Pincered at sea, lobsters get new hope on land in UK
By AFP
Published March 7, 2023
Juvenile lobsters are kept in a segmented tray, to prevent them from eating each other - Copyright Natuna ministry of communication/AFP Handout
Sylvain PEUCHMAURD
The tiny lobsters are safe from predators — including each other — as they eddy in large white plastic tanks swirling with artificial currents.
In a few weeks’ time, as part of a conservation project, they will leave their small shed in the northeastern English port of Whitby for the open sea.
Whitby, whose dramatic abbey ruins were an inspiration for “Dracula” author Bram Stoker, is Europe’s third-largest lobster port.
Some 100,000 lobsters are landed each year, providing jobs for 150 people. Joe Redfern, who runs the Whitby Lobster Hatchery, hopes eventually to release the same number each year from his tanks.
“We want to make sure that the marine environment is protected and the lobster populations are conserved for the future,” the 31-year-old biology graduate told AFP.
Lobster pots are piled high on the quays of the port, but the crustaceans were once part of a much bigger fishing industry in Whitby.
The town’s mainstay catch of white fish has collapsed, a result of overfishing and climate change. Fishermen also blame European Union quotas, before Britain quit the bloc.
In the 1990s, there were about 30 big fishing boats in Whitby but by 2005, “there was only one”, according to Redfern, who has been a fisherman himself.
White fish such as cod and haddock have migrated to colder waters north. Some of the Whitby boats moved with them, relocating to the Scottish ports of Peterhead and Aberdeen.
“The guys that didn’t want to move, they had to migrate into shellfish,” said Jonathan Parkin, a 43-year-old Whitby fisherman.
– Mass die-off –
A new disaster struck Whitby fishermen from late 2021.
Lobsters, crabs and other crustaceans began dying off in huge numbers. The cause remains a mystery.
Locals suspect a government project to dredge for a new post-Brexit “freeport” in the Teesside region, to the north of Whitby.
They say the dredging has stirred up chemical pollutants in the seabed — a legacy of Teesside’s past as a centre of heavy industry.
But a government-commissioned study by independent experts said in January that it was “as likely as not that a pathogen new to UK waters” was the cause.
Plans for the hatchery began before the mass die-off. But Redfern said it could help “bring a bit of hope back into the communities” and show that “something can be done to start to rebuild”.
The project involves harvesting female lobsters, each carrying thousands of eggs, from the North Sea so that they can hatch safely.
– Cannibalism –
In the unforgiving open sea, the survival rate for lobster larvae is just one in 20,000, or 0.005 percent.
By allowing them to grow in a protected environment, Redfern hopes to increase that to 20 or 30 percent.
As they are fed and develop in their hatchery tanks, the larvae are separated when they reach the stage when, in the wild, they are likely to eat each other.
After two to three months, they are ready for the sea.
“Obviously when we release them, they won’t all survive, but what we’ve done is protect them over the larval stage, which is their most vulnerable period,” Redfern said.
The project raised more than £100,000 ($120,000) to get off the ground, from crowdfunding and corporate sponsorship.
Individual donors can sponsor a lobster and follow it until it is introduced into the sea.
The idea came from the Whitby fishing community, drawing inspiration from a similar project in Cornwall, southwest England.
“It’s massively, massively important,” said Parkin, who is involved in the project.
“We’re releasing future generations of lobsters for future generations of fishermen.”
It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Sunday, March 12, 2023
Central Asia’s poorest farmers know the value of their land
Depleted land needs more water, which is already insufficient across much of Central Asia.
A Kazakh shepherd in the steppe south of Aktobinsk. / Airunp, cc-by-sa 3.0
By bne IntelIiNews
March 10, 2023
The soils of Central Asia yield far less meat, dairy and produce today than they did a few decades ago. While that is an undisputed driver of poverty, new research examining the relationship between poverty and soil management challenges the idea that the rural poor are shabby stewards of the land, and could foster novel approaches to soil restoration.
In a paper published this month, Alisher Mirzabaev of the University of Bonn and two Russian colleagues use household survey data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to examine the "vicious cycles between poverty and environmental degradation."
Mirzabaev has previously calculated that reduced crop yields, lower livestock productivity and increasing needs for costly inputs such as fertiliser and labour – all signs of land degradation – cost the Central Asian economies $6bn a year; the land was 4.8 times more productive in the early 1980s. Degraded land often needs more water, as well, to wash salts out of the topsoil.
But does poverty worsen soil degradation?
The poorest farming households, Mirzabaev and his co-authors found, are more likely to use their land sustainably, for example by reducing tillage (to cut down on fuel costs), diversifying and rotating crops. It stands to reason that farmers who are cash-poor have less money to spend on fuel and fertiliser and other environmentally unfriendly inputs: “Our results show that the poor households have adopted more SLM [sustainable land management] practices than their richer counterparts.”
SLM can be labour-intensive. But for the poorest farmers, who frequently live in rural areas with high unemployment, labour is often one thing they have in surplus.
This lack of alternative local work opportunities “reduces the opportunity cost of family labor, especially for women due to labor market inequalities, leading to increased allocation of family labor to farm production. From the view of land management, lack of non-farm employment opportunities may, thus, allow for the adoption of more labor-intensive SLM.”
In other words, the poorest farmers are putting more hours into tending the land by hand, doing less of the mechanised work that can deplete soils most rapidly.
The authors acknowledge their work could suffer a "survivorship bias," meaning that the farmers surveyed do not include those who have quit trying to farm depleted fields: "We are looking into the areas where land degradation has not trespassed the irreversibility points and thresholds beyond which no agricultural production is possible."
This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.
The soils of Central Asia yield far less meat, dairy and produce today than they did a few decades ago. While that is an undisputed driver of poverty, new research examining the relationship between poverty and soil management challenges the idea that the rural poor are shabby stewards of the land, and could foster novel approaches to soil restoration.
In a paper published this month, Alisher Mirzabaev of the University of Bonn and two Russian colleagues use household survey data from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to examine the "vicious cycles between poverty and environmental degradation."
Mirzabaev has previously calculated that reduced crop yields, lower livestock productivity and increasing needs for costly inputs such as fertiliser and labour – all signs of land degradation – cost the Central Asian economies $6bn a year; the land was 4.8 times more productive in the early 1980s. Degraded land often needs more water, as well, to wash salts out of the topsoil.
But does poverty worsen soil degradation?
The poorest farming households, Mirzabaev and his co-authors found, are more likely to use their land sustainably, for example by reducing tillage (to cut down on fuel costs), diversifying and rotating crops. It stands to reason that farmers who are cash-poor have less money to spend on fuel and fertiliser and other environmentally unfriendly inputs: “Our results show that the poor households have adopted more SLM [sustainable land management] practices than their richer counterparts.”
SLM can be labour-intensive. But for the poorest farmers, who frequently live in rural areas with high unemployment, labour is often one thing they have in surplus.
This lack of alternative local work opportunities “reduces the opportunity cost of family labor, especially for women due to labor market inequalities, leading to increased allocation of family labor to farm production. From the view of land management, lack of non-farm employment opportunities may, thus, allow for the adoption of more labor-intensive SLM.”
In other words, the poorest farmers are putting more hours into tending the land by hand, doing less of the mechanised work that can deplete soils most rapidly.
The authors acknowledge their work could suffer a "survivorship bias," meaning that the farmers surveyed do not include those who have quit trying to farm depleted fields: "We are looking into the areas where land degradation has not trespassed the irreversibility points and thresholds beyond which no agricultural production is possible."
This article first appeared on Eurasianet here.
How cryptocurrency mining froze a Kazakh city
Any decent historical account of crypto mining should include an entry on the Ekibastuz GRES-2 coal-fired power plant.
Any decent historical account of crypto mining should include an entry on the Ekibastuz GRES-2 coal-fired power plant.
/ Mountins13, cc-by-sa 4.0
By Nizom Khodjayev in Astana March 8, 2023
To digital currency enthusiasts the term “crypto winter” speaks of a prolonged cryptocurrency bear market, but to Kazakhs in the know it will for ever be associated with the plight of a city hit by power outages during minus-30 degree Celsius weather.
