Friday, November 13, 2020

Sunken boats. Stolen gear. Fishermen are prey as China conquers a strategic sea

Shashank Bengali, Vo Kieu Bao Uyen
LA Times12 November 2020

(AdriĆ  Fruitos / For the Times)More

On a warm, cloudless morning in June, a giant vessel blasted through the still waters of the South China Sea toward a wooden fishing boat painted in cerulean blue and flying the red flag of Vietnam.

The veteran fishing captain cranked up the engine to flee, but the approaching ship dropped two motorized dinghies into the sea with uniformed officers aboard. The rubber crafts raced along either side of the fishing boat, squeezing it like a pincer.

As the captain slowed to avoid a collision, the large ship was soon upon them. The large letters across its steel hull read: China.

Crammed into their cabin for safety, the 17 men were knocked to the deck by a jolt that nearly tipped the boat. Then another. And another. "Like war," recalled crew member Nguyen Day.

The Chinese vessel smashed the boat repeatedly, damaging the cabin. Four fishermen tumbled overboard. As the officers pulled them from the water, Day, 41, and the other Vietnamese men piled into lifeboats and watched their craft — laden with several hundred pounds of tuna, mackerel, grouper and flying fish — begin to float away.

The June 10 attack was part of Beijing’s hard-nosed offensive in the South China Sea, where Chinese vessels are using increasingly aggressive tactics to deter rival nations and stake control over the strategic waterway.

Unfazed by rising global criticism, China’s navy, coast guard and paramilitary fleet has rammed fishing boats, harassed oil exploration vessels, held combat drills and shadowed U.S. naval patrols. The escalating show of force has overwhelmed smaller Southeast Asian states that also claim parts of the sea, one of the world’s busiest fishing and trade corridors and a repository of untapped oil and natural gas.

Beijing’s maritime expansionism illustrates not only the Chinese Communist Party’s growing military might, but also its willingness to defy neighbors and international laws to fulfill President Xi Jinping’s sweeping visions of power.


An airstrip and other structures are seen on China's man-made Subi Reef in the South China Sea in 2017. (Bullit Marquez / Associated Press)

In its strategic quest to dominate the waterway separating the Asian mainland from the island of Borneo and the Philippine archipelago, China has built military outposts on disputed islands and reefs that, according to Xi, “are Chinese territory since ancient times … left to us by our ancestors.” The network of bases, harbors and landing strips deep in international waters has created a buffer for China's southern coastline, further encircled Taiwan and challenged the Pentagon’s ability to move ships into Asia.

“It appears that China is rapidly developing the capabilities to exclude other navies from the South China Sea,” Bill Hayton, an author and associate fellow at the Chatham House think tank, told a congressional commission in September.

Under the Trump administration — which has called China a "bully" seeking a "maritime empire" — the U.S. sailed more warships than normal through the region in 2020 to assert navigation rights. But the operations have done nothing to claw back the islets and waters that five Southeast Asian nations and Taiwan claim Beijing has usurped.

These countries don't have nearly enough naval power on their own to dissuade China. Instead the governments of Vietnam, the Philippines and other states have waged a quieter form of resistance by encouraging traditional fishing communities to continue venturing into disputed waters — placing them on the front lines of Chinese aggression.

It is a high-seas cat-and-mouse game of almost cartoonish proportions, pitting a superpower with the world's largest armed fleet — including more than 300 navy ships, 130 large coast guard cutters and a maritime militia comprising hundreds of thousands of motorized boats — against men equipped with little more than nets who earn a few hundred dollars per expedition. Piloting aging wooden vessels outfitted with simple navigation systems, fishers must evade capture while hunting for elusive catches in a sea ravaged by unregulated fishing and dredging, much of it by China.



Fishing boats are docked in the harbor at Ly Son, Vietnam. 
 (Vo Kieu Bao Uyen / For The Times)More

“As fish stocks collapse due to overexploitation and environmental destruction, Vietnamese and increasingly Filipino fishers are heading farther from home and taking greater risks in contested waters,” said Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “That helps explain why they are the most frequent actors to come into contact with Chinese law enforcement and paramilitaries.”

Fisherman Tran Hong Tho acknowledged that Vietnamese traveled farther into the sea these days. "The shore has run out of fish," he said.

Beijing is unapologetic about its actions, which it describes as maritime policing against illegal fishing. In September, the China Coast Guard reported that it had expelled 1,138 foreign fishing boats from the northern half of the South China Sea in the preceding four months, boarded and inspected dozens, and detained 11 boats and 66 foreign crew members, “effectively safeguarding our fishery interests and maritime rights.”

For the fishing communities of Vietnam’s central coast, confronting China represents a collective obligation — to defend the waters where generations have made their living.

“The Vietnam government sees fishermen as a living monument to assert maritime sovereignty in the East Sea,” said Le Khuan, chairman of the fishing union on the island of Ly Son, using the Vietnamese term for the South China Sea.

More than nationalism is at stake in the 1.4 million square miles of water.

The South China Sea has connected civilizations for thousands of years — from the Malay merchant ships that sailed Chinese silk, Indian spices and Arabian frankincense along the ancient trade corridor between Europe and Asia, to the hulking freighters and container vessels that crisscross the oceans and power today's globalized commerce. An estimated $3.4 trillion in goods passes through the sea annually, including 14% of all U.S. trade, 40% of China's and 86% of Vietnam's.

One-third of Vietnam’s 96 million people live along the serpentine coastline, where humble flotillas of identical blue-and-red boats bob in ramshackle harbors. The sea, which accounted for an estimated 12% of the global fish catch in 2015, has made Vietnam a leading seafood exporter and supports the families of at least 1.8 million people employed as marine fishermen.

Map of disputed territories in South China Sea (Len De Groot)


The June 10 collision occurred off one of the most contentious zones: the Paracel Islands, claimed by Vietnam, China and Taiwan, but occupied entirely by China since its troops drove out South Vietnamese forces in 1974.

