Thursday, January 13, 2022

 Analysis;

Threats of Israeli chemical weapons arsenals, meaningful Western silence

  
Threats of Israeli chemical weapons arsenals, meaningful Western silence

Since its establishment, the Israeli regime has been struggling to acquire arms and equipment granting it military capability and deterrence in the face of regional countries and the Palestinians and enabling it to pursue its expansionist goals in the region.

AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Since its establishment, the Israeli regime has been struggling to acquire arms and equipment granting it military capability and deterrence in the face of regional countries and the Palestinians and enabling it to pursue its expansionist goals in the region. 

Tel Aviv defines its military doctrine based on pre-emptive strikes using any type of weapons including biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Despite building nuclear warheads and various chemical weapons, it declined to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an agreement seeking prevention of stockpiling nuclear weapons. It has so far escaped punishment and international diplomatic limitations despite use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and internationally-banned arms in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria. 

Israeli chemical weapons use records 

The Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress has described the Israeli regime as having chemical arms capabilities and an undeclared biological weapons program, adding that Tel Aviv used chemical weapons in various wars against civilians. 

In February 2001, Israel used toxic gases against the people in Gaza Strip, causing many women and children to suffer suffocation, muscle cramps, and convulsions. Also, in March 2001, Tel Aviv gassed Al-Bireh village in Gaza. 

In its aggression against Lebanon and Gaza, Israel military used banned weapons, including four unknown types of weapons, against the Lebanese people, including cluster bombs, phosphorous bombs, unknown bombs emitting unknown fumes with a foul odor, and bullets that turn into 300 fragments after the explosion and can cover an area of 200×400 meters. 

Additionally, the injuries inflicted on Palestinians during Gaza bombing in 2014 war also demonstrate the fact that the Israeli regime used depleted uranium and chemical weapons in the Palestinian enclave. Norwegian doctors told Al-Alam news network that uranium traces have been discovered in the bombed areas of Gaza. 

Also, during the 11-day Israeli war on Gaza in May 2021, the Israeli army targeted Gaza with missiles containing chemical and toxic substances. Gaza-based medical centers asserted that a number of Palestinians died after breathing the toxic material fired by Israeli forces. There were clear signs on their bodies showing they died of gas, the centers continued. 

Syria, a showcase of Western contradictory behavior regarding chemical disarmament 

When the Syrian government was accused of using chemical weapons in 2013 against militants, Western countries, led by the US, threatened Damascus with military action should it does hand over its chemical weapons, claiming that the Syrian government had crossed the red lines. In the midst of the Syrian crisis, this became a pretext for increasing political and military pressure on the country, and as a result of these pressures, the government of President Bashar al-Assad agreed to accept the protocol banning the spread of chemical weapons, and as a result, all of its chemical weapons were destroyed. 

There was no evidence the government used chemicals against foreign-backed insurgents and the NPT spokesman at the International Court of Justice said the Israeli and American-provided evidence do not correspond to the standards required by the UN on use of WMDs. Exactly at the time Syrian chemical weapons were destroyed, Moscow and Damascus reported that foreign-backed terrorist fighters acquired chemical weapons with the likeliest provider being the Israeli government as it already supplied them with arms. 

Despite proofs that the Israeli regime used WMDs several times, it has never come under pressures to destroy its weapons or sign the NPT.

Dual standards regarding use of banned weapons 

The American journalist Seymour Hersh in his book The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy writes that the beginning of Israel's chemical and biological weapons program dates back to the 1960s, and in addition, in the Tel Aviv equipped some countries, such as Taiwan, with chemical weapons and transferred chemical weapons technology to others. Also, according to US intelligence assessments, the Israeli regime had tested chemical weapons in Negev desert. These measures have not met with a reaction from Western powers, especially the US, Britain or France in show of double standards in dealing with WMDs use. 

