Wednesday, February 11, 2026

AMERIKA

On Seeking Asylum and Refuge


February 11, 2026

Image by Nitish Meena.

Today, during my slog through the Substack messages, newspaper headline notices, and podcast reminders that hit my inbox every morning, two stories drew my attention. Both had to do with the fact that human beings have always moved around this planet, beginning long before there were any countries or maps to display the borders where one nation ends and another begins. I was reminded of a decades-old song by the Venezuelan singer Soledad Bravo, “Punto y Raya” — “The Dot and the Dash”:

“Entre tu pueblo y mi pueblo hay un punto y una raya,
la raya dice no hay paso el punto vía cerrada”

“Between your people and mine,” says the song, “there’s a dot and a dash. The dash says, ‘No entrance,’ and the dot, ‘The road is closed.’” Bravo goes on to say that, with all those dots and dashes outlining the borders of nations, a map looks like a telegram. If you walk through the actual world, though, what you see are mountains and rivers, forests and deserts, but no dots or dashes at all.

“Porque esas cosas no existen, sino que fueron creadas
para que mi hambre y la tuya estén siempre separadas.”

And she adds, “Because those things aren’t real, they were created so your hunger and mine would remain separated.”

Two Immigration Stories

Two morning news stories brought that song back into my mind, along with the human reality it expresses. Both appeared in the New York Times (and no doubt elsewhere). The first reported that the “United States population grew last year [between July 1, 2024, and June 30, 2025] at one of the slowest rates in its history.” Such a reduction in growth was in large part due to the Trump administration’s immigration policies. In 2025, immigration rates to the United States dropped by 50% compared to the previous year. Perhaps surprisingly, Trump’s vicious and deadly deportation efforts accounted for only about 235,000 of the 1.5 million-person net decline in immigration.

Much more significant were the barriers to entry created under Trump, largely through the influence of Stephen Miller, the man Steve Bannon has labelled the president’s “prime minister.” Those include the effective closing of our southern border to undocumented arrivals. The administration has also made legal entry to the U.S. much more difficult in a variety of ways, including:

Instituting a $100,000 fee to be paid by employers seeking to hire professional workers under an H1-B visa;

Erecting barriers to foreign students, leading to a 17% drop in new ones enrolling in American universities;

Fully or partially restricting entry by the citizens (including refugees) of 19 nations: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen (full restrictions) and Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela (partial restrictions);

Pausing all asylum applications by citizens of any nation in the world, leaving a backlog of 1.4 million cases;

Capping all refugee admissions at 7,500 per year, a reduction of 94% from previous limits (with the exception, of course, of white South African farmers).

Why does it matter that the U.S. population is growing more slowly while also aging? As the Times points out, this country “needs a large enough population of young workers and taxpayers to finance care for the nation’s older residents, whose numbers are swelling as the Baby Boom generation retires.” As any good Marxist will tell you, labor creates all wealth. In other words, a nation’s wealth (including that of its millionaires and billionaires) represents the accumulated value of work done by actual human beings. And that means an economy lacking enough workers will not be able to satisfy the grow-or-die logic of capitalism. Nor, if a reduction of the workforce is concentrated in jobs traditionally performed by immigrants, will that economy be able to feed its people. In other words, the stubbornly high price of groceries is not unconnected to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) terror campaign around the country.

Immigration reductions are part of the story of slowing population growth, but there’s another piece of the puzzle. During the Great Recession that began with a mortgage meltdown in 2008, Americans began having fewer children. In my world of higher education, we’ve known about this precipitous drop for a while. It’s been described as a “demographic cliff” that would become a (predictable) emergency for college enrollment 18-20 years later — that is, now. The entire higher education sector, which has grown steadily since the institution of the GI Bill at the end of World War II, now faces layoffs, retrenchment, and the closing of institutions.