Many media outlets and observers have in the past two years noted the quick rise and sudden death of Kazakhstan's crypto mining boom. The demise came under the weight of heavy government regulation made urgent by the country’s energy needs. The Central Asian nation saw its electricity grid over-strained by an influx of crypto prospectors, many of whom hurriedly moved on to Kazakhstan from China when Beijing introduced unsparing crypto crackdowns amid its own difficulties in various provinces with power shortages.
However, the news of the catastrophic city-wide power outage that hit Ekibastuz, in northeastern Kazakhstan’s Pavlodar Region, in late November—an outage that for many was not resolved until at least mid-December, with parts of the city’s power and heating systems still undergoing repairs to this day—was at first often contextualised as simply within the Kazakh government’s track record of such failures. There was no mention of crypto-mining.
Yet in hindsight, with the crypto surge over, it's clear that energy-thirsty crypto mining probably inflicted damage on Ekibastuz both before and after the boom.
The outage
As mentioned, the energy stoppage in Ekibastuz continued into December and, even after power was restored, at least 17 apartment buildings remained without heating. News items on repair works—namely, to the combined heat and power plant in Ekibastuz and to city homes damaged by the calamity—are still appearing to this day.
Cryptocurrency mining is renowned for being "energy thirsty"
By Nizom Khodjayev in Astana March 8, 2023
To digital currency enthusiasts the term “crypto winter” speaks of a prolonged cryptocurrency bear market, but to Kazakhs in the know it will for ever be associated with the plight of a city hit by power outages during minus-30 degree Celsius weather.
Many media outlets and observers have in the past two years noted the quick rise and sudden death of Kazakhstan's crypto mining boom. The demise came under the weight of heavy government regulation made urgent by the country’s energy needs. The Central Asian nation saw its electricity grid over-strained by an influx of crypto prospectors, many of whom hurriedly moved on to Kazakhstan from China when Beijing introduced unsparing crypto crackdowns amid its own difficulties in various provinces with power shortages.
However, the news of the catastrophic city-wide power outage that hit Ekibastuz, in northeastern Kazakhstan’s Pavlodar Region, in late November—an outage that for many was not resolved until at least mid-December, with parts of the city’s power and heating systems still undergoing repairs to this day—was at first often contextualised as simply within the Kazakh government’s track record of such failures. There was no mention of crypto-mining.
Yet in hindsight, with the crypto surge over, it's clear that energy-thirsty crypto mining probably inflicted damage on Ekibastuz both before and after the boom.
The outage
As mentioned, the energy stoppage in Ekibastuz continued into December and, even after power was restored, at least 17 apartment buildings remained without heating. News items on repair works—namely, to the combined heat and power plant in Ekibastuz and to city homes damaged by the calamity—are still appearing to this day.
Cryptocurrency mining is renowned for being "energy thirsty"
(Credit: Anita Evans Hunt, cc, MIT License).
After events in Ekibastuz, the authorities served warning that Astana could move to nationalise struggling energy firms. Politicians had been shaken by a full-blown crisis. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sacked the regional governor in charge of Ekibastuz, but likely only as a manoeuvre to redirect blame. And he instructed Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov to study the issue of nationalising problematic energy assets, according to a Facebook post from presidential spokesman Ruslan Zheldibay.
Kazakh authorities often attempt to take populist initiatives, such as with calls for nationalisations, to demonstrate the government’s apparent awareness of the issues. It’s all part of an attempt to divert responsibility from officials’ own roles in difficulties that have come to pass.
Kazakhstan’s ageing Soviet-era infrastructure often leads to disruptions in electricity provision. The government said in October that around 65% of regional power grids were in a poor state of wear and tear. The frustration with the grid stands in contrast to Kazakhstan’s status as a net energy exporter.
The rate of power outages became especially stark last year amid the influx of cryptocurrency mining firms to Kazakhstan that started in 2021.
The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC), a state-owned company, even introduced scheduled blackouts throughout late 2021 to prevent a system overload amid the spike in crypto-mining.
In 2021, Kazakhstan was considering the possibility of importing electricity from Russia in order to compensate for the strain on the grid caused by the crypto-mining, but with the ongoing war in Ukraine this became an increasingly unlikely possibility with the country attempting to reduce its economic reliance on its traditional ally.
The crypto boom
By the middle of 2021, the crypto mining industry in Kazakhstan had expanded from hosting a small group of prospectors drawn from around 2017 by cheap electricity to having the second-largest crypto sector in the world. In October 2021, Kazakhstan accounted for a remarkable 18.3% of the world's hash rate.
In the spring of 2022, Kazakhstan's bitcoin boom peaked after the authorities abruptly disconnected miners from the grid.
By late 2021, there were local estimates showing bitcoin mining in Kazakhstan was consuming more than 1.5 gigawatts of power, where two-thirds of that came from illicit miners or “grey” miners.
Heating or a higher hash rate? No-one put it to the vote in Ekibastuz (Photograph of a crypto mining farm in Iceland. Credit: Marco Krohn, cc-by-sa 4.0).
No wonder the grid was overloaded. Isolated blackouts spread. The lack of power supplies was even seen as a major contributory factor to raw tensions that spawned widespread public demonstrations in January 2022, culminating in the "Bloody January" countrywide political unrest that saw at least 238 individuals killed, according to the official account.
Following the unrest and more energy blackouts, the government moved to effectively shut down the cryptocurrency mining boom. Access to the electricity grid was restricted. Even mining operations run by relatives of individuals in power were cut off from the electricity network.
Miners gradually began to leave Kazakhstan, leaving their operations empty and abandoned. Ekibastuz went from having a high concentration of functioning crypto-mining enterprises, drawn by the vicinity's high level of electricity generation based on its traditional coal mining output, to being full of empty mining operations by the end of 2022.
Crypto parasitising off heating energy?
According to an article published by Kazakh news website Exclusive.KZ, residents of Ekibastuz noticed that issues with heating supplies for their apartment buildings significantly worsened after local power and heating authority Teplokommunenergo got a new chief. Azat Sarpekov took the helm in the winter of 2021-2022. Under Sarpekov, reported Exclusive.KZ, the main thermal power plant supplying heat to the city began directing energy capacities to “acquiring crypto-profits”.
The website also claimed that employees of the thermal power plant anonymously admitted to journalists that they were engaged in “imitating” work at the power plant.
And in April of 2022, around the same time that the energy ministry alerted the public to difficulties at the power plant, Exclusive.KZ noted that investigative journalists had discovered a mining farm on property of Teplokommunenergo. Whether Sarpekov faced any action amid the discovery is unclear—but in September, he was appointed deputy governor of Ekibastuz, the news outlet said.
In early December, with residents of the city still enduring unheated homes, a top Ekibastuz heating plant official, Sergei Vidlog, was found dead in his car.
Whether his death was down to suicide or perhaps even foul play remains unclear—Vidlog’s body was found in his car in a garage on December 4. According to RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, police attributed Vidlog’s death to a suicide that took place “after a falling-out with his wife”.
Given information shared by Exclusive.KZ, questions arise pertaining to Vidlog’s death. The mismanagement of the plant and energy infrastructure was already a major scandal, as Kazakh social media framed the situation as a greater failure involving the central government. But surely any possibility of the disaster being a near direct result of individuals in power mining crypto would have caused an even bigger uproar.
The situation also raises questions about all the “abandoned” crypto-mining farms—initially set up by foreign firms—that appeared in and around Ekibastuz. Were some of them taken over by individuals working for local authorities? Did mining operations simply continue instead of being halted as intended by the government?
Whatever the true sequence of events, the necessity of limiting crypto-mining in Kazakhstan was underlined.
As things stand, Kazakhstan has seen its global hash rate fall to 6.4% (down from the 18.4% peak) since the first quarter of 2022, reducing the carbon emissions of the nationwide power network by 10%, according to ClimateTech vice chair Daniel Batten. And due to Kazakhstan being 87.6%-fossil fuel dependent, less mining in the Central Asian nation results in a higher proportion of clean energy in the Bitcoin energy mix.
The country is unlikely to again become a top player in the cryptocurrency mining world unless it manages to properly address the issue of transitioning much of its energy sector to renewable energy. Or perhaps crypto might ride again in Kazakhstan if the ex-Soviet state builds an expected nuclear power plant.
Or not.
Following the collapse of the Bahamas-based FTX cryptocurrency exchange and hedge fund last year, a scandal that occurred around the same time as the Ekibastuz affair, Kazakhstan is in fact now considering a further tightening of crypto-mining regulations.
