Israel, US have armed themselves for the wrong war
Hezbollah published footage of striking an Israeli Merkava tank in the town square of Taybeh, southern Lebanon on March 26.
The Israeli Army took its heaviest tank losses in over 40 years after Hezbollah ambushes destroyed 21 Merkavas main battle tanks in a single day on March 26.
Multiple ambushes launched against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon caught them off guard and destroyed the tanks using a mixture of drone and infantry attacks. Independent verification of the scale of damage and weapons used remains limited.
According to local reports, cheap anti-tank guided missiles and drones were effectively used to destroy the large main battle tanks valued at several million dollars each.
It was an engagement strongly reminiscent of the opening stages of the war in Ukraine, Russian forces were also wrong-footed by lightly-armed Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) using US-supplied Javelin missiles that “popped the tops” or Russia’s heavy tanks in fast moving but devastating attacks.
Hezbollah’s weapons have been upgraded, and in addition to shoulder-fired missiles it has gone straight to the drone phase of the war using its advanced drone technology and that supplied by Russia.
Other footage released on social media has shown Iranian forces flying First Person View (FPV) drones, guided by an unjammable fibre optic wire controls system that have stuck and destroyed US Black Hawk helicopters inside a US Gulf base.
The fibre optic guidance system was a Russian innovation that was initially scorned by the AFU, then adopted wholesale by the Ukrainian forces. Since these technological advances both Russia and Ukraine have developed myriad new systems and countermeasures, but it appears that both the US and Israel are still relying on old school thinking and armed themselves with heavy mechanised armour that is increasingly helpless in the rapidly evolving modern warfare techniques developed in the wheatfields of Ukraine.
As bne IntelliNews reported, in a modern asymmetrical war it is not about having the best and most powerful weapons, but having cheap, but “good enough” weapons in massive numbers. The old school “Command of the Commons” military doctrine that emphases military “primacy” that has been standard for decades, has given way to the “Command of the Reload” since the short war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020 pioneered drone-use, where the emphasis is on overwhelming your opponent with an almost limitless supply of cheap but deadly drones.
Iran and its proxies like Hezbollah have adopted these tactics and have largely been able to negate the US and Israeli advantages in the sophistication of their weapons.
As Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote in an editorial recently: “The large-scale changes that have occurred on the battlefields of the Russian-Ukrainian war have changed the paradigm of how warfare is waged… Today, in a relatively cheap way, any country can have combat capabilities that completely outstrip its economic or demographic situation if there is a desire and political will for it.”
Israel found this out to its cost after Hezbollah destroyed 21 Merkava main battle tanks in less than a day between the towns of Taybeh and Qantara on March 26. Other reports claim Hezbollah destroyed more than 100 tanks in total in 48-hours, according to Iran’s state-run Press TV.
Hezbollah artillery units also targeted Israeli command positions in the Taybeh region, Rab Thalathin and Oudaiseh, while also firing on Israeli reinforcements that were dispatched to evacuate casualties, Military Watch reports. Hezbollah attacks were supported by longer-range missile strikes against Israeli positions by Iran.
As bne IntelliNews reported, Israel launched a large scale invasion of southern Lebanon after Hezbollah fired rockets in retribution for the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The IDF has been targeting civilians as part of a drive to depopulate the region and take complete control up to the Litani river. More than one million people have already been displaced as Israel adopts tactics similar to those used in Gaza by flattening residential buildings and destroying local infrastructure.
The success of the Hezbollah counterblow represents the most extreme losses Israeli armour has suffered in over 40 years since the early stages of the Lebanon War when Merkavas and older US-supplied tanks engaged newly supplied Syrian Army Russian-made T-72 tanks and anti-tank guided weapons.
Ammo running low
To compound the attacking coalitions problems, they are already running low onf the very powerful ammunition they put such store in. A new report from the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security warns that Israel has used most of its Arrow 2 and 3 interceptors, while U.S. THAAD missiles protecting Gulf allies are heavily depleted.