Former British member of parliament Sarah Wollaston, who voted against authorization for British government motion to join war on Syria in 2013, said in an interview with The Guardian "I've been looking at cluster weapons this week, and I think it would send an incredibly mixed message for the US to be dropping bombs on Syria because they say they're using a hideous weapon, when they're selling another hideous weapon – a third of whose victims are children – to Saudi Arabia. I think that people in the region look at that and say: where's the consistency from the world's moral policemen on innocent victims of weapons like this?.... "Look at white phosphorus. There's been very clearly documented examples where it's been used as a weapon, fired directly at people, and there's no doubt it's a chemical weapon used in those circumstances. It's a chemical which oxidizes on contact with air and just keeps burning. It inflicts hideous burns because it just keeps on burning until it runs out of oxygen, so right down to the bone. It's a really horrible weapon, and yet we don't call that a chemical weapon, because it's been used by US troops and it's been used by Israel. Again it's that kind of double standard that creates resentment about what's important."  

At a UN Security Council meeting focusing on West Asia region and chemical weapons on January 6, Iran's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Zahra Ershadi said: "It is a matter of grave concern that, as a result of the United States' failure to comply, as the only member of the Convention still possessing chemical weapons, with its commitments on the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons, this goal has not yet been achieved…. Another obstacle in this regard is the non-universality of the convention. To achieve this lofty goal, the Israeli regime must be forced to accede to this convention without any further prerequisites or delays."

To Help Central Asia, Engage with Muslim Civil Society

Kazakhstan’s violent upheaval this month underscores that governments and international organizations need to more effectively help Central Asia’s 76 million people build responsive, effective governance across their five nations. Mass protests or communal violence also have struck Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in recent years. As the United States, allied governments and international institutions seek ways to promote nonviolent transitions toward more stable, democratic rule, new research suggests that they explore for partners in an often-ignored sector—Central Asia’s active and disparate Muslim civil society.

Tajik men pray in the central mosque of Dushanbe in 2011. Central Asia’s governments mix tolerance and suppression of Islamic activities and groups, so many Muslim civil society organizations maintain a low profile. (James Hill/The New York Times)
Tajik men pray in the central mosque of Dushanbe in 2011. Central Asia’s governments mix tolerance and suppression of Islamic activities and groups, so many Muslim civil society organizations maintain a low profile. (James Hill/The New York Times)

Organizations working to build democracy and peace abroad increasingly recognize an imperative to work with local civil society in nations facing violent conflict. In any country, what we call “civil society”—a landscape of community organizations, social movements and other groups independent of governments and business—offers well-rooted, effective partners for nonviolent work to heal divides between governments and the governed. Still, habit and human nature lead us to seek our partnerships primarily among those parts of civil society that look most familiar. For many, this means secular groups that seem to reflect Western or international norms.

Yet Central Asia’s civil societies, as across the Muslim world, are rooted significantly in Islamic religious identities that tend to discourage Western and international organizations from constructively engaging them, says Sebastien Peyrouse, co-author of a new study of Muslim civil society across four of the five Central Asian nations. In Islamic countries of the Middle East, international organizations have partly overcome this barrier through years of exploration to find and engage strong partners within Muslim civil society. But not yet in Central Asia, Peyrouse stressed in an interview.

“The current upheaval in Kazakhstan reflects a broad crisis of government legitimacy that puts at risk the stability of an entire region,” Peyrouse said. “An important way for the international community to do better in helping build the effectiveness and legitimacy of Central Asia’s states is to reach out more broadly than we have so far to understand and work with Muslim civil society.”

After 30 Years, Eroded Hopes

The collapse of the Soviet Union exactly 30 years ago was driven by popular demands for change expressed via a nascent civil society in Soviet Europe. Those pressures and civil society groups were mainly nonexistent in Soviet Central Asia. Since then, the five ex-Soviet Central Asian states have been ruled largely through Soviet-style bureaucracies controlled by authoritarian rulers and their cronies. A generation of systemic corruptionorganized crime, rising inequalities between rich and poor, and widening poverty has corroded people’s early hopes for better lives following Soviet rule.

Across the region, “people spoke optimistically of their future in the early years after their independence,” said Peyrouse. But increasingly over the past decade, “when you travel and talk to people, especially outside the capital cities, you hear them say that their governments are corrupt and not interested in meeting the population’s needs.”

These frustrations have led to a rise in ethnic nationalisms and violent conflict, USIP Central Asia specialist Gavin Helf has noted. Kazakhstan’s current turmoil is only the latest in a long series of violent upheavals that have killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands across the region in the past decade.

