June 6, 2026
Observer Research Foundation
By Shivam Shekhawat and Maiwand Safi
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have deteriorated sharply in recent months, with Pakistani missile strikes hitting a university and a residential neighbourhood in Kunar in April — this despite the two sides reaching a consensus at a China-brokered informal meeting in Urumqi not to escalate the situation further. Unlike previous episodes of friction, this phase has escalated into open conflict, signifying a structural rupture in bilateral relations. Since the current phase of fighting began in February, Pakistani forces have launched an ‘open attack‘ on Afghanistan, conducting air and missile strikes deep inside the country, including in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kandahar. The Taliban government in Kabul has also launched retaliatory strikes on Pakistani military bases near the border.
Given the relationship’s historical trajectory, this violent breakdown is striking. For two decades, Pakistan and the Taliban maintained a close alliance. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, many Pakistani leaders, including former Prime Minister Imran Khan, publicly welcomed the development, calling the Taliban a “natural ally” and describing it as a strategic breakthrough — one that broke “…the shackles of slavery.” Yet over the four years since, expectations of strategic alignment have given way to deteriorating relations and open hostility.
The current crisis is rooted in several interlinked factors: a permissive geopolitical environment, a security vacuum, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban’s limited compliance with Pakistan’s long-standing aspiration for “strategic depth,” and the evolving engagement between Afghanistan and India.
Permissive Geopolitical Environment and Security Vacuum
The geopolitical priorities of the major powers have shifted significantly. The United States is preoccupied with the war in Iran and conflicts in the broader Middle East. Russia remains focused on its operations in Ukraine. China’s reluctance to engage in Afghanistan, combined with its desire to avoid alienating its ally Pakistan, has fostered a permissive geopolitical environment. This is further reflected in the failure of any externally mediated talks to produce a sustainable solution. Within this permissive landscape, regional states have been able to pursue military policies with minimal external monitoring, accountability, or criticism.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict must therefore be analysed within a broader geopolitical framework. Pakistan’s ongoing assaults on Afghanistan emerge at a moment when all major powers are focused on crises in the Middle East and Europe, resulting in diminished scrutiny and a lack of accountability for Islamabad, enabling it to strike Afghanistan with impunity.
In contrast to previous episodic conflicts between the two nations, which were brief and quickly contained, the current unchecked escalation reflects the absence of external security assurances and guarantors. This has created a deterrence vacuum that continues to fuel escalation. Under the previous government in Afghanistan, the international diplomatic and military presence imposed meaningful constraints on escalation, producing a degree of controlled volatility. The political transition in Kabul dismantled that security framework, allowing tensions to escalate with far fewer checks.
As a consequence, Pakistan now has the latitude to strike at its own discretion and on its own timeline. It previously hit the Omar drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul on 16 March and targeted Syed Jamaluddin Afghani University in Kunar last month, in both cases without facing any accountability. The absence of effective deterrence has left the current environment without workable de-escalation mechanisms, significantly raising the risk of a protracted and unmanageable conflict.
Observer Research Foundation
By Shivam Shekhawat and Maiwand Safi
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have deteriorated sharply in recent months, with Pakistani missile strikes hitting a university and a residential neighbourhood in Kunar in April — this despite the two sides reaching a consensus at a China-brokered informal meeting in Urumqi not to escalate the situation further. Unlike previous episodes of friction, this phase has escalated into open conflict, signifying a structural rupture in bilateral relations. Since the current phase of fighting began in February, Pakistani forces have launched an ‘open attack‘ on Afghanistan, conducting air and missile strikes deep inside the country, including in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kandahar. The Taliban government in Kabul has also launched retaliatory strikes on Pakistani military bases near the border.
Given the relationship’s historical trajectory, this violent breakdown is striking. For two decades, Pakistan and the Taliban maintained a close alliance. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, many Pakistani leaders, including former Prime Minister Imran Khan, publicly welcomed the development, calling the Taliban a “natural ally” and describing it as a strategic breakthrough — one that broke “…the shackles of slavery.” Yet over the four years since, expectations of strategic alignment have given way to deteriorating relations and open hostility.
The current crisis is rooted in several interlinked factors: a permissive geopolitical environment, a security vacuum, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban’s limited compliance with Pakistan’s long-standing aspiration for “strategic depth,” and the evolving engagement between Afghanistan and India.
Permissive Geopolitical Environment and Security Vacuum
The geopolitical priorities of the major powers have shifted significantly. The United States is preoccupied with the war in Iran and conflicts in the broader Middle East. Russia remains focused on its operations in Ukraine. China’s reluctance to engage in Afghanistan, combined with its desire to avoid alienating its ally Pakistan, has fostered a permissive geopolitical environment. This is further reflected in the failure of any externally mediated talks to produce a sustainable solution. Within this permissive landscape, regional states have been able to pursue military policies with minimal external monitoring, accountability, or criticism.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict must therefore be analysed within a broader geopolitical framework. Pakistan’s ongoing assaults on Afghanistan emerge at a moment when all major powers are focused on crises in the Middle East and Europe, resulting in diminished scrutiny and a lack of accountability for Islamabad, enabling it to strike Afghanistan with impunity.