The chain of coral islands and reefs — known as Hoang Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha in Chinese — lies roughly 150 nautical miles from both the central Vietnamese coast and the Chinese island of Hainan. On Woody Island, the largest in the archipelago, Beijing has built its main military and administrative center in the sea, complete with an airstrip, two harbors, surface-to-air missile platforms, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, desalination plants — even a tourism industry marketed to mainland Chinese.

Vietnam has denounced China’s occupation of the islands as illegal and backed fishing communities with fuel subsidies, preferential loans and other modest assistance.

Chinese tourists take photos with their national flag during a visit to Quanfu Island, in the disputed Paracel archipelago, in 2014. (Peng Peng / Associated Press)More

In Ly Son, an island of Buddhist shrines and garlic fields 20 miles off the coast, more than 500 fishing boats trawl the disputed waters. The living rooms of veteran fishing captains are lined with framed certificates, recognition from provincial authorities of their years of fishing in the Paracels.

Although no fishermen are believed to have been killed in an intentional collision, every trip to the islands now carries the risk of a clash — and financial ruin.

“I’ve lost count of how many times my boat was attacked or chased away by Chinese vessels — you get used to it,” said Duong Ming Thanh, a 65-year-old captain on Ly Son who has fished in the Paracels since the 1980s.

Chinese used to hold fishermen for ransom; these days, they're more likely to lob hammers and cement chunks at the smaller boats, sending crews scurrying into cabins before being interdicted. Catches and equipment are often confiscated, men sometimes beaten. Thanh’s most recent encounter came in August, when he escaped a Chinese vessel that hounded his boat and blared at him over a loudspeaker to return to Vietnam.

The Paracel Islands are "like our backyard," said Duong Minh Thanh, a fishing captain in Ly Son, Vietnam, who often confronts Chinese vessels in the disputed archipelago.
 (Vo Kieu Bao Uyen / For The Times)More

"Compared to them, our boat is as small as an ant," he said. “Fishing near the shore is safer, but we insist on fishing in Hoang Sa because it’s been our livelihood for generations. It’s like our backyard. It belongs to us, so why would we be scared?”

In early June, Nguyen Loc, the captain of the fishing boat numbered QNG 96416, said goodbye to his wife and four children and left his tidy, two-story house on Ly Son. He set a course for Lincoln Island in the eastern Paracels, about 20 miles from Woody Island, in a part of the sea known for sea cucumber, a slithery delicacy.

The 50-foot boat was piled with more than $8,000 worth of catch when it was intercepted by the Chinese ship and its dozens of officers, some pointing weapons at the crew.

Nguyen Loc's wooden fishing boat was intercepted by a Chinese vessel in the Paracel Islands in June. (Vo Kieu Bao Uyen / For The Times)More

The Chinese officers treated the four crew members who fell overboard for minor scrapes, then herded all 17 onto the bow of their ship. They watched as officers chased down the hobbled fishing boat and climbed aboard, seizing their nets, navigation equipment and everything they had caught.

Loc, speaking in Vietnamese, pleaded with the Chinese to anchor his boat in shallow water so it wouldn’t float away, but they refused. Neither side understood the other. An argument ensued, and one of the men kicked Loc in the head.

There was little talking after that.

The crew was made to sign pieces of paper printed in Chinese, then allowed to go back aboard their ransacked craft. The cabin had nearly caved in and its windows were shattered. Water had seeped into the engine, so they had to dry it out before they could sail again.

It took two days and two nights to make it back to Ly Son, guided by a handheld compass. The men slept under the stars and gnawed on raw noodles and rice paper.

When they finally stepped ashore, local authorities ordered them into quarantine. Because they had met Chinese people, an official explained, they might have contracted the coronavirus.

Though the countries share communist systems of government, Vietnamese harbor deep anti-Chinese sentiment from centuries of occupation and three deadly conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. In 2014, tensions flared at sea after a Chinese-operated oil rig ventured deep into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, triggering a weeks-long standoff and violent protests across the country.

Vietnam’s leadership grew even more uneasy after China refused to accept the 2016 international tribunal ruling, which invalidated Beijing’s sweeping claims of “historical rights” inside its so-called nine-dash line: a U-shaped zone stretching 1,200 miles south of the Chinese mainland and encompassing more than 80% of the sea.

Vietnamese protesters stand outside the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi in 2014 against Beijing's deployment of an oil rig in the contested waters of the South China Sea
 (Chris Brummitt / Associated Press)

While the Philippines, which had filed the case, and other claimants have played down tensions with their colossal neighbor, Vietnam has spoken out more consistently against Beijing’s expansionism, contributing to a rapprochement with Washington. In March Hanoi welcomed the Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier to the port of Danang, a move that irked Beijing. Four months later the State Department declared China’s nine-dash-line claims “completely unlawful,” formally endorsing the 2016 ruling.

“When it feels like it has stronger support from other countries, including the U.S., Vietnam tends to show China a tougher face,” said Linh Nguyen, a Singapore-based analyst at Control Risks, a consultancy. With its twice-a-decade party congress scheduled for early next year, she added, “the leadership is focused on building legitimacy with the people, so that is more important than being soft with China.”

In April Hanoi issued an unusually harsh statement, saying China’s behavior “threatened the lives and damaged the property and legitimate interests of Vietnamese fishermen.” Days earlier, Tran Hong Tho had anchored his new, 60-foot boat off Woody Island when he spotted the red and green lights of a Chinese ship approaching. The Chinese sprayed water cannons and rocks before slamming into the boat, nearly splitting it in two.

Tran Hong Tho's fishing boat was rammed and sunk by a Chinese vessel in the South China Sea in April 2020. (Vo Kieu Bao Uyen)

The Chinese brought eight soaking wet Vietnamese aboard their ship, where they watched the fishing boat — which the 33-year-old Tho had built just a year earlier — sink below the surface along with six tons of catch.

Tho and his crew remained captive until the following afternoon, given only water and bread, when three other Vietnamese boats came looking for them. The Chinese chased them too, Tho said, before relenting and handing him and his men over to their compatriots.

“What can we do?” Tho said when a Times reporter visited him at his one-story home in the coastal commune of Binh Chau. “Chinese vessels are dozens of times bigger than our boats. They’re all armed. We don’t dare push back.”

