Monday, November 03, 2025

 

A brief history of comic book vampires – including a homage to Donald Trump

Morbius faces off with Spider-Man in The Amazing Spider-Man, 1970. Art Villone


In Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula (1887), an English solicitor (Jonathan Harker) is sent to Transylvania to assist Count Dracula, an aristocrat, in his move to England. When Harker discovers Dracula lying in a coffin after feeding on blood, he understands the threat that Dracula poses to England.

Vampires have long represented our political and social attitudes to race, immigration and the threat of foreign invasion – reflecting the prejudices of their times.

My research explores how comic books and graphic novels interrogate political, social and cultural issues. Dracula became a 20th-century pop culture phenomenon, appearing in several films and TV programs. But American comic books were relatively slow to feature vampires.

In 1954, the US Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency investigated the comic book industry. Hearings were held to testify about the perceived harm caused by crime and horror comics. To allay threats to their business, publishers banded together to form the Comics Magazine Association of America and established The Comics Code of 1954, which banned crime and horror content, including stories featuring vampires. A revision and relaxation of the code in 1971 enabled vampires to be used when “handled in the classic tradition” of novels such as Dracula “and other high calibre literary works written by Edgar Allen Poe, Saki, Conan Doyle and other respected authors whose works are read in schools around the world”.

This led to the creation of the character Morbius the Living Vampire, who debuted in Amazing Spider-Man #101 in July 1971. Morbius was a scientist with a blood disease whose experimental cure using vampire bats led to his transformation.

Soon after, Dracula himself joined the Marvel comic universe in Tomb of Dracula #1 (November 1971), a series that ran until 1979. Writer Marv Wolfman and artist Gene Colan had to work within the limitations of the code by ensuring that they adhered to a traditional depiction of Dracula in line with Stoker’s original version. This could have limited the style and content of their stories, which were set in the modern era, but the inclusion of a newly created supporting cast kept the narrative fresh and engaging.

Vampires in American comic books retained this outsider status – invariably they were European immigrants like Morbius, who was born in Nafplio, Greece. In this way, comic vampires continue the literary vampire tradition of tapping into the fear of foreigners.

Doctor Doom: anti-immigrant populist politician

Comic book writer Ryan North explored a variation of this theme with Doctor Doom, the Marvel Comics’ super-villain, in issues of Fantastic Four released this year. Doom will be played by Robert Downey Jr. in the new film Avengers: Doomsday, due in 2026.

Doom rules Latveria, a fictional European country. He has recently declared himself Emperor of the World, supported by leaders of nations across the globe. Doom also uses Trump-style populism by propagating prejudice and fear-mongering against vampires.

In Fantastic Four #29 (February, 2025) Susan Storm, Ben Grimm and Jennifer Walters (also known as the Invisible Woman, the Thing and She-Hulk respectively) meet for lunch in a New York diner. They discuss Doom’s recent activities, which their waitress agrees are wrong before asserting that “at least he’s doing something about those horrid vampires”.

Outside, sat on the sidewalk, is a dishevelled, slumped vampire holding a sign that reads: “Anything Helps.” Apart from slightly elongated nails and subtly pointed canine teeth, there is nothing to distinguish him from any other normal person begging on a street.

Sue, Ben and Jen then leave the diner and encounter a terrified family of four being chased by an angry crowd. The father exclaims “Please! Leave us alone!!” and “Please don’t kill us” as they try to outrun the mob. The family, dressed in normal casual clothes, are vampires.

Protected by the heroes, the parents explain that they are starving. Having been turned away from a blood bank, and not wanting to harm people, they had resorted to eating a pigeon, which prompted the chase. Members of the crowd scream “Vampires!”, “Kill them!” and call them “monsters”. The parents are killed by a member of the mob, but the vampire children are saved by the Fantastic Four. This leads to Reed Richards (Mr. Fantastic) creating a synthetic food substance that quenches vampires’ bloodlust, before ensuring the children are re-homed with their aunt.

Thinking that solving vampires’ hunger for blood will render Doom’s propaganda impotent, the story ends on a foreboding scene: a normal suburban house in America, with parents waving off their children to school. However, their house is bedecked with Maga-style pro-Doctor Doom flags and signs. It seems that Doctor Doom is still winning the hearts and minds of many Americans.

In One World Under Doom #3 (April, 2025) a group of superheroes and super-villains team up against their common enemy and find out how Doom has manipulated the world’s leaders. Using their own powers, they discover that he has not used magic, telepathy or mind control. He has merely negotiated with other leaders to become World Emperor. His populist policies have been embraced by the public.

This, along with the anti-vampire rhetoric and misinformation, creates a powerful allegory of the far-right ideologies that are currently being propagated by politicians across our own world. This current portrayal of Dr Doom as a proxy for public figures and politicians who use anti-immigrant rhetoric, harmful stereotypes and egregious misinformation, strongly suggests that they are the real monsters. Not the immigrants – or vampires for that matter.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.The Conversation

Andrew Edwards, Student Learning Developer, The University of Law

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.


Spiritual Politics


Scary demons? Only if you harbor a little evil yourself.

(RNS) 
— Possession wasn't as spooky in the Middle Ages as it is in 'The Exorcist.'


Actress Linda Blair as the possessed girl in "The Exorcist."
 (Image ©Warner Bros. Pictures)

Mark Silk
October 31, 2025
RHS

(RNS) — On Thursday evening, my wife and I went to Trinity College’s splendid Cinestudio for a special pre-Halloween screening of “The Exorcist,” which neither of us had ever seen when it was released in 1973, or since. William Peter Blatty’s screen adaptation of his best-selling 1971 novel is about (in case you don’t know) a case of demonic possession that takes place in and around a tony Washington townhouse.

Pazuzu, the demon in question, seems to have been let loose unknowingly by archeologists at a dig in Iraq run by a Catholic priest, played by Max von Sydow. It takes possession of the pubescent daughter (Linda Blair) of a single mom Hollywood star (Ellen Burstyn) who’s acting in a movie about a student anti-war protest that’s being filmed on the Georgetown University campus.

RELATED: From exorcist to monster: How Hollywood has recast Catholicism

The heavy demonic action takes place in the girl’s bedroom. No question about it, Pazuzu is evil incarnate and — spoiler alert — will be responsible for the deaths of the movie’s director and the two priests who do the exorcism.


A half-century on, “The Exorcist” feels like an anti-Vatican II protest. His four marriages notwithstanding, Blatty was a conservative Catholic who, in 2012, filed a canon law petition against Georgetown (his alma mater) for violating church teaching by inviting abortion rights advocates to speak. “There are demons running all over that campus,” he told an interviewer.

The movie’s heartthrob priest (Jason Miller) is a psychiatrist who studied at Harvard and Oxford, disbelieves in demonic possession and has lost his faith — though before he dies he presumably regains it as a result of confronting Pazuzu. In other words, Blatty wants that old-time Catholicism back. Supernaturalism Sí! Aggiornamento No!