While authoritarian regimes have dominated Central Asia for a generation, they have had to legitimize themselves as defenders of national identities that are rooted partly in Islamic faith and tradition. This bedrock political reality has preserved varied degrees of political and cultural space for Muslim institutions—mosques, charitable foundations, neighborhood groups and others. At the same time, Central Asian governments monitor and constrict the activities of such religious-based groups out of deep fears of any manifestations of politicized Islam that could challenge the governments’ claims to power and legitimacy.

These disparate Muslim civil society organizations tend to be well rooted in their communities and thus to hold significant margins of popular legitimacy and potential influence, according to a new research report by Peyrouse and Emil Nasritdinov, an anthropology professor at the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan.

Too Diverse to Label

The research project, funded by USIP, interviewed dozens of participants in Muslim civil society organizations across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The research, still underway, provides a preliminary assessment that can help governments and donor organizations consider ways to build more effective partnerships for peacebuilding, development or pro-democracy efforts in Central Asia.

A first basic conclusion of the research report is that—contrary to a common view of Muslim civil society as “a homogeneous group of organizations focused mainly on religion,” Central Asia’s Muslim civil society groups are too diverse even to be easily labeled. They vary in their “objectives, working methods, attitudes toward and relations with government, opinions about the international community, and views on national and foreign policy” the study says. Notably, the groups reached in the research “expressed a generally positive view of the United States and an openness to working with U.S. structures, even if at the same time they criticized specific U.S. policies and actions.” Many of the participants interviewed said their groups could help their communities prevent radicalization of residents by Islamic extremist groups, “particularly by promoting moderate messages, strengthening education” and addressing local grievances.

While some Muslim civil society organizations “may be connected to some dangerous Islamist groups, if we want to have a role in development in Central Asia, we need to … go beyond the assumption that all [Muslim groups] are connected to Islamism or to political agendas,” said Peyrouse. “Getting to know them is how we learn which ones could be dangerous and which not.”

The Muslim civil society representatives “tended to focus more than [their secular counterparts] … on contributing to local development and social welfare rather than on holding governments accountable or promoting global issues such as democratization and human rights,” the report found. While some of the Muslim groups’ representatives expressed support for changes such as gender equality, “more appeared to reflect a rising tide of conservativism in Central Asian societies,” it said.

Possible Partners for Peacebuilding

The study identifies six broad types of organizations and urges further investigation to determine where international efforts might work with them:

  • Muftiates, or national religious hierarchies, are formally independent of, but generally cooperative with, the government. Some conduct philanthropic work. The muftiate in Kyrgyzstan buttressed the government’s response to COVID by offering religious schools as care centers with more than 1,400 beds.
  • Mosques of varied stripes serve not only as prayer venues, but as community discussion spaces and religious schools for young children. They are local—and in many places, primary—distributors of charity to the needy.
  • Mahallas (urban religious jurisdictions that traditionally include religious functions) play disparate roles. In Uzbekistan they perform government-sanctioned neighborhood administrative functions. Elsewhere, they may independently finance mosques or organize social events.
  • Jamaats (meaning simply “groups” or “associations”) are of disparate types, including Islamic movements, some of which preach and proselytize in communities, and some of which are funded from abroad.
  • Islamic charitable foundations may be local or affiliated with international networks, and may distribute necessities to the poor, fund educational programs or finance the building of mosques, among other activities.
  • Islamic nongovernmental organizations “may be the most diverse” type of Muslim civil society groups “run[ning] the gamut from official to semiofficial to underground,” and from local to national or international. Their operations range “from a few individuals working from their homes to offices with dozens of people.”

The study recommended that the United States, its allies, and development and assistance organizations should examine the diversity of Muslim civil society organizations and their roles, and should engage with them on issues “such as local economic and social development, fighting domestic violence, community stabilization, and countering violent extremism.” Also, international actors should more actively press Central Asia’s governments to open more space for activities by civil society, including its Muslim-oriented sectors.

In 1992, the Soviet Union’s collapse suddenly created 15 nations, from the Baltic Sea to Asia, as potential partners for American engagement. In Central Asia, the United States offered immediate recognition only to Kazakhstan, which had inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, and to Kyrgyzstan, which was seen as committed to liberal reforms. Its hesitation in engaging fully risked weakening its influence in a region where Iran, China and Russia are formidable competitors for influence. Thirty years later, Central Asia is, if anything, more fragile. So, the hesitation of that first diplomacy should this time be reversed to deepen America’s engagement with the broadest possible range of responsible and effective Central Asian partners.

