstated. Besides becoming a great popular success, it influenced artistic figures as ranging from Fritz Lang to Bertolt Brecht and the theater directors Erwin Piscator and Max Reinhardt. Not only did the film’s reputation in Germany help raise awareness of it in countries such as England and the United States, it even resulted in a second release of the film in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1926. However, the Soviet authorities’ decision to sell the negative to the Germans meant it would not survive in its original version.

THE RECONSTRUCTION

The pressures of censorship and the vagaries of distribution over the years have resulted in the situation that The Battleship Potemkin survives in several different versions, each with their own set of limitations. For many years the Museum of Modern Art circulated an English language version based on an authoritative print donated by the Eisenstein scholar Jay Leyda and supposedly provided by Eisenstein himself, but they altered the original intertitles, among other things making them longer and thus slowing the pace of the film. Another version with English titles was prepared by the British leftist filmmaker Ivor Montagu.

In 1950, the film was reissued in the Soviet Union in a version supervised by Grigori Aleksandrov and accompanied by a serviceable, if pedestrian, score by Nikolai Kryukov. According to Enno Patalas, this version was missing some seventy shots, suffered from substantially reworked intertitles, and even reordered some of the footage following earlier, similarly corrupted versions. For example, the visceral impact of the opening of the Odessa steps massacre--in which the title “And suddenly…” is followed by a series of jump cuts of a woman’s head jerking back--was blunted by preceding it with shots of the soldiers’ boots and rifles to provide more of a conventional cause-and-effect structure. This version also used step-printing (the repetition of individual frames) to slow the movement down for projection at sound speed.

In 1976, the Soviet filmmaker Sergei Yutkevitch, in collaboration with Naum Kleiman, created a new version that was the most complete and authentic to date, but its pacing was again compromised by the use of stretch printing, and it was still missing fifteen shots compared to the current reconstruction. Thus, while it contained fewer shots, at 74 minutes it still ran significantly longer than the 2005 reconstruction. Also, one could argue that the excerpts from the Shostakovich symphonies chosen to accompany the print added to its lugubrious atmosphere.

The 2005 reconstruction relies heavily on the Jay Leyda print and written recollections for its shot list, but whenever possible uses early generation prints held at the British Film Institute because of their superior photographic quality. (The original negative still exists at Gosfilmofond of Russia, though it bears the traces of German censorship and according to the archive is too fragile to use for printing, as Patalas related in a 2005 article in the Journal of Film Preservation.) The intertitles recreate the original text as closely as possible, including the restoration of a Trotsky quotation as the epigraph; predictably, it had been replaced by a Lenin quote when Trotsky fell out of favor. The length of the individual title cards is also now more in keeping with the film’s rhythm as a whole, which is no small point since Eisenstein viewed them as a crucial component of his montage aesthetic. Lastly, as Eisenstein intended from the start, this version uses hand-coloring to tint the Potemkin’s flag red during certain sequences.

In the documentary that accompanies Kino’s forthcoming DVD edition, Naum Kleiman sums up the difficult choices faced in reconstructing the film: “There being no absolutely exact film record from 1926, we cannot claim to have all the scenes in their full length. Often, what Patalas did was an extension of an already existing version, that is, of the censored version. Due to the disintegration of the film, or splices that have come apart, some parts had to be spliced together again. Some frames were lost in the process. Today it’s difficult to assess whether all that was added to the very last version changed the meaning of the film, or its rhythm, or whether it reinforced its visual quality. At any rate, we felt that we managed to approximate the original up to 99%, or even 99.5%.” Viewers already familiar with The Battleship Potemkin are likely to be struck with how much better the reconstruction flows as a film compared to previous versions. Combined with the superior detail and contrast of the new video transfer and the excitement of Meisel’s orchestral score, the reconstruction enables us to appreciate one of cinema’s greatest masterpieces in a fresh light.

FILM CREDITS

Producer: Yakov Bliokh
Director: Sergei M. Eisenstein
Script: Eisenstein, based on an idea by Nina Agadzhanova-Shutko
Assistant Director: Grigori Aleksandrov
Director of Photography: Eduard Tisse
Editing: Sergei Eisenstein
Cast: Aleksande Antonov (Vakulinchuk), Mikhail Gomorov (Matyushenko), Vladimir Barsky (Captain Golikov), Grigori Aleksandrov (Chief Officer Gilyarovsky), Aleksandr Levshin (Petty Officer), Beatrice Vitoldi (Woman on the Odessa Steps), N. Poltavtseva (Woman with the pince-nez), also Members of the Proletkult Theater, Sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, the Sebastopol Fisherman’s Union, and the Inhabitants of Odesssa.