In fact, that old-time Catholicism took a less harrowing view of demonic possession than “The Exorcist.” The cases I’m familiar with (from books written in the 12th and 13th centuries, I hasten to add) involve much more community-minded demons than Pazuzu.

In written accounts by the likes of Parisian master Peter the Chanter, Cistercian abbot Caesarius of Heisterbach and Cardinal James of Vitry, demoniacs are distinguished particularly by the fact that they publicize people’s hidden sins. If you’ve secretly sinned and happen to be in his or her presence, the demoniac will let the cat out of the bag — unless you’ve managed to confess the sin yourself.



St Guthlac, left, performs a medieval exorcism. (Image courtesy of British Library/Creative Commons)

Caesarius, for example, tells the story of a priest who has been having an affair with a knight’s wife. Suspicious, the knight arranges to go with the priest to a nearby village where a demoniac is holding forth on the sins that “had not been concealed through true confession” of those who came into his presence. On the way, the priest, realizing what was afoot and fearing for his life, pretended a call of nature and hurried into a stable where he begged one of the knight’s servants to hear his confession.

With a new sense of security, the priest returned to the knight and together they entered the church where the demoniac was. When the knight asked about the priest, the demoniac said in German, “I know nothing of him,” adding in Latin (which the knight didn’t understand), “He was justified in the stable.”

Examples of this sort were told in order to encourage lay people to go to Confession, which in those days was so rare an occurrence that in 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council issued a mandate that all Christians had to do so once a year. The demoniacs, or at least the stories about them, thus served to spur this ecclesiastical project.

We also have examples of demons going so far as to warn people away from sin. Caesarius tells another story about a priest’s concubine who, repenting her sins, became a recluse. When a local (married) knight pays court to her and she agrees to an assignation, a possessed woman who lives nearby comes to her cell and berates her for what she is about to do. The demoniac then goes to the knight and berates him as well, thereby preventing the adultery.

Caesarius himself seems somewhat perplexed by the story, which was told to him by a monk who testified that he’d heard it from the recluse herself. The abbot sums it up by averring that the two would-be sinners were saved “through the grace of Christ and the ministry of the devil.”

RELATED: The real priest behind ‘The Pope’s Exorcist’ was a fan of Hollywood horror films

Then there’s the story passed on by the Welsh chronicler Walter Map, from a clerk named John of Platena. It seems that John was annoyed at hearing some Cistercian abbots on a visit to Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Becket praising “to the stars” their order’s hero, St. Bernard of Clairvaux. So John recounted the “miracle” of a demoniac who was brought to Bernard to be exorcized. Unbound, the demoniac hurled stones at the saint and chased him through the town until subdued.

“So this is your miracle?” asked the archbishop, displeased. “Certainly,” replied John. “Those present said that this was a noteworthy miracle, because the possessed man was mild and friendly to everyone, and troublesome only to the hypocrite, and therefore this was in my view a punishment of presumptuousness.”

Happy Halloween!


Opinion

In visit to Hindu temple, King Charles demonstrates power of presence in a divided world

LONDON (RNS) — The king demonstrated that the simple act of showing up for another faith is a civic act worth preserving.



Britain's Queen Camilla, left, and King Charles III visit the BAPS Shri Swaminarayan Mandir (known as the 'Neasden Temple'), to celebrate the temple's 30th anniversary in Neasden, London, on October 29, 2025. (Photo courtesy of the Neasden Temple)


Tilak Parekh
October 31, 2025
RNS

LONDON (RNS) — As he tied a sacred thread to King Charles III’s wrist on Wednesday (Oct. 29), the head monk of London’s BAPS Swaminarayan temple blessed the string as “a string of friendship… to ensure our bonds remain ever sweet.” The gesture marked Charles’ first visit as monarch to the historic Hindu temple, continuing a decadeslong relationship as Britain debates immigration, religious diversity and national identity with increasing intensity.

With its intricately carved limestone and gleaming marble, the BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir is widely recognized as the first traditional Hindu stone temple built in the Western world. The king’s fifth visit to the mandir, commonly known as the Neasden Temple for its neighborhood in northwest London, marked the mandir’s 30th anniversary.

“The King’s coming was more than just a special moment for us,” said Karina Patel, a British diplomat, referring to the United Kingdom’s million Hindus. “It was a powerful message from the Crown that we belong. It signals that he and the country we call home respect our faith and value our contributions to British life.”

The king has a long record of engagement with other faiths, including visits to mosques, gurdwaras, and synagogues, as well as regular meetings with religious leaders. Just a week earlier, his formal state visit to the Vatican, during which he prayed with Pope Leo, had made history.

The king and queen were greeted at the temple with flower garlands and folded hands at the mandir’s entrance. The king, the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, then stepped respectfully into the temple. He observed as children offered flowers before the sacred images and as a family performed the abhishek ceremony, a devotional bathing of the sacred image of Bhagwan Swaminarayan, the god consecrated in the temple’s central shrine.

Hinal Patel, who performed the abhishek ritual, said, “The king is a Christian and we are Hindus, yet he appreciated our expression of faith. We prayed for their wellbeing and we believe God who resides in the murti (sacred image) also blessed them.”




Yogvivekdas Swami ties a sacred thread on King Charles III’s wrist, a traditional welcome on behalf of Mahant Swami Maharaj, whose image is seen behind them, during the king’s visit to the BAPS Shri Swaminarayan Mandir (known as the ‘Neasden Temple’), in Neasden, London, on October 29, 2025. (Photo courtesy of the Neasden Temple)

In an address, the head monk, Yogvivekdas Swami, reflected on the community’s longstanding relationship with the king, recalling earlier visits and situating them within a continuum of shared causes: heritage and traditional architecture, the performing arts, youth initiatives, charity and spirituality. Bonds, he suggested, have been forged through such common-good initiatives.

A choir of children recited the Shanti Patha, prayers of peace in Sanskrit from the Yajur Veda and verses from the Satsang Diksha, a Scripture on devotional and ethical living, authored by Mahant Swami Maharaj, spiritual head of the Hindu denomination, who joined the event via video from India. Like Charles, the guru has made a commitment to showing respect to other faiths by visiting religious places like the Grand Mosque and Sikh Gurudawara in the United Arab Emirates and has engaged with religious leaders from around the world.

Mahant Swami Maharaj, 92, thanked Charles for “decades of friendship,” recalling how the king had received his predecessor, Pramukh Swami Maharaj, who founded the Neasden Temple, at St James’ Palace in 1997. In his own sermons, Mahant Swami Maharaj said, he has often quoted from a 1991 speech by then-Prince Charles, urging the rediscovery of the divine element within as the most urgent need in the modern world.

When a monarch and a prominent faith leader come together, the moment may appear symbolic, or merely ceremonial. But these two men have such well-established personal histories of interfaith dialogue that their meeting signaled not a concession to a minority population, but a real show of respect to an integral part of Britain’s faith history.