Tho began fishing for another captain, hoping to earn back some of the money he'd borrowed to build his boat. In October, the provincial authority denied his request for a $3,200 fuel subsidy for the fateful expedition in April on the grounds that he hadn't spent the requisite 15 days in the Paracels.

Criticizing the government is risky in Vietnam's one-party state, yet Tho could not mask his despair.

"Fishermen have to suffer and struggle on our own to overcome losses when our boats are attacked by China," he said. "To be honest, I am disappointed."

Fishing industry leaders say the Vietnam government has been slow to increase financial support for crews that are attacked. A sinking could mean tens of thousands of dollars in losses, but captains usually recoup only a fraction of that.

Nguyen Viet Thang, a former deputy fisheries minister, said the government's current policies are "meant only for spiritual encouragement, without helping fishermen recover from the damage."

A Chinese navy frigate cruises near the Paracel Islands in 2014. 
 (Peng Peng / Associated Press)

Other initiatives have foundered. A $400-million plan to help fishers upgrade to steel-hulled boats produced substandard craft that were quickly abandoned. An official maritime militia launched a decade ago has stationed members aboard just 8,000 fishing vessels, or 1% of the registered fleet, according to government statistics.

Last December the defense ministry announced plans to beef up the maritime militia in 14 provinces for “sovereignty protection and economic development,” but fishermen say they've yet to glimpse the new units.

“The structure and the operation of Vietnam’s maritime militia is not coordinated by a grand strategy,” said Nguyen The Phuong, a researcher at the Saigon Center for International Studies. “At the moment we are lacking a more coherent, effective way of countering what China is doing.”


Progress for the Vietnam Maritime Militia. Currently the Vietnam People's Navy-owned Ba Son shipyard is still rapidly...Posted by VietDefense on Monday, November 9, 2020

China has stepped up its criticism, with state media accusing Vietnam of arming its fleet to encourage illegal fishing. Vietnamese boats have long been known to transgress not only Chinese waters but also those claimed by Indonesia and Malaysia — actions that in 2017 led the European Union to slap Hanoi with a “yellow card” warning on seafood that could lead to trade sanctions.

With estimates suggesting the sea’s fish stocks have plunged by 70-95% since the 1950s, a Peking University think tank recently described illegal fishing by Vietnam as “the most serious challenge to maritime security in the South China Sea.”

Yet many experts argue that China is the main culprit in overfishing, offering massive incentives to its armed fleet and regular fishermen to venture far into other nations' exclusive economic zones, from Latin America to the Antarctic.

The addition of armed vessels could heighten tensions, especially as governments have failed to make progress on a legally binding code of conduct for the disputed waters, and no country is pursuing an agreement on how to manage fisheries in a rapidly depleting sea.

“Clashes will increase as China strengthens de facto control and [fish] stocks collapse,” Poling said. “Eventually we will see loss of life if this keeps up.”

The fishermen of Ly Son have no plans to abandon the South China Sea. Next year, when typhoon season eases and calm returns to the water’s surface, Loc and his crew will set sail once again for the Paracels — in search of the fish their grandfathers caught.

“I’ve been going out into the sea for 20 years now, and I’ve never stopped except during rough waters,” Loc said. “I will keep on going out there until I die.”

Special correspondent Bao Uyen reported from Ly Son and Times staff writer Bengali from Singapore.

This is the fourth in a series of occasional articles about the effect China’s global power is having on nations and people’s lives.

This story originally appeared in Los Angeles Times.

 

Explainer: Asia-Pacific closes in on world's biggest trade deal

Martin Petty
ASEAN Summit in Hanoi

By Martin Petty

(Reuters) - Fifteen Asia-Pacific economies are set to conclude talks on Sunday and sign what could become the world's largest free trade agreement, covering nearly a third of the global population and about 30% of its global gross domestic product.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which could be approved at the end of a four-day ASEAN summit in Hanoi, will progressively lower tariffs and aims to counter protectionism, boost investment and allow freer movement of goods within the region.

A U.S.-China trade war and U.S. President Donald Trump's "America First" retreat from predecessor Barack Obama's "pivot" towards Asia has given impetus to complete RCEP, which is widely seen as Beijing's chance to set the regional trade agenda in Washington's absence.

The U.S. election win by Democrat Joe Biden, however, could challenge that, with the former vice president signalling a return to stronger U.S. multilateralism.

WHAT IS RCEP ALL ABOUT?

RCEP includes China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) - Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.

India was involved in earlier discussions but opted out last year.

One of the deal's biggest draws is that its members already have various bilateral or multilateral agreements in place, so RCEP builds on those foundations.

It will allow for one set of rules of origin to qualify for tariffs reduction with other RCEP members. A common set of regulations mean less procedures and easier movement of goods.

This encourages multinational firms to invest more in the region, including building supply chains and distribution hubs.

WHAT IS ITS GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE?

The idea of RCEP was hatched in 2012 and was seen as a way for China, the region's biggest importer and exporter, to counter growing U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific under Obama.

Negotiations for a U.S.-led "mega-regional accord" then known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - Obama's signature trade deal - were making strong progress and China was not among its 12 members.

Momentum behind RCEP grew when Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP in 2017, taking away its main architect and two-thirds of the bloc's combined $27 trillion GDP. It was renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and it includes seven RCEP members.

As the key source of imports and main export destination for most RCEP members, China stands to benefit and is well positioned to shape the trade rules and expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific, which Obama had openly sought to prevent.

HOW IS RCEP DIFFERENT TO CPTPP?

RCEP focuses heavily on slashing tariffs and increasing market access but it does not harmonise to the same extent as CPTPP and is seen as less comprehensive.

It requires fewer political or economic concessions compared with CPTPP and RCEP has less emphasis on labour rights, environmental and intellectual property protections and dispute resolution mechanisms, although it does include provisions on competition.

RCEP's market size is nearly five times greater than that of the CPTPP, with almost double its annual trade value and combined GDP.

WILL A BIDEN PRESIDENCY CHANGE ANYTHING?