RECONSTRUCTION CREDITS

Supervised by Enno Patalas in collaboration with Anna Bohn.
Produced by the Deutsche Kinemathek with the support of Bundesarchiv-Filmarchiv, the British Film Institute, the Munich Filmmuseum, and Gosfilmofond of Russia.
Colorization by Gerhard Ullmann.
Musical score by Edmund Meisel (1926); adaptation and instrumentation by Helmut Imig.
Music performed by the Deutsches Filmorchestra Babelsberg, conducted by Helmut Imig.
BW-69m.

by James Steffen

The image “http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/40324000/jpg/_40324011_potempkin203.jpg” cannot be displayed, because it contains errors.


The Pet Shop Boys will unveil their latest project - a soundtrack to the 1925 film Battleship Potemkin - at a free show in London's Trafalgar Square.





The irony is that this propaganda film for the Bolshevik Revolution was made four years after the
Kronstadt rebellion occurred against the Bolshevik hegemonic state, by the same sailors.

The image “http://www.kronstadt-uprising.co.uk/images/art8.jpg” cannot be displayed, because it contains errors.

The naval base of Kronstadt lies on Kotlin Island near the head of the Gulf of Finland. Peter the Great captured the island from the Swedes in 1703 and built it into a naval fortress to protect his new capital. The concentration of heavy armory and sailors on the small island made it a bulwark against foreign invasion, but also a tinderbox in times of internal unrest. During the stormy years 1905-1906 several mutinies broke out on Kronstadt. The sailors were important allies to the Bolsheviks after the February Revolution (1917), when the Kronstadt Soviet opposed the provisional government, declared a "Kronstadt Republic," and took part in the July 1917 mutiny. The famous cruiser Aurora, which had bombarded the Winter Palace on October 25, 1917 with its famous shot heard round the world, belonged to the Baltic Fleet based in Kronstadt.

It was a rude shock to the Bolsheviks when the red sailors of Kronstadt went into open rebellion in March 1921. The sailors saw themselves as loyal to the Soviet cause, if not to the Communist rulers. That bitter winter saw Kronstadt, like most other cities in Russia, hungry and discontented. Anger at material deprivations was compounded by the authoritarian regime the Bolsheviks were building, which seemed to violate the spirit of the revolution that the sailors had helped win. Popular unrest finally grew into strikes, which led to riots, lockouts, arrests. Finally on February 26, local Communist authorities declared martial law. A pattern of sharp protest and response escalated rapidly from here to a state of mutiny.

It is the source of the greatest political division on the left, between anarchists and Trotskyists, even to this day.

Hue and Cry Over Kronstadt By Leon Trotsky


SHAGYA BLOG: Kronstadt Izvestiia - " Four Legs Good "

The complete edition of
"Izvestiia of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Sailors, Soldiers and Workers of the town of Kronstadt"


Demands of the Kronstadt Insurgents, Expressed in the Resolution of the General Meeting of the Crews of the Ships of the Line

Kronstadt, 28 February I92I

Having heard the report of the representatives of the crews despatched by the General Meeting of the crews from the ships to Petrograd in order to learn the state of affairs in Petrograd, we decided:

  1. In view of the fact that the present soviets do not represent the will of the workers and peasants, to re-elect the soviets immediately by secret voting, with free canvassing among all workers and peasants before the elections.
  2. Freedom of speech and press for workers, peasants, Anarchists and Left Socialist Parties.
  3. Freedom of meetings, trade unions and peasant associations.
  4. To convene, not later than 1 March I92I, a non-party conference of workers, soldiers and sailors of Petrograd City, Kronstadt and Petrograd Province.
  5. To liberate all political prisoners of Socialist Parties, and also all workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors who have been imprisoned in connection with working-class and peasant movements.
  6. To elect a commission to review the cases of those who are imprisoned in jails and concentration camps.
  7. To abolish all Political Departments, because no single party may enjoy privileges in the propagation of its ideas and receive funds from the state for this purpose. Instead of these Departments, locally elected cultural-educational commissions must be established and supported by the state.
    ......................................
  8. To abolish all Communist fighting detachments in all military units, and also the various Communist guards at factories. If such detachments and guards are needed they may be chosen from the companies in military units and in the factories according to the judgment of the workers.
  9. To grant the peasant full right to do what he sees fit with his land and also to possess cattle, which he must maintain and manage with his own strength, but without employing hired labour.
  10. To ask all military units and also our comrades, the military cadets, to associate themselves with our resolutions.
  11. We demand that all resolutions be widely published in the press.
    .....................................
  12. To permit free artisan production with individual labour.