After events in Ekibastuz, the authorities served warning that Astana could move to nationalise struggling energy firms. Politicians had been shaken by a full-blown crisis. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sacked the regional governor in charge of Ekibastuz, but likely only as a manoeuvre to redirect blame. And he instructed Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov to study the issue of nationalising problematic energy assets, according to a Facebook post from presidential spokesman Ruslan Zheldibay.
Kazakh authorities often attempt to take populist initiatives, such as with calls for nationalisations, to demonstrate the government’s apparent awareness of the issues. It’s all part of an attempt to divert responsibility from officials’ own roles in difficulties that have come to pass.
Kazakhstan’s ageing Soviet-era infrastructure often leads to disruptions in electricity provision. The government said in October that around 65% of regional power grids were in a poor state of wear and tear. The frustration with the grid stands in contrast to Kazakhstan’s status as a net energy exporter.
The rate of power outages became especially stark last year amid the influx of cryptocurrency mining firms to Kazakhstan that started in 2021.
The Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC), a state-owned company, even introduced scheduled blackouts throughout late 2021 to prevent a system overload amid the spike in crypto-mining.
In 2021, Kazakhstan was considering the possibility of importing electricity from Russia in order to compensate for the strain on the grid caused by the crypto-mining, but with the ongoing war in Ukraine this became an increasingly unlikely possibility with the country attempting to reduce its economic reliance on its traditional ally.
The crypto boom
By the middle of 2021, the crypto mining industry in Kazakhstan had expanded from hosting a small group of prospectors drawn from around 2017 by cheap electricity to having the second-largest crypto sector in the world. In October 2021, Kazakhstan accounted for a remarkable 18.3% of the world's hash rate.
In the spring of 2022, Kazakhstan's bitcoin boom peaked after the authorities abruptly disconnected miners from the grid.
By late 2021, there were local estimates showing bitcoin mining in Kazakhstan was consuming more than 1.5 gigawatts of power, where two-thirds of that came from illicit miners or “grey” miners.
Heating or a higher hash rate? No-one put it to the vote in Ekibastuz (Photograph of a crypto mining farm in Iceland. Credit: Marco Krohn, cc-by-sa 4.0).
No wonder the grid was overloaded. Isolated blackouts spread. The lack of power supplies was even seen as a major contributory factor to raw tensions that spawned widespread public demonstrations in January 2022, culminating in the "Bloody January" countrywide political unrest that saw at least 238 individuals killed, according to the official account.
Following the unrest and more energy blackouts, the government moved to effectively shut down the cryptocurrency mining boom. Access to the electricity grid was restricted. Even mining operations run by relatives of individuals in power were cut off from the electricity network.
Miners gradually began to leave Kazakhstan, leaving their operations empty and abandoned. Ekibastuz went from having a high concentration of functioning crypto-mining enterprises, drawn by the vicinity's high level of electricity generation based on its traditional coal mining output, to being full of empty mining operations by the end of 2022.
Crypto parasitising off heating energy?
According to an article published by Kazakh news website Exclusive.KZ, residents of Ekibastuz noticed that issues with heating supplies for their apartment buildings significantly worsened after local power and heating authority Teplokommunenergo got a new chief. Azat Sarpekov took the helm in the winter of 2021-2022. Under Sarpekov, reported Exclusive.KZ, the main thermal power plant supplying heat to the city began directing energy capacities to “acquiring crypto-profits”.
The website also claimed that employees of the thermal power plant anonymously admitted to journalists that they were engaged in “imitating” work at the power plant.
And in April of 2022, around the same time that the energy ministry alerted the public to difficulties at the power plant, Exclusive.KZ noted that investigative journalists had discovered a mining farm on property of Teplokommunenergo. Whether Sarpekov faced any action amid the discovery is unclear—but in September, he was appointed deputy governor of Ekibastuz, the news outlet said.
In early December, with residents of the city still enduring unheated homes, a top Ekibastuz heating plant official, Sergei Vidlog, was found dead in his car.
Whether his death was down to suicide or perhaps even foul play remains unclear—Vidlog’s body was found in his car in a garage on December 4. According to RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service, police attributed Vidlog’s death to a suicide that took place “after a falling-out with his wife”.
Given information shared by Exclusive.KZ, questions arise pertaining to Vidlog’s death. The mismanagement of the plant and energy infrastructure was already a major scandal, as Kazakh social media framed the situation as a greater failure involving the central government. But surely any possibility of the disaster being a near direct result of individuals in power mining crypto would have caused an even bigger uproar.
The situation also raises questions about all the “abandoned” crypto-mining farms—initially set up by foreign firms—that appeared in and around Ekibastuz. Were some of them taken over by individuals working for local authorities? Did mining operations simply continue instead of being halted as intended by the government?
Whatever the true sequence of events, the necessity of limiting crypto-mining in Kazakhstan was underlined.
As things stand, Kazakhstan has seen its global hash rate fall to 6.4% (down from the 18.4% peak) since the first quarter of 2022, reducing the carbon emissions of the nationwide power network by 10%, according to ClimateTech vice chair Daniel Batten. And due to Kazakhstan being 87.6%-fossil fuel dependent, less mining in the Central Asian nation results in a higher proportion of clean energy in the Bitcoin energy mix.
The country is unlikely to again become a top player in the cryptocurrency mining world unless it manages to properly address the issue of transitioning much of its energy sector to renewable energy. Or perhaps crypto might ride again in Kazakhstan if the ex-Soviet state builds an expected nuclear power plant.
Or not.
Following the collapse of the Bahamas-based FTX cryptocurrency exchange and hedge fund last year, a scandal that occurred around the same time as the Ekibastuz affair, Kazakhstan is in fact now considering a further tightening of crypto-mining regulations.
Court ruling on Hidroelectrica management calls into question IPO planned this year
Hidroelectrica
By Iulian Ernst in Bucharest March 7, 2023
A March 6 court ruling invalidating the selection of Romanian state-controlled hydropower group Hidroelectrica’s management in 2019 has called into question the company’s IPO planned later this year.
The Court of Appeal rejected Hidroelectrica’s appeal to a lower court’s ruling issued in April 2022 in the case of the former Hidroelectrica CFO Petronel Chiriac who challenged the legality of the selection procedures for the company’s Board of Directors in 2019.
Hidroelectrica said in a statement released after the Court of Appeal announced its ruling on March 6 that the ruling has no impact on the planned IPO, reported Ziarul Financiar daily.
The ruling, furthermore not final, regards only the selection procedure and does not invalidate the mandates of the company’s board of directors, according to the interpretation by Hidroelectrica’s management set out in its statement.
The mandate of the board expires in June 2023 and a selection process is on course for appointing a supervisory board in charge of setting the selection procedures for a new board of directors, the company also explained.
However, a statement signed by lawyer Mihai Kehaiyan, who claims to have represented the plaintiff in this process, but does not mention his name, claimed that” "the five directors of Hidroelectrica no longer have any legal capacity — they can no longer sign documents … Practically, they no longer operate as members of the Hidroelectrica Board as of March 1.”
The lawyer argued that some of the board members should have been rejected from the first stages of the selection procedures, as they failed to meet basic requirements such as speaking a foreign language, meeting seniority criteria or not being in a conflict of interest with the company.
Hidroelectrica was expected to carry out its IPO on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BVB) either in the first part of May or in June, after filing the prospectus with the financial market authority, ASF, in April, Karoly Borbely, a member of the company’s managing board, said in February.
The IPO is designed to allow restitution fund Fondul Proprietatea to cash part of its 20% stake in Hidroelectrica. Borbely added that, in future, the Romanian state might decrease its 80% participation to 65-70%.
The manager of Fondul Proprietatea, Franklin Templeton, argued for a dual listing in Bucharest and London, but its shareholders approved the proposal backed by the Romanian authorities and Hidroelectrica shares will be listed only in Romania. The local market wouldn’t be deep enough for the 20% Hidroelectrica stake, Templeton argued.
Hidroelectrica
By Iulian Ernst in Bucharest March 7, 2023
A March 6 court ruling invalidating the selection of Romanian state-controlled hydropower group Hidroelectrica’s management in 2019 has called into question the company’s IPO planned later this year.