Biden is signalling a swing back to the multilateral approach of the Obama administration, but it might be premature to talk about trade deals given the huge challenges awaiting him on the domestic front, and risk of upsetting unions that helped get him elected.

His trade priorities are expected to focus on working with allies to jointly exert pressure on China over trade and to push for changes at the World Trade Organization. Rejoining the CPTPP in its current form might not be on the horizon soon.

The trade unions and progressives that backed Biden's election have previously been sceptical about free trade agreements. He has included elements of those in his transition team and may be advised to maintain protections on vulnerable industries like steel and aluminium.

However, indications of Biden's intent to reconnect in the Asia-Pacific would be broadly welcomed, including as a counterbalance against China.

US military using private spy planes to keep tabs on China, think tank says

Teddy Ng
South China Morning Post12 November 2020


Privately operated reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft have been sent to Asia to help the US keep watch on Chinese activities close to its maritime territory, according to a Beijing-based think tank.

The South China Sea Probing Initiative said using the spy planes would help boost the US military’s operational capabilities in the region.

In a report published on Wednesday, the think tank said three such surveillance aircraft had been sent to Okinawa in Japan and Manila in the Philippines since March.

Get the latest insights and analysis from our Global Impact newsletter on the big stories originating in China.

A Tenax Aerospace CL-604 landed at the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa on March 30, and patrolled around the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea on April 7, the report said.

It was then sent on a mission over the South China Sea on July 16, with a stop at the Clark Air Base in the Philippines for refuelling.

From March to November 11, the aircraft made 139 flights to the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and 17 flights to the South China Sea, the think tank said.

Private surveillance aircraft are said to have been sent to the US Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan. Photo: Kyodo

Another surveillance aircraft, a Bombardier CL-650, was also deployed to the East China Sea on August 3, and to the South China Sea on August 20.

That plane carried out nine reconnaissance and surveillance flights over the East China Sea, Yellow Sea and the northern part of the Taiwan Strait, it flew over the South China Sea four times, and entered South Korean airspace five times.
China’s military lays out technology road map to catch up with the US

The think tank described the plane’s activities near China over a period of about six weeks as being “like a test to see Chinese reactions”.

A third surveillance aircraft from Meta Special Aerospace meanwhile landed in Manila on August 14 and also carried out missions nearby.


The think tank said the private aircraft were being used as part of joint efforts with the US military, but they could also help to reduce the risk of conflict in the region.

“There is more flexibility in using jets from private companies and it can reduce diplomatic tensions compared with military aircraft [carrying out the same activities],” the report said. “This also signals that the US will step up its presence in the Indo-Pacific region through a collaboration between the military, coastguard and private security sector.”

Song Zhongping, a former instructor with the PLA’s Second Artillery Corps, said the use of private aircraft showed a forward-looking approach.

“This kind of outsourcing will save costs for the US military,” he said. “This is definitely a good thing for the US military. There will be more and more ways to outsource [military activities] in the future. This is also an important area where the civilian and military sectors can integrate.”

Additional reporting by Kristin Huang
President Bolsonaro calls Brazil 'a country of f--gots' while downplaying COVID-19 in new homophobic comment

Naina Bhardwaj
Business Insider13 November 2020

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro at the Planalto Palace in Brasilia, Brazil on November 11, 2020. Eraldo Peres/AP PhotoMore

Brazillian President, Jair Bolsonaro, referred to Brazil as "a country of f--gots" during a tourism launch event.

Bolsonaro used the Portuguese phrase "marcias" which translates to the homophobic slur f--got in English.

He previously told staff who wore face masks that they were "coisa de viado," a slur which means "for fairies."

He later contracted COVID-19. Twice.



Brazillian President, Jair Bolsonaro, referred to Brazil as "a country of f--gots" during a tourism launch event in Brasilia.

Bolsonaro used the Portuguese word "marcias" which translates to the homophobic slur in what was meant to be a brief closing speech, on Tuesday. It transformed into a 30-minute attack on the press, science, and president-elect Joe Biden, according to Vice News.

He said: "All of us are going to die one day. Everyone is going to die. There is no point in escaping from that, in escaping from reality. We have to stop being a country of f--gots," the Independent reported.

The president previously used homophobic language while mocking advice to wear face masks and told staff members who wore them that they were "coisa de viado," a slur which means "for fairies," according to Pink News. He later contracted COVID-19. Twice.

The Bolsonaro president who was elected in 2018, and was dubbed 'Brazil's Trump.' He has a long history of homophobic comments.

In 2011, he told Playboy: "I would be incapable of loving a gay son. I prefer that he die in an accident" and has also previously compared gay kisses to "a pedophile's right to have sex with a 2-year-old." He said he would punch couples kissing in public, Pink News added.

During a 2013 interview with Stephen Fry, Bolsonaro said that "homosexual fundamentalists" were brainwashing children so they could "satisfy them sexually in the future," The Guardian reported.

This week, he also sparked outrage by celebrating the suspension of China's Sinovac vaccine trials by Brazillian health regulator, Anvisa, after a Sao Paulo study subject took their own life. Bolonsaro is a longtime critic of China.

The death was later found to be unrelated and the trials have continued, The Guardian added.

Despite being 65-years-old, Bolsonaro previously said: "In my particular case, with my history as an athlete, if I were infected with the virus, I would have no reason to worry, I would feel nothing, or it would be at most just a little flu," according to Reuters.

Brazil currently has the second-highest rate of COVID-19 cases after the US with almost 5.7 million infections and at least 164,000 deaths, according to data from Johns Hopkins University.

Bolsonaro has not yet congratulated Joe Biden on his presidential victory. He is one of Donald Trump's strongest allies and the president continues to pursue legal challenges and refuses to concede.

On Tuesday, he warned that he would respond to the USA with "gunpowder" and not just "saliva" if the White House imposes economic sanctions on Brazil over deforestation in the Amazon.