What of the second story I read this morning? It concerned Spain, a country taking an entirely different approach to immigration. I’ve been lucky enough to spend time in Spain, meeting there, in addition, of course, to Spaniards, farmworkers from Mali and other parts of francophone Africa, and Central American waiters and taxi drivers, who could use their native language in a new land. (I wonder if they sound to the Spanish much the way I do — like a hick from the faraway sticks.)

Like that of the United States, Spain’s population is aging, but its response is the opposite of the Trump administration’s. Our president and his minions have made it clear in word and deed not just that they want almost no new immigrants, but also which few they would consider accepting. “Why is it we only take people from shithole countries, right?” the president asked last December. “Why can’t we have some people from Norway, Sweden, just a few? Let’s have a few from Denmark,” he added. (Of course, that was before his spat with that country over his urge to take possession of Greenland.)

Unlike Trump’s crew, the Spanish government has issued a decree permitting undocumented migrants already in the country to apply for temporary residency, with permission to work legally there. Recognizing their contributions to fueling the major engines of the Spanish economy — agriculture, tourism, and construction — Spain has bucked a European and American tide of anti-migrant sentiment, the very one Trump sought to stoke with his remarks at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos. Because of mass migration, he opined, “certain places in Europe are not even recognizable.” Critics of Spain’s new policy on the left argue that the country has been less welcoming to African migrants, but the socialist government of President Pedro Sánchez denies this (at least publicly).

Homesickness

All of this has left me thinking about the sacrifices people make when they choose, or are forced, to find a new home nation. Those of us in the U.S., even many who support immigrants, documented and otherwise, can fall into a trap of believing that, given the choice, everyone would rather live here. But it’s not that simple.

I spent some time in the Nicaraguan war zone in the mid-1980s. In spite of everything I loved about the early days of that country’s revolution, and how angry I became at the campaign of sabotage and torture my country unleashed to support the anti-government “contras,” there were days when I ached for the familiarity of home. The Greek roots of the word nostalgia refer to the literal pain of not being in one’s home, which describes just what I felt. I missed the everyday ease of knowing how to act without giving offense. I missed automatically understanding what was happening around me as well as, in a war zone, being able to distinguish the difference between people’s ordinary behavior and preparing for a possible attack. Most of all, I missed the feel of my native tongue in my mouth and its sound in my ears.

I knew that I would be going home in a few months, which set a limit to my homesickness. But I remember wondering then what it would be like to be a refugee, to know I’d never truly be home again. I thought about my friend Tiana, a Brazilian emigre with many years in the U.S., who used to talk about how she ached to hear Brazilian Portuguese. “Everything we say sounds so much more affectionate in Portuguese,” she told me. “We don’t just ask someone to pass ‘the butter’; we call it ‘the little butter,’ like a pet name.”

My grandfather must have felt that same nostalgic ache. The story my father told me was this: In 1910, after the Cossacks came to my grandfather’s village in what is now Ukraine and killed his youngest brother, the family hid him under the hay in a horse-drawn wooden wagon and had him driven out of town. He then made his way across Europe to Antwerp in Belgium, where he boarded a ship for New York City with nothing more than the name and address of a distant cousin in Norfolk, Virginia, who’d paid for his passage. He was just 18. He would then work for that cousin, almost like an indentured servant, until he eventually saved up enough money to bring the rest of his family to this country. I found evidence to support this tale when I visited the Ellis Island website and found his name and the cousin’s address in Norfolk listed in the manifest of the ship he took from Antwerp.

Cruelty Is the Point (of the Spear)

All of this is on my mind a lot these days, because most weeks I spend some time accompanying people to immigration court hearings or to their appointments with ICE. Each time I do so, I’m struck by the courage it takes to leave your familiar home, however dangerous it may have become, carrying that ache of nostalgia with you, maybe for the rest of your life. Last week, I waited outside an imposing building in downtown San Francisco, while a woman I’ll call Celia entered for an ICE check-in. The last time she’d done that, in October 2025, she hadn’t come out. Instead, she was sent to one of California’s privately-run ICE centers, the California City Detention Facility (CCDF), where she was imprisoned for the next two months.

