Wednesday, September 22, 2021

CANADA NEEDS AIRSHIP INFRASTRUCTURE
LONG READ

In a Tiny Arctic Town, Food Is Getting Harder to Come By

For her new book, Devi Lockwood traveled around the world gathering stories of how people are being directly affected by a warming planet.

PHOTOGRAPH: GETTY IMAGES


DEVI LOCKWOOD
SCIENCE 09.21.2021

This story is adapted from 1,001 Voices on Climate Change: Everyday Stories of Flood, Fire, Drought, and Displacement From Around the World, by Devi Lockwood.

IGLOOLIK, NUNAVUT, 1,400 miles south of the North Pole, is an umbrella town. The only way to get in or out is by passenger plane, dog sled, snowmobile, or—for a few weeks in summer when the sea ice melts—boat. Around 1,700 people live there. The few stop signs in town have words in both English and Inuktitut. People say yes by raising their eyebrows, and no by scrunching their noses.

When I visited in July 2018, with support from a National Geographic Early Career Grant, the sun was eternal: more than 21 hours of it. If I had arrived in June, near the solstice, the sun would never set at all—just circumambulate around us, a bright yellow juggling ball, always above the horizon. In July, there were a few hours of sunset and sunrise all at once. It never got fully dark. I learned to turn off my eyes to fall asleep.
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Life in the north is expensive. Fruits and vegetables are flown in; a 2-pound bag of grapes can cost more than 20 Canadian dollars. Earlier that summer, there had been a spate of polar bear attacks in communities nearby. People were on edge.



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There were also beautiful things. I arrived to the sound of ice melting on the beach, when a few flowers were blooming. There were insects on the hillside by the cemetery. Mosquitoes: one. Spiders: two. Sheryl, my host for the first two weeks, went to collect her water as ice or frozen snow in 5-gallon orange paint buckets. She scooped the ice with a saucepan and boiled it back home for consumption.

I visited the Igloolik community radio station, Nipivut Nunatinnii “Our Voice at Home,” and had them run an announcement that I was in town and looking for stories about water and climate change. Then, I listened.

The month I spent in Nunavut was part of a five-year journey that took me to 20 countries on 6 continents. I wore a cardboard sign around my neck that said “Tell me a story about water” on one side and “Tell me a story about climate change” on the other. My goal was to put stories of climate change in dialog with each other, giving names and voices to those impacted. I wanted to humanize an issue often discussed in terms of numbers: millimeters of sea level rise or degrees of temperature change. In Igloolik, many of the stories I heard were related to hunting and food security.
Disappearing Walrus

Marie Airut, a 71-year-old elder, lives by the water. We spoke in her living room over cups of black tea. “My husband died recently,” she told me. But when he was alive, they went hunting together in every season; it was their main source of food.

“I’m not going to tell you what I don’t know. I’m going to tell you only the things that I have seen,” she said. In the 1970s and ’80s, the seal holes would open in late June, an ideal time for hunting baby seals. “But now if I try to go out hunting at the end of June, the holes are very big and the ice is really thin,” Marie told me. “The ice is melting too fast. It doesn’t melt from the top, it melts from the bottom.”

A few years ago, she went seal hunting by boat, and brought the animal onto the land to eat fresh seal meat with her family. The skin looked “really old, and it was very easy to break,” she said. She blames this on increasingly warming water temperatures. Caribou hunting has also changed. In the 1970s and ’80s, she went caribou hunting on Baffin Island in August. Back then, it was “very, very hot, with lots and lots of mosquitoes. Now it doesn’t have any mosquitoes. The water looks colder at the top, but it’s melting from the bottom. The sea is getting warmer,” she repeated.

When the water is warmer, the animals change their movement. Igloolik has always been known for its walrus hunting. But in recent years, hunters have had trouble reaching them. “I don’t think I can reach them anymore, unless you have 70 gallons of gas. They are that far now, because the ice is melting so fast,” Marie said. “It used to take us half a day to find walrus in the summer, but now if I go out with my boys, it would probably take us two days to get some walrus meat for the winter.” Marie and her family used to make fermented walrus every year, “but this year I told my sons we’re not going walrus hunting. They are too far,” she said.

“I read my Bible every day, and I know things will change. And I believe both of them are happening now, what is written and what I see with my own eyes.”
Warming Water

Theo Ikummaq has worked as a wildlife officer in Igloolik since 1982. When Theo was a child, his family was nomadic. In the wintertime they lived in a sod house. In the spring and summer, they followed the animals: caribou, narwhal, walrus. He grew up learning how to hunt and navigate. “I was brought up to care about the environment,” he told me.

When it comes to climate change, he said, “The big thing that nobody is really aware of is the temperature change of the water. That’s what is creating climate change. Not the sky. Not the land. Water,” he said. Theo pointed out to the bay and told me that the ocean floor, 15 to 20 years ago, was averaging −2 degrees or −2.5 degrees Celsius. (Salt water doesn’t freeze until roughly −2.) “Today, any time during the year, it’s above zero,” he said. “Everything at the ocean floor is thawing.”

While people in town might not notice these changes, the hunters do. New birds come to Nunavut annually, and the diversity of sea creatures is shifting, too. “Seals are scarce,” Theo said, which tells us that “the food source of the seal is somewhat diminished.” Humans, polar bears, foxes, and wolves all rely on the ringed seal for food.

