File photo of the 2025 US-South Korea Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise. Photo Credit: Army.mil
August 19, 2026
By Dr. Rajaram Panda
Key Takeaways:
The US and South Korea launched the Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026 exercises (17–27 August), expanding focus beyond conventional scenarios to counter drones, GPS disruption, electronic warfare and cyberattacks in response to North Korea’s evolving capabilities.
Pyongyang’s military experience in Ukraine, closer ties with Russia, and continued missile and nuclear development have intensified the perceived threat, while constitutional changes formalize South Korea as a separate hostile state.
President Trump’s simultaneous announcement of plans to “substantially reduce” the joint drills, citing costs and his relationship with Kim Jong-un, has unsettled Seoul and raised broader questions about alliance reliability and deterrence on the peninsula.
The United States and South Korea commenced their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise from 17 to 27 August 2026, incorporating exercises to counter drones, GSP disruption and cyberattacks as they adapt to North Korea’s evolving capabilities. The allies said in a joint statement that the UFS will test operations and support the South Korean government’s emergency readiness drills. The exercise reflects the changing character of war, including the growing use of unmanned systems, electronic warfare and cyber operations.
The perceptions in both the US and South Korea about threats from North Korea has intensified in recent times after Pyongyang established close relations with Russia following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 and Kim Jong-un’s deployment of North Korean soldiers to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine. This experience by North Korea has helped to further develop and expand its nuclear and missile capabilities and taking an increasingly confrontational position towards South Korea. It transpires therefore that the involvement of North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war against Ukraine is a factor in the changing threat environment.
The drills therefore are intended to focus on sophisticated North Korean threats to the Korean Peninsula and the defence of South Korea. The drills would reflect the growing importance of unmanned systems, electronic warfare and cyber operations. In the drills, about 18,000 South Korean troops took part, a scale similar to previous exercises. The exercise will also test South Korea’s ability to maintain government operations and emergency preparedness during a crisis. This year, the military exercise is intended to go beyond conventional battlefield scenarios.
In view of the gains North Korea earned in warfare technology from its Ukraine experience, both the US and South Korea now feel compelled to prepare for a conflict that may no longer be dominated by traditional artillery and missile exchanges. Disruption of communications, GPS systems, military networks and critical infrastructure could become equally important elements of a future confrontation. North Korean forces return from Ukraine with new battlefield knowledge. Russia too has been providing addition military or technological assistance, thereby helping Pyongyang improve aspects of its own military doctrine and capabilities. For the US and South Korea, this new situation creates a more complicated security environment.
Despite innumerable sanctions imposed against North Korea because of its relentless pursuit of nuclear and missile development programs and marching towards further sophistications, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is not bothered. Kim knows that nuclear deterrence is the only means of regime survival and in no way is willing to barter away for any incentives. Kim is aware of the fate that Iraq’s Saddam Hussain and Libya’s Mohammad Gadafy and would not like to face a similar fate. Maintaining its nuclear weapons programs and expanding ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, artillery systems and other conventional weapons are the only guarantees for keeping the regime afloat.
North Korea has demonstrated to the world that expanding ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, artillery systems and other conventional weapons are unstoppable. In early August 2026, North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile banned by the United Nations towards the sea, underscoring its continued testing and development of missile systems. Pyongyang has repeatedly condemned US-South Korean military exercises as provocative and has historically described them as preparations for an invasion. Washington and Seoul, however, maintain that the exercises are defensive and designed to strengthen their ability to respond to an attack.
The on-going drills are likely to reinforce the familiar cycle on the peninsula: North Korean weapons development prompts greater military preparedness by the allies. At the same time, these exercises provide Pyongyang with further justification for expanding its own military capabilities. Interestingly, the exercises are taking place at a time when both Koreas have hardened ties following Pyongyang abandoning previous references to reconciliation and reunification and now define South Korea as a separate and hostile entity. Pyongyang revised its constitution recently and removed references to reunification and defined North Korean territory as bordering South Korea.
At the same time, Pyongyang describes itself as a “responsible nuclear weapons state” and committed to continuing the development of its nuclear capabilities. While this shift represents more than rhetorical escalation, it indicates and vindicates Pyongyang’s views that its nuclear arsenal as a permanent element of its national security strategy rather than simply a bargaining tool for negotiations.
The larger question is, why this US-South Korea joint military exercise is important and what purpose it serves?