A previous report from The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Payne Institute also identified critical shortages in 14 of the 35 munitions used in Iran after just the first 96 hours of fighting.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security estimates that Israel has already fired 80% of its Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 interceptors, 54% of its David’s Sling missiles, and 45% of the American-made THAAD interceptors it operates. By contrast, only 20% of Iron Dome interceptors have been used. The institute estimates that 60% of the THAAD missiles deployed to protect Gulf states from Iranian attacks have already been expended.
Israel’s stockpiles of offensive weapons remain in better shape; for instance, only half of its Rampage missiles have been launched, Haaretz reports.
Israel’s interception capabilities are finite and cannot match the rate at which Iran is launching missiles at Israel and the Gulf states. Each Arrow interceptor costs between $2mn and $3mn, limiting how many Israel can afford. The cost of the missiles and the size of the stockpile — which cannot be expanded quickly — put a mathematical limit on how long the war can run using the current mix of weapons and methods.
The institute estimates that it could take the United States up to five years to restore its Tomahawk missile reserves.
IDF sources responded last week to reports suggesting Israel’s interceptor stockpiles are running low, but did not give any details.
In addition to running short of interceptors, Iran’s latest missiles have received a technological upgrade and have proven able to evade interceptors and hit their targets. All 13 of the US Gulf bases have been badly damaged by Iranian strikes, and most are now largely without staff.
IDF under pressure
Selected leading Iranian weapons systems
Missiles (ballistic and hypersonic)
Fattah-2 hypersonic missile: Iran’s Fattah-2 is presented as a next-generation hypersonic system designed to evade air defences through high speed and manoeuvrability, using a glide vehicle that can adjust its trajectory in flight.
Khorramshahr intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): A heavy missile capable of carrying a 2-tonne cluster munition warhead, prioritising payload over precision and designed for high-impact strikes over intermediate ranges.
Kheibar Shekan: Unveiled in 2022, this newer-generation ballistic missile carries a one-tonne warhead and reflects a shift towards greater accuracy and mobility.
Sejjil missile: A solid-fuel ballistic missile offering faster launch times and greater survivability compared with liquid-fuel systems, forming part of Iran’s more modern strategic capability.
Fateh-110 family: A highly accurate, short-range ballistic missile and one of the most widely used systems in Iran’s arsenal, forming the backbone of its regional strike capability.
Zolfaghar: An extended-range variant of the Fateh family, with a range of around 700km, designed for precision strikes and used in operational deployments.
Qiam-1: A liquid-fuel missile derived from Scud designs but modified for greater efficiency, notably lacking stabilising fins, and used in several real-world strikes.
Shahab-3: One of Iran’s earliest medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 2,000km, forming a core part of its long-standing deterrent despite being less advanced.
Emad missile: An upgraded version of the Shahab-3 with improved guidance systems, marking a transition towards more precise targeting capabilities.
Nasrallah system missile: A newly identified system reportedly used in a strike on the Haifa refinery in Israel, signalling continued development of Iran’s strike arsenal, though details remain limited.
Cruise missiles and anti-ship systems
Soumar / Hoveyzeh cruise missiles: Long-range land-attack cruise missiles, believed to be derived from older Soviet designs, capable of flying at low altitude and evading radar.
Noor / Qader anti-ship missiles: Key components of Iran’s naval strategy, designed to target vessels in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, reinforcing its ability to threaten maritime traffic.
Drones and unmanned systems
Shahed-136 MS series: A loitering munition equipped with an improved eight-channel, jam-resistant satellite navigation system known as Nasir, reflecting upgrades made following recent conflicts.
Mohajer-6: A surveillance and strike drone capable of carrying precision-guided munitions, widely used in regional operations.
Shahed-129: A longer-range unmanned aerial vehicle designed for reconnaissance and strike missions, comparable in role to US Predator-type systems.
Azhdar underwater drone: An unmanned underwater vehicle intended for reconnaissance and potential attacks on maritime infrastructure, forming part of Iran’s asymmetric naval toolkit.