“Whatever happens in the sea affects the land. Whatever happens on the land affects the sea,” Theo said. “If you look after the whole system, the whole system looks after you. That was the theory the Inuit had at one point. We’re somewhat removed from that because we had to become like the rest of the world, to a certain degree. Other cultures coming in affected our culture. The culture coming in was stronger. We had to follow it. It was forced upon us, more times than not.”

Theo described climate change by saying, “The world shifted.” He started to notice this shift in the early 2000s. One example is the wind. When he was a child, the northwest wind was predominant, and it created a pattern of distinctive ridges that people could follow in navigation. Hunters would leave camp and follow patterns created by the wind in the snow. Later, when the wind had erased their tracks, they could return to camp by following the pattern of the ridges in reverse.

But now, the winds are less predictable. Starting about 15 years ago, “when our elders were navigating by snowdrifts only, they were getting dislocated. They ended up at the wrong place. They weren’t lost. They just ended up at the wrong place and then corrected their bearing,” he said. “The youngsters, with their GPS, were getting to the place where they had to go.”

Sightings of killer whales have increased throughout the territory in recent years. “Because the ringed seals have never seen a killer whale before, they don’t look at it as a predator, the ultimate predator,” he said. “They’re not even afraid of it.” As a result, killer whales go from bay to bay, wiping out everything. “It’s one killing machine that’s coming into our neighborhood,” he added. “It’s not just the humans; the animals aren’t aware of what’s happening out there.”
Encroaching Polar Bears

Francis Piugattuk has worked for 20 years as a wildlife technician at the Igloolik Research Center, a government-owned building on top of a hill that resembles a giant white mushroom. It was built in the early 1970s as a place to bring together Inuit knowledge and Western science. As a wildlife technician, Francis processes samples of polar bear bones and tissues and produces research permits. In the lab, he analyzes fat samples, ear tags, and tattoos to help track polar bear hunting throughout the territory. Polar bear teeth, Francis told me, “have growth rings like trees,” Suctioning out a tooth and counting the lines helps age the bears.

When Francis was a child, polar bear sightings were infrequent. “Even seeing tracks was an anomaly, a cause for excitement. And if people wanted to harvest polar bears, they would have to go long, long distances,” he said. Up until 20 years ago, the only animals attracted to walrus meat caches were arctic foxes. Now, the community is setting up electric fences and trying to extract the fermenting meat before the polar bears can get to it. While the population of polar bears hasn’t technically increased, they are moving closer to human settlements as ice patterns change. About 16,000 of the 20,000 to 25,000 bears in the world’s polar regions live in Canada.

Francis acknowledges that Western science and traditional Inuit knowledge are two systems that “seem to be at odds continuously.” When he was young, his parents waited until the last day of school in June to bring him from Igloolik onto the land for the summer. Then they followed the hunt until school started again in September. His elders would pass on lessons about which water was safe to drink—free-flowing was better than still. “Even though they did not learn what they knew in school, like we did, they learned. They had years of existence to learn,” Francis said.

Elders, Francis told me, were able to live sustainably off the land by selling fox or seal pelts in exchange for rifles, boats, and other materials. Today, it’s only those in the wage economy who can afford to buy an outboard motor or ammunition. “The cost of living is so great now that it’s not even viable to try to exist as a hunter,” he explained. “Those of us that do not hunt live on pasta and macaroni, rice, soup: food that is not as nutritious. Those that are still able to afford it are now going out and acquiring country food.” Country food, I had learned, includes traditional food such as bannock, arctic char, eggs, and muktaaq; it is often shared as a gift between families and in the community.


Climate change, Francis told me, is already here. “The ice used to stay longer,” he said.
Less Country Food, More Groceries

Terry Uyarak, a hunter in his early thirties, has deep tan lines around his eyes in the shape of his sunglasses—the sign of a summer spent out on the land. He invited me into his kitchen, where we ate muktaaq, frozen pieces of whale skin and blubber, and tuktu, caribou meat. Terry’s wife, Tanya, cut the meat with an ulu, a knife with a semicircular blade and a handle that is the sole province of women. I liked the rhythm of its rocking, the rounded edges.

Every season brings something new: beluga, narwhal, caribou, arctic char, walrus. Terry works for the government of Nunavut, coordinating programs that teach hunting to youth and document elders’ hunting methods. He is a leader in his community. “Usually in early summer, there’s no wind,” he said, noting that hunting is easier when the water is calm and there is less ice. The high winds that day had prevented him from going out fishing. He also noted that when he was younger, the ocean would freeze in late September. Now, come Halloween, he can still go boating. In the past he would be driving a snowmobile in late October.

“It’s changing quite rapidly. And I’m not old at all. I’m 31, and I can tell very much how it changed,” he said. Terry told me that polar bears are also coming closer than they used to, a threat to stored food. “Now we have to be armed all the time on our camping trips,” he said. He tries to be careful, even in the winter, to observe the ice and make sure that it is not too thin.

When hunting is less reliable, his family has to buy more groceries from the stores. “It’s very expensive, very, very, very expensive for us here.” Later, I rode on the back of Terry’s Honda ATV to the place outside town where he keeps his dog team. We tossed them pieces of raw fish: arctic char, the leftovers from his most recent catch. Terry’s face looked more complete with his sunglasses on. As we watched the dogs eat, I thought about the delicious caribou meat we had shared, still fresh on my tongue. Terry had warned me that I would crave the meat later, and he was right. The animal ran through me. All I wanted was more.

Country food is very nutritious, and also expensive to harvest. Consider 10,000 Canadian dollars for an outboard engine, then add a boat, snowmobile, bullets, gun, the cost of gasoline shipped in from the south, an ATV.