Analysis - Kazakhstan Crisis: Internal dispute or Western-plotted Color Revolution?

  
Analysis - Kazakhstan Crisis: Internal dispute or Western-plotted Color Revolution?

Situation is yet to be calm in Kazakhstan where unrest and clashes between the government forces and protestors, some of them armed, gripped the country since last week.

AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA): Situation is yet to be calm in Kazakhstan where unrest and clashes between the government forces and protestors, some of them armed, gripped the country since last week. 

Kazakhstan officials say more than 4,000 people have been detained in recent days. Protests in Kazakhstan were sparked by rising fuel prices, but as unrest spread, protesters raised other demands, including political freedoms.

Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has ordered suppression of the protests and told security forces that they can fire on protesters without warning. 

With the country calm and secure for years, the unfolding riots raise various speculations about the main reasons behind the fast-moving developments. 

An internal dispute? 

When the protests in Kazakhstan began last Wednesday, these developments were unexpected for many. Although the protests were rooted in discontentment about fuel price hike, since the beginning, some said they are a result of internal strife in Kazakhstan, adding the protests were exploited, if not planned, by incumbent President Tokayev and aimed at reducing pressure and influence of the former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The speculations went broader especially after rumors of Nazarbayev fleeing the country were circulated. On Saturday, Nazarbayev's spokesman rejected the news, saying that the founder of modern Kazakhstan was in the capital. His Twitter post said that the ex-president is in the country, held some consultation meetings, and kept in touch with Tokayev. He also, the spokesman continued, "talked to leaders of friendly countries and called on the people to unite around support for the current president to weather the current conditions." 

There has been denial of rumors of Nazarbayev's departure, but there is no doubt that Tokayev made the most of the current protests to reduce Nazarbayev's power. Although Nazarbayev has not been president since 2019, he has retained his influence and power in the former Soviet republic. It seems that Tokayev is seeking to distance Nazarbayev from power and that appears why he was dismissed from the presidency of the powerful National Security Council amid the demonstrations. 

Nazarbayev ruled the country for about three decades with an iron fist and attracted hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investment for energy and mining sectors. With extreme guile, he established balanced relationship with strong neighbors Russia and China. But he was intolerant of opposition and accused by West and rights organizations of human rights abuses and violation of democratic freedoms. A large part of the country's economy is estimated to be at his family's hands and after his dismissal from the National Security Council as his powerhouse things are unclear how would develop for him. 

However, the continuing protests in Kazakhstan show that the issue goes far beyond the internal power dispute, although it provided an appropriate opportunity to settle political scores. On Saturday, National Security Committee declared arrest of Karim Masimov who was also sacked from his post during the protests as the committee's chief. Masimov it an ally of Nazarbayev and served as prime minister from 2007-2012 and from 2014-2016. His removal and arrest is seen as part of a purge campaign pushed by the current president. 

Impasse of color revolution in Kazakhstan 

The protests in Kazakhstan have provoked widespread international reactions, with Russia reacting so seriously that it has deployed troops under a peacekeeping mission within the framework of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led regional security bloc. About 2,500 troops with heavy equipment from several Central Asian countries are currently stationed in Kazakhstan under the command of Russian peacekeeping mission. Moscow said the deployment came at the behest of the Kazakh president. At the same time as Russian troops are being sent to Kazakhstan, a BBC correspondent reported that the central square of Almaty has become a "battlefield" and the sound of machine gun fire can be heard overnight in Kazakhstan's largest city. 

Russia is very worried that instability and insecurity in Kazakhstan will be extended to Russia, and therefore will not accept unrest in Kazakhstan under any circumstances. 

On the other hand, the deployment of Russian-led peacekeeping forces in Kazakhstan has been met with a US reaction, with a White House spokesman questioning the legality of the dispatch. So far, the US response to Kazakhstan's developments has been conservative, but at the same time many have said that Kazakhstan's unrest is rooted in the West's plotting against Russia. In other words, the US-led West is trying to divert Russia's focus from tensions in Ukraine to the situation in Kazakhstan by orchestrating protests. Some experts suggest that Kazakhstan protests bear hallmarks a color revolution, a series of Western-arranged government changes in neighbors of Russia since the 2000s. 