The Court of Appeal rejected Hidroelectrica’s appeal to a lower court’s ruling issued in April 2022 in the case of the former Hidroelectrica CFO Petronel Chiriac who challenged the legality of the selection procedures for the company’s Board of Directors in 2019.
Hidroelectrica said in a statement released after the Court of Appeal announced its ruling on March 6 that the ruling has no impact on the planned IPO, reported Ziarul Financiar daily.
The ruling, furthermore not final, regards only the selection procedure and does not invalidate the mandates of the company’s board of directors, according to the interpretation by Hidroelectrica’s management set out in its statement.
The mandate of the board expires in June 2023 and a selection process is on course for appointing a supervisory board in charge of setting the selection procedures for a new board of directors, the company also explained.
However, a statement signed by lawyer Mihai Kehaiyan, who claims to have represented the plaintiff in this process, but does not mention his name, claimed that” "the five directors of Hidroelectrica no longer have any legal capacity — they can no longer sign documents … Practically, they no longer operate as members of the Hidroelectrica Board as of March 1.”
The lawyer argued that some of the board members should have been rejected from the first stages of the selection procedures, as they failed to meet basic requirements such as speaking a foreign language, meeting seniority criteria or not being in a conflict of interest with the company.
Hidroelectrica was expected to carry out its IPO on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BVB) either in the first part of May or in June, after filing the prospectus with the financial market authority, ASF, in April, Karoly Borbely, a member of the company’s managing board, said in February.
The IPO is designed to allow restitution fund Fondul Proprietatea to cash part of its 20% stake in Hidroelectrica. Borbely added that, in future, the Romanian state might decrease its 80% participation to 65-70%.
The manager of Fondul Proprietatea, Franklin Templeton, argued for a dual listing in Bucharest and London, but its shareholders approved the proposal backed by the Romanian authorities and Hidroelectrica shares will be listed only in Romania. The local market wouldn’t be deep enough for the 20% Hidroelectrica stake, Templeton argued.
Australia Walks Geopolitical Tightrope Amid Lithium Boom
Australia is entangled in the superpower competition between China and the United States over the control of lithium.
By Marina Yue Zhang
March 7, 2023
Australia is entangled in the superpower competition between China and the United States over the control of lithium.
By Marina Yue Zhang
March 7, 2023
Whether Australia can beat the "resources curse" and benefit from the "Great Lithium Boom" will be a delicate balancing act.
Clean energy technologies are essential to achieve the decarbonization targets set in the Paris Agreement. Critical minerals — including lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, and rare earth elements — are vital to produce clean energy products like solar panels, wind turbines, and power batteries for electric vehicles (EVs).
Demand for lithium, a key component in lithium-ion batteries, has soared over the past three years as the clean energy transition accelerates. Though abundant, lithium is unevenly distributed and non-renewable. And until an alternative material for or approach to power batteries becomes available, lithium looks set to be at the center of geopolitical tensions over the control of critical resources.
The top three producing countries process over 80 percent of the most critical minerals used in lithium batteries. China dominates the processing of almost all minerals, with more than 50 percent of total market share — except for nickel and copper — of which China controls 35 and 40 percent, respectively.
Technology-intensive industries rely on interdependencies between countries with different endowments. This works well during periods of geopolitical stability and cooperation but the high concentration of processing in the lithium battery supply chain means that it is vulnerable to disruption by war, global pandemics, natural disasters, or geopolitical tensions.
Australia has the world’s largest battery-grade lithium deposits, and export revenues have skyrocketed, with lithium becoming Australia’s sixth most valuable commodity export. Australia needs to consider how to profit from the boom and what role it can play in the lithium race.
Lithium battery production relies on a global supply chain composed of mineral extraction and production, mineral refinement and processing, and battery-cell production and battery-pack assembly. This supply chain is a complex network of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources.
Australia and China complement each other in this supply chain. Australia supplies 46 percent of lithium chemicals and a large proportion goes to Chinese processing facilities and then to Chinese battery and EV makers. China produces 60 percent of the world’s lithium products and 75 percent of all lithium-ion batteries, primarily powering its rapidly growing EV market, which accounts for 60 percent of the world’s total.
The severity of supply chain vulnerability is different for Australia and China. China relies on imports of lithium chemicals from Australia for downstream productions, but it can source lithium from other channels, including its domestic supplies or from South America.
Yet China’s dominance in lithium processing means that few countries could absorb Australia’s supply if China looks to alternative sources. Long lead times in building lithium processing facilities limit the speed at which new production can be ramped up to meet rapid demand increases. Building such capabilities requires capital investment, skilled workers, and an ecosystem where complementary suppliers of components, equipment, and services are clustered to minimize costs.
Prioritizing national security over economic benefits, the United States and European Union aim to increase their self-sufficiency in the lithium supply chain out of a concern about potential disruption to battery supplies stemming from China’s dominance of production. China could face the possibility of being cut off from the U.S.-led supply chain system.
Australian Industry and Science Minister, Ed Husic, commented: “Australia has globally significant deposits of essential battery materials and strong local innovation and research capabilities. By drawing on these strengths, Australia can take its place in the profitable global battery supply chain.” He implied that faced with the geopolitical tensions of lithium, Australia should move from a low-value-adding “digging it and shipping it” to a higher value-adding position, including lithium chemical processing and even battery manufacturing.
While Australia has not suffered a “resources curse” in the traditional sense, its resources boom in iron ore and natural gas in the past thirty years has led to the appreciation of the Australian dollar, which has lowered the competitiveness of other exports, especially in manufacturing. In 2021, value-added in manufacturing dropped to less than 6 percent of Australia’s GDP, down from almost 14 percent in 1990.
Australia moving up the value chain would require investment and technology, and bear a significant environmental cost. Without scale advantages, Australian-made products will fail to achieve global competitiveness. Australia must consider long-term industrial policies that enable the country to play a role in fighting against climate change rather than being caught between the superpower competition.
Australia is entangled in the superpower competition between China and the United States over the control of lithium. Chinese EV and battery manufacturers want to invest in Australia’s lithium production, including technology and talent development — as indicated by a deal between Ford and battery manufacturer CATL that will build a battery plant using China’s technology in the United States. But the United States expects Australia to be on board its friend-shoring of supply chains.
Whether Australia can beat the “resources curse” and benefit from the “Great Lithium Boom” will be a delicate balancing act between many factors.
Politicians and policymakers are responsible for making the right choice to balance national and economic security concerns, emergent and incumbent stakeholders as well as current and future needs. Lithium should provide a path to a clean future, not a tool for supremacy of great power competition.
This article was originally published on the East Asia Forum.
Clean energy technologies are essential to achieve the decarbonization targets set in the Paris Agreement. Critical minerals — including lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, and rare earth elements — are vital to produce clean energy products like solar panels, wind turbines, and power batteries for electric vehicles (EVs).
Demand for lithium, a key component in lithium-ion batteries, has soared over the past three years as the clean energy transition accelerates. Though abundant, lithium is unevenly distributed and non-renewable. And until an alternative material for or approach to power batteries becomes available, lithium looks set to be at the center of geopolitical tensions over the control of critical resources.
The top three producing countries process over 80 percent of the most critical minerals used in lithium batteries. China dominates the processing of almost all minerals, with more than 50 percent of total market share — except for nickel and copper — of which China controls 35 and 40 percent, respectively.
Technology-intensive industries rely on interdependencies between countries with different endowments. This works well during periods of geopolitical stability and cooperation but the high concentration of processing in the lithium battery supply chain means that it is vulnerable to disruption by war, global pandemics, natural disasters, or geopolitical tensions.
Australia has the world’s largest battery-grade lithium deposits, and export revenues have skyrocketed, with lithium becoming Australia’s sixth most valuable commodity export. Australia needs to consider how to profit from the boom and what role it can play in the lithium race.
Lithium battery production relies on a global supply chain composed of mineral extraction and production, mineral refinement and processing, and battery-cell production and battery-pack assembly. This supply chain is a complex network of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources.
Australia and China complement each other in this supply chain. Australia supplies 46 percent of lithium chemicals and a large proportion goes to Chinese processing facilities and then to Chinese battery and EV makers. China produces 60 percent of the world’s lithium products and 75 percent of all lithium-ion batteries, primarily powering its rapidly growing EV market, which accounts for 60 percent of the world’s total.