Many people can no longer afford their traditional lifestyle. Sharing the bounty is the norm and a necessity. Once the meat is distributed, it is time to harvest more.
A Shorter Seal Hunt

I spoke with Leah Angutiqjuaq, age 42, in her relative’s home in Igloolik. We had just boiled water for tea. The most pronounced climate impact, for Leah, is in the timing of the seal hunt. “The weather is changing,” she told me. “We used to go out seal hunting for one to two months. It’s only three weeks now.” When she was younger, her family camped and spent time on the land. “Now it’s different, because we need money and we hardly have any dogs. We have some, but only as pets now.”

“Our older people have passed away,” Leah added. “We can only buy food now. We used to share. If we went out camping, the family would come. Now it’s different.” Without a dog team, hunting is prohibitively expensive. “They try and let young ones go out camping, but they need money,” Leah said. “Many years ago, they used to help each other without money.” In a town where many people make minimum wage, a subsistence lifestyle is often out of reach. “Too much money now, maybe,” she said.

Before I left town, Leah sold me a white ring carved from a walrus tusk. The carving was in the shape of an owl, its wings spread wide around my finger. After I paid her, Leah went straight to the grocery store, cash in hand, to buy food.
A Fraying Food Web

When we met in Igloolik in 2018, Marie-Andrée Giroux was an assistant professor of environmental sciences at Université de Moncton in New Brunswick. She first visited the island in 2011 and lived in Igloolik for two years continuously. Since then, she has returned to the Arctic for a few months each summer to conduct research. Climate change is more pronounced in the poles than it is in lower latitudes. For Marie-Andrée, melting sea ice is the most pressing concern in the circumpolar region related to climate change. In the north, sea ice isn’t just a natural element—it’s also an infrastructure used for traveling to hunting grounds. “When the sea ice melts earlier or the conditions are not as stable as usual, it’s like the roads being unstable and unpredictable. So it has a big influence on traditions,” she said.

Wildlife has the same problem. Many species, like arctic foxes, cross between islands and the mainland using sea ice. In the winter, an arctic fox can travel for thousands of kilometers across the region, often following polar bears who prey on seals. After a polar bear leaves the seal carcass behind, a fox will scavenge and eat what remains. If sea ice conditions are unpredictable or melt earlier than usual, a fox’s access to food, water, and ability to reproduce is limited.

It’s easy to think that sea ice would impact only the ocean, but there are many energy exchanges between the terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Seabirds, for example, nest on an island, forage in the water, and then come back on the land, where their guano fertilizes plants. The tundra, as a low-productivity area, relies on energy inputs from the marine environment. This means that when sea ice dynamics change, not only marine food resources but also terrestrial resources change. And because people depend on terrestrial resources, whether by picking eggs or eating caribou, what happens to the sea ice impacts the human population, too. Everything is interconnected.

Still, the specifics of climate impacts on this system are difficult to predict without further study. “Right now it’s pretty hard to predict based on all those intricate relationships which are just being described right now,” she said.

One key species that is being affected by climate change in the tundra is the lemming. Lemmings are small rodents that spend the winter under the snowpack, where it’s warm enough for them to survive and reproduce. The snowpack, in addition to insulating their food, also protects them from predators.

Climate change wreaks havoc on this delicate balance. When the melting and freezing cycles change, the snowpack that lemmings rely on becomes less predictable. In a rain-on-snow event, the water percolates through the snow and freezes the vegetation underneath, rendering the lemmings’ food supply inaccessible. Many predators in the Arctic eat or select their breeding ground based on lemming abundance, and those same predators also eat birds and bird eggs. On Igloolik, when there are more lemmings, Marie-Andrée has observed that arctic foxes and avian predators (such as long-tailed jaegers, parasitic jaegers, gulls, ravens, snowy owls, and other raptor species) are more abundant. When climate change impacts the lemming, it indirectly impacts other species in ways that are not yet fully understood.

Marie-Andrée is most energized by climate solutions that take into account the needs and interests of different groups involved. Snow geese, which migrate to the Arctic from the United States and Canada to breed, have increased exponentially in the last four decades due to an increase in the amount of agricultural land where they feed during the winter and along their migratory path. “They have increased to a level where they are detrimental to Arctic ecosystems. When they come here to reproduce, they overbrowse the vegetation,” Marie-Andrée said. This destroys the habitat and forces predators to eat other birds at higher levels.

One approach to this problem is to implement snow goose harvesting programs—not only through a spring hunt in the south, but also by encouraging egg collection and harvesting of adults in the north at their breeding ground.

“If we can work toward supporting harvesting programs which are beneficial for conservation issues at the same time, I think that’s really good,” she said.
Sasquatch Sightings

The vast majority of Canada’s population, two out of three people, live within a hundred kilometers of the US border. In Nunavut, a territory with a population of just under 40,000 people, anyone who lives south of the Arctic Circle is considered a “southerner.” I met one of these southerners, Hunter McClain, on the street in Montreal.

Hunter is from a small town in northern British Columbia, close to the Hudson Bay Glacier. The glacier, which used to be visible on the mountain, has been receding to the point where it’s nearly invisible in summer and spring. “People who live out in the country are pretty in tune with the seasons, and we noticed changes in the wildlife,” she told me. “The wildlife has been going a bit nuts.”