But leaders of regional states, including Armenia, Turkey, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, in a reaction united with Kremlin's assured Kazakhstan president of support, signaling that they stand by Moscow in these developments. 

With regional countries demonstrating alignment of stance with Russia in preservation of Kazakhstan government, Western-eyed color revolution does not seem to have a chance of success in the big and important Central Asian country.

UPDATED

Campaign Against Nazarbaev And Cronies Of Kazakhstan’s First President Has Begun – Analysis

By 

By Bruce Pannier*

(RFE/RL) — The dust is settling in Kazakhstan after a tumultuous start to the year in which initially peaceful protests were hijacked by violent groups who left carnage in Almaty and other parts of the country.

Amid the unrest, it also became apparent that there was a power struggle going on within the government between the current president, Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev, and loyalists of his still powerful predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbaev.

The turmoil now seems to be ending with members of the family of the country’s first president and his close associates seemingly facing a bleak future.

If there were any doubts about who emerged victorious, Toqaev put them to rest on January 11 at a session of parliament when he ordered the end to any state business with a massive waste and recycling company linked to Nazarbaev’s youngest daughter, Aliya.

“Entrepreneurs and society in general have a lot of questions about the activities of the company, which is called the Operator ROP,” Toqaev said.

Operator ROP is a recycling monopoly founded in 2015.

Kazakh Ecology, Geology, and Natural Resources Minister Serikkali Brekeshev told a meeting of the government on January 12 that the company has earned some 692 billion tenge (almost $1.6 billion) since 2016.

The company’s website features a large photo of President Nazarbaev with a strong recommendation for the heads of Kazakh regions to do business with Operator ROP.

Toqaev’s January 11 comments were the first clear indication that the vast wealth and holdings of members of the Nazarbaev family might be in jeopardy.

Toqaev had announced that he was taking Nazarbaev’s seat as secretary of Kazakhstan’s Security Council on January 5, a move many saw as an indication that the fortunes of the 81-year-old former president known as “Elbasy” — or Leader of the Nation — might have taken a turn for the worse.

Nazarbaev had used that powerful post to retain a great deal of his influence after he officially stepped down as president in March 2019 and handed over the presidency to Toqaev, his hand-picked successor.

Nazarbaev press spokesman Aidos Ukibay said on January 9 that the ex-president had voluntarily stepped down as Security Council secretary, though no one else in the Kazakh government repeated this claim.

Amid speculation as to Elbasy’s whereabouts – he has not been seen in public since December 28 — Ukibay said on January 8 that Nazarbaev was still in the capital, Nur-Sultan.

In his January 11 speech, Toqaev added that “Thanks to the first president, Elbasy, a group of very profitable companies emerged in the country, as well as a group of people whose wealth is significant even by international standards.”

Toqaev announced that a special social fund “for the people of Kazakhstan” would be created and would receive “significant and regular contributions” from businesses.

He said the government “will have to establish the group of companies with which it will have to agree with upon the size of their annual contributions to the foundation.”

Toqaev added: “I believe the time has come to pay that which is due to the people and help them.”

Toqaev did not mention any specific names, but he didn’t need to.

People like Kazakhmys chief Vladimir Kim or banker Bulat Utemuratov — well connected to the former president — are known to have made billions of dollars during Nazarbaev’s nearly 30-year reign.

And everyone in Kazakhstan knows that the members of Nazarbaev’s family have grown fantastically wealthy, something detailed in a December 2020 report by RFE/RL.

Nazabaev’s second-oldest daughter, Dinara, and her husband, Timur Kulibaev, are regularly ranked as being among the richest people in Kazakhstan with assets in excess of $1 billion.

Prior to the recent outbreak of violence, it seemed like most of the time when Kazakhstan was mentioned in Western media it was because of mansions, villas, and even castles members of the Nazarbaev family owned in Europe, the United States, or Dubai — or for the massive yachts and private jet planes they bought.

Where most of the members of the Nazarbaev family are today remains unclear at the moment.

An aide to Darigha Nazarbaeva, Nazarbaev’s eldest daughter and parliament member, said on January 12 that she had COVID and is still in Almaty, which is why she missed sessions of parliament.

Kyrgyzstan’s 24.kg website reported on January 12 that Nazarbaev’s notorious brother, Bolat, crossed into Kyrgyzstan by car in the early morning of January 6 and later the same day boarded a flight from Bishkek to Dubai.