California Senator Alex Padilla visited that detention center recently. Having been to many jails and prisons over the years, he reported that, among other things, he expected complaints about issues like the quality of the food. “But I was shocked,” he said, “at the amount and intensity of the complaints about lack of medical care. Like, even in prisons, even under conditions of war, there [are] basic standards that we are supposed to hold and maintain. That is not happening.”

New Yorker story by Oren Peleg about the CCDF supports Padilla’s claims. Detainees with gastric ulcers, prostate cancer, bloody urine, heart failure, and other serious medical problems told Peleg that they couldn’t get the medications or treatment they needed. It seems that CoreCivic, the company that runs CCDF, may be withholding medical treatment to encourage people to leave the country “voluntarily.” That may help explain why eight medical positions, including those of a physician and a psychiatrist, have gone unfilled for months. As Peleg writes:

“But staffing issues do not fully explain the lack of basic medical care at California City. ‘They do it so you give up,’ Julio Cesar Santos Avalos, who was a detainee at California City from September to November, told me. When he arrived at C.C.D.F., Santos Avalos recalls a consistent push by staff for detainees to sign away their rights and self-deport. Instructions for how to self-deport are displayed prominently near phones where detainees communicate with their lawyers. Santos Avalos and many of the detainees and attorneys I spoke to believe the lack of medical care is part of that push.”

Peleg concludes that the “detention center is aiming to make conditions so terrible that detainees stop fighting and decide to leave.” The case of Santos Avalos is particularly searing. He lives with “chronic pain owing to a foot deformity caused by childhood cases of polio and Guillain-Barré syndrome,” but he was denied pain medication and forced to sleep in a top bunk at the detention center. He eventually chose to return to El Salvador, a country he’d left at the age of seven. As is true for many immigrants who came here as children, the home he now aches for is one in the United States.

Imagine the courage it took for Celia to smile, give herself a shake, and walk through those doors, knowing that she could very well end up back at CCDF. That day, however, we were lucky. After about 30 minutes, she emerged through the large bronze doors free — at least until her next appointment in a few months (and assuming there’s no Bay Area ICE surge in the meantime). I say “we” were lucky, because, while my fears are minor compared to hers and those of other immigrants like her, I’m always afraid that someone I’m accompanying will be taken away, leaving me angry and helpless.

Seeking Refuge

Like nostalgia, the word asylum has Greek roots. It suggests being free from someone else’s right of seizure, and so, by extension, “refuge.” When people come to this country seeking asylum, they are looking for refuge from horrors of all kinds: political oppression, familial or institutional violence, war, torture, you name it. An asylum is, by definition, a refuge, a safe place. That’s why institutions for people with mental illness used to be called “insane asylums.” (It’s been suggested that Donald Trump confuses the legal concept of seeking asylum with the term insane asylum, which is why he thinks that other countries are sending their mental patients here.)

An asylum should be a safe place, even if it may never feel like home. But in the first year of Trump’s second term as president, it’s become clear that, for those seeking, or even granted, asylum, the United States is no longer a safe place. Increasingly, as those two recent ICE murders in Minneapolis have shown, it’s not even a safe place for the rest of us.

In his poem “The Death of the Hired Man,” Robert Frost wrote:

“Home is the place where, when you have to go there,
They have to take you in.”

That’s what asylum is supposed to be in international law: the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in.

In these dark and frightening days, I often find a short sentence bubbling to the top of my mind: “I just want to go home.” I’m not quite sure what it means, but I think that, like so many people in Donald Trump’s America, I’m looking for a place that doesn’t yet exist, a refuge we will have to build with our own hands.

This piece appeared on TomDispatch.

Trump’s Politics and a Declining US Capitalism in 2026


 February 11, 2026

Image by Artur Ament.

