.jpg)
May 20, 2026
Observer Research Foundation
By Sayantan Haldar and Tuneer Mukherjee
Observer Research Foundation
By Sayantan Haldar and Tuneer Mukherjee
The Strait of Hormuz currently sits at the heart of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which began with the launch of air campaigns by the US and Israel against Iran. Tehran’s strategic decision to partially close the Strait in response aims to pressure the US and its partners involved in the conflict to stand down, and has brought to the fore several dimensions of maritime security that continue to shape the war’s trajectory. As part of this effort to partially close the Strait, Iran has effectively blocked most vessel movement through the maritime corridor, with the exception of ships from a handful of countries that Tehran deems friendly.
Tehran’s reported use of naval mines is central to operationalising this selective blockade. The deployment of mines by Iran underscores their enduring value as a strategic tool to deny access to the Strait. While the United States has launched operations to locate and remove the mines, these efforts have faced multiple challenges to date. The episode has reaffirmed the importance of mines as a critical instrument of modern warfare. The unfolding events at sea amid the Middle East conflict have also raised urgent questions about access to and control of maritime corridors and chokepoints. These developments have not only disrupted supply chains of goods, commodities, and resources, but have also rendered the letter and spirit of a rules-based order at sea, which guarantees freedom of navigation, vulnerable to unilateral coercive tactics.
The Strait of Hormuz is a strategically significant maritime passage for oil and energy, and its selective closure has triggered a major upheaval in the global energy market, described as the world’s largest oil supply disruption. In response to Iran’s actions, the US threatened to take sweeping measures to reopen the Strait to all countries and restore stability in global energy supplies. First, President Trump announced that the US would close the Strait to ships transiting to and from Iranian ports, ostensibly to build tactical and economic pressure on Tehran. Washington then briefly launched a naval mission to escort traffic through the mined waterway, before pausing the operation to allow diplomacy with Tehran another chance. Officials from both sides have met in Pakistan on multiple occasions to negotiate an end to the conflict, but have yet to reach an agreement. Amid these developments, Iran’s restrictions on passage through the Strait of Hormuz remain in place — a unilateral closure that raises several pressing questions about maritime security.
How did Iran enforce coercive control over the Strait of Hormuz? Tehran’s strategy to close the Strait combines several tactics. Alongside naval deployments and patrols, there have been reported incidents of gunboat fire to keep vessel movement through the Strait minimal and restricted to only those ships Iran selectively approves. Central to sustaining this closure is Iran’s use of naval mines, which can be tactically placed across the narrow maritime corridor to deter and deny the movement of ships.
Naval mines have a long history of use across conflicts worldwide, playing a critical role in shaping the course of warfare during the First and Second World Wars. However, given that much of the discourse on maritime security has long bent normatively towards freedom of navigation and a rules-based order at sea, the use of naval mines — which are typically deployed to curtail free movement across the oceans — has emerged as a flashpoint in the conversation around maritime security and a potent naval strategy in the context of the Middle East conflict. Iran’s reported use of naval mines should therefore be understood as more than a straightforward attempt to deny passage through the Strait; it reflects Tehran’s broader strategy to cultivate an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability as a means of achieving deterrence.
The threat of Iranian naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz has been a long-established concern in US national security thinking. During the Tanker Wars of the 1980s, both Iran and Iraq mined the Persian Gulf to deter each other, prompting the US to conduct escort missions. During the First Gulf War, Iraq again mined the Persian Gulf to deter US naval operations, necessitating a protracted clearance mission involving eight nations. In the context of the current conflict, not only is the precise number of mines deployed by Iran unknown, but the situation is further complicated by Tehran’s claim that it cannot locate all the mines it has deployed and lacks the capability to clear them. Such ambiguity deepens the risk premium facing international shipping transiting the waterway and places the onus squarely on the US to restore freedom of navigation.
Figure 1. Naval Mines: Types and Trigger Mechanisms
Source: Authors’ illustration, generated with AI assistance.
Conceptual reference drawn from a Wall Street Journal infographic on naval mines.