One thing remains undisputed, that the exercises extend beyond the number of troops participating. The exercise reflects a broader transformation in how South Korea and the US prepare for a potential conflict when that occurs. For South Korea, the stakes are particularly high. Its densely populated territory and proximity to North Korean artillery and missile systems leave little room for error during a crisis. Seoul takes comfort that the US maintains a major military presence on the peninsula and regards the defence of South Korea as a central element of its Indo-Pacific security commitments.
The truism is that the exercises risk reinforcing the security dilemma that has defined relations on the peninsula for decades. While the US and South Korea view military drills as necessary deterrence, Pyongyang interprets them as evidence of hostile intentions and responds by strengthening its own military capabilities. The latest bonhomie between North Korea and Russia further complicates the matter. This larger geopolitical realignment poses bigger challenge to both Washington and Seoul.
Trump scaling down drills upsets Seoul
Amid the ongoing joint military drills, US President shocked Seoul with his announcement that the US shall “substantially reduce” joint military exercises with South Korea, citing his “very good relationship” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. This was his way to punish Seoul after South Korea declined to join the US in the “denuclearisation” of Iran. Trump reasoned that the exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the US but sends a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile. While Trump posted an old photograph of himself and Kim from June 2019, writing the two were great friends, thereby hinting his willingness to have a fourth summit with Kim anytime soon, South Korea’s presidential Blue House said it would continue diplomatic consultations on military cooperation with the US related to the Strait of Hormuz.
The US walking back from the drills was never an option as the same would have carried high cost with relatively little benefit. In order to maintain peace and stability and stem tensions in the Korean peninsula, it is essential for the military forces of both the US and South Korea to remain in perpetual readiness. Therefore Trump has taken the risk of scaling down the drills, which can damage alliance coordination, slow the process of South Korea taking on greater responsibility for its own defence, and weaken deterrence against possible conflicts in Asia. While Trump need to understand that the cost saving from downsizing drills would be marginal, the diplomatic benefits for relations with Pyongyang are doubtful. Seoul would take comfort that about 28,500 American military personnel are stationed in South Korea.
Seoul faces a critical dilemma. Seoul is seized of the fact that Trump was the first ever sitting US President to set foot in North Korea when he visited seven years ago and had two summits with Kim, first in Singapore and then in Hanoi, both yielding with no result. He also crossed the DMZ a fourth time symbolically to please Kim. This time around, Seoul takes a mixed message from Trump’s statement on Kim. If Trump is really keen to bring back Kim to the table, Seoul would be too happy to support. But what would worry Seoul more is Trump’s displeasure that Seoul was unwilling to make direct military or logistical contributions to the US hostilities with Iran. At the same time Seoul would not be too disappointed given that other US allies such as Japan, France and the UK expressed unwillingness to get involved in Trump’s war with Iran.
Seoul is also aware that Trump’s move to downsize joint military exercises with South Korea is not without precedent. Trump had suspended the exercises entirely in 2018, during denuclearisation negotiations with Kim during his first term, saying that the drills were provocative towards North Korea. The exercises were again scaled back in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. It was not surprising therefore when this time too Trump announced to scale down the drills.
Trump’s downscaling threat is a part of the larger US agenda. For quite some time, Trump has been putting pressure on both allies in East Asia – Japan and South Korea – to spend more on their defences and increase their share in security burden, as he feels that the US is providing security to the allies without getting much in return. Seoul has tried to allay US concerns and committed $350 billion investment in the US.
Kim’s larger gambit is to have another summit with Kim Jong-un as soon as possible, as negotiations with Iran falter. He has asked his officials to work out a summit meeting with Kim as early as in November during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China. Trump may be still aiming at his goal for a Nobel by securing a deal with Kim on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program.
However, Trump’s desire to have a summit with Kim is likely to remain as a pipedream as Kim’s nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities have expanded since the 2018 Singapore summit and 2019 Hanoi summit. Both talks collapsed after Trump rejected Kim’s demand for sanctions relief without an agreement to dismantle all of North Korea’s nuclear activities. It is estimated that North Korea has around 60 nuclear warheads and enough fissile material for as many as 90. Pyongyang maintains these as its deterrence ability and as insurance for regime survival, and is unlikely to surrender in any circumstance.
Even when talks for a possible summit with Kim are doing the round, Trump’s downsizing the joint military drill is keenly watched by Japan, Russia and China. In particular, China and Russia are dissecting Trump’s foreign policy and how easily the US President could abandon the US allies in East Asia. The defence community in the US have expressed disappointment with Trump’s decision to scale down the drills. Even if Trump is honestly trying to have another summit with Kim, its fate could not be any different than the outcomes of Singapore and Hanoi. The collateral damage would have been he would have lost trust as a dependable ally of South Korea and Japan, compelling both to explore other ways to secure their security. There are also talks that scaling down exercises is a precondition to talks with Kim. As of now, the claim cannot be verified. At a time when both Japan and South Korea host around 54,000 and 28,500 US troops, respectively, Trump’s demands that both cough up more cash for defense, besides issuance of onerous tariffs, and now downsizing the military drills would inevitably fuel doubts about Washington’s commitment to Asia. Kim has shown virtually no interest for talks with Trump, much less on denuclearisation.