Britain’s King Charles III and Queen Camilla stand before a statue of Pramukh Swami Maharaj, the creator of the the BAPS Shri Swaminarayan Mandir, in Neasden, London, on Oct. 29, 2025. (Photo courtesy of the Neasden Temple)

The King has spoken of a sovereign’s duty to protect the country’s diversity, including the space for faith and its practice, within what he has described as the United Kingdom’s identity as a “community of communities.” His Christian convictions, he has said, bind him to those who follow other spiritual paths, as well as those who live by secular ideals. In an era when leaders are increasingly scrutinized for either safeguarding or undermining religious freedoms, such visits take on added resonance; what leaders signal through their presence, or diminish through their absence, affects the possibilities for pluralism.

As connections are increasingly mediated by screens and scrolling, distance can breed assumptions, reducing people to categories and flattening their complexity. Charles’ visit demonstrates that showing up still matters, especially in places that hold sacred meaning for their communities. Hearing from the crowd, observing non-verbal cues and listening to the candid conversations in the video coverage, one notices how much is conveyed by physical presence.

In news footage, the visit was often reduced to standard images: The king smiled in recognition as he greeted familiar monks and volunteers and wished several people “a belated Happy Diwali.” Queen Camilla admired the temple’s architecture and praised the design of a new temple being built in Paris. Gifts were exchanged. But from these royals, these smiles, handshakes and brief conversations are the human threads through which respect across faiths and cultures is built.

The intimacy was especially evident as the king and queen greeted devotees on their way out. Many in the crowd had arrived decades ago as refugees from East Africa, built their lives in Britain and had volunteered and donated generously to construct this “home of God.” For them, the moment carried a powerful resonance.

RELATED: How Hindu temples can become community pillars in a changing America

Across Britain and the United States, democracies are fracturing along lines of identity, belief and belonging. The king’s visit showed that simple acts showing respect, being present for one another’s sacred commitments, remains a civic practice worth preserving. The thread of friendship was tied at the visit’s opening with a blessing, “to ensure our bonds remain ever sweet.” The question for Britain is whether, and how, such bonds — between communities, across faiths, amid difference — can endure.

(Tilak Parekh is a researcher in religion and anthropology at the University of Cambridge, studying diaspora Hindu temples. The views expressed in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of Religion News Service.)




After Oct. 7, Jews seek healing at kabbalah-informed psychedelic retreats

(RNS) — The nonprofit Shefa integrates Jewish beliefs and rituals with legal psychedelic practices, an approach that’s especially resonated in recent years.


A Star of David mosaic in Jerusalem. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia/Creative Commons)

Kathryn Post
October 29, 2025
RNS

(RNS) — For nearly two decades, Larry Hertz, a 64-year-old professional, had found healing and spiritual enrichment through underground ceremonies where he and others took psychedelics. But there was a part of him missing: Raised in a culturally Jewish home in California’s Bay Area, he found that few in psychedelic circles knew much about Judaism; if religion was present, it was usually Christianity.

At the same time, his psychedelic practice made him feel as if he were living a double life.

“I think a lot of times when you’re in the medicine world, you can feel very isolated because it’s below ground,” Hertz told RNS. “A lot of my friends, I couldn’t tell them that I was taking medicine.”

That changed last year when an online search led him to Shefa Jewish Psychedelic Support, a spiritual community that, according to its website, bolsters “Jewish psychedelic explorers in North America and abroad.” Shefa does this by conducting psychedelic-fueled retreats that integrate Jewish beliefs and rituals, as well as by hosting a mix of events, from Purim dance parties and Hanukkah gatherings to courses in breath work and other healing techniques.




Rabbi Zac Kamenetz. (Photo courtesy of Shefa)

If its mission statement emphasizes exploration, Shefa’s focus is just as much aimed at healing, especially for American Jews grappling with trauma and fractured identities in a post-Oct. 7 world. “We know people are holding a lot of trauma, whether it’s conscious, unconscious, immediate with their own trauma, or ancestral,” said Shefa’s founder, Rabbi Zac Kamenetz. “We’re not going to resolve a global crisis, but we are going to be ourselves in the pain, the alienation, the anguish, the anger, whatever side you’re taking, or taking no sides.”

Kamenetz came to the world of psychedelics through his participation in a Johns Hopkins-New York University study in which clergy of various faiths took doses of psilocybin, the compound found in hallucinatory mushrooms, to test how spiritually attuned people would respond. While the study itself has generated as much controversy as firm results, it has fostered the launch of at least two other organizations touting its work.

On a hot August night in 2019, Kamenetz, then a director of San Francisco’s Jewish Community Center, stood in the back of a crowded Judaica shop in Berkeley to describe two psilocybin trips he experienced on separate “dose days” during the study. On the first occasion, he saw a vision of the kabbalistic Tree of Life, a diagram central to Jewish mysticism; on the second, he encountered a dark void. “Yes, there is the bliss and color and light, but then there’s a higher reality that falls away to experiencing the void,” Kamenetz said, according to The Jewish News of Northern California.

Kamenetz’s inbox quickly filled with inquiries from people looking to discuss their psychedelic experiences. Months later, as the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a global shutdown and Kamenetz subsequently lost his job at the JCC in the summer of 2020, he saw it as an opportunity to innovate.

At first, Shefa, which in Hebrew means “flowing abundance,” began as a series of Zoom-based integration circles open to Jews across the spectrum of observance. The meetings incorporated short teachings based on the Jewish calendar or weekly Torah reading, and participants shared about previous psychedelic trips.

Shefa began publishing newsletters, hosting courses and in-person events across the country. The point, according to Kamenetz, was not to encourage illegal drug use — a disclaimer on Shefa’s website says: “We do not conduct illegal activities, nor do we refer people toward illegal activity. We also do not provide mental or medical healthcare.” Rather, Kamenetz suggests that adopting a “psychedelic theology” can impact daily life by informing how people understand things such as their interconnectedness with creation or attunement to God’s presence.




A Shefa sticker that says “Judaism Is Psychedelic.” (Courtesy photo)

Shefa attracts Jews from some unexpected corners. “It’s not that I didn’t want to connect to God,” said one person who was raised in ultra-Orthodox Judaism in Brooklyn, who asked to remain anonymous. “It’s just that it didn’t feel like the ultra-Orthodox community was a good fit for where I was at that juncture. When I found psychedelics and specifically Shefa, it was like coming home.”

Kamenetz’s approach reframed his understanding of Judaism, the Brooklynite said: Rather than a system of laws, he now sees Judaism as “a path towards an intimate and transformative connection with God.”

Shefa’s events initially provided only education about psychedelics and Judaism, without involving psychedelics directly. But after Hamas’ attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, Kamenetz, who had trained in ketamine-assisted psychotherapy, began facilitating retreats in Berkeley with the drug, a powerful anesthetic with hallucinogenic effects.