A year into Trump’s second term clarifies what his presidency aims to accomplish. On the one hand, his initiatives and their impacts are widely overemphasized. Far less well recognized are how received conditions and conventional Party politics in the US produced Trump and most of what he does. Underlying both Trump, US politics, and their whole environment are the basic changes in US capitalism that both shape and reflect its declining place in the world. These include especially certain class, race and gender aspects of those changes.

Trump’s Republican Party (GOP) never stopped being a coalition. On the one hand, the Party’s major donors have mostly been leading members of the class of private US employers. Those donors provide the key funds that higher Party officials use to organize and mobilize the other side of the coalition, particularly blocs of voters. Major donors divide into three groups: those who give to the GOP, those who give to the DEMs, and those who patronize both. Both parties use the money from their major donors to organize their mass of voters, win offices, and thereby reward those donors. The GOP and DEMs compete for voters using their respective donors’ money. The donor class’s donations protect it from serious or sustained criticism by either major US Party. They are costs of that class’s hegemony. Neither coalition dares to offer such criticism, for fear of threatening its capacity for donations and, by extension, the party’s very survival.

From time to time, one Party performs better than the other in working this “Coalition-Politics”. It gets more money from donors and/or undercuts donations to the other party. It is more successful than the other party in securing or building blocs of voters. The other party then fights back. In the decades before Trump, the Republican Party coalition declined. While the GOP delivered dutifully to its major donors, it merely fed symbols more than changed realities to its voting masses. The GOP loudly opposed abortions but never actually stopped them. It supported fundamentalist Christianity but more in words than deeds. It endorsed neoliberal globalization and celebrated the profits it brought to its donors, but it barely acknowledged, and far less compensated, the losses it imposed on the US working class.

Over recent decades, the DEMs coalition also endorsed neo-liberal globalization and likewise celebrated its profitability as if it were “good for all America.” Some DEM leaders gave lip-service recognition to workers’ losses from globalization. They likewise claimed “concern” that globalization aggravated US inequalities of wealth and income and “hollowed out of the middle class.” However DEMs offered little more than rhetoric, since big donations from globalization’s leading beneficiaries remained a key DEM party goal. US workers hurt by globalization thus felt increasingly alienated, disappointed and betrayed by the DEM coalition. Meanwhile, that coalition redirected its focus and appeal toward women and racial/ethnic minorities as voting blocs. Opposing the discrimination those blocs had long suffered in the US entailed far less risk of losing major corporate and individual donors. Only a relatively few voices on the progressive left of the DEM coalition criticized the costly impacts of globalization on the working class. DEM leadership undertook only modest “progressive” steps (although often claiming to do more than those steps actually achieved). For not really doing more, of course, DEMs blamed the GOP.

So long as this sort of politics worked for the DEMs, the GOP adopted a “me too” approach suggesting sympathy for the interests and women and minorities. But once decades of globalization had immiserated sufficiently large (and especially male, white) sections of the US working class, Republicans changed their approach. They increasingly turned the DEMs’ appeals to women and non-whites against the DEMs by portraying those appeals as indicating that DEMs had abandoned the white, male, Christian working class. Enter Donald Trump who rode this turn the furthest by sharply ejecting the traditional GOP leadership (Bush family etc.) that had hesitated to go that far.

The Trump-led GOP coalition seeks the same donors from the same class (employers) as always. That coalition likewise seeks the votes of largely white blocs of  workers (especially male, fundamentalist Christian, super-patriotic, etc.). However, unlike traditional Republicans, Trumpers go much further in pandering to the more extreme among those voters, those dissatisfied with mere symbolism. They promise to go far beyond the limits of the traditional GOP leadership to reverse all they blame on the DEMs (and especially on Obama and Biden).