The severity of supply chain vulnerability is different for Australia and China. China relies on imports of lithium chemicals from Australia for downstream productions, but it can source lithium from other channels, including its domestic supplies or from South America.
Yet China’s dominance in lithium processing means that few countries could absorb Australia’s supply if China looks to alternative sources. Long lead times in building lithium processing facilities limit the speed at which new production can be ramped up to meet rapid demand increases. Building such capabilities requires capital investment, skilled workers, and an ecosystem where complementary suppliers of components, equipment, and services are clustered to minimize costs.
Prioritizing national security over economic benefits, the United States and European Union aim to increase their self-sufficiency in the lithium supply chain out of a concern about potential disruption to battery supplies stemming from China’s dominance of production. China could face the possibility of being cut off from the U.S.-led supply chain system.
Australian Industry and Science Minister, Ed Husic, commented: “Australia has globally significant deposits of essential battery materials and strong local innovation and research capabilities. By drawing on these strengths, Australia can take its place in the profitable global battery supply chain.” He implied that faced with the geopolitical tensions of lithium, Australia should move from a low-value-adding “digging it and shipping it” to a higher value-adding position, including lithium chemical processing and even battery manufacturing.
While Australia has not suffered a “resources curse” in the traditional sense, its resources boom in iron ore and natural gas in the past thirty years has led to the appreciation of the Australian dollar, which has lowered the competitiveness of other exports, especially in manufacturing. In 2021, value-added in manufacturing dropped to less than 6 percent of Australia’s GDP, down from almost 14 percent in 1990.
Australia moving up the value chain would require investment and technology, and bear a significant environmental cost. Without scale advantages, Australian-made products will fail to achieve global competitiveness. Australia must consider long-term industrial policies that enable the country to play a role in fighting against climate change rather than being caught between the superpower competition.
Australia is entangled in the superpower competition between China and the United States over the control of lithium. Chinese EV and battery manufacturers want to invest in Australia’s lithium production, including technology and talent development — as indicated by a deal between Ford and battery manufacturer CATL that will build a battery plant using China’s technology in the United States. But the United States expects Australia to be on board its friend-shoring of supply chains.
Whether Australia can beat the “resources curse” and benefit from the “Great Lithium Boom” will be a delicate balancing act between many factors.
Politicians and policymakers are responsible for making the right choice to balance national and economic security concerns, emergent and incumbent stakeholders as well as current and future needs. Lithium should provide a path to a clean future, not a tool for supremacy of great power competition.
This article was originally published on the East Asia Forum.
A complicated Relationship between China and the Iraq-Kurdistan Region
March 10, 2023
By Amer Ababakr
In addition to its state-to-state relationship, China’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan, as a non-state actor, is essential to understanding China’s role in the region and its global expansion. Some context is required before trying to answer the question of why this happened. China opened a Consulate General in Erbil in 2014, the last of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to do so. The Chinese move followed the inclusion of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the Iraqi constitution. Previously, the two sides had little direct contact.
China is now one of the KRG’s primary trading partners. The former is expanding its partnership in infrastructure, communications, education and other types of soft power. However, the relationship remains delicate, complex, and likely to be contentious in the future.
Studying the relations between China and Iraqi Kurdistan is so important. China does not fully recognize the KRG. While China has established a Consulate General in Erbil, it has so far refused to allow the KRG to establish a representative office in Beijing. There are a number of issues underpinning this unacknowledged relationship, including, China’s relationship with minorities, which reflects the complexities of domestic Chinese politics and One China politics; China’s sensitivity to any form of decentralization; China’s advocacy of an absolutist Westphalian approach to international relations and its reluctance to follow the principle of the responsibility to protect; and China does not consider any political issue elsewhere and its approach continues to pursue its interests despite the circumstances.
The Chinese Communist Party displayed the flag and a historical picture to the delegates of each country during a meeting with a delegation of Arab left parties. The Kurdistan Communist Party of Iraq was one of the invited parties. When it was Kurdistan’s turn, the Chinese did not display the Kurdish flag, and instead showed a picture of the Citadel of Erbil with a Kurdish flag on it.
This attempt to avoid displaying the Kurdistan flag embodies China’s aversion to any symbol of independence or detachment from the center. Not only does China oppose self-determination, but it also remains on the sidelines, as evidenced by its stance towards Ethiopia. Studies comparing Africa and the Middle East will help shed more light on the relationship between China and the Middle East and North Africa in this regard. As a result, Iraqi Kurdistan exemplifies China’s subtle diplomacy in this region as an example of the periphery defying the center. As the tale shows, China is trying to accommodate the Kurds while refusing to accommodate their wishes.
Iraq and the Iraq war occupy a special place in American memory. Iraqi territory was used to demonstrate the dominant power of the United States. As a result, China’s intervention in Iraq may be more vulnerable to American power than elsewhere. Iraq feeds the Chinese narrative of US strategic failure. When China signed the infrastructure treaty with Iraq, it tried to frame it in the context of the bomb and build a narrative of division, that is, the American bombing and the building of China. As a result, the rise and fall of unipolarity of the United States is directly related to China’s presence in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.
Kurdistan is one of the few places where China and the United States have a strong presence. During the Cold War, the great powers used the region to shape each other’s perceptions. Henry Kissinger said regarding the region, “What I want is for the Politburo in Moscow to be in a state of mind that is not willing to engage in further adventures in the Middle East.” It remains to be seen how much this history haunts the region, making Iraqi Kurdistan a fertile field for research.
There is no alternative to the American security provider for the Kurds. Over the past three decades, the United States has worked to build a partnership with the Iraqi Kurds that includes institution building, unification and reform of armed groups, and economic support. China does not wish to replace these, but the KRG cannot avoid Chinese economic interests. Regional elites are concerned and hope to keep the relationship out of the spotlight. How will this delicate balance be maintained across a broader security sector that includes telecommunications and the Internet?
The majority of agreements between China, Iraq, and Iraqi Kurdistan are memorandums of understanding, not treaties. This may be common elsewhere, but it is particularly important in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi constitution requires parliament to approve international treaties and agreements. However, this does not apply to the memorandums of understanding.
As a result, the agreement with China is kept entirely within a small circle of executive power, avoiding any transparency or accountability. Moreover, in a social and political environment such as Iraq, secrecy fuels rumors and conspiracy theories. This could be due to a variety of factors, including the highly centralized nature of the Chinese state, avoiding loud attention (the US), keeping a low profile, and avoiding any legal obligations that signing a treaty might entail.
China prefers to emphasize its version of development over democracy. The US mission to democratize Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan has not led to democratic governance. The Chinese model and strongman-led development narrative is being marketed as a viable alternative to the anarchy of democracy. As a result, economic achievements such as large-scale poverty reduction, massive investment in infrastructure, and other aspects of development are direct results of China’s authoritarian government. This narrative and actions have the potential to strengthen anti-democratic and authoritarian forces. This has an impact not only on the political system, but also on personal liberties, security, and governance architecture. When it comes to Chinese soft power in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, it is clear what China prioritizes and what it ignores.
Iraqi Kurdistan has a number of other characteristics in addition to those listed above. The history of Maoism in the region and its influence on local politics is not well known, but it has a direct impact on the current relationship. Kurdish Maoism was not directly related to international Maoism. The Kurdish Maoists had no direct knowledge of how the system worked inside the country. It was a delusion for them, but Maoism, as a “cultural phenomenon”, provides a safe haven in which anyone can invest whatever they want. “That is why it manifests itself in such varying ways from country to country,” explained Christophe Pourslier. In addition, the classical poetry, songs and folklore of the Kurds of Iraq contain an interesting picture of China.
March 10, 2023
By Amer Ababakr
In addition to its state-to-state relationship, China’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan, as a non-state actor, is essential to understanding China’s role in the region and its global expansion. Some context is required before trying to answer the question of why this happened. China opened a Consulate General in Erbil in 2014, the last of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to do so. The Chinese move followed the inclusion of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the Iraqi constitution. Previously, the two sides had little direct contact.
China is now one of the KRG’s primary trading partners. The former is expanding its partnership in infrastructure, communications, education and other types of soft power. However, the relationship remains delicate, complex, and likely to be contentious in the future.