Naval platforms and asymmetric warfare
Kilo-class submarines: Russian-built diesel-electric submarines known for their relative stealth, providing Iran with a conventional undersea warfare capability.
Ghadir mini-submarines: Smaller, domestically produced submarines optimised for shallow waters, suited to ambush tactics and operations in the Gulf.
Fast attack craft (IRGC Navy): Small, heavily armed boats designed for swarm tactics, central to Iran’s strategy for confronting larger naval forces in confined waters.
Naval mines: A critical but often overlooked capability, allowing Iran to disrupt shipping lanes and potentially close chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.
Beyond Technology: The ‘Way Of War’ In The Iran Conflict – Analysis
March 28, 2026
Observer Research Foundation
By Rahul Rawat
The ongoing US-Israel-led military operation against Iran has expanded significantly both in terms of the scope of battlefield operations and strategic objectives of the war. What began as a short-term, decisive, high-intensity operation by the Trump administration has now lasted for three weeks. The conflict has observed the use of a diverse set of military capabilities, predominantly modern technology, adding a degree of sophistication to conventional military power.
However, military power is an aspect of military strategy characterised by an interplay of means, ways, and ends. To secure the ends, it is important to get both means (capabilities) and ways (organised application) right. The Iran war shows that the ‘way of war’ is critical for determining and subsequently framing the engagement in relation to the nature of the adversary. The US military’s Operation Epic Fury and Iran’s subsequent response demonstrate that technological superiority alone does not guarantee strategic victory. But how states organise capabilities and employ military power as a subset of military strategy helps determine decisive victory (beyond the battlefield).
Differing Battlefield Technologies and Targeting
The US-Israel front, as part of an ongoing military contestation, has observed demonstrations of costlier and more sophisticated technological systems on the battlefield. On the other hand, Iran, drawing lessons from the 12-Day War, has framed a relatively time-sensitive and asymmetric counter-response. Iran has translated the lessons to use military technologies for attrition and tilt the overall cost economics of war against the US interests.
On the battlefield, drones have been central to the debate over their effects, tilting the balance of power in favour of the aggressor. There is a clear shift in the use of drones from the ‘War on Terror’ era, thanks to lessons learnt from the Ukraine war. The US deployed the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System(LUCAS) as a solution; however, it remains a short-term measure against the cost-effective and scalable Shahed drones. Iran has developed the ecosystem of Shahed drones and cluster munitions to traffic as well as infiltrate the US and Israeli air defence mechanisms.
Specifically, a Shahed-136 costs a fraction of a cruise missile or ballistic missile, between US$20,000 and US$50,000 per unit, has a range of up to 2,000 kilometres, and has precision guidance. The Iranian drone element carries an element of precision mass to cater to the changing character of warfare. Through targeted drone attacks, the Iranian military has reduced the cost of offence for maintaining its campaign cost while simultaneously raising the cost of defence for the US and Israel (led partners).
Even though most of the drones have been intercepted at a decent rate of 80-85 percent, Iran’s use of drones with a few ballistic missiles has been able to strain the resources as well as hit targets in Israel, the US military and its allies in the region. The cost of interception for the US-Israel front through the use of costlier Patriot-like systems multiplies exponentially against cheap Shahed drones and relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles based targeting by Iran. Washington, in other words, despite its lead in developing and deploying sophisticated capabilities, lacks low-cost, increasingly autonomous drones for surveillance and short- and long-range strikes.
Figure 1: The extensive US and Israeli strikes on Iranian Retaliatory Capabilities
The US and Israel have hit targets, including those inside Iran, with both precision and depth. It has degraded Iranian capabilities to a substantial extent but has not eliminated its bases of power. On the other hand, the US military’s long-range vector power, along with the associated cost elements (as shown in Figure 2 below) and industrial base production capabilities to scale products, has emerged as a serious limitation.
Figure 2: Estimated Munitions Usage (figures in USD millions)
Finally, Iran has relied on the Chinese BeiDou network for real-time military targeting. The US military, through its cyber operations and the deployment of AI, has enabled real-time targeting and prioritisation across a range of assets. Primarily, the US military has been using AI to support decision-making purposes. This element has remained the key advantage of the US military, not just in capabilities but also in how it has adopted and integrated AI into its doctrinal and warfighting philosophy.