One year, the bears didn’t hibernate because they couldn’t find enough food. “All the juvenile bears over the winter were running around town looking for food. You could see them losing hair, and they looked so thin,” Hunter said. “I had never seen a really skinny bear before, but when you see a skinny bear loping around and standing up, you really realize that that’s Sasquatch.” The bears on their hind legs looked like the legendary monster. Hunter was terrified, and equally “weirded out by people who live in that area who are climate change deniers.” To her, the connection to climate change was indisputable.

Adapted from 1,001 Voices on Climate Change, by Devi Lockwood. Copyright © 2021 Simon & Schuster, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Tiller Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc.
AUSTRALIA
IT'S ALL BLUE (NATGAS)
Green Hydrogen Needs To Actually Be Green — It Ain’t Easy Being Green


Ted Smout Bridge. Photo by Majella Waterworth and David Waterworth.


By David Waterworth
CLEANTECHNICA
POLICY & POLITICS
Published 2 days ago

There is a lot of talk about green hydrogen, but to be really green, the feedstock needs to be water (not so called “natural gas,” aka fossil methane) and the energy used for electrolysis needs to come from renewable energy (not coal or gas). In high school, we did an experiment where we ran a current through water and collected the hydrogen and oxygen that was produced. This is how green hydrogen is produced, but on a much more massive scale.

Based in Western Australia, Strike Energy’s hydrogen is purported to be green, but is it? Sure, the plant will be powered by geothermal and renewable energy, but the feedstock is 98% “lower carbon” gas. Only 2% will be green! It might produce low-carbon urea as a fertilizer, but its hydrogen is not green. Strike Energy is a gas company.


In every jubilant article about green hydrogen, we need to ask the question: “What is the feedstock?” It’s like the difference between an “electrified” vehicle (like Toyota produces) and an electric car (with a plug). Read carefully and see if an article mentions: water, desalination plants, and electrolysers. Calling the hydrogen green when it is produced from methane is just not cricket.

Be careful with the misleading term “renewable hydrogen” as well. This appears to refer to hydrogen produced from methane with renewable energy. Certainly that’s somewhat greener than hydrogen produced with power from coal, but is it green enough? No. That’s like a petrol/gas station being powered by renewables rather than coal. The petrol’s still petrol.

Currently, the economics of green hydrogen don’t stack up. “According to a presentation by global energy giant Iberdrola at the Ammonia Energy conference in Australia last week – the cost of wind and solar will need to fall by around 30-40 per cent, the cost of electrolyser technology (which splits water into hydrogen and oxygen) will need to fall by at least 50 per cent. The efficiency, or load factor, of electrolysers will need to lift by 10-20 per cent.” Those are major, major requirements needed to get green hydrogen competitive.

It is still cheaper (and more politically palatable) to produce hydrogen from fossil fuel gas or coal gasification than water. Also, an unintended consequence of producing hydrogen from water could be the worsening of scarce water resources in parts of Australia that are far from the coast, as some of these projects appear to be.

Could hydrogen replace the current LNG export industry? Prime Minister Morrison hopes so … but will our export partners (Japan especially) buy it if it is not quite green?

 

IEEFA Update: Why Australia is a bigger carbon pariah than we think

Counting carbon-based exports burned and smelted by others makes Australia the world’s third largest emitter. We can’t disown them as easily as all that.

The Glasgow summit on climate change is looming, and we continue to see Australia pretending to be a small emitter of carbon dioxide on the global stage.

We continue to see Australia pretending

It is not by any means. It’s all about Scope III emissions. A subject that Australian governments don’t want to hear about. Both sides of politics are no better than the other, they both put their electoral interests ahead of any vision for the future.

Australia has to share responsibility for China’s emissions

As other countries begin to reduce demand for our mining products, Australia will need that vision to replace wishful thinking that promotes statements such as: Technology will fix things; If we don’t sell carbon-intensive products someone else will; We’re only responsible for 1.5% of the total carbon dioxide emissions; It’s China and India that need to change, not us.

I find myself wondering what future Australian generations will come to think of our current decision-makers.

But let’s get to the heart of the matter, Scope III emissions. Australia puts out data on Scope I and Scope II emissions, covering what we burn here, fugitive emissions, and purchased electricity and other energy.

Scope III emissions for companies look at the whole supply chain, such as transporting resources and, most important of all, the use of our supplied products.

So, for example, if we dig out a lump of coal, it doesn’t contribute much to global CO2. But when we ship it, and someone else burns it, the carbon dioxide release is much larger.

We don’t publish official Scope III emissions in Australia

To say we dig it out and supply it, but hey it’s not our responsibility if they choose to burn it, ignores the world our grandchildren will face.

It’s like those ads on television that push sports betting and other forms of gambling: Here is the product to bet all you want, but please be responsible with betting.

We don’t publish official Scope III emissions in Australia and, to be fair, part of the reason is that full supply chain calculations are not easy to make and only a handful of large-sophisticated companies do so.

Fortunately, these do include large mining companies such as BHP and Rio Tinto. They deserve credit for doing so (and may yet be the ones to take leadership for a sensible climate strategy). So, using factors from their calculations we can have a go at applying them to just three basic product types: metals, petroleum/gas and coal, for Australia as a whole. If someone can supply better Scope III data, please do so. But, in the meantime, let’s try to put some magnitude on our supply chain responsibility.

From 1.15pc to 9.4pc of emissions

In a nutshell, we take the mining company Scope I, II and III calculations, excluding anything produced in their overseas operations (like the Gulf of Mexico, Canada, etc).