Read the original article on Business Insider
Grief, anger, disbelief: Trump voters face Biden's victory

TAMARA LUSH, ADAM GELLER and MICHELLE PRICE
Associated Press11 November 2020


1 / 8

Election 2020-Trump Voters

Joan Martin poses for a portrait on the front porch of her home in Picayune, Miss., Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2020. When she heard that Joe Biden was declared the winner of the presidential election, the retired nurse and avowed supporter of President Donald Trump was deeply unsettled. To steel herself, she thought about how her household weathered Hurricane Katrina, when it battered her hometown of Picayune, in 2005. (AP Photo/Gerald Herbert)



ST. PETERSBURG, Fla. (AP) — When Joan Martin heard that Joe Biden had been declared the winner of the presidential election, the retired nurse and avowed supporter of President Donald Trump was deeply unsettled. To steel herself, she thought about how her household weathered Hurricane Katrina when it battered her hometown of Picayune, Mississippi, in 2005.

As the storm blew toward the town, Martin rushed out into her yard to carry her 85 show chickens to safety. Outside, howling winds lashed her family’s barn, lifting the edges of the roof off its moorings.

“The next day they (the chickens) were very concerned about the changes in the yard — we had trees down,” said Martin, 79. “They were very eyes-wide. But within two days, they said, ‘Oh, yeah, we can deal with this,’ and they did. So I have to follow their lead.”

Across the country, many of the 71.9 million people who voted for Trump — especially his loyal, passionate base — are working through turbulent emotions in the wake of his loss. Grief, anger and shock are among the feelings expressed by supporters who assumed he would score a rock-solid victory — by a slim margin, maybe easily, perhaps even by a landslide.

There is also denial. Many are skeptical of the results, saying they don't trust the media's race call for Biden, the way election officials counted the ballots, the entire voting system in America. Their views echo the unsupported claims Trump has made since Election Day.

This despite the fact that state officials and election experts say the 2020 election unfolded smoothly across the country and without widespread irregularities. Trump and other Republicans have pointed to isolated problems, but many are explained by human error. Many of the Trump campaign's legal challenges have been dismissed in court. And with Biden leading Trump by solid margins in key battleground states, none of those issues would have any impact on the outcome of the election.

Still, any fragment of possibility is enough for some Trump supporters to reject reality, feel aggrieved and rebuff Biden's calls for unity. Their comments lay out the political challenge ahead for the president-elect: The longer Trump casts doubt on the legitimacy of Biden’s win, the harder it will be for the new president to unite a riven country, as he has said he wants to do.

“I’m really not in a live and let live mood," said Daniel Echebarria, a 39-year-old school teacher who lives in Sparks, Nevada.

Echebarria said he was surprised by the election results, questioned some of the numbers and would like to see the president continue with his legal challenges. But he also said he doesn’t consider the result “a big rig job” and doesn’t want to see Trump deny the results into January. Still, he's not feeling particularly united, either.

Echebarria said he believes Democrats never gave Trump a chance to govern and cites the Russia investigation and the impeachment trial as examples.

“I think that the president was prohibited from getting a lot of his agenda done because so much time and effort had to be put against defending against these," he said.

Several Trump supporters interviewed by The Associated Press in recent days were rankled by widespread celebrations of Biden's win in liberal cities. They saw hypocrisy in the public, outdoor gatherings after Democrats condemned Trump supporters for attending big rallies — some were held indoors — during the coronavirus pandemic.

“Sad” is how Lori Piotrowski sums up her mood. The president of the Boulder City Republican Women club in Nevada at first sounds much like any other deflated supporter.

“You always want your candidate to win. You’re a little let down. You worked hard," she said.

But Piotrowski also described herself as “extremely” surprised by the result of the election. She's struggling to reconcile her version of the campaign with the results. She says she saw so many images of large Trump rallies in the final days. On a recent drive from Las Vegas to Reno — through rural, GOP-leaning Nevada — she saw only Trump signs and banners, she said.

“The votes didn’t reflect that amount of enthusiasm. I just find that very surprising,” she said. ”It makes me wonder.”

Biden won Nevada by racking up votes in the state’s urban areas.

Piotrowski, like many Trump supporters, wants to see Trump’s legal challenges continue. A massive surge in mail voting and the slower tally of those votes made the vote count look unfamiliar and strange. Piotrowski said it concerns her that races were called with so many ballots outstanding, although that is often the case.

“It just seems to me that there’s a lot of things that can be improved in the system so that people felt more confident,” she said.

She said she hasn’t listened to any of Biden’s speeches since Election Day.

Za Awng, of Aurora, Colorado, is also suspicious of the vote count.

Awng, who came to the U.S. as a refugee from Myanmar, has embraced Trump as a politician who echoes his conviction that China’s influence in the world must be sharply curtailed, and as one who Awng says shares his Christian values.

This spring, Awng lost his job as a chef for two months when the pandemic forced the closure of the restaurant where he works. Back at work now, he credits Trump with working hard over the last four years to improve the economy. It was hard for him to grasp how the president could lose.

“I believe there is something wrong," he said, pointing to what appear to be Democratic shifts in the tally but were a result of mail-in votes being counted later. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to cast mail-in ballots after Trump baselessly declared mail voting fraudulent.

“I hope there will be counting again and maybe it will change,” he said.

Even in less tense times, Jim Czebiniak seeks solace in hours of evening prayer. So when Czebiniak, an avid Trump supporter who lives in the upstate community of Knox, New York, heard that Biden had been declared the winner, he turned once again to worship in a search for answers.

“First of all, I went to the Lord and I asked him why, why is it going like this? The Lord said, ‘Because I’m working on stuff. Just relax and let things work themselves out,'" said Czebiniak, 72, who is semi-retired from a career writing custom software.

“To quote what’s-his-name from the Rolling Stones, Mick Jagger: ’You can’t always get what you want,'” Czebiniak said.

Still, Czebiniak said he is far from ready to accept a Biden presidency. He cited several unsupported claims made by the Trump campaign.

“The election isn’t really called yet,” Czebiniak said, days after all the major U.S. television networks and the AP examined vote counts in key states to declare Biden the overall winner. “I don’t trust anything that’s going on there with all this vote counting."