Studying the relations between China and Iraqi Kurdistan is so important. China does not fully recognize the KRG. While China has established a Consulate General in Erbil, it has so far refused to allow the KRG to establish a representative office in Beijing. There are a number of issues underpinning this unacknowledged relationship, including, China’s relationship with minorities, which reflects the complexities of domestic Chinese politics and One China politics; China’s sensitivity to any form of decentralization; China’s advocacy of an absolutist Westphalian approach to international relations and its reluctance to follow the principle of the responsibility to protect; and China does not consider any political issue elsewhere and its approach continues to pursue its interests despite the circumstances.
The Chinese Communist Party displayed the flag and a historical picture to the delegates of each country during a meeting with a delegation of Arab left parties. The Kurdistan Communist Party of Iraq was one of the invited parties. When it was Kurdistan’s turn, the Chinese did not display the Kurdish flag, and instead showed a picture of the Citadel of Erbil with a Kurdish flag on it.
This attempt to avoid displaying the Kurdistan flag embodies China’s aversion to any symbol of independence or detachment from the center. Not only does China oppose self-determination, but it also remains on the sidelines, as evidenced by its stance towards Ethiopia. Studies comparing Africa and the Middle East will help shed more light on the relationship between China and the Middle East and North Africa in this regard. As a result, Iraqi Kurdistan exemplifies China’s subtle diplomacy in this region as an example of the periphery defying the center. As the tale shows, China is trying to accommodate the Kurds while refusing to accommodate their wishes.
Iraq and the Iraq war occupy a special place in American memory. Iraqi territory was used to demonstrate the dominant power of the United States. As a result, China’s intervention in Iraq may be more vulnerable to American power than elsewhere. Iraq feeds the Chinese narrative of US strategic failure. When China signed the infrastructure treaty with Iraq, it tried to frame it in the context of the bomb and build a narrative of division, that is, the American bombing and the building of China. As a result, the rise and fall of unipolarity of the United States is directly related to China’s presence in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.
Kurdistan is one of the few places where China and the United States have a strong presence. During the Cold War, the great powers used the region to shape each other’s perceptions. Henry Kissinger said regarding the region, “What I want is for the Politburo in Moscow to be in a state of mind that is not willing to engage in further adventures in the Middle East.” It remains to be seen how much this history haunts the region, making Iraqi Kurdistan a fertile field for research.
There is no alternative to the American security provider for the Kurds. Over the past three decades, the United States has worked to build a partnership with the Iraqi Kurds that includes institution building, unification and reform of armed groups, and economic support. China does not wish to replace these, but the KRG cannot avoid Chinese economic interests. Regional elites are concerned and hope to keep the relationship out of the spotlight. How will this delicate balance be maintained across a broader security sector that includes telecommunications and the Internet?
The majority of agreements between China, Iraq, and Iraqi Kurdistan are memorandums of understanding, not treaties. This may be common elsewhere, but it is particularly important in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi constitution requires parliament to approve international treaties and agreements. However, this does not apply to the memorandums of understanding.
As a result, the agreement with China is kept entirely within a small circle of executive power, avoiding any transparency or accountability. Moreover, in a social and political environment such as Iraq, secrecy fuels rumors and conspiracy theories. This could be due to a variety of factors, including the highly centralized nature of the Chinese state, avoiding loud attention (the US), keeping a low profile, and avoiding any legal obligations that signing a treaty might entail.
China prefers to emphasize its version of development over democracy. The US mission to democratize Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan has not led to democratic governance. The Chinese model and strongman-led development narrative is being marketed as a viable alternative to the anarchy of democracy. As a result, economic achievements such as large-scale poverty reduction, massive investment in infrastructure, and other aspects of development are direct results of China’s authoritarian government. This narrative and actions have the potential to strengthen anti-democratic and authoritarian forces. This has an impact not only on the political system, but also on personal liberties, security, and governance architecture. When it comes to Chinese soft power in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, it is clear what China prioritizes and what it ignores.
Iraqi Kurdistan has a number of other characteristics in addition to those listed above. The history of Maoism in the region and its influence on local politics is not well known, but it has a direct impact on the current relationship. Kurdish Maoism was not directly related to international Maoism. The Kurdish Maoists had no direct knowledge of how the system worked inside the country. It was a delusion for them, but Maoism, as a “cultural phenomenon”, provides a safe haven in which anyone can invest whatever they want. “That is why it manifests itself in such varying ways from country to country,” explained Christophe Pourslier. In addition, the classical poetry, songs and folklore of the Kurds of Iraq contain an interesting picture of China.
China’s $540 Million Energy Deal with Taliban in Afghanistan: What Does It Mean?
February 27, 2023
By Syed Raiyan Amir
The Taliban celebrated the signing of their first international deal since taking power in August 2021 with a televised event on January 5, 2023. The document signed is a contract for the exploitation of oil reserves in northern Afghanistan with a Chinese business. In accordance with the agreement, Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co (CAPEIC) will contribute $150 million annually to Afghanistan, rising to $540 million for the 25-year contract in three years. The initiative is focused on a 4,500 square-kilometer region that spans three northern Afghan provinces: Sar-e Pol, Jowzjan, and Faryab. The latter two are Turkmenistan’s borders. After the US soldiers withdrew in August 2021 and the Taliban overthrew the U.S.-backed government, Afghanistan’s aid-dependent economy crumbled. The administration is attempting to stabilize the economy by luring in investments that will provide work for Afghans who are suffering from hardship. One of the few available economic choices is the development of mines and hydrocarbon resources where energy can play a significant role. Besides, in the regional domain, China can play an important role in terms of political and economic prospects. Hence the deal came across.
Previously, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the previous administration signed such an agreement back in December 2011. The Amu Darya basin was thought to contain up to 87 million barrels of crude oil at the time. Wahidullah Shahrani, the mining minister at the time, stated that “real work will begin in October 2012.” He mentioned negotiations with an undisclosed northern neighbor and the anticipation that Afghanistan may be producing 25,000 barrels per day by the end of 2013 when he stated in March 2013 that “the wells are ready for production.” As Kabul maintained talks with Uzbekistan on transit issues, construction had apparently been suspended and Chinese employees had left the country by August 2013. Hence the recent development holds a great deal of significance.
Dealing with the Taliban is an extension of a strategic conundrum China is experiencing with its energy security. China is the most populated country in the world, a powerhouse industrially, and it also consumes the most energy globally. The nation’s domestic resources are insufficient to meet the demands of its rapidly expanding domestic market. As a result, China is now a sizable net importer of oil and gas, which has been a driving force behind several of its recent alliances, including those with Russia, Ecuador, and the Gulf States of the Middle East. Although China has maintained excellent relations with these nations, Beijing’s energy imports have a strategic weakness since, with the exception of those from Russia, they must be transported by sea and via politically sensitive areas that the US is militarizing including the South China Sea. Since China has the BRI and other projects like this to create its own sphere of influence. But no strategic blueprint of China, including the BRI, would be complete without including Afghanistan. The Middle East, Central Asia, and Southern Asia are all connected via a little section of border that the Central Asian nation shares with China. This indicates that Kabul is essential to China’s own security and strategy as well as for the expansion of economic activities. Despite the fact that Afghanistan has always been intrinsically unpredictable and hence unsuitable in terms of the political landscape, the end of the US-led war against it and the Taliban takeover has provided China the ground to accelerate its sphere of influence in the region. But amidst the Ukraine war, the economy of the country got distorted in many ways and needs some sourcing. On the other hand, China with its vision to become an economic superpower, as mentioned earlier, needs Afghanistan on the right side of the line. Besides, the war also has disrupted its energy supply chain. Against the backdrop of all these, the investment has taken place. The write-up will highlight the major prospects of the deal and its outcomes.
Creating a Viable Economy for Afghanistan
At a contract-signing ceremony for the new field in Kabul, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs, stated that his group aimed to create a viable economy for Afghanistan. It will channel newer windows of cooperation between the two.
Paving the ways to Create New Investment Opportunities
The worth of Afghanistan’s natural riches, which include rare-earth minerals now utilized in electric automobiles, was estimated by American specialists to be $1 trillion ten years ago. This potential wealth was never taken advantage of while the war raged. Besides, developing mining and oil ventures in Afghanistan is still the safest it’s been in years in comparison with the previous time. The development of this project provides a paradigm for China-Afghanistan collaboration in big projects in energy and other industries. Besides, Shahabuddin Dilawar, the Taliban’s minister for minerals and petroleum urged China to finish developing the massive Mes Aynak copper mine, which is one of the largest untapped copper resources in the world.