The perceptions in both the US and South Korea about threats from North Korea has intensified in recent times after Pyongyang established close relations with Russia following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2024 and Kim Jong-un’s deployment of North Korean soldiers to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine. This experience by North Korea has helped to further develop and expand its nuclear and missile capabilities and taking an increasingly confrontational position towards South Korea. It transpires therefore that the involvement of North Korean soldiers in Russia’s war against Ukraine is a factor in the changing threat environment.
The drills therefore are intended to focus on sophisticated North Korean threats to the Korean Peninsula and the defence of South Korea. The drills would reflect the growing importance of unmanned systems, electronic warfare and cyber operations. In the drills, about 18,000 South Korean troops took part, a scale similar to previous exercises. The exercise will also test South Korea’s ability to maintain government operations and emergency preparedness during a crisis. This year, the military exercise is intended to go beyond conventional battlefield scenarios.
In view of the gains North Korea earned in warfare technology from its Ukraine experience, both the US and South Korea now feel compelled to prepare for a conflict that may no longer be dominated by traditional artillery and missile exchanges. Disruption of communications, GPS systems, military networks and critical infrastructure could become equally important elements of a future confrontation. North Korean forces return from Ukraine with new battlefield knowledge. Russia too has been providing addition military or technological assistance, thereby helping Pyongyang improve aspects of its own military doctrine and capabilities. For the US and South Korea, this new situation creates a more complicated security environment.
Despite innumerable sanctions imposed against North Korea because of its relentless pursuit of nuclear and missile development programs and marching towards further sophistications, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is not bothered. Kim knows that nuclear deterrence is the only means of regime survival and in no way is willing to barter away for any incentives. Kim is aware of the fate that Iraq’s Saddam Hussain and Libya’s Mohammad Gadafy and would not like to face a similar fate. Maintaining its nuclear weapons programs and expanding ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, artillery systems and other conventional weapons are the only guarantees for keeping the regime afloat.
North Korea has demonstrated to the world that expanding ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, artillery systems and other conventional weapons are unstoppable. In early August 2026, North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile banned by the United Nations towards the sea, underscoring its continued testing and development of missile systems. Pyongyang has repeatedly condemned US-South Korean military exercises as provocative and has historically described them as preparations for an invasion. Washington and Seoul, however, maintain that the exercises are defensive and designed to strengthen their ability to respond to an attack.
The on-going drills are likely to reinforce the familiar cycle on the peninsula: North Korean weapons development prompts greater military preparedness by the allies. At the same time, these exercises provide Pyongyang with further justification for expanding its own military capabilities. Interestingly, the exercises are taking place at a time when both Koreas have hardened ties following Pyongyang abandoning previous references to reconciliation and reunification and now define South Korea as a separate and hostile entity. Pyongyang revised its constitution recently and removed references to reunification and defined North Korean territory as bordering South Korea.
At the same time, Pyongyang describes itself as a “responsible nuclear weapons state” and committed to continuing the development of its nuclear capabilities. While this shift represents more than rhetorical escalation, it indicates and vindicates Pyongyang’s views that its nuclear arsenal as a permanent element of its national security strategy rather than simply a bargaining tool for negotiations.
The larger question is, why this US-South Korea joint military exercise is important and what purpose it serves?
One thing remains undisputed, that the exercises extend beyond the number of troops participating. The exercise reflects a broader transformation in how South Korea and the US prepare for a potential conflict when that occurs. For South Korea, the stakes are particularly high. Its densely populated territory and proximity to North Korean artillery and missile systems leave little room for error during a crisis. Seoul takes comfort that the US maintains a major military presence on the peninsula and regards the defence of South Korea as a central element of its Indo-Pacific security commitments.
The truism is that the exercises risk reinforcing the security dilemma that has defined relations on the peninsula for decades. While the US and South Korea view military drills as necessary deterrence, Pyongyang interprets them as evidence of hostile intentions and responds by strengthening its own military capabilities. The latest bonhomie between North Korea and Russia further complicates the matter. This larger geopolitical realignment poses bigger challenge to both Washington and Seoul.