Unlike many Trump supporters, Michelle Sassouni wasn't shocked by the outcome of the election or the aftermath.

The 29-year-old in Tampa, Florida, is an active member of her region's Young Republicans Club and a co-host of a video show, “Moderately Outraged.” She floated the idea of Biden's nomination, and potential to win, months ago.

“Everyone laughed at me on the show,” she said. With many liberal friends, she had seen the strong opposition to Trump. She even understands it somewhat. “I don’t love everything he does, but I voted for him because I’m a Republican.”

But Sassouni doesn't see danger in Trump's vow to fight the results in court. People need to be reassured of the results, and a court fight might give them confidence, she said.

“If you voted for Joe Biden, wouldn’t you want to know that he won fair and square so that there's not this cloud over his head?” she asked. “If half the country believes there was some sort of election tampering, then that creates distrust in the system, that creates distrust in Western democracy as a whole.”

Martin, the retiree in Mississippi, says she's planning to resume her daily life, tending to her animals and avoiding talking about the country’s change in leadership as a way to deal with the stress and trepidation she feels.

“I’ll go out in the yard to check and talk to my chickens and say my old-fashioned hymns and get by,” she said.

___



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Election 2020-Trump Voters
Joan Martin poses for a portrait with her Bichon Frise named Brigeet in the backyard of her home in Picayune, Miss., Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2020. When she heard that Joe Biden was declared the winner of the presidential election, the retired nurse and avowed supporter of President Donald Trump was deeply unsettled. To steel herself, she thought about how her household weathered Hurricane Katrina, when it battered her hometown of Picayune, in 2005. (AP Photo/Gerald He






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Election 2020 Trump Voters
Daniel Echebarria, a 39-year-old supporter of President Donald Trump, poses for a picture in Carson City, Nev., where he works as a teacher. Echebarria lives in Sparks, Nev., and said he's disappointed and surprised in the results of the November election and isn't open to Joe Biden's message of unity after four years where he says Democrats prohibited the president from accomplishing his agenda by instead leaving him to fight the Russia investigation and impeachment. (AP Photo/Sam Metz)



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Election 2020-Trump Voters
Joan Martin poses for a portrait wearing her mask that she says she always wears in public, on the front porch of her home in Picayune, Miss., Wednesday, Nov. 11, 2020. When she heard that Joe Biden was declared the winner of the presidential election, the retired nurse and avowed supporter of President Donald Trump was deeply unsettled. To steel herself, she thought about how her household weathered Hurricane Katrina, when it battered her hometown of Picayune, in 2005. (AP Photo/Gerald Herbert)
National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956.

National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956. By David Brandenberger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. xv plus 378 pp.).

At a reception for Red Army commanders during World War II, Stalin famously praised the Russian people as "the most outstanding nation of all the nations in the Soviet Union." "I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people," he declared, "not just because they are the leading people, but because they have a clear mind, a hardy character, and patience." (pp. 130-131) This statement marked the culmination of an ideological shift in which the Soviet regime exchanged proletarian internationalist rhetoric and symbolism for russocentric imagery. Historians have long been fascinated by the apparent "great retreat" from communism and revival of Russian nationalism under Stalin beginning in the mid-1930s. Yet few scholars have sought to analyze the origins and nuances of this shift or to assess the reception it found among the Russian-speaking Soviet public.

David Brandenberger's monograph, National Bolshevism, seeks to fill this gap. Using archival and other sources that were unavailable to Western scholars before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, he analyzes the formulation, dissemination, and reception of a "russocentric form of etatism" (p. 2) in Stalin's Soviet Union. Brandenberger argues that it was not genuine nationalist sentiment that induced the Soviet leaders to turn to "national Bolshevism"; rather, they used Russian history and russocentric images to promote an etatist agenda and build support for the communist state. The result, ironically, was something Stalin and his comrades never intended--the emergence of a popular sense of Russian national identity.

This mass Russian nationalism, Brandenberger argues, was something entirely new in Russian history. In an introductory chapter, he makes the case that there was no "articulate, coherent sense of mass identity" (p. 10) in Russia before the Stalinist era. During the first world war, Russian soldiers showed little interest in fighting for their homeland; the allegiances and loyalties of the overwhelmingly peasant population were regional and local rather than national. In the 1920s, the regime actively discouraged Russian national pride and treated tsarist history as an unfortunate and oppressive prelude to the Soviet era. Yet secret police reports in this period revealed that much of the population was apathetic--even hostile--toward Bolshevik goals. Brandenberger sees the 1927 war scare, in which a series of foreign policy setbacks led the regime to fear imminent capitalist attack, as a pivotal moment in the Bolsheviks' ideological evolution. Aware that calls for proletarian solidarity would not suffice to rally the population, the Soviet leaders began to search for a new basis for mass loyalty.

They found it in Russian history. Beginning in the mid-1930s, the regime began to celebrate the virtues of the Russian past. The Stalinist leadership rehabilitated prerevolutionary military and cultural figures, while championing the Soviet state as the natural heir of the tsarist empire. In a move away from the equality of all Soviet nationalities promoted by Lenin, Stalin now described Russia as "first among equals" (p. 43)--a revolutionary vanguard nation leading the other Soviet peoples to socialism. Brandenberger argues that this russocentric rhetoric was meant to supplement, not replace, proletarian internationalism. Along with tsarist-era heroes, the regime also promoted leading figures of the revolution and civil war as models for Russians to emulate. But as the escalating purges of the 1930s claimed more and more Soviet-era heroes, pre-revolutionary figures became the focus of Soviet propaganda. The Russian masses, meanwhile, overlooked the nuances of Stalinist ideology and welcomed the new rhetoric as the outright promotion of Russian nationalism; for some, the shift even became a license to express chauvinist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic views.