Participants were required to complete a long application and medical screenings before meeting online to prepare in sessions that drew on Hasidic and kabbalistic teachings. The ketamine retreats themselves incorporate Jewish prayers, rituals and music, including a process invented by the 18th-century mystic Ba’al Shem Tov to navigate expanded states of consciousness.


RELATED: Groundbreaking synagogue lures burned-out techies with digital strategies (and ecstatic dance)

Months after Oct. 7, a 30-something researcher in the Bay Area who asked to be identified only by her first initial, A., first met Kamenetz at a Purim party facilitated by Shefa where the rabbi was handing out “Judaism is psychedelic” stickers.

It was a difficult season for A., who has family in Israel. Suddenly, the artistic and political spaces she inhabited no longer felt safe. Intrigued by Shefa, she signed up for an in-person, nine-week course and, later, a ketamine retreat.

“Judaism is going through a dark night of the soul,” A. told RNS. “People are disagreeing fundamentally about what it means to be Jewish right now, and what our relationship with our ancestral homeland means, or should be, or could be, and also how to be in the world post-Holocaust, when you realize that a lot of that negative sentiment towards Jews is still there. It is an existential crisis.”



Sam Shonkoff. (Courtesy photo)

Her previous psychedelic experiences had taken place alone. Now, they were happening in a community that deeply understood her Jewish context.
RELATED: Episcopal Church removes priest who founded Christian psychedelic society

Sam Shonkoff, a professor of Jewish studies at the Graduate Theological Union, connected Shefa to the legacy of Jewish counterculture, spearheaded by leaders such as Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi, who experimented with LSD alongside psychedelic advocate Timothy Leary in the early 1960s and later founded the Jewish Renewal Movement.

The Jewish counterculture was typically populated by politically progressive Jews who, anecdotally, gathered for underground psychedelic encounters that “sprinkled in” Jewish melodies and prayers, said Shonkoff. Often, he added, “the most potent Jewish reverberation” happened after the trip, through Jewish interpretation.

Despite this tradition, said Shonkoff, “it’s another thing to have a 501(c)(3) that has its explicit purpose to really nourish this integration of Jewish tradition and psychedelics, and to have that be aboveground now for half a decade.”

Some researchers caution that approaching Judaism through psychedelics may dilute the power of the faith, but Shefa hasn’t faced much pushback from establishment Jewish leaders. A Christian group called Ligare, by contrast, has faced significant hurdles.

Founded by another participant in the Hopkins-NYU trial, Ligare aims to help individuals process psychedelic experiences from a Christian worldview. A former Ligare intern has criticized its founder, a former Episcopal priest named Hunt Priest, warning that framing psychedelic trips in religious terms could harm the spirituality of those who have a bad experience. Priest’s enthusiasm for psychedelics also drew an investigation from Episcopal leaders, and earlier this year, Priest agreed to be removed from ordination in his denomination, after the investigation found he’d crossed the line from discussing psychedelics into endorsing them.

A third group inspired by the Hopkins-NYU study and Islam, called Ruhani, is in development.

These groups are hardly the first to fuse psychedelics and spirituality; Indigenous Americans have long fought to protect their right to spiritual practices involving peyote and other compounds, and laid the legal groundwork for psychedelic churches that claim psychedelics as sacraments normative to their religious practice.
RELATED: After a decade of controversy, clergy psychedelic study is published

It’s due in part to Indigenous Americans’ ancient ties to psychedelics that Shefa will be hosting its first legal psilocybin retreat this month in Oregon, with both Jewish and Indigenous facilitators. In preparation, the Indigenous facilitators have learned Jewish and Hebrew songs, and the Shefa facilitators are “making space for Indigenous wisdom,” Kamenetz said.

As Shefa develops its psychedelic programming, Hertz said it’s having tangible impacts. He’s attended two Shefa-facilitated ketamine retreats and plans to attend a third; the Jewish framework, he said, has created a comfortable setting where he can be his authentic self. In fact, after a hiatus from the religious expressions of Judaism, he’s recently been inspired to attend Friday night services again.

“Instead of feeling I was living a dual life,” he said, “I now have one life.”

This story was produced with funding from the Templeton Religion Trust.

 

Blood in the Water: Profit over the People of Timor-Leste


Contrary to popular belief, it turns out that sharks have an undeserved reputation for indiscriminate lethal attacks on people whose blood they detect in the water. In fact, sharks much prefer their customary aquatic prey, can tell the difference between that blood type category and others, and will therefore usually spurn edible humans that might be on offer in favour of marine animals. As food for sharks, people are a rare and usually accidental option.

No such luck with corporate-controlled capitalist governments, however. For them, so long as they yield a profit for their corporate paymasters, the sources of pretty much any old ‘blood’ will do and the more of them the merrier.

Among other things, this means that human casualties count for little or nothing so long as they are ‘over there’, do not look like ‘us’, and the killing of them can be rationalised in terms of the so-called ‘national interest’ (a catch-all that excuses doing more or less anything you like).

I mention this because I have just finished reading and commenting on Kim McGrath’s excellent and sobering book manuscript, entitled, ‘Bloody Treaty’: Australia’s Kissingerian pursuit of oil and gas in the Timor Sea (forthcoming, Melbourne University Press) (unless otherwise indicated, quotes that follow are from this source).

The book is important because it reveals in meticulous, excruciating detail how thoroughly unscrupulous, insouciant, and unrelenting Australian governments of all political persuasions have been in their pursuit of the oil and gas riches discovered in the seas that separate northern Australia from Indonesia and Timor Leste. And how, in their unseemly haste – their stampede – to acquire as much as possible of those resources, they trampled on the people of what is now the independent country of Timor-Leste and were complicit in what amounted to genocide.

The purpose of this essay is to consider briefly why it is that countries like Australia behave in this way.

In doing so, first, it gives an inkling of the human suffering of the Timorese people during a period that began with the invasion by Indonesia (in December 1975) of what was then East Timor and continued until the country attained independence in May 2002. Second, it discusses the extent of Australia’s complicity in the crimes that were committed – how far governments were prepared to stoop to get what they wanted – and the reasons for this. And third, it speculates about possible causes and implications.

During the period October 2001 to July 2008, I carried out five short-term consultancies (four for UNDP and one for UNDP/World Bank) and one long-term (two-year) assignment for AusAID in East Timor/Timor-Leste and can therefore attest personally to the devastating social and institutional consequences of the occupation and slaughter.

The discussion that follows draws principally on McGrath’s book, but also on observations made during my consulting assignments.

Carnage, Societal Turmoil, and Complicity

Australia’s attitude to East Timor has deep roots. As long ago as the 1960s, responding to Washington sources who were encouraging Australia to ‘approach the Portuguese at the highest level and insist it is time the people of Portuguese Timor were brought into the 20th Century’, Attorney-General and External Affairs Minister, Garfield Barwick, advised cabinet that Portuguese Timor was ‘an anachronism and can’t survive’. The solution he proposed was to ‘get it quietly transferred to Indonesia’. Barwick insisted that it was ‘difficult to see a practicable alternative to the Timorese people joining Indonesia.’