And the investigative outlet Bellingcat tracked “a Bombardier Challenger 604 private jet [that] flew from Almaty to Geneva” on January 4, two days after the protests started.

Bellingcat said “this aircraft’s past flight record shows trips to several European countries, Russia, the Maldives, and Dubai.”

Bellingcat also reported that “On 5 January, between 10 and 11 UTC…a Bombardier Global 6000 with no registration number and no other identifying details was spotted flying from Almaty…[and] we found that it landed at Farnborough Airport just outside London, a common destination for private jets coming to the U.K.”

And there were two Kazakh planes that briefly landed at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas airport on January 5, one arriving from Dubai and the other from North Macedonia. The planes stopped only briefly for maintenance and refueling before traveling onward.

The abundance of private jets flying in and out of Kazakhstan during the days of upheaval have many suggesting that close and extended members of the Nazarbaev family left the country.

Toqaev has not openly said Kazakh authorities are going after the Nazarbaevs and, considering Toqaev has been in the Kazakh government working for Elbasy since the first days of independence, he will need to tread carefully in attacking the family of the man he served for so long.

But Toqaev would have an abundance of public support for stripping Nazarbaev family members of their ill-gotten gains and Toqaev will need this support as he finally steps out of the shadow of his predecessor and forms his own government.

  • Bruce Pannier writes the Qishloq Ovozi blog and appears regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL.
Kazakhstan: Did 'anti-terrorist' operation hide battle between political clans?

One week after the violent repression of protests in Kazakhstan, France 24 went on the ground to try to understand what sparked the situation. 
Elena Volochine, France 24

Text by: FRANCE 24Follow|

Video by: Elena VOLOCHINE

A week after the crackdown on protests in Kazakhstan, residents of the former capital, Almaty, are still wondering what really happened. As Russian coalition forces began their withdrawal Thursday, FRANCE 24 went there to try to understand how peaceful demonstrations could have turned into war scenes.

10 days after the events, what really happened in Almaty remains unknown. Amnesty International has called on Kazakhstan to publish information on the number of victims among civilians; so far there has not even been an estimate of that figure.

At the public television station Almaty TV, visited by FRANCE 24, the damage was visible. “We asked the authorities," said Aygerim Agyltaeyeva, the news editor, "but we haven’t had an answer yet”.

After Kazakhstan unrest, relatives await detainees’ release

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Police block the road to control the traffic in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Wednesday, Jan. 12, 2022. Kazakh authorities said Wednesday they detained 1,678 more people in the past 24 hours over their alleged participation in the violent unrest that rocked the former Soviet nation last week, the worst since Kazakhstan gained independence three decades ago. (AP Photo)

ALMATY, Kazakhstan (AP) — With about 12,000 people arrested after anti-government protests in Kazakhstan last week, friends and relatives of those held by police waited outside a jail Wednesday, hoping to learn their fate. Some even went to morgues to see if a loved one was among the scores killed in the unprecedented violence in the Central Asian nation.

Authorities have refused to allow relatives or lawyers to see those in custody, giving little information about them, according to human rights activists.

The demonstrations began Jan. 2 in the western part of Kazakhstan over a sharp rise in fuel prices and spread throughout the country, apparently reflecting wider discontent with the government, which declared a state of emergency for the whole country and asked a Russia-led military alliance to send in troops to help restore order.

Another 1,678 people were arrested in the past 24 hours in Almaty, the largest city that was hit hardest by the turmoil, and more than 300 criminal investigations have been opened. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev blamed the unrest on foreign-backed “terrorists,” but did not provide any evidence, and had given shoot-to-kill orders to security forces to quell the unrest.

Outside a branch of the Internal Affairs department that housed a large detention center, a man who gave his name only as Renat said he has been waiting nearly a week to see or get any information about a close friend, Zhandos Nakipovich. He said Nakipovich, whom he described as being like “a brother” to him, was taken into custody on Jan. 4 during a peaceful protest.

“He was at first held at a precinct, then they told us he was in the Internal Affairs department,” Renat told The Associated Press. “Since Jan. 6, we’ve been here and we don’t know whether he’s alive or not.”

Military checkpoints prevented anyone from getting close to the building.

