[By Joe Keary, Raji Rajagopalan and Linus Cohen]
Rather than gradually expanding its defense and security engagement across the Indo-Pacific, Beijing may choose to accelerate its trajectory, pushing boundaries to advance its interests and take advantage of a distracted United States. The result would be a rapid buildup of Chinese presence and a sharper, faster-moving cycle of pressure that tests regional cohesion and alliance resolve.
Earlier articles this week explored the likely effect of China’s defense and security engagement beyond the first island chain until 2031 and 2036. We’ve also looked at where friction and miscalculation could emerge. This final article examines a different future, one in which China picks up the pace in securing physical access and increasing its presence while actively testing the thresholds of regional states and alliances.
In the Southwest Pacific, a more assertive Beijing would pursue port access and logistics agreements more aggressively, including dual-use arrangements and hubs capable of sustaining persistent operations. A buildup of China Coast Guard and maritime militia activity would intensify pressure in fisheries and maritime zones, expanding Beijing’s access while testing sovereignty boundaries.
This would place Pacific island countries under significant strain. Their ability to balance economic engagement with sovereignty would be tested, and diverging responses would be likely. Some states, such as Solomon Islands, might deepen partnerships with Beijing, while others might seek to leverage heightened competition to extract greater benefits from external partners, risking regional fragmentation.
At the same time, many island countries would work to avoid such fractures. This might involve tighter management of external partners by the islands or a turn inward to preserve cohesion. Consolidating security cooperation through the Pacific Islands Forum, and consolidating engagement with traditional partners Australia and New Zealand, would help to reinforce regional norms and resist coercion. However, this could also constrain engagement with partners such as the US and Japan, reflecting difficult trade-offs to maintain unity.
In Australia’s maritime approaches, higher-tempo Chinese operations would bring capable naval flotillas, survey vessels and intelligence ships closer to critical infrastructure and shipping routes. These activities would probe Australian and allied response times while signalling China’s capacity to operate persistently in areas of strategic importance to Canberra.
Intensified live-fire exercises, seabed survey activity and grey-zone operations would place additional strain on Australian Defence Force readiness. To maintain credible deterrence, Australia would need to respond by strengthening its surveillance of the sea, its broader intelligence and surveillance capabilities and its northward deployment of forces. Greater emphasis on partnerships with middle powers and regional states would also be critical, particularly if US regional engagement fluctuated.
As activity increased on both sides, so would friction. China’s more assertive posture would test Australia’s domestic resilience, political resolve and alliance settings, while Canberra’s response, through expanded presence and exercises, would contribute to a more complex and crowded operating environment. Strategic messaging and domestic cohesion would be essential to managing escalation risks.
In the Indian Ocean, accelerated Chinese naval activity would focus on key sea lanes and chokepoints. Expansion of China’s base in Djibouti, alongside greater access to ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, would support a more persistent presence. This would increase operational proximity with India, Australia and other regional actors, likely driving deeper cooperation through intelligence sharing, joint exercises and undersea surveillance.
Encounters between submarines, surface vessels and surveillance aircraft in this environment carry inherent risks. Misinterpretation, close manoeuvring or signalling of resolve could escalate quickly, particularly around busy chokepoints. Efforts to maintain freedom of movement might generate a reinforcing cycle of action and response across vital maritime corridors.
Beyond expanding its presence, China would also seek to test allied responses. By varying the tempo and intensity of its activity, Beijing could assess thresholds, probe alliance cohesion and identify gaps in regional resilience. These actions might fall short of provoking conflict but would increase operational risk and the likelihood of miscalculation.
China’s most recent five-year plan reinforces this trajectory. Despite fiscal pressures, defense and security objectives remain a priority, suggesting that a larger and more persistent Chinese presence is likely.
For Australia and its partners, the security environment will continue to grow in complexity. If China continues to accelerate investment in its defense forces, deterrence will remain necessary but insufficient on its own. Partnership building, domestic resilience and sustained regional engagement will be critical to shaping outcomes. Persistent presence, intelligence sharing, joint exercises and operational interoperability will need to grow to manage risk and maintain influence in an increasingly contested environment.
If China continues to accelerate, regional states are more likely to hedge rather than fully align with either side, balancing economic opportunity against sovereignty and security concerns. This will complicate collective responses and reinforce the importance of flexible, inclusive regional approaches.
The challenge for Australia and its partners is not to prevent Chinese presence, but to shape the strategic environment in which that presence operates, managing risk, reinforcing partnerships and reducing the likelihood that intensifying competition tips into crisis
Joe Keary is a senior analyst, Raji Rajagopalan is a resident senior fellow and Linus Cohen is a researcher at ASPI.
This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
