Then They Came for the Communists: Putin Regime Moves Against The KPRF – Analysis

File photo of members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) holding a rally in Moscow, Russia. Photo Credit: Bogomolov.PL, Wikipedia Commons

November 9, 2026

By Paul Goble

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin intensified pressure on radical Communist Party (KPRF) elements after the September Duma elections, arresting former candidates and charging a Komi Republic deputy with terrorism in a bid to force Moscow loyalists to discipline regional radicals.

The effort is backfiring: 80-year-old leader Gennady Zyuganov and others have become more outspoken against the war’s domestic costs, transforming much of the KPRF into a genuine opposition in the eyes of voters.

Analysts expect further repression and radicalization, setting the stage for a rare systemic-party clash that could intensify during any future succession struggle.

The Kremlin began its campaign against radical elements of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) even before the September Duma election was concluded. In the weeks since, it has stepped up this effort against both former deputies and their supporters in the population (Vyorstka, November 3).

Before the vote, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime took steps to exclude KPRF radicals from running and then to defeat them in races for the Duma and regional bodies. Despite the expectations of many, the moves against the communists did not end when the balloting was over. Moscow has since arrested former KPRF candidates and detained their supporters who have participated in protests, often held without the approval of the authorities, against the falsification of the results but with the support of radical KPRF leaders in the regions (Window on Eurasia, September 27, October 24; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, October 25).

By so doing, the Putin regime clearly hoped to force loyalist elements in the KPRF leadership in Moscow to police the KPRF itself and crack down on the far more radical party groups in the federal subjects, and even to ensure that the current KPRF leader, 80-year-old Gennady Zyuganov, would soon be succeeded by someone more prepared to cooperate with the Kremlin (Vyorstka, November 3). Despite arrests, something that has spread concern in the party about who might be next, this Kremlin effort is backfiring. These developments have prompted Zyuganov himself and his hitherto loyalist entourage to become more radical, even on issues like the way in which Putin’s war against Ukraine is hurting Russians at home (The Barents Observer, October 23; Vyorstka, November 3).


They have also had the effect of transforming much of the KPRF into a real opposition party both in legislatures at all levels but also, and more importantly, in the eyes of the population, which observers suggests increasingly views the KPRF as speaking for the people (The Barets Observer, October 29). That likely sets the stage for more repression against the communists in the coming months but also for more opposition behavior by the KPRF—behavior that may become more rather than less prominent and important as the country enters a succession crisis.

The Putin party system is based on the idea that the United Russia party will dominate the situation. The goal is for the other parties who succeed in electing candidates—and thus become “systemic” opposition parties, including the KPRF—to defer to United Russia when it comes to issues the Kremlin cares about. The system has worked relatively well in the Duma from the Kremlin’s point of view, but in the regions, often strong and more radical KPRF organizations have acted differently, not deferring to United Russia and Moscow’s representatives but instead behaving as de facto regionalist parties in opposition to the center (Window on Eurasia, March 27, 2025).

In the case of the KPRF, many Russian observers now divide the party between loyalists in Moscow and radicals in the regions. Reflecting his own desire to quiet the political system, Putin launched a campaign against the radicals in the run-up to the elections and has expanded it in recent weeks. Because most of this campaign has taken place outside the capital, of course, it initially attracted less attention.


Recently, however, the Putin regime has moved more harshly. It charged a former KPRF deputy from the Komi Republic, Oleg Mikhailov, with supporting terrorism, the first such case in recent Russian history, as well as bringing lesser charges against KPRF activists in other regions and republics far from Moscow. That has led their party comrades and voters to come out in support and, perhaps most worrisome to the Kremlin, prompted loyalist KPRF head Zyuganov to condemn these moves and take an increasingly anti-Kremlin line. As a result, what many have dismissed as a regional fronde is now seen as something far more serious, a development the independent Vyorstka news portal has documented (Vyorstka, November 3).

As Vyorstka notes, Putin’s moves against the KPRF radicals were intended both to exclude them from political life and to intimidate others in that party into deferring to the Kremlin. Many KPRF cadres in the regions have been frightened, with members asking each other who is likely to be next. Others there, however, have been radicalized by what the Kremlin is doing, speaking out on behalf of those arrested and charged. They are even raising more pointed questions about the holy of holies of the Putin years, his expanded military invasion of Ukraine.

The latter have even been joined by Zyuganov, who has asked why Russians should have to suffer to pay for the war against Ukraine, an indication that KPRF radicals are now prepared to question even that. Such dissent has deepened the divide between Kremlin loyalists within the KPRF and communist radicals even in the capital, and sparked speculation that Putin would like to orchestrate Zyuganov’s removal and replace him with the more deferential and far younger KPRF Duma faction leader, Yuri Afonin, who is 48.

For now, at least, the Kremlin shows no sign of easing pressure on KPRF radicals. Just the reverse appears likely. Many more KPRF activists and supporters are likely to face charges as the trials of those under arrest continue. Unless these repressive moves intensify quickly, however, it appears likely that while they may intimidate some, they are radicalizing many more in the KPRF who recognize that what the Kremlin is doing is a measure of their strength in the population and the Kremlin’s own weakness. As a result, they are more likely to act as a genuine opposition party not only in legislatures but also in speaking to the population. That, in turn, means actions and counteractions are likely to spiral up in the regions at first, and in the center as well.


The stage is set for something not seen before among the “systemic” parties in the Putin era—a genuine clash between the Kremlin and the radicalizing KPRF. Yevgeny Stupin, a former KPRF deputy in the Moscow city Duma, told Vyorstka:

Over the past 15 years, there have been only two structures in Russia that could organize serious protests—the FBK [the Anti-Corruption Foundation] and the KPRF. The former are recognized as extremists, and their leader, Alexei Navalny, was killed in prison. And the top of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is united and works completely with the Kremlin … But regional branches are a different world, and the party is not a single monolith, where everyone is subordinate to Moscow (Vyorstka, November 3).

The Kremlin is thus moving not against the KPRF as a whole but against radicals in the regions. Its approach is radicalizing communists against it, including at the party’s highest levels in Moscow. Putin will likely win these battles at least initially. If he weakens, or even more likely, when he passes from the scene, and the succession struggle begins in earnest, the radicalization of the KPRF that Putin’s actions have produced may have a profound impact on Russian politics, one very different from that which the Kremlin dictator certainly intends.

This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation


About Paul Goble
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
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