In mid-May 2026, an article by Mohammad Altaf Afridi, a former USAID program director in Pakistan, published in The Guardian attracted considerable attention. Afridi, who spent more than two decades managing millions of dollars in foreign aid, made a striking admission: what the West has built for years under the banner of “strengthening civil society” in countries of the Global South has often not been deeply rooted popular institutions, but rather networks of professionalized, project-based organizations structurally dependent on foreign funding — institutions more accountable to embassies, foundations, and Western donors than to the people they claim to represent.
His account of a mechanic’s market in Islamabad — where workers and shopkeepers had organized collectively to defend their interests without receiving a single dollar of foreign aid — was more than a personal anecdote. It exposed the profound gap between “real society” and a class of professional activists who speak in the name of the people while depending for their survival on the uninterrupted flow of external funding.
What has emerged across much of the periphery over the past three decades is not simply a handful of corrupt NGOs or failed development projects. Rather, it is a global industry of civil-society production: an industry that transforms social protest, human suffering, and even political resistance into projects, grants, financial reports, and evaluation metrics. Within this global marketplace, it is not the most radical forces that survive, but the most manageable ones — those capable of speaking the language of Western institutions, employing donor-approved vocabulary, and translating social anger into forms, presentations, and policy frameworks.
This is precisely where the critiques advanced by thinkers such as Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson become essential. Decades ago, they warned that “development” is not merely an economic project but a technology of power: a mechanism for managing peripheral societies, containing radicalism, and reproducing the global capitalist order.
Within this framework, poverty is no longer understood as the product of global capital accumulation, historical colonialism, or structural inequality. Instead, it is reframed as a technical or managerial problem. Consequently, the proposed solutions are no longer structural transformation or redistribution, but “capacity building,” “resilience,” and “good governance” — neutral, technocratic terms that conceal class conflict, exploitation, and imperial domination.
Afghanistan may be the clearest example of this historical failure. Following the 2001 occupation by NATO and the United States, billions of dollars in foreign aid flooded the country. Officially, the objective was to build democracy, women’s rights, and a modern civil society. In practice, however, a massive aid-driven economy emerged — one composed of security contractors, development consultants, NGO managers, international bureaucrats, and urban elites tied to Western money.
At its height, foreign assistance accounted for nearly 40 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP. Thousands of organizations and projects were established whose survival depended not on genuine social participation but on the continuous injection of foreign capital. This structure remained stable only as long as the Western military and financial apparatus remained intact.
Yet following the U.S. withdrawal, and especially after the drastic reduction of USAID funding in 2025, this artificial structure rapidly collapsed. Hundreds of projects were shut down, thousands lost their jobs, and many organizations that had long been presented as “representatives of Afghan civil society” effectively disappeared. The sudden implosion of this network revealed that much of what had been called civil society was, in reality, an economy of dependency.
But the issue was not merely the failure of development. In Afghanistan, NGOs functioned as part of the architecture of occupation itself. Development projects frequently complemented military operations: pacifying social discontent, purchasing legitimacy for the new order, and cultivating a class of local elites aligned with Western interests. It is therefore unsurprising that with the collapse of military presence, the development order collapsed as well.
In Iran, although the political conditions differ significantly, the logic of dependency has taken another form. Over the past two decades, segments of the expatriate opposition media sphere and various organizations abroad have benefited from funding linked to institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and Western foundations. While these networks present themselves as defenders of democracy and human rights, they frequently operate within the broader geopolitical priorities of Western powers.
Structural financial dependency sooner or later produces political dependency. Any media outlet or organization whose economic survival relies on foreign donors inevitably adapts itself to their implicit red lines. For this reason, many Persian-language media outlets abroad are highly active when discussing state corruption, compulsory hijab, or cultural tensions, yet remain silent — or adopt deeply conservative positions — regarding economic sanctions, global financial capital, neoliberal privatization, or the destructive consequences of market-driven policies.
This process effectively reduces politics from a question of class and political economy to a series of cultural and identity-based disputes. Within this framework, workers, teachers, and retirees are pushed to the margins, replaced by “experts,” “professional activists,” and “project managers.”
By contrast, genuine social movements generally emerge outside this orbit. Labor strikes in Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Company, protests by steel workers in Ahvaz, demonstrations by teachers and pensioners, and the struggles of farmers in Isfahan over water rights were not products of foreign grants or Western think tanks. They arose directly from material crises: inflation, privatization, economic insecurity, and structural injustice. It is precisely this social rootedness that has given these movements durability and legitimacy.
Real civil society, unlike its greenhouse version, is always disorderly, contradictory, volatile, and unpredictable. It cannot be engineered through performance indicators, workshops, or evaluation forms. Genuine civil society emerges from the living contradictions of society itself, not from the glass offices of the development industry.
The experiences of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran point toward a common lesson: no society can be liberated through foreign dollars. In many cases, the Western development project has functioned not as an instrument of emancipation but as a mechanism for reproducing dependency. Rather than dismantling domination, it has often produced a softer, more managerial form of the same system of control.
If genuine liberation is to endure, it can only emerge from the independent organization of ordinary people, from rooted social institutions, and from authentic class struggle — a difficult, contradictory, and lengthy process that cannot be purchased, engineered, or imported.
References
- Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World
- James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine
- David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism
- Arundhati Roy, “NGO-ization of Resistance”
- Reports by SIGAR on corruption and structural aid dependency in Afghanistan
- World Bank reports on foreign aid and the Afghan economy
- Mohammad Altaf Afridi, article published in The Guardian, May 2026
- Media reports on the financial crises and structural changes affecting Persian-language broadcasters abroad, including Manoto TV and Iran International


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