“Neither lawyers nor relatives — no one is allowed inside. Lawyers should be present during interrogation, but as you see, no one can pass,” said Galym Ageleuov, head of the Liberty human rights group, who was waiting at the barricade.

“The checkpoint blocks the access for lawyers and relatives to see what’s going on there. We don’t even have the list of detainees,” Ageleuov said.

More than a dozen men and women in dark winter clothes gathered outside one of Almaty’s morgues, with some of them waiting to collect the bodies of relatives killed in the unrest. Huddled together in small groups, they stood at the gate of the facility, chatting quietly with each other but refused to talk to a reporter.

Although the official death toll was announced as 164, Tokayev has said hundreds of civilians and security forces were killed and injured.

Life in Almaty has started returning to normal after days of unrest that saw cars and buses torched, government buildings stormed and set ablaze, the airport seized and the sound of gunfire ringing out. The unrest had largely ended by last weekend.

Public transportation has resumed and shopping malls reopened, and the only reminders of the violence were occasional military roadblocks and the charred exterior of city hall, which was set ablaze at the height of the rioting.

Authorities in the energy-rich country of 19 million sought to mollify the anger at the government by capping fuel prices for 180 days. The Cabinet resigned, and longtime former leader Nursultan Nazarbayev was ousted from his influential post of head of the National Security Council. Nazarbayev had stepped down as president in 2019 after nearly three decades in power, but retained influence in the security forces.

Tokayev requested help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, a Russia-led military alliance of six ex-Soviet states. The bloc sent over 2,000 troops to Kazakhstan, and Tokayev said the troops will start withdrawing Thursday.

Surprising photos of soldiers in Almaty wearing UN peacekeeping helmets spark a response from the United Nations.

Images released by the Associated Press on January 8 show several soldiers in Kazakhstan's largest city, Almaty, wearing helmets with "UN" stenciled on them in the unmistakable colors of United Nations peacekeeping forces. The photos, made by photographer Vladimir Tretyakov and shared by independent journalist Jake Hanrahan, have added to questions over what exactly is happening in the restive Central Asian country.Since protests set off by gas prices broke out across Kazakhstan last week, Internet blackouts, unidentified gunmen, disputed official claims, and winter fog have made events on the ground increasingly murky.

  • What to Make of Kazakhstan’s Seemingly Sudden Unrest

    What started last week as a protest against fuel price increases has quickly turned into a nationwide movement that is taking aim at Kazakhstan’s elite political and economic leaders — in particularly, the semi-retired former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, whose continued role in political affairs has become a focal point of popular discontent. The demonstrations have become increasingly violent in recent days, as protesters clash with Kazakh police and Russian military personnel have been brought in at the request of Kazakhstan’s president. USIP’s Gavin Helf and Donald Jensen discuss where these explosive protests came from, Moscow’s increasing role in the crisis and where Kazakhstan goes from here.

    President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, delivers remarks at the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York. September 24, 2019. (Dave Sanders/The New York Times)
    President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, delivers remarks at the United Nations General Assembly at the United Nations headquarters in New York. September 24, 2019. (Dave Sanders/The New York Times)

    Kazakhstan is the wealthiest Central Asian republic and — until now — has been the most stable. Is this all out of the blue or have warning signs been visible for a while?

    Helf: In many ways, Kazakhstan is a poster child for the new “techno-authoritarianism” and a model of a successful petrostate. It has been careful about investing its oil wealth to create a robust, diverse economic future beyond petroleum and has done better at sharing the wealth throughout the society than many of its neighbors. It is now an upper middle-income economy that attracts foreign labor — unlike its neighbors, who are dependent on labor migrant remittances from Russia.

    Problems in the past that have led to protests have been usually localized and/or narrowly focused —such as labor unrest in Western Kazakhstan, protests over land ownership (especially by Chinese companies), inter-ethnic conflicts and protests over consumer debt relief and inflation.

    As in a lot of places, Kazakhstan’s good economy has been shaken by COVID and government has lost some of its shine over the last two years. Corruption, always endemic at some level, has become more offensively obvious during COVID. What has been surprising this time, though, is the sudden and wide geographic spread of the discontent and its initial lack of focus.  