The resolutions were adopted by the meeting unanimously, with two abstentions.

 President of the Meeting, PETRICHENKO.

Secretary, PEREPELKIN.



SEE

West Side Story

Brecht Meets Oscar

Battle of Algiers

Ennio Morricone A Fistful of Composer

The Many Faces of Solaris

V for Anarchy

SPECTRE

Dimiti Shostakovich 1906-2006

Censorship and Art

The Fifth International


Find blog posts, photos, events and more off-site about:
, , , , , , ,, , , , , , ,


Thursday, September 06, 2007

He Has A Point


And everyone thought Putin was just saber rattling.
Mr Putin, in announcing the resumption of round-the-clock flights by long-range bombers with a nuclear capability, pointed out that other nations – in other words, the US – had continued their missions since the end of the Cold War.

Defense News reports"A U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with five nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D, to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the incident.

The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber’s wings.

Of course they are more of a danger to American civilian populations than to the Russians. Not because of a possible nuclear explosion but from a leak of toxic plutonium. Forget anthrax scares, this is scarier because it will never be announced.

At no time was there a risk for a nuclear detonation, even if the B-52 crashed on its way to Barksdale, said Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94. A crash could ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of the plutonium, but the warheads’ elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, he said. In 1966, a bomber collided with an aerial tanker and exploded over Palomares, Spain. Four nukes fell to earth and were recovered. Studies on the effects of the nuclear accident on the people of Palomares were limited, but the United States eventually settled some 500 claims by residents whose health was adversely affected. Because the accident happened in a foreign country, it received far more publicity than did the dozen or so similar crashes that occurred within U.S. borders. As a security measure, U.S. authorities do not announce nuclear weapons accidents, and some American citizens may have unknowingly been exposed to radiation that resulted from aircraft crashes and emergency bomb jettisons.

At least 4,000 people died as a result of nuclear projects during the Cold War, and 36,500 became ill with radiation-related diseases, the Rocky Mountain News reported Friday.

The News said it collected the numbers by records from federal projects involving uranium, including the building and testing of bombs, and did not include people who had never filed claims or whose claims were rejected. People who mined uranium, built bombs and who inhaled dust from bomb tests – whether they were workers or nearby residents – were included in the tally.

The nation built 70,000 atomic bombs, beginning in 1945. Some of the uranium used in the bombs dropped on Japan came from Uravan, Colo. About 15,000 workers were employed 15 miles west of Denver at Rocky Flats, making plutonium triggers for the bombs.

Of the 36,500 who became ill, about 15,000 were involved in the manufacture of bombs. The radiation they were exposed to sometimes took years to affect them. Some of them may have ultimately died as a result of their work, but were not listed among project deaths by the government.

Hundreds of thousands of people, including soldiers, were exposed to radiation from nuclear tests.


Find blog posts, photos, events and more off-site about:
, , , , , , , ,

Cyberwar


While the Americans claim that the Chinese have hacked the Pentagon how do they know it wasn't the Russians?

Is the Chinese military responsible for recent attacks on Pentagon computers?

That's the question after numerous reports surfaced claiming that the People's Liberation Army of China hacked into a system in the office of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in June.

In a statement published Tuesday, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman confirmed that a system in Gates' office was hacked in June.

He declined, however, to identify the origin of the attack.


After all they crippled Estonia last spring. Though there was no evidence proving this was a state sanctioned attack.

“In information warfare, you may know your opponents, rivals, and enemies, but you do not know who is actually attacking," Evron said.


These hack-attacks may be shadows of the new cold war.

Attacks on U.S. systems have never been linked directly to state-sponsored cyberwarfare, but in 1999 Chinese hackers took down three U.S. government sites after NATO bombers mistakenly attacked the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

The astonishing thing about last spring's alleged Russian cyberattack wasn't the crippling effect it had on Estonian's government and the lives of its citizens but the lack of serious reaction elsewhere. The European Union raised but one scolding finger, NATO sent a few experts to the Baltic nation, and the US protested mildly and briefly — then President Bush welcomed Putin to the Bush family compound in Kennebunkport, Maine. In fact, as the world witnessed the trial run of a new mode of warfare, pundits at The New York Times and other publications dismissed the digital assault on the tiny nation as much ado about nothing.