The factors from this calculation are then applied to the government Scope I and II carbon dioxide data for metals, petroleum products and coal for the whole country. This focus is on mining and excludes Scope III from other industries.

Calculated this way, Australia is responsible for a total of 3320 million tonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide in 2019, roughly five times the official Scope I and II number. Instead of 1.15% of global carbon dioxide, Australia would be responsible for 9.4% of the world’s carbon dioxide, third place globally.

Australia would be responsible for 9.4% of the world’s carbon dioxide, third place globally

If every country calculated their carbon dioxide including Scope III in this full supply chain sense, our Scope III carbon dioxide would need to be removed from other country’s numbers to avoid double counting.

Should such large numbers be a surprise? Australia is the largest exporter of iron ore, gas and metallurgical coal. It runs second in thermal coal. They are smelted and burned away from our shores.

This sheeting of supply chain responsibility to the home country, of course, is not going to happen. But these back of the envelope calculations illustrate the magnitude of the responsibility that Australia wishes to disown.

It is a case of “please take our products and if you choose to use them, well then it is nothing to do with us”.

Instead, both sides of politics duck and weave. Like swearing they didn’t ask the UK to go easy on them in the free trade agreement (FTA). Or the frenzied diplomacy to stop the UNESCO World Heritage Centre from declaring that our Great Barrier Reef is “in danger”, astounding as that seemed to most Aussies. All upside you would think.

But there were the coal ships to Japan, China, India and Korea to think of. Promises about zero net emissions in 2050 without pricing carbon because they will use things like carbon capture technology (that doesn’t deliver).

I suspect a future government dealing with the mess of climate change will probably apologise

The government of the biggest mining state literally crowing about growth and its budget surplus that is no fault of its own and oblivious to Australia’s large Scope III role in climate change.

All the while catastrophic climate events trend upwards. In the 1980s, such events averaged 292 a year, according to Munich Re, then 462 a year, in the 1990-2010 period, 730 in the last decade, and a record 980 in 2020.

I asked earlier what future generations will think of our current decision-makers? I suspect a future government dealing with the mess of climate change will probably apologise to the nation for the short-sighted leaders of today who didn’t have a plan that included our kids.

By guest contributor Adrian Blundell-Wignall 

This commentary first appeared in the Australian Financial Review on 13 September.

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IEEFA Australia: There’s a better way to manage coal closures than paying to delay them

Energy Ministers and the energy industry should reject the ESB capacity mechanism proposal

21 September 2021 (IEEFA Australia): The Energy Security Board’s (ESB) proposal for consumers to pay conventional generators such as coal and gas an extra fee for their capacity, not just the actual power they produce, should be rejected by Energy Ministers at a forthcoming meeting this Friday argues a new report prepared by energy market analysts, IEEFA’s Johanna Bowyer and Green Energy Market’s Tristan Edis.

Uncertainty in the market is driving investment risk

The report analyses the ESB’s recommended capacity payment relative to a range of alternative reforms.

It finds that while the ESB has correctly diagnosed a range of ailments which inhibit the electricity market from replacing ageing and unprofitable coal generators on a timely basis, their prescribed treatment will make problems worse.

Johanna Bowyer, report co-author says the ESB identified a key challenge facing the national electricity market.

“Uncertainty in the market is driving investment risk,” says Bowyer.

“That uncertainty is driven by high levels of uncertainty around coal exits, short term market contracting, early mover disadvantage in power technologies subject to deflation, and unpredictable government intervention, among other things.

“The ESB’s capacity mechanism involves paying generators not for producing electricity, but for being able to prove they are available in certain periods of the year when there is a risk of an energy supply shortage.

“It’s like getting paid not for working every day, but for being able to prove you would be able to be at work on some of the busiest days of the year.”

Bowyer notes the capacity mechanism will provide an additional payment to existing coal, gas and hydro generators.

“The capacity payments would be expensive, up to $6.9 billion a year in cost to consumers, or $430 per household, using Western Australia’s capacity market as a benchmark,” says Bowyer.

The capacity payment will likely delay the exit of polluting coal plants

“It is likely to not only delay the exit of polluting coal plants, but it’s also poorly designed to support investment in new dispatchable and flexible capacity like batteries and pumped hydro.”

“Further, it won’t address the investor uncertainty facing the national electricity market, as it will only push the coal exit uncertainty problem further into the future, will not lengthen contracting terms, does nothing to address early mover disadvantage, and does not address the underlying challenges in the market which are driving government intervention.”

Tristan Edis, co-author of the report, says the capacity payments may not encourage the resources that the national electricity market really needs through the energy transition.

“Comments by Energy Minister Angus Taylor appear to indicate that batteries will be cut out from qualifying for capacity payments,” says Edis.

“This is based on a dubious claim that only power sources which can deliver capacity over long periods of time can fill the gap left by exiting coal.

“Analysis that takes into account variability of wind and solar power suggests that the vast bulk of the gap left by exiting coal can be filled with batteries capable of supplying power for around 6 hours or less.”

The authors note that an insistence on long duration resources acts as a subtle but decisive barrier to new entrant competitors in batteries as well as demand response.

The vast bulk of the gap left by exiting coal can be filled with batteries

The report finds there are many more targeted and more cost-effective mechanisms that could be employed instead which address the ailments facing the national electricity market.

“A strengthened regulatory regime for ensuring owners of large and aged power stations give at least three and half years notice of exit based on providing an upfront bond could reduce the uncertainty around coal exit,” says Edis.