Largely thanks to its adoption of "national Bolshevik" ideology, Brandenberger argues, the regime was successful in mobilizing popular support in 1941. The war saw the spread of russocentric language and imagery, not just in official propaganda but also among ordinary citizens. In letters home, front-line soldiers compared Hitler's invasion with earlier incursions by medieval Teutonic knights and Napoleonic troops. Civilians kept up their spirits by reading Tolstoy's War and Peace and the memoirs of tsarist military heroes. By the postwar period, ordinary Russians deftly wielded the tropes of Russian nationalism. Citizens now routinely referred to the Russian "national character," which was said to be exceptionally heroic, patient, and self-sacrificing. The terms "Soviet" and "Russian" had become virtually synonymous. Between the mid-1930s and the mid-1950s, in short, the Stalinist regime had created modern Russian nationalism.


While scholars have known for some time about the Stalinist regime's turn to russocentrism, Brandenberger has made an important contribution by highlighting the impact of this shift on ordinary Russians. Using sources such as student essays, museum comment books, and personal diaries, he demonstrates that the Russian public rapidly learned to speak the language of national Bolshevism. Brandenberger also offers an intriguing look at the political machinations underlying the regime's ideological twist and turns, including Stalin's personal interventions in debates about culture and history. Among other fascinating tidbits, we learn that Stalin criticized the 16th-century tyrant Ivan the Terrible for showing too much kindness to his enemies.

Although Brandenberger's argument about the Stalinist roots of modern Russian nationalism is compelling on many levels, some readers may be left wondering why, if there was virtually no popular Russian nationalism before 1917, ordinary Russians so enthusiastically adopted the russocentric rhetoric of the Stalinist regime. Particularly in light of the emphatic Soviet rejection of Russian nationalism in the 1920s, the eager popular embrace of prerevolutionary heroes and themes in the 1930s seems to suggest the prior existence of a reservoir of common images and symbols of Russianness. Proletarian internationalism, which the Bolsheviks promoted vigorously for nearly 20 years before turning to russocentrism, never managed to evoke such enthusiasm--a fact that Brandenberger attributes primarily to the complex and abstract nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Yet I am not convinced that the complexity of Marxism alone can explain the greater appeal of nationalism. Such quibbles aside, National Bolshevism deserves praise for shedding new light on the evolution of Russian identity and significantly advancing our understanding of the Stalinist state and its popular underpinnings.

Adrienne Edgar
University of California, Santa Barbara

COPYRIGHT 2004 Journal of Social History

Dr. David  Brandenberger

David Brandenberger - History - University of Richmond

Professor of History and Global Studies
Global Studies Concentration Advisor: Politics and Governance

David Brandenberger has written on Stalin-era propaganda, ideology and nationalism in journals like Russian ReviewSlavic ReviewKritika, Revolutionary RussiaNationality PapersEurope-Asia StudiesJahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, Noveishaia istoriia Rossii and Voprosy istorii. His first book, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Harvard, 2002), focuses on the USSR's reliance on russocentric mobilizational propaganda and the effect that this pragmatic use of historical heroes, imagery and iconography had on national consciousness among Russian-speakers, both during the Stalin period and after. His second book, an interdisciplinary co-edited volume titled Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda (Wisconsin, 2006), elaborates on many of these themes in its examination of the Stalin regime's co-option of canonical classics from Pushkin and Lermontov to Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible. His third book, Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination and Terror under Stalin, 1928-1941 (Yale, 2011), explores the USSR’s failure to inculcate a sense of communist identity in interwar Soviet society—a failure that precipitated the mobilizational exigencies detailed in his earlier books. His forth book, Stalin’s Master Narrative (Yale, 2019), is a co-edited critical edition of the general secretary’s infamous 1938 party history textbook. He is presently writing a book on the 1949 Leningrad Affair, Stalin's last political purge, and co-editing the purge-era diary of a high-ranking member of the USSR’s Politburo.



Russia’s occupation of Ukraine: a historical and centuries-old process


Ukrainian artist Dariya Marchenko created a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin from 5,000 spent shell cases collected from location of battles in Russia's aggressive war in the Donbas. Photo: dashart.com.ua


2020/11/13 - 10:04 • HYBRID WAR


Article by: Oksana Syroyid


Editor’s NoteThis year’s Lviv Security Forum brought together security experts from different countries in order to model the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict so that the sovereignty of Ukraine on territories temporarily occupied by Russia would be restored and Ukraine would be protected against Russian aggression in the future. In the preface to the report of the modeling exercise, the Security Forum’s co-chair Oksana Syroyid laid out an essential introduction to Russia’s war against Ukraine — that is, the centuries-old struggle of Russia to access warm-water ports. It is through this prism that the current war against Ukraine — and Russia’s attempts to resurrect its former empire altogether — should be viewed.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict reaches back to the times when Ukraine emerged on the world map. In fact, it had started long before Russia established itself as a state. The nature of this conflict, though, has remained unchanged.

Since the creation of the Tsardom of Muscovy, its eastern and northern territories have been protected by seas, and the southern territories have been protected by mountains.


Photo: lib.byu.edu

However, basic human resources, agricultural land, and infrastructure routes were located along the western border. In addition, while possessing vast natural resources, the Russian Empire didn’t have access to warm-water ports.

This determined the main strategy of its expansion westward – to secure access to the Baltic and Black Seas and increase the buffer zone around the lifeline containing vital infrastructure and resources.


The defeat of the Tsarist Russian Empire in World War I and the October Coup didn’t in any way change the imperialist policies of Bolshevik Russia.

In fact, immediately after its formation in 1917, Soviet Russia began the occupation of the newly established Ukrainian People’s Republic. The occupation began with the formation of the “Ukrainian People’s Republic of Soviets” – an enclave controlled by the Bolsheviks (similar to today’s ORDLO – Separate Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions).

During the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919 – 20, the leaders of the three nations – the United States, United Kingdom, and France – conceded statehood to nations that emerged from the ruins of European empires. The leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic sought support to oppose the Bolsheviks and the recognition of their statehood. However, it was the offensive of Bolshevik Russia that prevented the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic.

Western powers were exhausted by World War I and didn’t have the resources and desire to resist the Bolsheviks, whose intentions were unclear to them. They chose to isolate and ignore the Bolsheviks instead.