Nevertheless, despite such outcry about these attacks
, Beijing and those responsible in the PLA can sleep easy. What reprisals will seriously affect them? Earlier this year, Russia launched a major cyber-attack on Estonia, taking down the Baltic state's government, banking and press websites. Estonia is a Nato country and a cyber-attack is a hostile act yet no sanctions were taken and the Kremlin used this successful defiance to escalate its rhetoric and actions even further. As far as Titan Rain, it will probably soon descend to a "Team America" moment of "we will be very angry with you ... and we will write you a letter, telling you how angry we are."

The Russian bear is back with a vengeance. But seen from Moscow, the Kremlin is simply reacting to a series of provocations by the United States and Nato as the Western alliance creeps towards Russian borders, threatening the security of the state.

The "new Cold War" has its origins in a speech made by Mr Putin last February at a security conference in Munich, in front of an audience of Western defence ministers and parliamentarians, in which he listed Moscow's grievances and accused the Bush administration of trying to establish a "unipolar" world.

"One single centre of power. One single centre of force. One single centre of decision-making. This is the world of one master, one sovereign," the President complained.

In May, Mr Putin fired off another volley against American unilateralism, obliquely comparing US policies to those of the Third Reich in a speech commemorating the 62nd anniversary of the fall of Nazi Germany.

In the same speech, he attacked Estonia, a new European Union member, for relocating a monument to the Red Army, which he said was "sowing discord and new distrust between states and people". When Estonian government websites fell victim to an unprecedented cyber attack, Nato was called in as the finger of suspicion fell on the Kremlin.

Ironically the hack attack could have been launched in the U.S. itself and re-routed through China.

Web-Hosting Terrorists

Most Americans will be surprised to learn that many Islamist hacker sites are hosted right here in the U.S.

Consider it an unmistakable and very much intended irony that these cyberjihadists are using our own domestic Internet resources against us.

Under Executive Order 13224, companies are forbidden to provide services to organizations known to support terrorism.

Technology industry leaders have also been doing their part to raise threat awareness, but greater cooperation between government and industry would go far in closing these sites down.

In some cases, sites have been shut down in the U.S. only to reappear in highly Internet-savvy countries such as Malaysia.

As one of the 9/11 terrorist planning locations, Malaysia has hosted a number of jihadist sites after authorities acted to terminate them in the U.S.

To its credit, that nation has not been deaf, dumb and blind to the problem -- quite the contrary.

In May 2006, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced the creation of a program called the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-Terrorism, or IMPACT, to help countries work globally to fight cyberterrorists.

In one notable case, an especially worrisome jihadist hacker site first registered in Florida was shut down, but the organization behind it reconstituted operations in Badawi's country.

The Malaysian authorities took action to shut the site down. Unfortunately, it has appeared again where it originated: Tampa, Fla.

The site has grown from a membership list of only about 300 to more than 122,000 over the past few years. Skill levels are improving and technical information-sharing is taking place.

Some in the intelligence field -- and many on its fringes -- have argued that the U.S. needs to keep these jihadist sites up in order to monitor and understand their activities. True, some of this surveillance is necessary, but this is a wholly misguided attitude.


SEE:

Israel Hacker Heaven



Find blog posts, photos, events and more off-site about:
, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,

Thursday, August 30, 2007

Sounds Like

A collection of sound bites on Afghanistan....then and now.


"What will happen if we withdraw now…"

Soviets in 1980s


"Recently one can often hear …that we 'betrayed' [our] Afghan friends [by withdrawing from Afghanistan] and that, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, we are not interested anymore in the fate of Afghanistan." (Sovetskaya Rossiaya, 14 April 1990)

"Continuation, and even escalation, of fighting after the withdrawal of Soviet troops …" (Minister of Defence of Afghanistan general Sh. Tanai, Izvestiya, 8 September 1989)


Canadians now

"…pulling troops out of Kandahar would simply open the door to another Taliban takeover. There is also a real danger that the return of the Taliban would lead to civil war..." "unwillingness to grapple with the consequences of withdrawing troops seems common, if not endemic, among those opposing the war…. In the face of the Taliban's history of cruelty, MacDonald argued that withdrawing troops would be a betrayal. …But before raising the call to withdraw troops, we might consider those whose lives have unquestionably improved because of the security provided by international forces. " (This Magazine (Canada), March/April 2007)

Insurgency was/is called…

Soviets in 1980s


"hardened murderers" (Pravda, 13 December 1985)

"… scumbags" (Soviet soldiers and a nurse quoted in Izvestiya, 23 May 1988)

Canadians now

"detestable murderers and scumbags"
(Chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, Globe and Mail, 13 April 2007. Also see "Helping Afghanistan will protect Canada, says top soldier", CBC News, 15 July 2005)



"There is no comparison"

Soviets in 1980s


"If one agrees with people who…are ready to declare Soviet people to be 'occupants' and compare their [i.e. Soviet people's] actions to what Americans were doing in Vietnam, or to what British colonizers were doing in the same Afghanistan, then one has to admit that those 'occupants' were behaving in a very strange ways. They were delivering food and fuel, clothing, agricultural machinery and industrial equipment to the [Afghan] population; they were treating the sick [Afghans], teaching in the educational institutions, building residential houses, supporting work of the vital industrial plants, electric stations and irrigation structures…" (Zhitnuhin & Likoshin, 1990, p.169).