In contrast to previous episodic conflicts between the two nations, which were brief and quickly contained, the current unchecked escalation reflects the absence of external security assurances and guarantors. This has created a deterrence vacuum that continues to fuel escalation. Under the previous government in Afghanistan, the international diplomatic and military presence imposed meaningful constraints on escalation, producing a degree of controlled volatility. The political transition in Kabul dismantled that security framework, allowing tensions to escalate with far fewer checks.
As a consequence, Pakistan now has the latitude to strike at its own discretion and on its own timeline. It previously hit the Omar drug rehabilitation hospital in Kabul on 16 March and targeted Syed Jamaluddin Afghani University in Kunar last month, in both cases without facing any accountability. The absence of effective deterrence has left the current environment without workable de-escalation mechanisms, significantly raising the risk of a protracted and unmanageable conflict.
The TTP and Strategic Depth Dilemma
Islamabad expected that once the Taliban took control of Kabul, they would rein in or even dismantle the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). A striking paradox has since emerged in Pakistan-Taliban relations: Pakistani officials accuse the Taliban of providing sanctuary, training, and resources to the TTP, which has carried out militant attacks on Pakistani security forces since 2022, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The Taliban rejects these allegations, maintaining that the TTP is an internal Pakistani matter and that Islamabad must address its domestic militancy through political and security means rather than external pressure. The deadlock is further exacerbated by political, tribal, and ideological factors within Afghanistan that constrain Kabul’s ability to respond to Pakistani concerns regarding the TTP.
When the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, many Pakistanis saw it as creating ‘a new bloc’ — paving the way for the realisation of ‘strategic depth‘: the idea that a friendly government in Kabul would provide security leverage against India. However, this vision of ‘strategic depth’ proved shortsighted. The Taliban demonstrated a degree of autonomy that defied Pakistan’s expectations, pursuing a more independent regional approach rather than aligning closely with Islamabad’s strategic interests. They sought to consolidate support across Afghan society, transition into a full-fledged government, and forge ties beyond Pakistan — including with countries such as India.
Additionally, the Durand Line remains a significant point of contention between the two countries, with successive governments — including the current Taliban administration — not having endorsed it as an international border. For Pakistan, it is a matter of national security; for Afghanistan, the Durand Line remains politically and historically contentious. This unresolved dispute perpetuates bilateral tensions and undermines cross-border security cooperation, increasing the risk of conflict and instability in the region.
At the same time, Afghanistan’s re-engagement with India has added a layer of anxiety to Pakistani strategic and security thinking. New Delhi has opened channels of engagement with the Taliban, upgrading its technical mission to a diplomatic mission following Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi’s visit to India on 9 October 2025. High-level official visits, particularly from the Afghan side, have signalled that India intends to retain influence in Afghanistan.
Pakistani officials, including the country’s defence minister, have expressed concern that the Taliban is drifting toward alignment with Indian strategic interests. From Islamabad’s perspective, the prospect of deepening Afghanistan-India ties raises the fear of strategic encirclement.
Pakistan’s Endgame?
Military escalation and open war are unlikely to eradicate the structural causes of the conflict. Airstrikes and missiles will not compel the Taliban to formally recognise the Durand Line. Severing ties with India is also not an option for the Taliban: diversifying foreign relations is a pragmatic necessity, since international recognition and economic assistance require engagement beyond any single partner. The prospect of the TTP’s disbandment appears equally remote, particularly given that the Taliban has already refuted claims that it shelters the group on Afghan soil.
Some analysts argue that Pakistan’s objective is to degrade Afghanistan’s military capability, including equipment left behind after the US withdrawal. Pakistan’s approach appears less oriented toward decisive victory than toward strategic denial. Pakistani airstrikes targeting military infrastructure suggest an intent to weaken Kabul’s security capacity. This posture reflects a longer-term strategic calculation: with a strong India on its eastern border, Islamabad prefers an Afghanistan of limited strategic capacity to its west, in order to avoid strategic encirclement. The Taliban’s recent efforts to consolidate military and economic autonomy appear to have sharpened these anxieties. The conflict may thus be read as an effort to limit Afghanistan’s military infrastructure before it further shifts a regional balance already tilting in India’s favour.
This strategy is not without its costs. It destabilises borderlands, inflames Afghan nationalist sentiment, and deepens regional polarisation in an already war-torn area. It also strains Pakistan’s security and economic resources at a time of considerable vulnerability and internal turmoil, undermining its ability to address pressing domestic challenges. Unless the deeper political, security, and regional drivers are addressed through sustained engagement and confidence-building measures, cycles of tension are likely to persist — limiting the durability of any future truce or ceasefire.
About the authors:
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Maiwand Safi is a senior PhD scholar at South Asian University, working on the geopolitics of connectivity, with a particular focus on Afghanistan, South Asia, and regional strategic dynamics
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
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