The return of control over Ukraine and its resources opened up new opportunities for the Russian Bolshevik government. The most valuable of such resources was grain, which could be exported to raise funds necessary for the industrialization of the Soviet Union.
However, taking grain from peasant owners was not easy, and collectivization pressed for technical development.

Collectivization and “dekulakization” provoked thousands of peasant revolts throughout Ukraine. People demanded the return of land and local governance to their communities. In order to prevent any potential peasant revolts and to secure control over land and grain, which was the main currency back then, Stalin killed millions of Ukrainian peasants by starvation in 1932 – 33.

Nazi Germany was the closest ally for Stalin’s empire at that time. Hitler and Stalin relied on each other’s resources in preparation for their own wars.

Stalin intended to move west, establish control over the seas and increase the “sanitary zone” under the banner of the socialist revolution. Hitler needed Ukrainian lands as the source of a workforce and food for his future empire.

Ukraine, or rather its land, remained the main trophy in the war between the two dictators. That’s why people weren’t spared. Ukrainians accounted for almost 40% of all human losses of the Soviet Union in World War II.


World War II was started by both dictators, but only one of them was punished.

Stalin ended the war as a winner who spelled the terms of peace. As a result, as of 1945, the Soviet empire had advanced its borders to Berlin.

Stalin intended to move even further west. He first laid siege to West Berlin and established the German Democratic Republic (once again, similar to today’s ORDLO) in breach of the conditions of the occupation zones.

Later on, in 1952, he attempted to expand westward, proposing that German leader Konrad Adenauer unite the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany under conditions of an amnesty to former members of the Nazi party, new elections, and the non-aligned status of a united Germany. To this Chancellor Adenauer replied,

“Refusal to integrate with the West will lead to the capture of Germany by the Bolsheviks and will be tantamount to “political suicide.”

Despite unsuccessful attempts at further expansion to the west, the Soviet empire achieved the cherished dream of all Russian tsars.


Control of the Baltic Sea was secured by the Kaliningrad enclave – the remnant of the Kingdom of Prussia with its capital Kƶnigsberg, as well as the occupation of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the GDR satellite.

The Black Sea was put under Russian control as a result of control of the Crimea and the Ukrainian coastline, which was further boosted by the occupation of Georgia and the turning Bulgaria and Romania into Soviet satellites. The “sanitary zone” was expanded enough to keep the empire’s lifeline safe.


After WWII, Russia expanded its influence far to its east via the Eastern Bloc. Image: Wikipedia


Without control over the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as without control over Ukrainian resources, “Greater Russia” is impossible.

Meanwhile, Europe needed to recover from the war of the past, protect itself from the Soviet military threat of the present, and prevent wars between European nations in the future.

To maintain geopolitical balance on the European continent, the North Atlantic Alliance was established, whose aim, according to its first Secretary General, Baron Ismay, was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

The democratic world assessed the purpose and methods of the Soviet threat adequately. However, the West was unable to look into the roots of the problem: throughout the decades of the Cold War, it was communism as an ideology, not the imperial nature of Russia which was considered a threat.


That is why Russian aggression against Ukraine, unfortunately, was inevitable. It is no coincidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century.”

Without control over the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as without control over Ukrainian resources, “Greater Russia” is impossible.

Initially, Russia took advantage of Ukrainians’ lack of experience in state-building and management of their resources after independence, and during large-scale privatization, they freely bought up strategic enterprises and critical infrastructure.

Most of the figures now called “oligarchs” have monopolized Ukrainian regional gas companies, oblenergos, thermal power plants, shipyards, and access to key natural resources for Russian money and in Russia’s interest.


They have never held a Ukrainian identity or interest in the development of Ukraine, so they easily pumped out and continue to pump out money from Ukraine through offshore jurisdictions. At the same time, in order to maintain their monopolies and guarantee Ukraine’s movement in the Russian fairway, those actors established control over Ukrainian politics through dependent media and political projects.

After all, today these oligarchs no longer make a secret of their reliance on Russia, openly lobbying for a Russian “appeasement” scenario in both Ukraine and the United States.

However, even this control wasn’t enough for Russia’s plans. Generations of people were born and raised in Ukraine, for whom any pro-Russian sentiments were alien and who increasingly looked to the West, identifying with European civilization and not with the “single Slavic people.” Time played against Russia – the territory got out of control.

The Revolution of Dignity proved to be only a pretext for the Russian invasion. The main purpose of the annexation of Crimea was to gain control of the Black Sea and strengthen geopolitical leverage in the greater Mediterranean region.

Thus, the main reasons for the occupation of East Ukraine were the levers of Russian pressure on Ukraine in both domestic and foreign policies.

Is it possible to resolve the age-old Russian-Ukrainian conflict? Is Ukraine able to do it alone? Is the democratic world ready to recognize the dependence of its own security on Ukraine’s security, realizing, in historical perspective, the price it will have to pay in the event of Ukraine’s loss of its freedom and independence?

“Thus it would be hypocrisy to deny that an independent Ukraine is as essential to […] the tranquility of the world. Merely because it is inconvenient to consider it and highly so to attempt its solution, the problem has too long been ignored. But it is a problem which has deep and intricate roots in history and in its modern form has assumed extreme urgency. Voltaire noted admiringly the persistence with which Ukrainians aspired to freedom and remarked that being surrounded by hostile lands, they were doomed to search for a Protector.

Until they are assured of liberty they will be faithless to whichever State they are bound and will continue freely to shed their own blood and that of their conquerors. So long, too, as this situation continues other nations will be tempted to exploit it. What then is the use of pretending that there is peace when there is no peace? Nor will there be any until this Ukrainian question is satisfactorily disposed of.”

These are the words of Lancelot Lawton, a British soldier, historian, economist, Ukrainian scholar, public figure, and international journalist, which he spoke in 1935. Ignoring these words then cost Europeans tens of millions of lives. Perhaps, history provides us with a chance to correct this mistake, doesn’t it?


Editor’s Note

Read the entire report here. The text in this article has been slightly edited for clarity.[/editorial


Oksana Syroyid is co-chair of the Lviv Security Forum, leader of the Samopomich Union political party, Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament in 2014-2019.