"I would not draw any analogies between our actions in Afghanistan and the American actions in Vietnam. There was no similarity in objectives or methods, nor were the results similar" (Soviet general Varennikov, CNN interview)

Canadians now

"We are not an 'occupation force' as some even here in Canada have stated, but backers of the legitimate Afghanistan government, which was voted in by a huge majority of Afghans who wanted their first democracy in 25 years. (column by Sgt. Russell Strong, CBC News Viewpoint, CBCNEWS, 13 September 2006)

"…comparison of current international efforts [in Afghanistan] and the Soviet invasion in 1979 is totally without merit… To compare today's mission [of Canadian forces in Afghanistan] to the invasion of a totalitarian [Soviet] regime is beyond comprehension" (op-ed "Unfair comparison" by Col. (ret.) M. Capstick, Globe and Mail, 2 December 2006)

On "fighting evil"

Soviets in 1980s


"…we heard shots. Run towards the village. Found three dead on the road: man, woman and a child. They we probably on the way home. This is the evil. That's why we are here - not to allow such [things] to happen." (from the journal of the Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, quoted in Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 July 1986)

Canadians now

"We believe that we are engaged in a war on terrorism, a war on evil people, just as we were during the First and Second World Wars. We believe that these people have to be brought to justice," (Jay Hill quoted in Toronto Star, 20 April 2007)


On "our troops in Afghanistan"

Soviets 1980s


"We are giving our young years and our lives for peace"(from the journal of the Soviet soldier in Afghanistan, private Yuri Pahomov, published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, 15 December 1989)

"…my son …died a hero" (mother of the Soviet soldier killed in Afghanistan quoted in Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 March 1988)

"[he] died a hero …shielding his comrades from death" (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 25 April 1987)

"…sincere belief in the high meaning of their [Afghanistan] mission." (book "Star over Kabul-city", 1990, Moscow, p.171).

Canadians now

"He died a hero" (friend of Canadian Soldier killed in Afghanistan quoted in thestar.com, Apr 19, 2007)

"[he]… died a hero, he died protecting his fellow comrades" ( message by Jason Carey on the death of Pte. Costall, 3/30/2006, DND website)

"…unwavering belief in the Afghanistan mission" (Toronto Star, 17 December 2006)


SEE:

Kandahar

Afghanistan

War




The image “http://photos1.blogger.com/blogger/4319/673/320/2006-08-31-Troops.jpg” cannot be displayed, because it contains errors.

Find blog posts, photos, events and more off-site about:
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,



Tags







Sunday, July 29, 2007

Whose Arctic


Twenty years ago it was proposed that Canada needed a nuclear powered submarine fleet to defend Arctic Sovereignty. Post War Canada once boasted the lead in submarine hunter killer helicopters and planes to protect its sovereignty. Along comes Harper with much sturm and drang about protecting the Arctic with Ice Breakers. But then the Russians challenge his bluff.

In the next day or two a mini submarine will plant a Russian flag
hewn from titanium 14,000ft beneath the North Pole, along with the country's coat of arms.

Although it will be a symbolic gesture and carries no legal weight, it is designed to send the West a clear message: Russia has shrugged off its post-cold war weakness and will be aggressively defending and pushing its national interests from now on.

If it goes smoothly, the flag planting, reminiscent of the kind of propaganda coup beloved by the Soviets, will feed a rising state-orchestrated sense of patriotism and national pride.

It will also be the beginning of what is likely to be a lengthy international struggle for the Arctic Ocean's riches, with Canada, Denmark, Norway, the United States and Russia all having competing interests in the hydrocarbon-stuffed area.


The 1987 military review highlighted Canada's abysmal capabilities of enforcing sovereignty on its Arctic coast. It was therefore announced that MARCOM would receive a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) suitable for operating for extended periods under the Arctic ice. The proposed SSN fleet would force any nation, friend or foe, to possibly think twice before using Canada's territorial seas in the Arctic for operating nuclear submarines. During 1987-1988, MARCOM examined several British and French SSN designs. The planned procurement, however, was cancelled in 1988-1989 during a time of increased defence cuts.