“Furthermore, legislation could also be enacted to set out a schedule for coal generating units to be steadily retired once set amounts of new reliable replacement capacity are built. This would increase certainty around the exit of coal capacity thereby encouraging investment in new capacity.

“Government underwriting schemes could also reduce the early mover disadvantage in batteries and other technologies and encourage new entrants to build new dispatchable capacity.

“Furthermore, the introduction of an overarching emissions reduction policy for the national electricity market would be likely to reduce the extent of ad hoc and difficult to predict government interventions currently occurring to support renewable energy in order to reduce emissions.”

The report notes that contracts with individual generators to remain open as per the Victorian Government arrangement with Yallourn should be avoided as they can act to chill investment in new, more reliable and more durable dispatchable capacity.

Contracts with individual generators to remain open should be avoided

“The lack of transparency and competitive process also raises red flags about whether such a deal provides value for money relative to other options to ensure reliability,” says Edis.

“To address concerns around the heightened risk of abrupt coal closures in the interim period until completion of Snowy 2.0, Ministers could instead consider augmenting the existing energy only market with enhanced energy reserve mechanisms like the operating reserve or the jurisdictional strategic reserve. These recommendations from the ESB may be of merit.

“Energy Ministers and the energy industry should reject the ESB capacity mechanism proposal and instead explore other options which have the potential to be more effective in overcoming the challenges facing the national electricity market.”

Read the report: There’s a Better Way To Manage Coal Closures Than Paying To Delay Them How the Energy Security Board Made the Right Diagnosis but Recommended the Wrong Treatment

Media contact: Kate Finlayson (kfinlayson@ieefa.org) +61 418 254 237

Author contact: Johanna Bowyer (jbowyer@ieefa.org) and Tristan Edis (tristan.edis@greenmarkets.com.au)

About IEEFA: The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) examines issues related to energy markets, trends, and policies. The Institute’s mission is to accelerate the transition to a diverse, sustainable and profitable energy economy. (www.ieefa.org)

Australia Claims 1.2% Of Global CO2 Emissions — Should Be 10%

3 Sisters of the Outback, Carisbrooke, Australia. Image by David Waterworth.

By David Waterworth
POLICY & POLITICS
Published 1 day ago

The hypocrites in Canberra blame the big emitters India and China for climate change, but the coal they are burning is ours. We dig the stuff out of the ground, sell it overseas, and wash our hands of the outcome. We claim to be low-carbon emitters, but it just isn’t true if you take into account Scope 3 emissions. Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions come from how we produce here and how we burn here. Scope 3 covers the emissions after our product reaches its goal (the coal-fired power station in China, for example).

Australian politicians on both sides are putting their electoral and donor interests ahead of our grandchildren’s future. There’s more ball passing than a State of Origin rugby league match. It is time we brought the politicians to account.


BHP and Rio Tinto are taking the leadership position, filling the vacuum created by the Morrison Conservative government. The Australian government does not publish Scope 3 emissions — the emissions caused overseas when the countries we blame for the problem burn our coal — but the mining companies do.

Looking at their figures, we find that Australia is responsible for almost 10% of the world’s CO2 emissions, not the paltry 1.2% the government owns up to (the domestic figure — Scopes 1 & 2). It is the third highest emitter of greenhouse gases in world behind India and China. But the bronze medal is nothing to cheer about in this case.

We have had an apology to the stolen generation — those young indigenous people removed from their parents. This took many decades. I wonder how long it will take till we have a government that apologizes for stealing the future of all people by causing an overheating planet.



See more: “IEEFA Update: Why Australia is a bigger carbon pariah than we think.”

 

IEEFA Canada: Teck’s possible met coal exit an ominous sign for U.S. coal companies

Overseas demand, high prices and climate issues give Teck cover for met coal exitFacebook

IEEFA Teck Met Coal Mine MapTeck Resources, the Canada-based copper, zinc and coal mining company that is one of the biggest exporters of steelmaking coal in the world, is considering selling or spinning off its metallurgical coal operations, according to a Sept. 14 Bloomberg report.

Any divestment of its big coal mines in British Columbia could be a signal that the company sees its coal operations as an increasing hindrance to its ability to attract investors, maintain access to capital at low interest rates, get insurance, or raise its share price as financial firms increasingly distance themselves from doing business with coal companies.

Teck may also sense an opportunity to cash out while overseas demand and prices for its coal, particularly from China, are high. The company is also among the world’s major producers of zinc and copper, which were responsible for the majority of its revenue and gross profit in 2020— a reversal with its coal segment compared with recent years. The company would presumably continue to focus on those materials, since future growth appears strong because of their use in electrical and industrial components.

The news is significant because metallurgical coal has been regarded by some big U.S. coal companies as less vulnerable to the energy transition sweeping through power markets, which use thermal coal. Arch Coal and Alpha Metallurgical Resources, for example, have completely shifted their business strategies over the past three years to get out of thermal coal and focus instead on the met coal market. The strategy shift is so recent that Contura changed its name in February to “Alpha Metallurgical.” Arch is still in the process of lowering its thermal coal exposure, but it now calls those mines “legacy” operations.

Teck’s proposal signals that metallurgical coal may not be a safe financial haven, either. While steelmaking is still highly dependent on coal, that is likely to shift as companies seek to develop less carbon-intensive energy inputs in response to more restrictive government policies and public demand. The company has also reported that gross profits from coal plunged from more than $3 billion Canadian (about US$2.4 billion) in 2018 to just $277 million Canadian (US$216 million in 2020.