These are telling statements that set the tone for Australia’s relations with the Timorese people for the next half century. The subtext clearly being that the Timorese were a backward and inferior people who needed to be taught a thing or two about the modern world. It is not difficult to see how such beliefs endured and, so long as they could be said to be furthering the national interest, turned to condoning ‘appropriate’ lessons being taught and even a little (and clearly much needed) ‘culling’ here and there. Views that received considerable lubrication from the subsequent discovery of large quantities of oil in the Timor Sea.

The extent of the carnage in East Timor following its occupation by Indonesia in 1975 can be conveyed by a few stark statistics. Australian- and US-backed Indonesian rule of East-Timor resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 East Timorese – equivalent at the time to 25% to 30% of the population (do the sums and extrapolate to the US or Australian populations) – and widespread rape and torture. According to Noam Chomsky, this was comparable to the atrocities in Cambodia committed by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s and 1980s.

More of the same followed the 1999 vote for independence. Within a few weeks, an additional 10,000 people had been killed and more than 250,000 were forced across the border into Indonesian West Timor.

In 2002, I described the state of the country’s infrastructure as follows:

… the situation was one of total devastation: of the institutions of government, of basic services, and of infrastructure.

For example, late in 2000, 37 out of a total of 58 power stations were inoperable. Forty per cent (68,000) of houses and seventy per cent of all public buildings had been destroyed – government offices, schools, hospitals, seed production facilities, animal clinics, and medical and animal laboratories. In addition, forty per cent of all livestock [had] either [been] killed or taken to West Timor.

Every bank [had been] looted, which rendered the banking and payments system inoperable. All property records [had been] destroyed, and land and property ownership [became] a serious problem.

Another disturbing and striking feature of Timorese society, which I observed in 2008, was the degree to which after

… more than 25 years of war and, since independence, several more years in which sporadic internecine conflict has occurred have inured people to violence and created generations of men who regard violence as the major means of problem resolution available to them. This experience also seems to have had the effect of raising the social status of violence among young men – to a point where it is seen as an essential expression of masculinity and as a rite of passage to manhood, conferring prestige and status that cannot be gained in other ways.

Australia’s Response and Corporate Reciprocity

In order not to jeopardise negotiations over sea boundaries and the control of the oil and gas bonanza that lay beneath the waves, at no time did a seemingly purblind Australian government criticise or question Indonesia’s actions. Throughout, Australia’s sole concerns were fossil fuel acquisition and profit.

Later, when negotiating with an independent Timor-Leste, in order to gain advantage whatever the cost in terms of honour or dignity or fair dealing, the Australian government resorted – under the guise of a development assistance project (!) – to bugging the cabinet room of a fledgling Timorese government exhausted by years of war; to prosecuting Australian whistleblowers who threatened to expose its bad behaviour; and, unless they suited their avaricious purposes, to showing a cavalier disregard for international laws and conventions.

On the question of reciprocity, the cosy relationship between government and the fossil fuel corporations followed a familiar pattern, which meant that as officials were spun out of DFAT’s revolving door or other high government office a significant number of them either had velvet cushioned landings in the boardrooms of the corporations (Woodside etc.) whose interests they had been pursuing with such selfless (!) zeal in their official capacities, or they popped up as highly paid consultants to the same corporations.

The perfidy that characterised Australia’s treatment of the Timorese people, which included being an accessory to genocide, is referred to by McGrath as ‘Kissingerian realism.’

Opportunism with One End in Mind

Throughout this shameful history, in its relations with Portugal, Indonesia, and with an independent Timor-Leste, for the Australian government, the constants were oil and gas, the sea boundaries that determined who got what, and the money.

Otherwise, like a reptile that sheds its skins, succeeding governments presented themselves to those they felt held the key to these treasures at different times in ways that were designed solely to please and to obtain the best possible deal.

Conclusion

There are salutary lessons to be learned from McGrath’s compelling record (based in large part on now public official documents and correspondence) of how the people of Timor-Leste were treated by Australia and the reasons for this. Most obviously because it sets out in detail the sordid things that our governments are prepared to do – and cover up – in our names when there is money to be made, and how deep are the wells of their hypocrisy and betrayal and how frequently and remorselessly they draw upon them.

We can only imagine how much worse a picture McGrath might have presented had she had access to the many official documents that have not been released because, we are told, doing so would compromise the ‘national interest’ (that term again).

But perhaps the main lesson to be drawn from this work is that much the same motives and allegiances that drove Australia to do what it did to the Timorese are likely to be shaping government responses to what is happening now in Palestine (where, no doubt, its well-rehearsed denial of genocide will have come in handy) and the Ukraine, the Middle East generally, and regarding China.

The feculent government behaviour alluded to here and discussed in dispassionate detail in McGrath’s book was not so much a function of the colourful personalities involved as it was a central, ineluctable (structural) feature of the savage capitalism practised by the Australian state and its subservience to its delusionally omniscient and would-be omnipotent lord and master in the US.

It is plausible that our governments’ easy accommodation to such influences arises in part from the fact that settler-societies like Australia have a congenital proclivity for doing this sort of thing. A structural habit that reflects the violence of their creation and the capitalist system that depends on it, and is fertilised by a discriminatory, patronising, and dismissive view of the ‘other’.

But, clearly, this is no excuse.

All the while, scorched repeatedly by the dragon’s breath of Australian governments that, despite the sometimes warm words, cared only about profits from fossil fuels and the drawing of nautical boundary lines so as to maximise them, the people of Timor-Leste have had to endure genocide and other atrocities and in too many instances to make do with what might be said to be the leftovers of what is rightfully theirs.

In the light of this, no need to dwell on the prospects for realising from those responsible even the bare minimum of remorse, or anything like an ethical governmental response for the people of Timor-Leste that might approach that suggested by Chomsky: ‘We cannot undo the past, but we should at least be willing to recognize what we have done, and to face the moral responsibility of saving the remnants and providing ample reparations, a pathetic gesture of compensation for terrible crimes.’

Give me a (wrongly maligned) shark any day!

Peter Blunt is Honorary Professor, School of Business, University of New South Wales (Canberra), Australia. He has held tenured full professorships of management in universities in Australia, Norway, and the UK, and has worked as a consultant in development assistance in 40 countries, including more than three years with the World Bank in Jakarta, Indonesia. His commissioned publications on governance and public sector management informed UNDP policy on these matters and his books include the standard works on organisation and management in Africa and, most recently, (with Cecilia Escobar and Vlassis Missos) The Political Economy of Bilateral Aid: Implications for Global Development (Routledge, 2023) and The Political Economy of Dissent: A Research Companion (Routledge, forthcoming 2026). Read other articles by Peter.