In 1998, the Canadian government made a deal with the United Kingdom to acquire four mothballed, but state-of-the-art Upholder-class diesel-electric submarines that were made surplus by the Royal Navy's decision to operate only nuclear-powered submarines such as the Trafalgar-class boats. The Upholders were considered too valuable and technologically advanced by the Royal and US navies to allow them to fall into the hands of a non-allied nation. Therefore Canada was encouraged through significant discounts to acquire the Upholders. The four submarines were eventually purchased after much foot-dragging by the federal government for $750 million CAD.

The transaction was supposed to have included some reciprocal rights for British forces to continue using CFB Suffield for armoured-unit training and CFB Goose Bay for low-level flight training, while Canada received four well-built and very lightly used high-technology submarines to replace the 1960s-era Oberon class. (It was later revealed that there were no reciprocal rights. It was a plain lease-to-buy arrangement.) After a costly update program which took longer than expected, along with several public and highly embarrassing equipment failures, the Upholders are being successfully reactivated following a decade of mothballing and are now being integrated into the Canadian navy as the Victoria class. Technical problems still seem to plague the fleet however. Part of this deal will see MARPAC receive its first submarine in four decades and returning an active submarine presence to Canada's west coast.



SEE:

Polar Bears Threaten Tories Arctic Sovereignty


Tories Ignore Arctic Climate Change


Petrocan's Arctic Sovereignty


US Declares War For The Arctic


Find blog posts, photos, events and more off-site about:
, , , , , , ,,,, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Saturday, May 05, 2007

Yeltsin's Legacy


Kleptocracy in the Guise of Reform

The decision to transform the economy of a huge country without the benefit of the rule of law led not to a free market democracy but to a kleptocracy with several dangerous economic and psychological features.

In the first place, the new system was characterized by bribery. All resources, at first, were in the hands of the state; businessmen thus competed to “buy” critical government officials. The winners were in a position to buy more officials, with the result that the practice of giving bribes grew up with the system.

Besides bribery, the new system was marked by institutionalized violence. Gangsters were treated like normal economic actors, which tacitly legitimized their criminal activities. At the same time, they became the partners of businessmen who used them as guards, enforcers, and debt collectors.

The new system was also characterized by pillage. Money obtained as a result of criminal activities was illegally exported to avoid the possibility of its being confiscated at some point in the future. This outflow deprived Russia of billions of dollars in resources that were needed for its development.

Perhaps more important than these economic features, however, was the new system’s social psychology, which was characterized by mass moral indifference. If under communism, universal morality was denied in favor of the supposed “interests of the working class,” under the new reform government, people lost the ability to distinguish between legal and criminal activity.

Official corruption came to be regarded as “normal,” and it was considered a sign of virtue if the official, in addition to stealing, also made an effort to fulfill his official responsibilities. Extortion also came to be regarded as normal, and vendors, through force of habit, began to regard paying protection money as part of the cost of doing business.

At the same time, officials and businessmen took no responsibility for the consequences of their actions, even if they led to hunger and death. Government officials helped organize pyramid schemes that victimized persons who were already destitute, police officials took bribes from leaders of organized crime to ignore extortion, and factory directors stole funds marked for the salaries of workers who had already gone months without pay.



From "Criminal Communism" to "Criminal Capitalism"

Satter said that Russia's transition from "criminal communism" to "criminal capitalism" had occurred in three stages: hyperinflation, privatization, and criminalization. Hyperinflation began on 2 January 1992, when the Gaidar government freed virtually all prices, consequently wiping out the life-savings of millions of Russians. According to Satter, this same government also chose to ignore a law passed by the Supreme Soviet calling for the indexation of savings accounts in the event of price liberalization, deeming it the responsibility of the old regime. Yet while the majority of the population was being driven into poverty by inflation, a group of well-connected insiders was becoming very rich.


Satter mentioned several ways in which people with access to the state budget and ties to state officials were able to amass wealth including: establishing and fooling the public into investing in pyramid schemes, speculating in dollars, obtaining lucrative licenses to export raw materials, and appropriating and collecting interest on state credits that were supposed to support industry. Satter asserted that by the time privatization got underway, the country was already divided into haves and have-nots.


This hyperinflation had been briefly preceded by "wild privatization," during which government and party officials began to privatize whatever they could get their hands on, noted Satter. Former government officials who had once been in charge of state resources became the new owners and proceeded to sell off these resources. In addition, an amendment to the law on cooperatives allowed factories to create cooperatives within the framework of the factory, which encouraged massive theft as factory directors were now given the means to establish cooperatives through which to write off and sell factory supplies.