Historically, mines have been the US Navy’s greatest vulnerability, damaging more ships than any other armament since World War II. The US therefore faces one of its most serious operational challenges in recent history, as any mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz carries significant risk. Iran has deployed various multi-domain assets along the waterway to enforce its selective blockade and deter any concerted attempt to clear the mines. Mine-clearing operations generally take weeks to complete even in the absence of active threats; given that Iran is likely to counter any such mission before a diplomatic solution is reached, a low-risk clearance operation in the current environment is virtually impossible. Tehran is believed to possess a mix of seabed, moored, limpet, and floating mines, including variants equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors that trigger detonation when a vessel comes within range. Figure 1 illustrates how some of these mines are deployed. Adding to the challenge, certain mines in Iran’s arsenal — such as the Maham 7 — are specifically designed to evade sonar detection.
The US has traditionally relied on dedicated minesweeping assets but has largely retired that fleet in recent years, and its current minesweeping protocols are undergoing transition. The US Navy’s principal assets for this mission are its Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which employ the AN/AQS-20 mine-hunting system. US Central Command has also reported deploying two destroyers to the region to support mine-clearing operations. However, given the operational risks involved, these efforts have yielded limited results. Should the diplomatic impasse continue, the US is likely to deploy uncrewed systems to carry out this precarious mission in such a saturated battlespace. Alternatively, Washington may look to NATO allies with specialised minesweeping capabilities to assist in clearing the Strait.
More than two months have passed since Operation Epic Fury was launched with the stated aim of regime change in Tehran. The situation today is best described as a stalemate: a selective Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, a US counter-blockade in the Gulf of Oman to restrict Iranian oil exports, and a rudderless diplomatic back-and-forth mediated by Islamabad. All the while, Iran has successfully weaponised the chokepoint to advance its strategic goals — deploying naval mines to heighten navigational risk and, in turn, driving up global energy prices. For Iran, the physical denial of passage matters less than maintaining a minefield credible enough to make commercial transit seem prohibitively risky. For the rules-based maritime order, the deeper danger is that freedom of navigation may remain intact on paper while, in practice, being held hostage by deliberate ambiguity beneath the seas.
About the authors:
Historically, mines have been the US Navy’s greatest vulnerability, damaging more ships than any other armament since World War II. The US therefore faces one of its most serious operational challenges in recent history, as any mine-clearing mission in the Strait of Hormuz carries significant risk. Iran has deployed various multi-domain assets along the waterway to enforce its selective blockade and deter any concerted attempt to clear the mines. Mine-clearing operations generally take weeks to complete even in the absence of active threats; given that Iran is likely to counter any such mission before a diplomatic solution is reached, a low-risk clearance operation in the current environment is virtually impossible. Tehran is believed to possess a mix of seabed, moored, limpet, and floating mines, including variants equipped with magnetic and acoustic sensors that trigger detonation when a vessel comes within range. Figure 1 illustrates how some of these mines are deployed. Adding to the challenge, certain mines in Iran’s arsenal — such as the Maham 7 — are specifically designed to evade sonar detection.
The US has traditionally relied on dedicated minesweeping assets but has largely retired that fleet in recent years, and its current minesweeping protocols are undergoing transition. The US Navy’s principal assets for this mission are its Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which employ the AN/AQS-20 mine-hunting system. US Central Command has also reported deploying two destroyers to the region to support mine-clearing operations. However, given the operational risks involved, these efforts have yielded limited results. Should the diplomatic impasse continue, the US is likely to deploy uncrewed systems to carry out this precarious mission in such a saturated battlespace. Alternatively, Washington may look to NATO allies with specialised minesweeping capabilities to assist in clearing the Strait.
More than two months have passed since Operation Epic Fury was launched with the stated aim of regime change in Tehran. The situation today is best described as a stalemate: a selective Iranian blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, a US counter-blockade in the Gulf of Oman to restrict Iranian oil exports, and a rudderless diplomatic back-and-forth mediated by Islamabad. All the while, Iran has successfully weaponised the chokepoint to advance its strategic goals — deploying naval mines to heighten navigational risk and, in turn, driving up global energy prices. For Iran, the physical denial of passage matters less than maintaining a minefield credible enough to make commercial transit seem prohibitively risky. For the rules-based maritime order, the deeper danger is that freedom of navigation may remain intact on paper while, in practice, being held hostage by deliberate ambiguity beneath the seas.
About the authors:
Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Tuneer Mukherjee is a Non-Resident Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
No comments:
Post a Comment