Observer Research Foundation
By Aleksei Zakharov
Before US President Donald Trump’s visit to China, Russian experts unanimously predicted that his summit with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping would not alter the US-China equation. This view was grounded in the belief that the US-China confrontation has taken on a systemic nature, compounded by the broader shift in the world order, which has been set in motion “in earnest and for the long haul.” In this context, the odds of a ‘big deal’ between Washington and Beijing, let alone the establishment of a ‘G2’ condominium, seemed slim.
The summit outcomes have reinforced this view, indicating that the bilateral competition, albeit carefully managed by both sides, resembles a long-term strategic deadlock that is unlikely to give way to any significant rapprochement.
Readings of the US-China Summit
Moscow is increasingly convinced that Beijing, seriously affected by the global geopolitical churn, may be reconsidering its foreign policy approach. China no longer harbours any illusions about reaching compromises with the US that could deliver mutually beneficial solutions. Therefore, the Trump-Xi meeting was less about a rapprochement and more about a ‘truce’ between the two closely intertwined yet distrustful states.
Recognising this, Xi urged the US to continue the dialogue to prevent relations from descending into deeper crises. On economic issues, he stated that consultation “on an equal footing” is the only option going forward. Whether the new formula revolving around “constructive and strategic stability,” as suggested by China, will become a mainstay for bilateral relations remains to be seen.
As Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of the journal, Russia in Global Affairs, argues, the outcome of the US-China talks is the consolidation of interdependence amid diverging interests. He believes that the interdependence between the two will weaken, and the divergences will further intensify. Rather than being temporary, this shift appears to be a permanent feature of the relationship. However, it will be a gradual process, as neither side has any interest in ending ties.
Vasily Kashin, Director at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University, and one of Russia’s foremost China scholars, observes that China’s strategy is to delay a full-scale confrontation with the US. If the US remains in a deep political and economic crisis, as the Chinese leadership seems to believe, the future will only bring improved circumstances for China and the US “may retreat from certain positions without a fight.”
Ivan Zuenko, another prominent Russian expert on China and Associate Professor at MGIMO University, points out that the Summit underscored China’s elevated status in world affairs, reflecting Washington’s realisation that Beijing cannot be pressurised. The talks could lead to the relaxation of US tariffs and can bring new trade deals, including China’s imports of US oil. However, despite securing some economic concessions, the US will not abandon its containment policy since the China threat is a matter of bipartisan consensus in the US Congress. As such, the summit has given an impetus for the two countries to move ahead with the talks on critical topics, without bringing in any significant breakthroughs.
Russian observers are confident that the US-China talks will not affect Russia-China cooperation. They estimate that American oil cannot compete with Russian oil and that the spike in energy prices may push Russia-China bilateral trade to a new record by the end of 2026.
US-China-Russia Triangular Dynamics
Back-to-back visits to Beijing by the US and Russian presidents have revived conversations about the US-China-Russia strategic triangle. According to Lowell Dittmer’s classification, this triangle is a ‘stable marriage’, featuring amicable relations between two of the players and antagonistic ties between each of them and the third player.
Trump’s attempts to employ the ‘Reverse Kissinger’ strategy in the first months of its presidency have not visibly altered the trilateral equations. The US-Russia rapprochement has not delivered any tangible results, not even on technical issues such as visas and frozen diplomatic property. This has prompted growing disillusionment among Russian officials who are losing hope of improving ties with Washington. US and China remain locked in a strategic competition, while Russia and China have considerably expanded their strategic partnership. These types of relationships within the triangle are set to endure for years to come.
Some Russian experts have argued that in certain cases, Russia and China may refrain from providing direct support to each other if doing so would cause undue complications; however, they will never act to the detriment of their counterpart. Conversely, when it comes to its relations with the US, China now seems to realise that the policy shift is not a reflection of presidential preference, but rather of how the US fundamentally understands its goals and objectives. This could mean that periodic escalations and de-escalations have become a tacitly accepted norm of US-China relations.
A Shift to Coalition?
The inability of major powers to negotiate with Trump and the US, in Russian eyes, might prompt them, including China, to shift gears. Firstly, Beijing is expected to double its military capabilities to withstand any external pressure. Secondly, a deadlock with the US could encourage China to join forces with Russia to build an alternative financial infrastructure immune to US encroachment–something that Beijing has been lukewarm about despite Moscow’s proposals. From this perspective, the absence of a ‘big deal’ between the US and China plays into Russia’s hands.
Despite appearing battered after four years of war, Moscow has not lost its great power ambitions. Russian experts firmly believe that the US-Russia-China triangle will be pivotal in shaping an equilibrium-based new world order. However, these great power aspirations are often met with a harsh reality check, forcing Russia to build its capabilities without leaning heavily on China.
With a growing realisation that the transition to a new world order will not be peaceful, there is a greater argument in Russia for a coalition with China, beyond military engagement, including closer coordination on financial, economic, and technological issues. Even as these musings might, at some point, strike a chord with China, convincing it to consider such a coalition, which, as the logic goes, could shield the two from Western sanctions and potential naval blockades, Russia, in a more desperate condition, will seemingly have to play second fiddle to Beijing.
The notable shift in Russian narratives from positioning as a guarantor of a ‘New Non-Alignment’ alongside India–a popular idea before the war in Ukraine–to embracing the prospect of a coalition with Beijing against the US, colours Russia’s engagement with China more definitively and provides New Delhi with food for thought. It is probably not so much the US-China ‘G2’ but rather the trajectory of Moscow’s ever-closer alignment with Beijing that could pit India against a new geopolitical reality in the not-too-distant future.
About the author: Aleksei Zakharov is Fellow, Russia & Eurasia, with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
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