New Job Opportunities for the Afghans
Shahabuddin Dilawar, the Taliban’s minister for minerals and petroleum, claimed that the Amu Darya project would give Afghans 3,000 new jobs. He claimed that the Afghan side initially owns 20% of the project. In two to three years, he would make sure that the economy would flourish, and there would be people coming from overseas to work in Afghanistan. Mr. Dilawar stated that the field’s oil would be refined in Afghanistan, though it is unknown if China would be willing to set up a refinery there.
Attracting New Foreign Investments
Afghanistan has 1.75 trillion cubic feet of confirmed natural gas reserves and some oil in addition to its tremendous mineral wealth. The Chinese investment reflects the current state of improving political and economic nature of the nature. It will attract newer foreign investments in the related fields. Besides, China agrees to follow its long-standing policy of non-interference and to respect Afghanistan’s internal politics in exchange for this agreement. While providing the United States with a significant edge and different option. Other investors may get some insights from this.
Promoting Economic Growth and Stability in the Region
With this investment, in Afghanistan, China has had a significant role in a number of areas, including energy and minerals. The nation has recently made large expenditures in the infrastructure and development of Afghanistan’s natural resources, which has aided in promoting economic growth and stability in the area.
Growing Mineral Industry
China has also grown to be a significant role in Afghanistan’s mineral industry in addition to the energy industry. China has been involved in the exploration and mining of these resources. The nation is thought to have enormous quantities of minerals, including iron, copper, gold, and lithium. For instance, one of the biggest copper mines in the world, Mes Aynak in Afghanistan, has been developed in part by the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC). It is anticipated that the development of this mine will provide thousands of jobs and significantly strengthen Afghanistan’s economy.
Another Milestone for the BRI
The overarching Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a worldwide infrastructure development initiative aiming at tying together nations in Asia, Europe, and Africa through a network of roadways, trains, and ports, includes China’s involvement in Afghanistan’s energy and mineral industry. Afghanistan is viewed as a crucial participant in the BRI and as a means for China to expand its economic and political clout globally.
Energy Assurance for China
China has benefited from the expansion of Afghanistan’s oil and mineral industries in addition to the country itself. China is able to assure a consistent stream of energy and minerals for its own use by investing in Afghanistan’s natural resources, assisting in the country’s long-term economic progress. Additionally, China’s investments in Afghanistan’s infrastructure and resources have improved trade and transit connections between the two nations, further solidifying their economic ties.
Exploration of New Gas Fields
But, the estimated oil reserves at the Amu Darya site are not that much significant. However, there is hope that a massive gas field that is just across the border from Turkmenistan extends into Afghanistan; if this is the case, it could make Afghanistan’s economy as important as it is for Turkmenistan.
Facing the Odds: Real Challenges to be Addressed
The Chinese influence in the region will be confronted with strategic and diplomatic approaches by the Unites States of America and other regional actors. Besides, the country is surrounded by so many challenging terrains that it will be a massive task for China to channel out the resources to its destination. The local politics should also be taken into account since local war lords are heavily armed and can make huge obstacles in many areas. But in the end, this is a sign of new competition in the region in terms of economic prospects and the Taliban regime may find a new economic instrument to strengthen its grip in power.
Energy Dilemma on Paris Agreement
on February 27, 2023
By Syarifah Huswatun Miswar
In the 21st century, energy is an important issue for policymakers, academics and entrepreneurs to consider. Energy is a resource that is used for many purposes, including the provision of electricity, heat, light and more. With increasing global energy consumption, the availability of energy is very important to meet human needs.
When it comes to energy shortages, there are many factors that have an impact on the level of energy available. This includes natural factors that may reduce existing energy supplies and human factors that may increase energy demand. Here are some of the main reasons for the current energy shortage.
First, there is limited power availability. Energy shortages may be due to a lack of subsurface energy reserves. Most sources of renewable energy, such as water, wind and solar, are non-renewable and renewable. Energy reserves like oil and natural gas may also be depleted at some point.
Second, the cost of producing power is high. The cost of producing energy from natural resources like oil and gas is high. That increases the cost of producing power. High energy generation costs mean that energy prices will rise, reducing the amount of energy available.
And third, ineffective energy use. Although there are many new technologies that can minimize energy use, there are still many inefficient uses of energy. Ineffective use of energy can lead to excessive use of energy, reducing the amount of energy available.
Fourth, pollution comes from the burning of fuel. Combustion of fuels like oil and natural gas can cause air and water pollution. This pollution can decrease the quality of the environment and harm human health. In addition, such pollution may decrease the amount of energy available.
Fifth, climate change Climate change has the potential to impact energy availability. Climate change can cause extreme weather conditions, like droughts or floods, that can reduce energy availability. Climate change may also affect energy production, as an unstable climate may affect energy production processes.
Sixthly, political instability. Political instability has the potential to influence energy availability. Countries experiencing military or political conflict may reduce their energy output or limit their energy exports. This can lead to reduced global energy availability.
Seventh, over-use of energy Over-use of energy can increase energy demand, which can reduce energy availability. In addition, excessive use of energy can raise energy production costs, increasing energy prices for consumers.
Eighth international disagreement The lack of international consensus on how to solve energy problems may lead to energy shortages. Countries competing for control of energy resources may limit energy production and distribution, leading to energy scarcity.
Energy Constraints in the Paris Agreement
Energy shortages do not occur in a specific region, but globally. It is natural that human nature should cooperate in dealing with the same problem. To address this issue of scarcity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was created.
In order to achieve the goals of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), strengthened by the Paris Agreement, many countries are working together to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and reduce climate impacts. Sustainable energy development is one of the tools employed to reach this goal. However, in the context of continued efforts to build sustainable energy, there is a dilemma. While sustainable energy promises environmental benefits, there are a few barriers that must be overcome.
First, we have economic constraints. While the cost of sustainable energy has declined, there are still costs associated with technology that need to change. That can create economic problems for countries that are trying to comply with the Paris Agreement.
Secondly, there are technical restrictions. Although there are many development technologies for building sustainable energy, there are still technical limitations inherent in each technology. This may hinder efforts to develop sustainable energy across different countries.
Thirdly, there are policy constraints. While many international agreements govern sustainable energy development, many countries still refuse to help achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. This creates political conflicts between various countries and hampers efforts to build sustainable energy.
In addition, there are social constraints. Many countries implement technologies for sustainable energy development, which have an impact on local communities. For instance, hydro projects in many countries have affected human rights. This results in social conflict and hampers efforts to build sustainable energy.
Those constraints are the source of an energy dilemma in the Paris Agreement. Consequently, a solution is necessary to reduce the obstacles to the construction of sustainable energy. A solution that can be implemented is to increase the involvement of the community and others. Community involvement can contribute to the reduction of social conflict and the improvement of human rights. The government must also commit to increasing investment in the sustainable energy sector and to a firm commitment to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Countries should also collaborate to promote better technologies.
It is important to bear in mind that solutions must be based on the needs of each country and must focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Countries that have made efforts to build sustainable energy must commit to pursuing their efforts to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Some countries should also encourage others to contribute to global efforts to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
In resolving the energy dilemma in the Paris Agreement, it is important to find a solution that respects human rights, accommodates economic, technical, political, and social interests, and most importantly, is a solution that focuses on reducing GHG emissions. There must be a greater awareness of the impact of sustainable energy development and a stronger commitment to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
The solution to the energy dilemma of Paris Agreement.
As a matter of fact, there are many solutions to the energy dilemma of the Paris Agreement. These solutions include the application of renewable energies, such as the use of wind and solar energy for electricity production, and the development of sustainable energy infrastructure. Increased investment in the energy sector, legal protection for sustainable energy development, and a mix of renewable and fossil fuels. However, these solutions will not work properly in the absence of strong engagement and strict oversight. It also requires a comprehensive assessment to ensure that the responsible party can achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
Future Potential of Fusion Energy
February 28, 2023
By Nimra Javed
Fusion power is a sultrily debated topic in the pursuit of cleaner energy. Recently, it gained renewed attention due to the climate crisis. Fusion energy is engendered when atomic nuclei fuse into heavier elements through nuclear fusion, just like in the sun and other stars. In fusion reactions, hydrogen isotopes are heated and subjected to high pressure, causing their nuclei to fuse and relinquish energy. Despite its potential as an approximately illimitable and clean energy source, significant technical challenges must be overcome to make fusion energy authentic. Perpetual research is being conducted to address these challenges.” In December 2022, scientists at the US Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory promulgated that they achieved a fusion reaction with net energy gain for the first time. In place of a tokamak, they utilized a massive laser array to fire two megajoules of energy at a metal sphere containing deuterium and tritium, resulting in a fusion reaction that gave off three megajoules of energy. However, the lasers consumed more energy than the system engendered. To engender commercial fusion energy, scientists must engender multiple fusion ignition events minutely, which is a significant challenge in both science and technology. Apart from the techniques, some practical quandaries require a solution to make scientific breakthroughs efficacious.