Trump’s GOP loudly proclaims that DEMs care only about females, black and brown workers, and immigrants. Trump’s GOP charges that DEMs get votes by getting jobs and incomes for these females, black, brown and immigrant workers (illegal as well as legal). Moreover, Trump repeats, those jobs and income came at the expense of the jobs and incomes for male, white, Christian workers and their communities. Republicans successfully blamed DEMs for the suffering of white, male Christian workers who lost their jobs to globalization since the 1980s. DEMS minimally criticized the US employer class (to secure its donors) and focused instead on attacking China (as if the decision to move jobs from the US to Asia was China’s rather than a decision made by the heads of US corporations).

Trump’s serious campaigns for president arrived after several decades of GOP and Democratic coalitions alternating in power. Across those decades, US capitalism had benefited from ongoing US government support. Huge tax cuts and government spending programs boosted corporate profits. Huge government bailouts followed stock and credit market crashes. Both parties endorsed, advanced, and protected neo-liberal globalization as they competed for major donors. In contrast, both doled out merely symbolic gestures to their respective voters. For not doing more, each Party attacked the other in a blame game that proved decreasingly effective. Slowly but steadily increasing portions of the voting blocs inside both Parties’ coalitions became alienated from voting and party politics altogether.

Trump’s personality and personal beliefs fit the historical moment and therefore served it. Forces had accumulated that understood (or at least vaguely sensed) the need for US capitalism to get more support than that provided by both Parties’ traditional coalitions. The decline of US capitalism relative to China, on the one hand, generated those forces. On the other hand, so did decades of decline in the numbers, well-being, and political identifications of unionized US manufacturing workers Those forces found Trump, an outsider to both coalitions, willing to go much further than traditional Party leaderships to rebuild the numbers and commitment of their respective coalition voters.

The Republican wing of those forces found immense potential in Trump’s extreme hostility toward immigrants, apparent sympathy for white supremacy, support for fundamentalist Christianity, and disdain for traditional leaders of both major parties. That wing was thrilled by his promises to ban abortions, celebrate fundamentalist Christianity and the NRA, increase tolerance for white supremacy, and reject “Diversity, Equity and Inclusion” (DEI) and ecological initiatives as hoaxes or worse. These were just the ticket to reanimate the GOP’s voting bloc base. Trump reiterated promises to the Party’s major donors that he would deliver historic tax cuts, subsidies, and massive deregulation of their business practices. With their donations, of course, Trump’s extremism could secure the votes needed to have the US government deliver on promises made to both parts of the Republican coalition.

In the views of those who early found and supported him, Trump had what it would take to rescue the Republican Party from a coalition gone stale. via neglect of its voter blocs’ sufferings from neo-liberal globalization. That rescue took the form of ending the GOPs neglect of globalization’s victims while seeking to re-engage the more extreme right wing chiefly by talking much more bluntly than traditional politicians of either Party had dared. He mocked them for their timidity. He defeated them in Republican primaries. He excoriated his DEM opponents for their favoring immigrants, women and non-whites. He mostly blamed them – not big business – for the losses suffered by white, male Christian workers. His aggressive language toward all conventional politicians who opposed him aimed to prove to the masses that he would deliver what earlier Republicans had failed to do. Meanwhile, he kept reassuring the billionaires that they would receive enhanced riches for their donations.

Bernie Sanders – a “progressive” Independent who caucuses with the Democrats and describes himself as “socialist” – offered the DEM coalition a different kind of rejuvenation. He too promised much more to the DEM masses of voters than traditional DEM leaders had dared to do. What sharply differentiated Sanders were his clearly explicit criticisms of the US employer class. In his view, that class did not need or deserve lavish gifts (huge tax cuts and subsidies) from elected politicians. It was instead to be blamed and held accountable for the costs that its profit-raising decisions imposed on the working class. Sanders’ presidential campaigns showed both that mass support of its voting blocs could be rebuilt and that such support could deliver many millions in small donations

Unlike the traditional GOP leaders who failed to stop Trump and got displaced by his Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement, the traditional DEM leaders grasped how to save themselves from a comparable displacement. They committed to destroying Sanders’ presidential campaigns. Despite that, other progressive Democrats and socialists followed Sanders. Victories like those of Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez in Congress and Zohran Mamdani in New York City have further developed what Sanders started. So too did the mass mobilization in Minneapolis in late January 2026 against Trump’s ICE army with its creative and effective use of the general strike.