Teck is no stranger to the challenges of investing in fossil fuel production. The company’s proposed C$20 billion (US$15.6 billion) Frontier Oil Sands Mine Project in northern Alberta, which was supposed to produce as much as 260,000 barrels of oil daily, was cancelled last year amid persistently low oil prices and strong public opposition. The decision forced the company to take a C$1.13 billion (US$881 million) writedown. An IEEFA analysis of the Frontier project found it to be economically unviable, and noted that the initial governmental approval for the project showed a “reckless disregard for financials” by basing that approval on overly optimistic oil price forecasts.

Metallurgical coal may not be a safe financial haven

When Teck withdrew its application to the Canadian government for the Frontier project, CEO Don Lindsay wrote, “global capital markets are changing rapidly and investors and customers are increasingly looking for jurisdictions to have a framework in place that reconciles resource development and climate change . . . This does not yet exist here today.”

This attention to how quickly investor sentiment is shifting may be leading the company to reconsider its coal operations, which Bloomberg said could be valued at as much as $8 billion. Companies with fossil-fuel assets are being increasingly shunned by investors, lenders, and insurers.

Other large, diversified mining companies have recently been working to shed or spin off their coal, oil, and gas businesses. Rio Tinto, the global mining behemoth with US$44.6 billion in 2020 revenue, successfully finished selling off its coal assets in 2018—a playbook Teck may be seeking to emulate. Anglo American, another big global mining company, whose US$31 billion in 2020 revenue came primarily from iron ore, copper, platinum group metals and diamonds, exited the thermal coal sector this year, spinning off its South African operations and selling its stake in Colombia’s Cerrejón mine. At present, the company still controls significant metallurgical coal assets in Australia. 

Teck may sense that strong recent commodity prices and other global trade factors provide an opportunity to cash out of met coal when asset values are high. This would shield the company from growing investor concerns over coal, as well as future coal-market downturns, and enable it to focus on materials with rapidly growing demand from the energy transition. That could be a bad sign for the U.S. coal companies that have staked their future on met coal.

Seth Feaster (sfeaster@ieefa.org) is an IEEFA energy data analyst.

 

 

IEEFA: Accepting gas power plants as sustainable investments in Asian taxonomies heightens greenwash risk

Accommodating the gas sector risks diluting standards and discouraging new pools of green capital

21 September 2021 (IEEFA Asia): Incorporating gas-powered generation as a sustainable investment into Asian taxonomies could have unintended consequences, finds a new report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA).

Doing so could lock Asia into a high-emitting future while also posing a credibility and greenwashing problem that Asian policymakers and ESG debt investors would be wise to avoid.

Taxonomies for sustainable finance in Asia

This is particularly important as Europe and the U.S. ramp up their climate ambition, with the U.S. Treasury releasing a guidance last month requesting multinational development banks rapidly align portfolios with the Paris Agreement, develop targets for green bonds, ‘green’ the partnerships with financial intermediaries, and align policy based operations with climate goals.

A taxonomy specifies the technical requirements of an asset or project that companies must satisfy to enable the labelling of the project as a green or sustainable investment, giving ESG investors reliable information on where to deploy capital to support the acceleration of a sustainable energy transition.

There are many Asian taxonomies in preparation

However, the report notes that controversial or ‘transitional’ economic activities such as gas-powered generation are likely to be recognised in Asian taxonomies as sustainable investments, with energy policy planners attempting to justify the merits of gas and LNG as a reasonable bridging fuel to greening the economy.

There are many Asian taxonomies in preparation that are designed to prioritise an ‘orderly transitional pathway’, including a regional taxonomy for Southeast Asia.

While most Asian taxonomies have yet to acknowledge the undue influence of the oil and gas industry, this will be controversial going forward as the region contemplates replacing coal-fired generation with gas-fired power.

“Gas is a fossil fuel and its high emissions—like coal’s—do not equate to it being a sustainable asset,” says report author Christina Ng.

“And after more than a decade’s effort, carbon capture is yet to be proven as economically and technically viable at scale, which creates a credibility issue for labelling gas power plants as sustainable investments.”

The report notes that financial institutions could also be entangled in greenwashing risk as many of them are lenders to gas-related power projects and are green/sustainable bond issuers themselves.

Financial institutions could be entangled in greenwashing risk

If a taxonomy recognises gas-powered assets as sustainable investments the proceeds from their green or sustainable bonds could be used to finance those assets. Under this scenario any such financial institution would fail the ESG market test.

Ng says policymakers and regulators that are hoping to unlock new pools of capital and meaningfully attract leading ESG investors must rationalise the issues related to gas as a sustainable investment or risk discrediting its taxonomy.

“Asian policymakers must anticipate the rigour with which ESG investors are analysing assets and using taxonomies in the most dynamic global markets,” says Ng.

The report notes policymakers considering adding gas-powered plants to an Asian taxonomy should consult widely first and consider what ESG debt investors—whose capital will determine the usefulness of a taxonomy—will be willing to fund under the sustainable label.

“ESG debt investors would need to be even more forensic in their research on what the different taxonomies will recognise and, as a result, what issuers will sell as ‘sustainable’,” says Ng.

ESG debt investors would need to be even more forensic in their research

“Investors could also be proactive and voice their concerns now over the direction of taxonomy discussions.”

Ng notes the existence of a sustainable finance taxonomy does not prevent projects that the taxonomy excludes—such as gas or carbon abatement projects—from being financed through conventional sources of finance. They just would not be labelled sustainable investments or qualify for sustainable debt instruments.

