Days before Armenia’s parliamentary elections on June 7, Russia is carrying out a full-scale offensive and campaign of pressure against the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which has the strongest chances of winning.
Not only President Vladimir Putin, but also the leaders of the other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states have jointly demanded that Pashinyan hold a referendum on whether Armenia should join the European Union or remain in the EAEU. Pashinyan rejected the demand, arguing that such a referendum is currently impossible because Armenia has not submitted an application for EU membership. Simultaneously, Russia’s deputy prime minister warned Yerevan about the possibility of higher gas prices should Armenia leave the EAEU.
Russia has imposed restrictions on imports of several Armenian products, including at least five types of vegetables, fresh flowers and ornamental plants, fish and fish products, as well as Armenian brandy and wine. In addition, the sale of 64.5mn bottles of Jermuk mineral water has been banned.
Russia justifies these measures by citing product quality concerns. However, the political dimension is evident, particularly as pro-Russian political forces have actively accused Pashinyan of provoking an economic conflict with Russia. The core of their criticism is the adoption of legislation envisaging a process toward EU accession and the gradual transition of the country’s economic and state standards from Eurasian to European norms. In essence, pro-Russian forces are using the Kremlin’s sanctions and threats to argue that rapprochement with the EU is another mistake by Pashinyan following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The leader of the main opposition force, Strong Armenia, Samvel Karapetyan, has warned of a possible economic war with Russia should Pashinyan be re-elected. Another pro-Russian figure, Robert Kocharyan, who heads the second-largest opposition bloc, has stated that a rupture in relations with Moscow would be nothing short of a disaster for Yerevan. “The stakes are much higher than parliamentary elections alone. The issue is Armenia’s foreign policy course: is Armenia moving away from Russia, or is it maintaining a certain balanced policy?” Kocharyan said.
For its part, the European Union has stated: “As a sovereign, democratic and independent state, Armenia has the full right to choose its own path of development and its partners.” The EU further noted that Russia is attempting to damage Armenia’s economy and influence the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections, adding that “Brussels will continue supporting Armenia in overcoming such attempts at coercion.”
Government sources indicate that Armenia, together with the EU and the United States, has already developed contingency plans addressing the economic, energy, security and other risks that Russia could activate. Concrete solutions exist regarding alternative gas supplies in the event of a comprehensive Russian economic and energy war, mechanisms for subsidising higher gas prices, and support programs for exporters seeking access to new markets. In Moldova’s case, the EU allocated billions of euros to help counter similar Russian sanctions, and those efforts proved successful.
In Armenia’s case, however, the Kremlin has effectively delivered an ultimatum. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the declaration adopted by four EAEU member states — Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan — implies that all legal and economic details concerning a possible suspension of Armenia’s participation must be thoroughly prepared and discussed by December. In other words, EAEU countries, under Russia’s leadership, are threatening to suspend Armenia’s participation in the economic bloc. Simultaneously, Putin is demanding a referendum requiring Armenians to choose between the EU and the EAEU.
Clearly, this combination of Kremlin-organised threats is intended to steer Armenian voters away from supporting parties advocating closer integration with the EU and a pro-European political course. The leading force in this camp is Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party.
In recent weeks, Armenian officials have repeatedly revisited potential countermeasures against Russian sanctions and reviewed the steps Armenia would need to take in the event of a comprehensive Russian economic offensive and import restrictions.
Pro-Russian political forces are attempting to monetise Russian threats as political dividends. However, this coordinated campaign is not translating into an effective anti-Pashinyan political technology. According to polling by the International Republican Institute (IRI), Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party improved its standing in May compared to February. In February, approximately 24-29% of respondents were prepared to vote for the party; by May, that figure had reached 38%, representing an increase of roughly 9-14 percentage points. Political parties must surpass a 4% electoral threshold, while alliances must secure 7-8%.
Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia has experienced a decline. In February, the alliance enjoyed support from approximately 9-11% of respondents, but by May this had fallen to 7%, a decrease of around 2-4 percentage points.
The rating of Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance has remained largely unchanged or has seen only marginal growth. It stood at approximately 3-4% in February and reached 4% in May. Another pro-Russian force, Prosperous Armenia, also recorded a slight decline, from around 3% in February to 2% in May.
The pro-European Meritocratic Party of Armenia has a small chance of entering parliament, making it unlikely that pro-Russian forces could come to power through such a scenario. Even if the votes of the 20% undecided respondents and the additional 23% who declined to answer are distributed proportionally, the pro-Russian opposition would still lack the numbers needed to remove Pashinyan. Nor are they likely to capture those votes disproportionately. Moreover, Russian threats may produce the opposite effect and mobilise support around Pashinyan.