Polling as well as other evidence suggests that Sanders’ “progressive” wing of the Democratic Party is gaining popularity both within the Party and generally. They may well become the left-wing equivalent of the MAGA masses supporting Trump. If confrontations escalate, the US employer class may then throw its full weight on the MAGA side and fulfill the fascistic inclinations already in play on that side. As great American artists have insisted before, “it can happen here.” Trump’s strategy will then be internal repression to end the socially disruptive confrontations threatening the MAGA project, the system’s profits and possibly rising to challenge the capitalist system itself.

Trump’s internal program is still largely intact early in 2026. However, the continuing decline of the US empire and of its relative position in the world economy takes its toll. So too does mounting social opposition to Trump’s “handling” of the Epstein scandal, opposition of many inside as well as outside MAGA against the Israel-US alliance over Gaza, and widespread revulsion against ICE’s violence and its mission. Always a candidate for action to distract from mounting domestic problems, foreign affairs attracted the Trump team (despite his failure to end the war in Ukraine quickly as he had promised). However, bombing Iran (jointly with Israel), abducting Venezuelan president Maduro, threatening Greenland, Denmark and NATO over his intended “taking” of Greenland, bombing a Nigerian village, threatening to reclaim Panama, threatening war with Iran, menacing Canada and Mexico (and, of course, Cuba yet again) have proven to be unpopular in the US. So successive polls show.

Most intractable are the economic problems that beset Trump’s regime. Even if the Supreme Court validates Trump’s global imposition of tariffs, their effects are having troubling results for Trump. Far from enough new revenue will be generated to do much to reduce US budget deficits. Indeed, Trump’s proposed War Department budget increase of  $600 billion will worsen US deficits significantly. That budget increase alone is several times larger than estimates of what Trump’s tariffs will yield. Likewise, savings from Musk’s DOGE storm fell far short of generating the hyped and hoped budget cuts. Nations opposing the US takeover of Greenland led to a free trade deal between the European Union and Mercosur and renewed trade negotiations between China, on the one hand, and Germany, France, and the UK. Trump’s maneuvers to control exports of Nvidia’s semi-conductor chips once again led to China’s retaliation around rare earths. Finally, US tariffs and threats against Canada have now produced new trade deals between Canada and China. The economic impacts of these and similar deals already under consideration threaten significant long-term economic damages and costs.

Soon, the rise of China and its BRICS allies combined with the decline of the US and what may be left of the G7 alliance will shift in a basic way. One historical epoch is fading while another is replacing it. We are at inflection points where quantitative becomes qualitative and where change shifts from slow to fast. The goal of current political moves toward various forms of authoritarianism in many capitalisms is to hold all this back. But for many of those authoritarianisms, it is too late. They have inherited too many overlapping problems from capitalism’s decline. They have too little in the way of real options to solve them.

Socialisms of various kinds, variously infused with the histories and characteristics of different nations, are preparing to replace today’s authoritarian efforts to hold back historic change. Those Socialisms self-preparations entail a return to full commitments to democracy in politics but also in economics. The latter includes the democratization of internal organizational structures within enterprises (factories, offices, and stores). Socialisms are becoming the champions of democracy just as capitalism’s self-preservation forces it toward authoritarianism. Socialisms respond to their own histories by moving more towards democracy while capitalisms respond to their histories by shifting more towards authoritarian social structures. Such ironies of modern history reflect a profound period of change, full of abundant dangers but also of historic opportunities for a new and better world.

Richard Wolff is the author of Capitalism Hits the Fan and Capitalism’s Crisis Deepens. He is founder of Democracy at Work.