“If Asian policymakers and regulators want market development to proceed smoothly and taxonomies to be influential, now is the time to appreciate that industry is only one voice in market creation,” says Ng.

Read the report: Asian Hopes for Sustainable Finance Will Rest on More Credible Taxonomies – Accepting Gas Power Plants as Sustainable Investments Heightens Greenwash Risk

Media contact: Kate Finlayson (kfinlayson@ieefa.org) +61 418 254 237

Author contact: Christina Ng (cng@ieefa.org)

About IEEFA: The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) examines issues related to energy markets, trends, and policies. The Institute’s mission is to accelerate the transition to a diverse, sustainable and profitable energy economy. (www.ieefa.org)

 

Offshore Wind Turbine Builder Vestas Closes Three Factories

vestas
Vestas 9.5 MW turbines at the new Triton Knoll wind farm (RWE UK)

PUBLISHED SEP 21, 2021 12:33 AM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

After reporting mixed financial results in the second quarter, with rising revenue but slim margins, wind turbine manufacturer Vestas has announced that it is closing three of its factories in Europe, including a facility that makes power components for one of its largest offshore models.

Vestas is the leading manufacturer in the onshore wind turbine market, and it has a portfolio of offshore turbine models as well, including a new 15 GW giant with the largest swept area in the industry. Scale is key in offshore wind project developments, and Vestas' leap forward from 9.5 to 15 GW at the high end of its range will help it to keep pace with competitor Siemens Gamesa and GE, which have recently boosted the top end of their respective lineups to 14 GW.

Vestas’ factory in Esbjerg, Denmark makes power conversion modules for two previous generations of offshore wind turbine, the V164 and the 9.5 GW V174. The factory employs about 75 people, and it is on the list for closure. "As demand for these modules will gradually shift to markets primarily outside of Europe and be delivered via more localized manufacturing facilities, Vestas expects to conclude production of power conversion modules in Esbjerg during the first half of 2022," the company said. 

Vestas said that it will look for opportunities to relocate the staff currently working at its factory in Esbjerg to other sites in Denmark, where it has a total of nearly 6,000 employees. 

In Spain, Vestas will be closing a factory that makes control panels for the V164 offshore turbine and generators for its smaller 2 MW onshore turbines. Demand for the 2 MW platform is falling, Vestas will close its factory in Viviero and offer opportunities to employees to relocate to other sites; about 115 personnel will be affected. 

In Germany, Vestas is planning to sunset its factory in Lauchhammer, which makes a limited number of turbine blades for its V117 and V136 series. The company expects to make enough blades for these models using supply from its other factories around the world. The expectation is to end production in Lauchhammer by the end of 2021, and about 460 people will be affected. As elsewhere, Vestas will work to find new opportunities for employees who are displaced by the closure. 

"Today’s fast-moving energy transition, rapid introduction of new products and recent integration of our onshore and offshore business require us to further mature and evolve our supply chain network and manufacturing footprint," said COO and EVP Tommy Rahbek Nielsen. "I would like to emphasise that we are deeply committed to explore opportunities to relocate our colleagues, who unfortunately will be impacted by the cease of production at our factories in Lauchhammer, Viveiro and Esbjerg."

 

Vestas to Close Offshore Wind Factories in Denmark and Spain

Danish wind turbine manufacturer Vestas plans to cease production at its factories in Viveiro, Spain, and Esbjerg, Denmark, as well as the onshore wind factory in Lauchhammer, Germany.

Vestas said that the move is part of the company’s integration of its onshore and offshore business started after Vestas acquired a 100 per cent stake in MHI Vestas from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

The factory in Esbjerg employs approximately 75 people who manufacture power conversion modules for the V164 and V174 offshore turbines.

As demand for these modules will gradually shift to markets primarily outside of Europe and be delivered via more localised manufacturing facilities, Vestas expects to conclude the production of power conversion modules in Esbjerg during the first half of 2022.

The company will explore opportunities to relocate employees currently working at the factory in Esbjerg to other Vestas sites in Denmark.

The Viveiro factory employs approximately 115 people who manufacture generators for the 2 MW onshore platform as well as control panels for the V164 offshore turbine for markets outside of Spain.

Due to both the decrease in demand for the 2 MW platform and the need to optimise offshore manufacturing, it is no longer sustainable to continue activities in Viveiro, Vestas said.

Based on current plans, Vestas expects to finalise production in Viveiro end of 2021 and will offer opportunities to relocate employees currently working in Viveiro to other Vestas sites in Spain.

”Today’s fast-moving energy transition, rapid introduction of new products and recent integration of our onshore and offshore business require us to further mature and evolve our supply chain network and manufacturing footprint,” said Executive Vice President and COO Tommy Rahbek Nielsen.

”While Vestas will sustain a strong footprint in Europe across manufacturing and service activities, it’s always hard to make decisions that negatively affect our good, hardworking colleagues at Vestas. I would like to emphasise that we are deeply committed to explore opportunities to relocate our colleagues, who unfortunately will be impacted by the cease of production at our factories in Lauchhammer, Viveiro and Esbjerg.”

Where required by local law, Vestas will now initiate legal proceedings and negotiations with worker’s representatives and the local work councils for all affected employees. The total cost of this adjustment of Vestas’ manufacturing onshore and offshore footprint will depend on specifics related to the outcome of negotiations with work councils, sale of buildings, etc. As indicated in Vestas’ guidance for 2021, the total cost will be booked as special items related to the integration of the offshore business and will be recognised in the third quarter of 2021.