“We Are The Working Class”?: Indonesia’s Labour Party and the Limits of Reformist Politics

Sunday 2 November 2025, by Mark Johnson


LONG READ


When more than 50 Indonesian labour unions gathered in Jakarta on 5 October 2021 to establish the Partai Buruh (Labour Party), it appeared to mark a historic moment: workers organising their own political vehicle to challenge an oligarchic system that had stripped away their rights. Yet from its inception, the party embodied a contradiction. Led by union bureaucrats with histories of elite collaboration, the Labour Party promised working-class independence whilst its president courted the very politicians who had passed anti-worker legislation. It claimed to represent the marginalised whilst maintaining "deafening silence" on human rights abuses and democratic backsliding. The 2024 elections exposed this hollowness: the party secured less than 1 per cent of votes, failing even to enter parliament. More damning still, its leadership subsequently embraced the authoritarian Prabowo government it had supposedly opposed. The Labour Party’s trajectory reveals not workers’ power, but the dangers of reformist politics in an oligarchic state—and why most of Indonesia’s revolutionary left now declares that the Workers Party has "failed to become a political vessel for the oppressed people."

Introduction

On 5 October 2021, exactly one year after Indonesia’s controversial Omnibus Law on Job Creation was passed, more than 50 labour unions gathered in Jakarta to formally establish the Partai Buruh (Labour Party). This marked a significant moment in Indonesian politics: the revival of a workers’ political party after years of fragmented labour representation and defeats at the hands of a political establishment dominated by elites with roots in the authoritarian New Order regime [1].

The party’s formation was driven by a stark realisation amongst union leaders that traditional tactics—mass demonstrations, general strikes, and lobbying—had failed to prevent the passage of legislation that fundamentally undermined workers’ rights. The 2020 Omnibus Law on Job Creation, a sweeping 812-page piece of legislation, had relaxed rules on firing workers, expanded outsourcing without restrictions, weakened severance protections, and extended overtime limits, all whilst reducing environmental safeguards and threatening indigenous land rights. Despite massive protests that drew hundreds of thousands of workers onto the streets, the law passed with minimal consultation from labour unions or civil society groups.
Historical context: Labour politics in post-Suharto Indonesia

The Partai Buruh represents the latest attempt to build working-class political representation in Indonesia’s electoral system. The history of labour-based parties in the post-Suharto era has been one of repeated failure. After the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, labour activist Muchtar Pakpahan established the National Labour Party (Partai Buruh Nasional), which competed in the first democratic elections in 1999 but attracted only a tiny fraction of votes. The party competed again in 2004 as the Social Democratic Labour Party and in 2009 as the Labour Party, but failed to secure any seats. In 2009, it garnered just 0.25 per cent of votes—approximately 265,000 ballots.

This electoral weakness reflected deeper structural problems. Indonesia’s labour movement emerged from decades of repression under Suharto, during which all unions were forced into a single state-controlled organisation. The legacy of this control has been a fragmented labour movement with over 100 specialised unions and multiple competing confederations. Of Indonesia’s approximately 127 million workers, only 2.7 million are registered union members, and these are scattered across numerous organisations with competing political allegiances.
Party structure and founding coalition

The 2021 revival drew support from several major labour confederations: the Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPI) with 2.2 million members, the Confederation of All Indonesian Workers’ Unions (KSPSI) [2] with 3 million members, and several smaller confederations. The core initiator was the Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers’ Unions (FSPMI), which represents 300,000 workers primarily in the automotive, electronics, and manufacturing sectors concentrated in the industrial zones around Jakarta and Bekasi.

To expand beyond its industrial union base, the party aligned itself with farmers’ organisations, fishers’ groups, informal sector workers, domestic workers, migrant workers, online transportation workers, teachers’ unions, and urban poor movements. With more than 80 million workers in Indonesia’s informal sector—representing 60 per cent of the workforce—the party aimed to build a broad coalition of the marginalised.

Said Iqbal, president of both the KSPI confederation and the FSPMI metal workers’ union, was elected unopposed as party president at the founding congress. Born in Jakarta in 1968 to parents from Aceh, Iqbal began his working life in 1992 at an electronics factory in Bekasi District. His experience with poor working conditions drew him into labour organising, and after the fall of Suharto, he helped establish the FSPMI, eventually becoming its president. Under his leadership, the KSPI organised major national strikes and demonstrations, including protests against outsourcing practices and minimum wage violations.
Political platform: Towards a welfare state

The Labour Party’s programme centres on what it calls a "welfare state" agenda, directly challenging the neoliberal economic policies that have dominated Indonesia since the 1990s. The party’s key demands include:

Rejection of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and restoration of labour protections that existed under the 2003 Labour Law

Ending the system of unlimited contract renewals that keeps workers in precarious employment indefinitely

Abolishing outsourcing for core production work whilst maintaining direct employment relationships

Establishing a living wage rather than the current minimum wage, which covers only 82 per cent of basic needs

Adequate severance pay protections

Humane working hours with limits on overtime

Menstrual and birthing leave enshrined in law

Universal social security coverage including health insurance and pensions

Protection for domestic workers, ship crews, and migrant workers who currently lack legal safeguards

Agrarian reform and food sovereignty

The party’s demands extend beyond traditional labour issues to encompass broader social justice concerns, reflecting its attempt to position itself as a voice for all marginalised groups rather than narrowly representing unionised industrial workers.
The 2024 elections: High hopes, disappointing results

The party’s registration for Indonesia’s 2024 parliamentary elections attracted considerable attention from commentators and civil society activists. For the first time in decades, a party backed by the country’s largest unions would compete in national elections. The party claimed it could mobilise 10 million members across 25 provinces and needed approximately 7 million votes to surpass the 4 per cent threshold required to enter parliament.

However, the election results on 14 February 2024 proved deeply disappointing. According to the official count from Indonesia’s Electoral Commission, the Labour Party secured only 0.62-0.73 per cent of the national vote—well below the parliamentary threshold. In Jakarta, where the party had its strongest organisational presence, it performed slightly better but still failed to gain significant traction.

The party’s electoral strategy faced numerous challenges. Committed to rejecting "money politics"—the widespread practice of vote-buying that dominates Indonesian elections—Labour Party campaigners distributed pamphlets and engaged in door-to-door canvassing without offering cash or gifts. Residents repeatedly asked why party workers hadn’t brought rice, cooking oil, or other necessities that other parties routinely provided. Some voters scoffed at candidates who "couldn’t enrich themselves," revealing how deeply transactional politics has penetrated Indonesian electoral culture.

A survey of709 workers in Central Java found that none of the surveyed workers supported the Labour Party, instead aligning with mainstream parties such as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Gerindra—the same parties that had supported the Omnibus Law. Workers’ votes fragmented across the political spectrum, with the top five parties chosen by working-class voters being Gerindra (20.1 per cent), PDI-P (17.3 per cent), Golkar (10.7 per cent), the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (8.5 per cent), and Nasdem (7.2 per cent).
Contradictions and critiques from the left

From its inception, the Labour Party has faced sharp criticism from more radical elements within the labour movement and the Indonesian left. Critics point to fundamental contradictions between the party’s rhetoric and its leadership’s political practice.