However, according to Satter, the real theft of the state's most valuable enterprises began with money privatization in 1994. At "public" auctions for state property, the bidders for the most desirable enterprises were well-connected to local officials, with the results of these auctions being largely determined in advance. The loans-for-shares program, in which the government exchanged shares of enterprises for loans, greatly benefited the banks empowered by Yeltsin in 1993 to handle government accounts. These banks used government money to make short-term loans at extremely high rates of interest. Then, having made a profit using the government's money, the banks were able to loan it back to the government in exchange for valuable enterprises. This is how the much-talked-about oligarchy came into being and eventually began to dominate the political and economic scene, explained Satter.


Satter then commented on the final stage of the rise of the criminal state in Russia--criminalization. In short, the first cooperatives were established at a time when all property in the Soviet Union belonging to the state was completely unprotected. It was also illegal to have a private security service. Both of these factors made the first Russian businessmen attractive targets for criminals. As the number of independent businessmen grew, the underworld experienced phenomenal growth. With no one to protect them, Russia's new economic elite, composed largely of corrupt insiders, had no choice but to turn to criminal gangs for protection. Eventually, Russian businessmen found gangsters useful in other aspects of business, including curbing the growing epidemic of non-payment of debt.


According to Satter, as these groups became more interwoven, the entire commercial and political apparatus in Russia was poisoned. On a final note, Satter reflected that the only rule in business and political life in Russia continues to be the rule of force and that without the rule of law, Russia has no hope of resurrecting itself.

Yegor Gaidar


GAIDAR: The loans-for-shares deals took place at a time when I hadn't worked in the government for a long time. There were people with more authority, who were responsible for that question. That would be Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Anatoly Chubais.

But I discussed that subject, at least with Chubais, many times, and I had my own
understanding of the situation. In my opinion, the major motive at that moment was a political one, connected with providing stability and not allowing the return of communists to power. In 1995, a large portion of the property in Russia belonged to the so-called Red Directors, people who sympathized with the Communist party, who stole money from their enterprises, which they directed badly. And the point was that they were not attracted to the new regime. And if I understand correctly, the loans-for-shares deals were first and foremost directed at creating a critical mass of influential and powerful political forces that would have been vitally interested in not allowing the return of the communist regime. For these deals, we paid endlessly a great deal during the second term of Yeltsin's presidency. Masses of things that we dreamed about, that we could have done in the second term of Yeltsin's presidency, were not done because there was this compromise. A great many characteristically unpleasant features of Russian capitalism today were brought about as a result of that series of compromises. Nonetheless, when, in the intervening years, I asked myself the question: would it have been better to take the risk of the communists coming to power and see what would have happened, knowing what the Communist party was and knowing what Russia was like and knowing how dangerous the situation was for ourselves and for the rest of the world-well, I cannot convince myself that this would have been better.

Criminal capitalism?

YAVLINSKY: Loans-for-shares privatization was a way of creating criminal capitalism in Russia. We learned a very important lesson [in the process], by the way. Karl Polanyi, as you know, wrote a book Open Society and Its Enemies, and he described two main enemies of the open society-fascism and communism. In the last 10 years Russia has found out that open society has one more enemy. That enemy is capitalism that is not limited by laws, by civil institutions, by tradition, by belief, by trade unions, by anything-simply the wild will for profit at any price. That was the key idea of privatization here, that was the key of all changes here.

INTERVIEWER: Yegor Gaidar believes that loans-for-shares privatization was a
necessary evil that helped save the country from the surging communist party.

YAVLINSKY: It's not true, because it's very likely that [those behind the scheme]
were paying the communists to [reinforce this point of view]. It would have been
much better not to pay the communists and to take a different approach. The mob of communists in the country was growing together with the poverty. Communism is a social disease coming from poverty. You can have a lot of disease from poverty. For example, if you have no soap you have a lot of disease. Communism is something like that. If you have a poor society and poverty in the country, you have communists. The reform as these guys were doing it was creating more and more poverty. And the poverty was producing more and more communists. So it was absolutely possible to use a different approach and not to distribute the property between 10 personal friends. There was no need for that. The task was to give the property to millions of people. The [privatizers] were not doing anything for small and middle businesses, and that was one of the key issues. They were all the party of big business. But the big business in Russia was [corrupt] business.