A scientific breakthrough like this is consequential, yet, without collaborating factors, this size would not transmit much about fusion energy. First, the energy sector gets funding from the public sector. However, to engender electricity, a plethora of funding is required; moreover, funding for electricity projects is precarious. In addition, getting a patent on electricity is arduous, and private companies shy away from investing in projects like these early on. Another quandary with fusion energy was the decentralization network. Decentralization is consequential because it can engender competition between firms and jump-start invocations. Secondly, the regime should invest in research and development, and then other companies will join.
Historically, the work on fusion energy was centralized. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in France is the most sizably voluminous and sumptuous scientific experiment in history, with collaboration from the EU, US, Russia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The project was sparked by a meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet bellwether Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 to utilize nuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. The ITER project was formally launched in 2007, progress has been slow and arduous due to technical and organizational issues. The most sizably voluminous-scale fusion project, ITER, is intergovernmental, but private sector startups are joining and investing in fusion energy.
According to Forbes, the fusion companies recently launched reported funding of 4.8 billion dollars. Funding for fusion energy witnessed a 139 per cent increase. First, in history, funding in the fusion sector was more than regime funding. This year, Fusion Industry Sodality (FIA) conducted an ecumenical study to establish a directory of the companies and businesses participating in fusion energy. This year, 33 companies developing commercial fusion took part; last year, the number was 23. This year’s survey included advanced players in many industries. Since the publication of this survey, six incipient companies have raised $200 m. There were some eminent investments, for instance, $ 1.8 billion for the Commonwealth Fusion System and $ 500m for Helion energy.
The regimes are additionally incrementing the investment and fixating on fusion energy. The UK government included fusion energy in its energy security bill. Moreover, the US additionally decided to increment public-private funding in line with their Bold Decadal Vision. China is heavily investing in fusion energy as well. In January 2022, the Chinese 1 trillion dollars nuclear fusion reactor got five times sultrier than the sun and achieved a temperature of 70 million degrees Celsius. Chinese top weapon scientist, Peng Xianjue, unveiled the first nuclear fusion reactor. The Chinese regime additionally orchestrated building the first pulsed reactor by 2028. With these investments, fusion energy will also need transmission equipment and manufacturing of the fusion equipment has already commenced. Last year, Kyoto Fusioneering, which makes advanced equipment for fusion labs, promulgated the construction of an integrated testing facility for fusion power plant equipment. It aims to demonstrate the utilization of fusion energy by 2024. Now, the crucial question arises when the dream of fusion energy will become authentic.
The fusion energy is moving in the right direction. Firstly, the regimes have to step up investment in the fusion industry. Secondly, the decentralization of fusion research is transpiring. Incipient startups are growing, companies are taking an interest in fusion energy, and private-sector investment is transpiring at an expeditious rate. According to a survey by FIA, 93 percent of people working in the fusion industry believe that fusion energy will reach the grid by 2030. In the last year, the survey percentage of these people was 83 per cent. In the same survey, 84 percent of respondents believe that fusion energy is going to be efficacious. The top Chinese scientist believes that fusion energy will become authentic by 2028. These people might be partial towards the prospects of fusion energy because they work in the fusion industry; however, fusion energy is, without a doubt, moving in the right direction.
Energy Crisis in Pakistan
March 11, 2023
By Usama Rehman
Pakistan is land with ample indigenous natural resources. These resources can play a pivotal role in helping and running country’s economy. The mismanagement of the resources and ignorance can lead to several crises. The governance and leadership in Pakistan seems to be ignoring and undermining these factors. This ignorance for a developing country like Pakistan which is already going through a tumultuous economy has many ramifications. Pakistan is encapsulated with a number of problems ranging from social, economic to political domain. All these factors have been unattended by the leadership for many years. It has a Herculean task to solve and addresses these issues. Amongst them is the energy crisis that has remained unaddressed for many years.
Pakistan is witnessing acute energy crisis. It has been observed that the electricity shortfall widened to 7,000 megawatts, which indicates that the energy crisis in Pakistan has deepened to such an extent. The sweltering weather conditions have amplified the demand to produce 28,200 megawatts whereas the power supply is 21,200. Currently, hydropower is generating 4,635 megawatts of electricity, the governments thermal power plants facilitates the country with 1,060 megawatts whereas 9,677 is manufactured by IPPs. The shortage of oil, gas and coal has led the country to shut several power plants. Due to this shortfall, different parts of the country are going under severe load shedding with duration of 10 to 12 hours. The lives of people have been miserable due to power cuts.
The looming energy crisis in Pakistan can be traced back to the 1990s. In 1970s, the government launched two massive projects in the form of Mangla and Tarbela dams. The energy crisis was averted with the launch of these mega projects. These projects not only proved fruitful to overcome energy crisis rather they lend a hand in economic growth. The economic growth soar the energy demand. Due to several factors, government was unable to keep up and satisfy demand. The inability to cope the situation, lack of policy making, mismanagement of resources has made the situation worse to the present day.
There are several reasons behind every problem. If the problem is not tackled in a proper way, it can affect societies, citizens, and economy of the country drastically. Pakistan is confronted with unprecedented energy crisis. It is essential for the prevailing government to assess the depth of the situation and take measures to bring out the best possible solutions. The production of energy is stagnant while the use of it increasing by every passing day. It seems that government has categorically excluded this aspect from priorities. This ignorance has resulted in energy crisis in Pakistan.
It is important for our politicians to work for the well being of the country leaving behind their differences. Pakistan can be steered on the right path of prosperity if there seems unanimity and consensus among the politicians. Unfortunately, the politicians and parliament is divided so badly that they are unable to realize the severity of the situation. The best example in this regard is Kalabagh dam. The disunity among politicians had shunned the idea of construction of the dam. If the dam had been constructed, it would have reduces the energy crisis. Since it’s been so long that Pakistan has not built any dam and water reservoirs, it has further aggravated and exacerbated the situation.
The other factor that contributed to the energy crisis is the incapability of government to collect funds in order to launch new power projects. The economic condition of any country plays an integral part in collecting funds. Pakistan’s current economic situation is not up to the mark to appeal to foreign funding. The collection of funds is dependent on budget deficit. According to Economic Survey of Pakistan, the Pakistan’s fiscal deficit is Rs.1.13 trillion in 2021. Due to high fiscal deficit, it is impossible to stat over new power projects without having specified amount of funds.
The factor that needs government’s attention is the use of modern technology. The leadership should ponder upon the use of technology. There is a dire need for the government to make use of advanced equipments to overcome the crisis. The energy crisis can be reduced to 50 years only by brining solar and wind energy into use. This method also failed to grab the attention of our politicians.
Apart from these factors, one of the causes leading to crisis is the theft of energy. People in Pakistan have adopted this norm very well without taking into account the consequences the country is going to face. Every year, 4,500 megawatts energy has been stolen and 100 billion bills are unpaid. This practice has adverse effects on economy. If the energy will be theft and bills would be unpaid, the country is not capable of purchasing energy with a circular debt that is increasing by every passing day. The energy theft was recorded to 2.73 trillion in the year 2021.
All these factors have led the country to experience the energy crisis. There are problems but effective measures and appropriate remedies can be used to encounter such problems. These factors provide an insight into plethora of problems that Pakistan is facing. The energy crisis has reached to an alarming stage which needs to be properly addressed. Our politicians need to take at deteriorating situation of Pakistan. They should keeps their personal interests aside and prioritize the country’s interests. Therefore, it is the need of an hour to take initiatives to halt the looming crisis of energy; otherwise darkness will be the fate of the country. Then there will be no use of crying over spilt milk.
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