Most problematically, Said Iqbal’s history of collaboration with political elites has raised questions about the party’s genuine commitment to opposition politics. In both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, Iqbal campaigned for Prabowo Subianto, a former general under Suharto’s regime with a controversial human rights record. Iqbal allegedly expected to be appointed minister of manpower in a Prabowo government. After Prabowo’s defeats, Iqbal quickly pivoted to expressing support for President Joko Widodo, participating in friendly photo opportunities and initially supporting Widodo’s controversial plan to relocate Indonesia’s capital.

During the 2024 presidential campaign, whilst the Labour Party officially maintained that it could support none of the candidates because all backed the Omnibus Law, party leaders reserved the right to change policy if circumstances shifted. After Prabowo’s victory, Iqbal declared that the party and KSPI would support the Prabowo-Gibran government, prompting accusations of inconsistency from party members. At a May Day event in 2025, Iqbal claimed that 95 per cent of workers supported President Prabowo—a statement far removed from oppositional politics.

Furthermore, the appointment of Andi Gani, president of the KSPSI confederation and a Labour Party supporter, as special staff to the national police chief for labour affairs has raised concerns about co-optation. Critics argue that these developments demonstrate the "trade union bureaucracy" remains fundamentally oriented towards accommodation with the political establishment rather than building genuine working-class power.

Internal tensions have emerged between two streams within the party: the "Iqbal stream" that prioritises lobbying and negotiation with elites, and the more oppositional Political Committee (Kompolnas) stream associated with the Confederation of United Indonesian Workers (KPBI) that advocates for continued mass mobilisation and civil society activism.

Significantly, some of the most militant unions have remained outside the Labour Party entirely. The Congress of Indonesian Unions Alliance (KASBI) [3], which represents a key part of Indonesia’s independent labour movement, stayed away from the party. KASBI’s scepticism stems partly from distrust of Said Iqbal’s political history—including his 2014 statement that "human rights are not important to workers" when defending his support for Prabowo Subianto, a man accused of serious human rights violations during the Suharto era. KASBI activists also question whether electoral politics within Indonesia’s oligarchic system can deliver meaningful change, or whether it inevitably leads to co-optation.

In May 2025, the divisions within Indonesian labour manifested dramatically in two separate May Day events in Jakarta. The Labour Party, under Said Iqbal, participated in a state-aligned event held at the National Monument with President Prabowo, military commanders, police chiefs, and parliamentary leaders on stage—an event that looked more like an official state ceremony than a workers’ demonstration. Meanwhile, KASBI and 35 other critical civil society groups organised the Labour Movement with the People (GEBRAK) coalition [4], holding an oppositional protest outside the parliamentary building. GEBRAK’s demands went beyond workplace issues to include repeal of the Law on the Armed Forces, opposition to military interference in civilian affairs, and a denunciation of "capitalism, oligarchy and militarism" as "the enemies of the working class." This split reveals a fundamental divide in the Indonesian labour movement between those pursuing accommodation with state power and those maintaining an oppositional stance.

Left-wing organisations including the Socialist Union (Perserikatan Sosialis) issued a manifesto during the 2024 elections calling on the Labour Party’s left wing to maintain an independent position and avoid collaboration with pro-Omnibus Law politicians. They argued that the party risked becoming just another vehicle for elite interests rather than a genuine force for working-class transformation.
Far left critiques: "The Labour Party has failed"

By 2025, disillusionment of anti-capitalists with the Labour Party had deepened. The Indonesian People’s Movement (Solidaritas Perjuangan Rakyat Indonesia, SPRI) [5] issued a scathing assessment declaring that "the Labour Party has failed to become a political vessel for the oppressed people. The Labour Party has actually compromised with the powers it was supposed to fight. Instead of becoming a tool for the working-class struggle, it submitted to the logic of parliament and the elite."

The SPRI critique represents a broader frustration amongst Indonesia’s revolutionary left with both the Labour Party and the trajectory of the once-radical People’s Democratic Party (PRD). The PRD, which emerged from student movements in the late 1980s and played a heroic role resisting Suharto’s dictatorship—with leaders like Budiman Sudjatmiko serving long prison sentences—had itself undergone a rightward shift. In 2021, the PRD merged into the Just and Prosperous People’s Party (Prima), which subsequently aligned itself with President Prabowo Subianto’s government. This represented, in the words of SPRI activists, "a betrayal of the spirit of the people’s resistance."

The far left argues that Indonesia now faces an "alternative political vacuum" with no parties that "truly represent the voices of the poor, workers, farmers, fishers, and the oppressed." They contend that "all the major political parties and those claiming to be ’left’ have been co-opted by the elite system." This analysis extends beyond mere electoral failure to encompass a fundamental critique of reformist politics: that any attempt to work within Indonesia’s oligarchic parliamentary system inevitably results in co-optation and betrayal.

These groups call for building a new party that would differ fundamentally from the Labour Party model. Rather than being led by trade union bureaucrats with histories of elite collaboration, it would be grounded in mass movements—labour, farmers, indigenous peoples, students, and environmental activists—united under a strategic framework explicitly aimed at challenging capitalist power. Such a party would not "adapt" to elite politics but would "shake the status quo," standing "at the forefront with the oppressed people, not the owners of capital."

The Socialist Union’s 2024 manifesto articulated a maximalist programme that goes far beyond the Labour Party’s reformist demands: nationalisation of strategic assets under popular control, redistribution of national wealth, liberation of women from sexism and sexual oppression, full equality for traditional communities and youth, environmental protection, support for international solidarity and self-determination, and elimination of foreign debt for all Third World countries. Critically, they called for "national industrialisation to develop productive labour for the welfare and progress of the ordinary people"—a programme of economic sovereignty that challenges Indonesia’s dependent relationship with global capitalism.

Within this far left perspective, the Labour Party’s emphasis on achieving a "welfare state" within the existing capitalist framework represents inadequate reformism. They argue that Indonesian capitalism, dominated by oligarchs with deep roots in the Suharto era and increasingly integrated into global supply chains, cannot be reformed to serve workers’ interests. Only a revolutionary transformation that breaks with imperialism and establishes popular democratic control over the economy can genuinely address the working class’s needs.

The critique extends to the Labour Party’s failure to take clear positions on issues beyond immediate workplace concerns. The far left notes that the Labour Party maintained "deafening silence on the most controversial issues" including President Widodo’s manipulation of democratic institutions to install his son Gibran as vice president, Prabowo’s well-documented human rights violations during the Suharto era (including his alleged role in the disappearance of activists like poet Wiji Thukul), and ongoing repression of West Papuan independence movements. For revolutionary socialists, a genuine working-class party must link labour struggles with broader fights for democracy, human rights, national sovereignty, and anti-imperialism.