    Kazakhstan saw local protests get out of hand ten years ago, but a brutal, heavy-handed crackdown was employed to quell them. In the interim, authorities have tried to learn from that experience and developed a more sophisticated game plan. So far, they’ve tried to address concerns over fuel price hikes by reversing — and then cutting — the prices, and then cutting prices on other commodities and making other economic concessions. When that didn’t work, they blamed the ministries and the prime minister, who the president then fired as a scapegoat. This, again, has not worked to quell the protests.

    Who are the protesters then, and how has this developed? 

    Helf: It is very hard to get a clear picture right now, but the protests up until Wednesday were faceless, peaceful and seemed to be consistent with the kind of post-COVID economic revolt that the government thought it could buy off.

    Then things took a very different turn. The protests suddenly became focused on the country’s semi-retired first president Nursultan Nazarbayev. After his official retirement in 2019, he has been publicly revered as “The Leader” and “Father of the Nation.” But as these protests developed, statues of him started to fall and reports of him preparing to seek medical treatment abroad and of his family members fleeing by private jet started to circulate. Right now, it’s not clear why this happened.

    His hand-picked successor, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, also removed him from his chairmanship of the National Security Council and very quickly started to purge Nazarbayev’s loyalists in key positions. We still don’t know where Nazarbayev is, what role he is playing at this time or whether he is actively opposing Tokayev’s purge.

    The situation on the ground changed on Wednesday night as well — turning violent. In Almaty, armed protesters seized the country’s major airport, as well as important government buildings, which they set ablaze.

    What we may be seeing — in addition to a “people-power” revolt — is also a catastrophic failure of Nazarbayev’s managed transition to his successor, Tokayev, playing out in real time. Transition from one ruler and ruling family to another is a huge weak spot in authoritarian, oligarchical systems. It seldom goes well, as a fading leader tries to secure both his political legacy and the wellbeing of his family after his own passing.

    January 4 also marked the 20th anniversary of the suppression of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan — a pro-reform, pro-Nazarbayev political movement that Nazarbayev turned against. One of their leaders, Mukhtar Ablyazov, has been very actively trying to promote regime change from abroad since his exile, and has popped up all over foreign media this week, seeming to speak for the protesters. He is likely to figure prominently in any hunt for a “foreign” hand in this drama, regardless of what he actually did over the last few days.

    It’s also important to remember that in Kazakhstan, there really is no democratic opposition waiting in the wings. The government has either coopted or suppressed anyone even mildly critical of its policies over the last three decades. There are, however, plenty of grievances that nativists, Islamic extremists, xenophobes and others could try to exploit — along with plenty of political entrepreneurs with their own agendas who will try to take advantage of the situation and bend it to their own goals. Whatever comes next will likely be messier than what has come before.

    President Tokayev has appealed to the Moscow-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. How has Russia responded to the request, and what is motivating Moscow’s decision-making in regard to Kazakhstan?

    Jensen: On January 6, Kazakh President Tokayev claimed that unrest in his country was due to “an invasion of bandit formations trained from abroad” and requested the assistance of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In response, the CSTO officially announced the start of a peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan that would be tasked with the protection of state and military facilities and assistance to police forces. Russian airborne special forces have already begun arriving in the country, and reports indicate they will send a few companies but no more than 5,000 troops total.

    Russia’s immediate goal in Kazakhstan is most likely the containment and suppression of political instability at its southern border. In addition, Russia has numerous interests in Kazakhstan, including military installations, the Cosmodrome at Baikonur and valuable business investments. The protection of these locations from violent disruption is probably of paramount importance to the Kremlin. 

    In the long term, it’s unlikely that Moscow sees the current unrest in Kazakhstan (and the CSTO response to that unrest) as an opportunity to crystalize or serve some broader strategic approach. The events in Kazakhstan also come at an inconvenient time for the Kremlin, with its attention focused on Ukraine, where Russia has massed forces near the Ukrainian border in an effort to gain concessions from Ukraine and its Western supporters either through saber rattling or a real invasion.

    With that military deployment underway, it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would use the current situation in Kazakhstan as an opportunity to use military force in Central Asia or to assert a new foreign policy doctrine. Russian policy has not been consistent regarding defense of neighboring authoritarians, and in the case of Kazakhstan, it’s not even clear whether they would be intervening to stop a democratic revolution or to stop internecine elite fighting. It is far more probable that the Kremlin is responding to events with the minimal force necessary to protect Russia’s interests.