One of the main reasons why in Eastern Europe the reforms were very successful
and in Russia they were not was that in 1991 in Eastern Europe the real democratic revolutions happened. New people came to power. It was a real replacement of the political elite, like it was after the war in Germany and Japan, when the Nazi leaders were completely ripped out and new people came in. The same happened in Eastern Europe after 1991. In Russia it was [different]. The same people changed their jackets and changed the portraits in the rooms, and instead of saying "Communism" and "Lenin" and "five-year plan" started to use "market democracy" and "freedom" as their key words-with the same substance that was with "Lenin" and "Communism" and "five-year plan." They came to power, and you can see: we had Mr. Yeltsin, who was a member of the Politburo, as president of the country. For ten years we had a member of the Politburo as a leader of the country. But we also had 8 or 7 Prime Ministers during the 10 years; all of them were members of the Central Committeeof the Communist Party or representatives of the KGB, with one minor exception of Kirienko, who was a Komsomol leader of his region. So it was the mentality of these people, the approach to life of these people that was the main factor of our failure.

These people hired young economists to present a business card [of reform] to the
world. And they were very successful, because they got about $50 billion in loans
[thanks to] the so-called [economic] dream teams-nice faces speaking English. Mr.
Yeltsin certainly used them, and they brought in money to support the new system.
$50 billion, that's a pretty big number.

INTERVIEWER: What went wrong in Russia's case?

STIGLITZ: Well, there [were] an enormous number of mistakes, one after the other. They began with the shock therapy of liberalization, of eliminating price controls for most of the commodities. The result of that was that there was a massive inflation.

So the high levels of inflation were, in fact, a consequence of the shock therapy
strategy in the beginning. That wiped out the savings of an enormous number of
people. You didn't at that point have any basis of people having wealth to have a
legitimate privatization process. They then had a privatization process that was
corrupt and in which the country's assets were turned over to a few, to the oligarchs.

The strategy was privatization at any cost. Do it quickly, is what the IMF kept telling them. The IMF kept a score card-how many privatizations had you done. But it's easy to privatize, give away the state assets to your friends. And in fact, it's not only easy-it's rewarding, because then they give a little bit of money back to you. So that was the strategy that was advocated and pushed. They then had policies like capital market liberalization before they were ready.

So what did that mean? You had an illegitimate privatization. The people who had
been able to use their political influence to get these billions and billions of dollars of
natural resources for a pittance were then told, Well, you have a choice, keep your
money inside Russia or take it to the United States. United States was having a
boom, Russia, because of the policies, was in a depression. Well, if you were smart
enough to persuade Yeltsin to give these billions of dollars, you were smart enough
to figure out it's better to take your money to the United States or, even better, to
Cyprus, to secret bank accounts, to Switzerland, knowing full well that there'll be a
change in government. When there's a change of government, there'll be a
questioning of whether those privatizations were legitimate. If you had your money in Russia, people might say, we want to do that over again; you effectively stole the country's assets. So the experiences in Russia show that in some sense economists are right: incentives matter. But under the IMF strategy, you put in place incentives that lead to asset stripping rather than wealth creation and to the implosion of the economy rather than to economic growth.

INTERVIEWER: How did this affect the poor in Russia and the average person?

STIGLITZ: A number of things happened that contributed to the increase in poverty. Poverty increased from around two percent to forty percent or more, depending on how you calculate it. [It was] one the most rapid increases in poverty that the world would have seen in that short span of time, apart from a natural disaster. With the tight monetary policies that were pursued and the other policies, firms didn't have the money to even pay their employees. What was tragic about it is while they didn't have enough money to pay their pensioners, to pay their workers, they were giving away the valuable state assets to a few rich people. So in a way, resources were leaving Russia in massive amounts, billions and billions were leaving, with these open capital markets. Russia privatized before they had a good tax system in place.

It's very easy to tax oil, and you can monitor the amount of oil that's being shipped
abroad. It's actually relatively easy. But they privatized it before they put in the
means of taxing this most basic resource of the Russian economy.
And so by not getting the sequencing right, by not pacing right, they lead to the
impoverishment of massive amounts of their people. Then, with the government not having enough revenue, other aspects of life started to deteriorate. They didn't have enough money for hospitals, schools. Russia used to have one of the [best] school systems in the world. Now they didn't have enough money for that. So this began to affect every dimension of people's lives.

Interim outcome of the Russian transition: clan capitalism

"When Postmodernism Came to Russia"

'Political capitalism' and corruption in Russia

U. S. S. R.: The Corrupt Society: The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism

Foreign Affairs - Russia's Phony Capitalism - Grigory Yavlinsky


See:

Yeltsin Schmeltsin

State Capitalism in the USSR

Crisis in the Ukraine

Oligarchs

Ukraine Gases Government



Tags
, , , , , , , , , , , , ,