Yet the far left’s own organisational weakness complicates these critiques. The revolutionary groups remain small, fragmented, and lacking mass base—a reality acknowledged in their constant calls to unite social resistance with a common political strategy. The PRD’s trajectory from militant opposition to government alignment reflects not merely leadership betrayal but the immense pressures facing left organisations in a political system where money dominates, repression remains possible, and co-optation offers material rewards. The question remains whether a more radical alternative can be built without either retreating into sectarian isolation or succumbing to the same accommodationist pressures that have compromised the Labour Party.
Structural obstacles: Why labour parties struggle in Indonesia

The Labour Party’s difficulties reflect broader structural obstacles to working-class political representation in Indonesia. Several factors combine to create a hostile environment for labour-based parties:

Low union density and fragmentation: Despite the large workforce, less than 2 per cent of Indonesian workers belong to unions, and these are divided across more than 100 organisations with no unified confederation to channel collective action.

Patronage politics and money culture: Indonesian elections are characterised by endemic vote-buying, with established parties distributing cash, rice, cooking oil, and other goods to voters. Parties refusing to participate in this system face massive disadvantages, particularly when voters have been conditioned to expect material benefits in exchange for votes.

Elite domination of political space: Until 2024, virtually all parties in parliament traced their origins to the New Order period or were vehicles for elite figures. The electoral system privileges parties with massive financial resources for television advertising, celebrity candidates, and elaborate campaign infrastructure.

Lack of strong unifying figures: Indonesian political culture continues to emphasise strong individual leaders. The Labour Party has struggled to produce a charismatic figure who can command broad appeal, whilst Iqbal himself carries political baggage from his previous elite alignments.

Poverty and false consciousness: Extreme wealth inequality and persistent poverty have fragmented the working class, preventing class-based political mobilisation. Many workers identify more strongly with middle-class aspirations or religious/ethnic identities than with their class position. This "false consciousness"—where workers vote against their material interests—helps explain why so many supported parties that passed anti-worker legislation.

Gender and patriarchal structures: Women workers, who dominate labour-intensive industries such as garments and textiles, face particular vulnerabilities under the Omnibus Law. The expansion of outsourcing and contract work disproportionately affects women, who are often the first laid off and have less bargaining power in a patriarchal society. Yet the Labour Party has struggled to centre women’s concerns or develop distinctly feminist political perspectives that address the intersections of class and gender oppression.
A partial victory: Constitutional Court ruling

In October 2024, the Labour Party and several union confederations achieved a significant legal victory when Indonesia’s Constitutional Court granted 21 of 71 petition points in their judicial review of the Omnibus Law. The court ruled that workers must be given priority over foreign workers in employment, that fixed-term contracts cannot exceed five years, that workers are entitled to two rest days per week rather than one, and that termination of employment can only occur through an order from an industrial relations institution.

Said Iqbal declared the ruling "a monumental victory for Indonesian workers," though critics noted the decision came through judicial channels rather than mass mobilisation or electoral power. The court ordered the government to enact a new law within two years, but President Prabowo Subianto established a Labour Welfare Council comprising union leaders to "advise" on labour affairs—a mechanism that could facilitate lobbying but also risks further co-opting labour leadership into elite decision-making structures.
Future prospects: An uncertain path forward

The Labour Party’s trajectory remains deeply uncertain. Its failure to secure parliamentary representation means it has no direct legislative power and must rely on extra-parliamentary tactics—the very methods party leaders claimed had failed in 2020. Nevertheless, the party continues to organise demonstrations and campaigns, including protests demanding fairer public housing policies and opposing anti-worker provisions.

Some analysts suggest the party could grow if it maintains organisational discipline and continues mobilising at the grassroots level in preparation for the 2029 elections. The sting of the Omnibus Law continues to galvanise sections of the labour movement, and the party’s willingness to reject money politics—whilst electorally costly—could eventually build credibility amongst voters disgusted with corruption.

However, the contradictions within the party leadership may prove insurmable. The gap between the party’s radical rhetoric about being "the working class" and its leaders’ accommodation with elite politics undermines its claim to represent a genuine alternative. If the oppositional forces within the labour movement—represented by coalitions such as the Labour Movement with the People (GEBRAK)—decide to form their own political party, Indonesia could see competing labour-based parties that sharpen rather than resolve the movement’s internal contradictions.

The Indonesian working class remains without effective political representation in the electoral sphere. The dominant parties in parliament—whether nominally left like PDI-P or right like Gerindra—all support neoliberal economic policies and have demonstrated little commitment to protecting workers’ rights. The Labour Party’s emergence represents an important attempt to challenge this consensus, but it is very unlikely that members will overcome the structural obstacles and purge its accommodationist leadership tendencies.

18 October 2025

First published: ESSF

Sources: Indonesia at Melbourne, FULCRUM, Inside Indonesia, IndoLeft

Attached documentswe-are-the-working-class-indonesia-s-labour-party-and-the_a9246.pdf (PDF - 946.4 KiB)
Extraction PDF [->article9246]

Footnotes


[1] The New Order refers to the authoritarian regime of President Suharto, which ruled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998. The regime was characterised by political repression, military dominance, and the subordination of civil society organisations, including trade unions.


[2] Although KSPSI claimed 3 million members, the confederation’s leadership did not initially support the party’s formation, with its president Elly Rosita Silaban expressing scepticism about the conditions for labourist politics in Indonesia.


[3] KASBI (Kongres Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia) was formed in 2005 by 18 labour unions and has maintained a more militant and independent stance than the larger confederations. KASBI has engaged in direct action campaigns, including strikes against multinational corporations.


[4] GEBRAK (Gerakan Buruh bersama Rakyat) represents oppositional unions and civil society groups that reject alignment with state power and continue to emphasise mass mobilisation and protest tactics.


[5] SPRI is a coalition of radical left organisations in Indonesia advocating for a militant, democratic alternative that unites social movements under one strategic framework focused on genuine people’s power.

Indonesia
Social revolts and environmental issues in South Asia
The lesson of Indonesia
Lessons of the Defeat in Indonesia
Prabowo: Stop State Violence, Revoke Parliamentarians’ Facilities and Allowances, End Repression Against Mass Action, Provide Justice for Victims
Labour’s Polycrisis
Trade unions/workplace organizing
Energy, Infrastructure, and Civilians Targeted: Ukrainian Trade Unions Call for Solidarity
The return to slavery will not pass in Greece!
More pay, but less union democracy - A complicated strike victory at Air Canada
Building grassroots trade unionism – Troublemakers
Protests follow arrest of union leaders in Panama

Mark Johnson is IV’s correspondent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and more widely in Eastern Europe, and an editor of ESSF.


International Viewpoint is published under the responsibility of the Bureau of the Fourth International. Signed articles do not necessarily reflect editorial policy. Articles can be reprinted with acknowledgement, and a live link if possible.