Trump scaling down drills upsets Seoul
Amid the ongoing joint military drills, US President shocked Seoul with his announcement that the US shall “substantially reduce” joint military exercises with South Korea, citing his “very good relationship” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. This was his way to punish Seoul after South Korea declined to join the US in the “denuclearisation” of Iran. Trump reasoned that the exercises are not only costly, with much of these costs paid for by the US but sends a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile. While Trump posted an old photograph of himself and Kim from June 2019, writing the two were great friends, thereby hinting his willingness to have a fourth summit with Kim anytime soon, South Korea’s presidential Blue House said it would continue diplomatic consultations on military cooperation with the US related to the Strait of Hormuz.
The US walking back from the drills was never an option as the same would have carried high cost with relatively little benefit. In order to maintain peace and stability and stem tensions in the Korean peninsula, it is essential for the military forces of both the US and South Korea to remain in perpetual readiness. Therefore Trump has taken the risk of scaling down the drills, which can damage alliance coordination, slow the process of South Korea taking on greater responsibility for its own defence, and weaken deterrence against possible conflicts in Asia. While Trump need to understand that the cost saving from downsizing drills would be marginal, the diplomatic benefits for relations with Pyongyang are doubtful. Seoul would take comfort that about 28,500 American military personnel are stationed in South Korea.
Seoul faces a critical dilemma. Seoul is seized of the fact that Trump was the first ever sitting US President to set foot in North Korea when he visited seven years ago and had two summits with Kim, first in Singapore and then in Hanoi, both yielding with no result. He also crossed the DMZ a fourth time symbolically to please Kim. This time around, Seoul takes a mixed message from Trump’s statement on Kim. If Trump is really keen to bring back Kim to the table, Seoul would be too happy to support. But what would worry Seoul more is Trump’s displeasure that Seoul was unwilling to make direct military or logistical contributions to the US hostilities with Iran. At the same time Seoul would not be too disappointed given that other US allies such as Japan, France and the UK expressed unwillingness to get involved in Trump’s war with Iran.
Seoul is also aware that Trump’s move to downsize joint military exercises with South Korea is not without precedent. Trump had suspended the exercises entirely in 2018, during denuclearisation negotiations with Kim during his first term, saying that the drills were provocative towards North Korea. The exercises were again scaled back in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. It was not surprising therefore when this time too Trump announced to scale down the drills.
Trump’s downscaling threat is a part of the larger US agenda. For quite some time, Trump has been putting pressure on both allies in East Asia – Japan and South Korea – to spend more on their defences and increase their share in security burden, as he feels that the US is providing security to the allies without getting much in return. Seoul has tried to allay US concerns and committed $350 billion investment in the US.
Kim’s larger gambit is to have another summit with Kim Jong-un as soon as possible, as negotiations with Iran falter. He has asked his officials to work out a summit meeting with Kim as early as in November during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China. Trump may be still aiming at his goal for a Nobel by securing a deal with Kim on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program.
However, Trump’s desire to have a summit with Kim is likely to remain as a pipedream as Kim’s nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities have expanded since the 2018 Singapore summit and 2019 Hanoi summit. Both talks collapsed after Trump rejected Kim’s demand for sanctions relief without an agreement to dismantle all of North Korea’s nuclear activities. It is estimated that North Korea has around 60 nuclear warheads and enough fissile material for as many as 90. Pyongyang maintains these as its deterrence ability and as insurance for regime survival, and is unlikely to surrender in any circumstance.
Even when talks for a possible summit with Kim are doing the round, Trump’s downsizing the joint military drill is keenly watched by Japan, Russia and China. In particular, China and Russia are dissecting Trump’s foreign policy and how easily the US President could abandon the US allies in East Asia. The defence community in the US have expressed disappointment with Trump’s decision to scale down the drills. Even if Trump is honestly trying to have another summit with Kim, its fate could not be any different than the outcomes of Singapore and Hanoi. The collateral damage would have been he would have lost trust as a dependable ally of South Korea and Japan, compelling both to explore other ways to secure their security. There are also talks that scaling down exercises is a precondition to talks with Kim. As of now, the claim cannot be verified. At a time when both Japan and South Korea host around 54,000 and 28,500 US troops, respectively, Trump’s demands that both cough up more cash for defense, besides issuance of onerous tariffs, and now downsizing the military drills would inevitably fuel doubts about Washington’s commitment to Asia. Kim has shown virtually no interest for talks with Trump, much less on denuclearisation.
About Dr. Rajaram Panda
Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library (PMML). Earlier Dr Panda was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, JAPAN. His latest book "India and Japan: Past, Present and Future" was published in 2024 by Knowledge World. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com
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