Differing Ways of War
The way of war is determined by how military power is organised and employed to achievethe objectives in a conflict. The US-Israel and Iranian ways of war differ in several ways.
First, the US-Israel war against Iran is centred not on Iran’s intentions but its potential to enhance its ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities. To this end, the conflict has showcased the decapitation strikes against the apex leadership and precision-based targeting of missile facilities across the geographical expanse of Iran. Iran, however, is not Venezuela and is in a war for (regime) survival against the US-Israel-led united front. Unlike the 12-Day War, Iran framed a quick response and so far, has relied on vertical as well as horizontal escalation-based response against the US and Israel-led military front.
Second, Trump-led American military thinking is premised on hitting hard to deliver a decisive blow against the adversary. This thinking also stems from an overreliance on technological superiority, however, this approach to warfare faces a challenge with the threat of attrition to the US military. Iran, on the other hand, has, since day one, adopted calibrated retaliation to spiral escalation against its adversaries.
Third, apart from the use of force backed by technological capabilities, the US could not secure clear support from its partners in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere. This takes the form of higher costs on the battlefield and beyond, as fissures emerge in political support for the US-led military operations. To this end, Tehran has led a war of attrition by widening and deepening the conflict by targeting Israel as well as the US military assets in the Middle East region.
Fourth, against a multi-domain US military-led operation against the political regime, Iran, in the aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, made a swift transition from a ‘unity of command’ to a ‘unity-of-effort’ led model. This model created multiple yet simultaneous decision-making centres, enabling the IRGC to continue warfighting while divesting resources and diluting the focus of its adversaries.
Fifth, the US had to ensure there was no geographical spillover of the conflict, as it would hurt the interests of its partners and allies in the region and beyond. To this end, the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was an ultimate test of resolve, pressuring the US to the point of reaching out to its European allies without any credible commitments in return.
Sixth, the determined use of military power by the US amid its maximalist, shifting strategic goalposts, over time, has made it difficult to claim a decisive victory against Iran. On the other hand, Tehran has so far maintained internal cohesion, which has supported its resilience and will to fight the US-Israel-led military alliance. For Iran, in a war of survival, prolonging the military conflict and denying the US victory through ‘regime change’ becomes no less than a strategic victory for Iran.
The above factors reveal that, while rapidly evolving military technology offers advantages, it has encountered limitations in achieving strategic objectives due to differing ‘ways of warfare’. Iran is fighting for regime survival and its significance in an emerging regional order in the Middle East. Military technology has not enabled the surrender of the adversary or a decisive victory for the US military.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the potential and demonstrable effects of battlefield technologies, the Iran war shows that differing ways of war remain critical in the conduct of war and in decisive outcomes. This war is yet to push Iran to surrender and present a decisive victory to its adversaries. Herein, the limitations of military technology and power are reflected against the lack of a way of war towards the strategic endgame. Iran has targeted the US military assets with an expanding targeting list to bring a second-order coercion to bear on the US’s allies and partners in the Middle East. The expansion of territorial and political limits of war has led the European and Indo-Pacific allies to lend support to the Trump administration-led conflict against Iran. Iran’s staggered use of drones and missiles amid a prolonged war, with some reserve of capabilities, is likely to be meant to gain political momentum in the war.
For the US, a decisive end to the conflict seems elusive from the battlefield viewpoint, along with the goal of regime change. However, the sustainment of attrition and the will to fight by either party would become influential factors in concluding the conflict on terms and conditions of their choosing. Whether and to what extent the war against Iran to degrade its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes would put a stop to Tehran’s long-term ambitions remains a dilemma for the Western technology-fueled military power. The drivers of real change on the battlefield to yield strategic outcomes lie more in doctrine, warfighting culture, and operational concepts, not in tech gadgets. The bottom line is that technology remains only an enabler and cannot, by itself, become the way of warfare.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