According to the same survey, the proportion of citizens who perceive Russia as a threat increased by three percentage points — from 29% to 32% — compared to February. This rise coincided with the intensification of Russian threats and hybrid pressure. It is therefore reasonable to assume that roughly one-third of Armenia’s population is prepared to actively support efforts to resist Russian pressure, representing a potentially significant electoral resource for Pashinyan.
If credible polling is accurate, Pashinyan’s party will win the June 7 election, while the pro-Russian opposition will secure roughly 30% of parliamentary seats. Under Armenia’s constitution, one-third of parliament must consist of opposition forces, meaning that even opposition groups failing to cross the electoral threshold may ultimately gain representation.
Could these Russian-related risks evolve into post-election unrest?
It is unlikely that Russian sanctions will halt Armenia’s process of integration with the European Union. With support from Western partners, Yerevan is likely to receive assistance in mitigating the consequences of such measures. The Kremlin is also likely to lose in the political arena. Consequently, provoking unrest in Yerevan could theoretically be considered as a tool for regime change. The question is whether the Kremlin and Armenia’s pro-Russian political forces possess sufficient resources to pursue such a strategy.
Armenia’s political history demonstrates that citizens have taken to the streets to defend electoral rights when governments in power prior to 2018 manipulated presidential and parliamentary elections. By contrast, Pashinyan’s government is not visibly pursuing election fraud. There have been allegations regarding the use of administrative resources to bring citizens to campaign rallies, but even if proven, such actions would not necessarily amount to election falsification.
Therefore, large-scale unrest triggered by allegations of election fraud appears unlikely. Moreover, Armenia’s law enforcement institutions are operating quite effectively. Hardly a day passes without authorities releasing recordings or evidence of alleged attempts by supporters of Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia, or the Armenia Alliance to distribute vote-buying incentives or violate restrictions on charitable activities during the campaign. The decline in support for Karapetyan’s political force between February and May may partly be linked to the almost daily publication of alleged evidence concerning electoral violations. Searches have been conducted at regional offices of the main opposition force, dozens of individuals have been detained, and numerous others have been charged.
The opposition is not only unable to mobilise citizens over alleged electoral violations; it is itself accused of engaging in such practices. Consequently, the likelihood that the pro-Russian opposition could organise mass demonstrations demanding a halt to Armenia’s EU accession process — the very outcome Russia seeks — is low.
Supporters of EU membership outnumber opponents by at least three to one. According to the IRI survey, when respondents were asked, “If a referendum on Armenia’s accession to the European Union were held next Sunday, how would you vote?”, 52% said they would vote in favour, while only 13% said they would vote against. This suggests that the country’s pro-EU potential constitutes a stronger political resource for Pashinyan than for the opposition.
Furthermore, since the 2020 war, Armenia’s opposition has launched several major protest movements aimed at removing Pashinyan from power. Even Kocharyan, one of the initiators of these campaigns, has acknowledged that repeated unsuccessful protest efforts have “worn down” the opposition’s popularity. Opposition-minded segments of Armenian society have become disillusioned with ineffective street movements. This is reflected in the decline of the opposition’s combined vote share compared to the 2021 elections.
Nevertheless, Strong Armenia leader Karapetyan has explicitly stated that the opposition is prepared for street action and any other form of struggle. He declared: “I am not prepared for the status of opposition leader; we are going to take power.” His political force cites its own internal polling, claiming that it is poised to win the elections. However, polls published by political parties often face serious credibility concerns.
If this force loses in elections widely regarded as credible, attempting to seize power through unconstitutional means would not be a rational course of action, given that law enforcement institutions appear capable of managing risks associated with domestic unrest. Such movements would likely lack broad public support. Pashinyan’s government would possess legitimate grounds for preventing street violence. Indeed, unlawful behaviour by the opposition may even benefit the authorities, as it provides opportunities to weaken political rivals through legal mechanisms and damage their public standing.
The June 7 parliamentary elections have ceased to be merely a contest among domestic political actors. They have evolved into a referendum on Armenia’s foreign policy orientation and sovereignty. In our assessment, Russia’s hybrid pressure and economic coercion, intended to strengthen pro-Russian forces, are in fact producing the opposite effect by consolidating support for a Western-oriented course and the incumbent government. This is reflected both in the rise of support for Pashinyan’s party and in growing public backing for EU membership.
Absent extraordinary developments, the election results and the resilience of Armenia’s state institutions are likely to neutralise the risk of post-election turbulence and enable the country to continue what increasingly appears to be an irreversible path toward European integration and economic diversification.
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