Gold is increasingly being weaponised by states, criminal networks and sanctioned regimes as a strategic financial tool, while regulatory systems are failing to keep pace with rapidly evolving illicit supply chains, according to a new report from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC).
The report, Commodity, Currency, Crime: How Illicit Gold Markets are Outpacing Global Responses, argues that illicit gold has become one of the world's most consequential criminal markets, acting as a financial backbone for organised crime, sanctions evasion, conflict financing and corruption. The authors contend that criminal actors increasingly control entire gold supply chains, from extraction and processing to logistics and trade, making illicit flows harder to detect and disrupt.
Released in Geneva on June 9, the 72-page report comes amid record central bank gold purchases and a sharp rally in bullion prices. According to data cited by GI-TOC, gold prices have risen nearly 587% over the past two decades, reaching record highs as investors and governments seek protection from geopolitical uncertainty and currency volatility.
Africa accounts for a significant share of global gold production, with major producers including Ghana, South Africa, Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Tanzania and the DRC. The report argues that the continent's combination of extensive mineral resources, weak governance in some jurisdictions and expanding informal mining sectors has made it particularly vulnerable to illicit gold flows.
The organisation warns that gold is increasingly being used as an instrument of "geocriminality" — the deployment of illicit financial networks by states to achieve geopolitical objectives. Russia, Iran, Venezuela and Sudan are identified as examples of countries that have used gold to circumvent sanctions, access hard currency and sustain governments that might otherwise face financial isolation.
“However, in practice, it can be difficult to differentiate between policy, selective enforcement of regulations and laws, and geocriminality. For example, although Chinese private sector entities have been implicated in the expansion of illicit gold mining in Ghana, Beijing has repeatedly denied involvement or support for illicit operations. In June 2025, the Chinese ambassador to Ghana asserted that it was a ‘significant injustice’ to blame Beijing for the spread of illegal gold mining,” the report says.
Ghana, Africa's leading gold producer in recent years, has struggled with illegal small-scale mining, known locally as galamsey. The issue has become a major political and environmental concern because of its impact on rivers, forests and agricultural land, while authorities have repeatedly linked parts of the sector to foreign-backed illicit mining operations.
GI-TOC said Russia has systematically expanded its use of gold following its invasion of Ukraine, including through military-linked networks operating across Africa. The report notes that Russian-linked entities, including Wagner Group and Russian military-linked structures including Africa Corps, have secured access to gold resources in countries such as Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic.
Criminal networks industrialise illicit mining
The study argues that conventional approaches to tackling illicit gold remain too narrowly focused on artisanal and small-scale mining. Instead, the report identifies systemic vulnerabilities throughout the entire gold ecosystem, including industrial-scale illegal mining operations, opaque refining networks, under-regulated commodity markets, recycled gold channels and emerging cryptocurrency-linked gold transactions.
“Illicit gold operations also drive demand for other illicit markets. In South Africa, for example, the same syndicates that control illegal mining operations are linked to human trafficking, with miners recruited under false pretences or coerced into working in lethal conditions, as the 2024 Stilfontein mine standoff revealed,” the report states.
“The syndicates are also connected to arms trafficking and Lesotho organized crime groups with political links. A secondary informal economy has emerged around the mines, with syndicates supplying food, liquor, drugs and sex workers to underground operations, compounding the human exploitation. Consequently, illegal gold mining in South Africa anchors an entire criminal ecosystem.”
The organisation also highlighted the growing industrialisation of illegal mining operations across Africa, Latin America and Asia. Foreign financing, weak governance and regulatory capture have transformed many illicit mining activities into large-scale enterprises that bear little resemblance to traditional artisanal mining. Criminal groups are increasingly controlling processing facilities, logistics networks and other strategic bottlenecks across supply chains.
A major concern identified by the report is the lack of transparency across global bullion markets. GI-TOC described international bullion centres such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China and the United States as significant blind spots because they handle large volumes of global gold trade while maintaining limited transparency over bullion activities and gold provenance.
The report further argues that central banks are among the least scrutinised participants in the gold market despite record levels of purchasing. Domestic buying programmes in some producing countries risk absorbing illegally mined gold, while gold swaps and reserve accumulation programmes can introduce additional provenance concerns.
GI-TOC warned that illicit gold should not be viewed as a niche commodity crime but rather as an accelerant economy that amplifies broader criminal activity. The proceeds from illicit gold mining and trading are linked to environmental destruction, deforestation, mercury pollution, wildlife trafficking, illicit cattle ranching, arms purchases, conflict financing and human rights abuses.
“Links between gold and conflict have been well documented and are the focus of a multitude of regulatory instruments. While gold can be an important source of revenue for armed groups, a focus on conflict financing and restrictive application of terms such as ‘conflict mineral’ often produces a narrow view centred on non-state armed group revenues,” the report says.
“This obscures understanding of the broader political economy of gold and the state and other actors embedded within it, while overlooking the root causes of conflict and the more nuanced roles gold plays in conflict. For example, efforts to cut off conflict financing can have the effect of building the legitimacy of non-state armed groups among local populations. Securing livelihoods and other forms of service delivery has long been a tactic of organized crime groups to undermine state legitimacy while building their own.
“Such is the case in West Africa, where ASGM is a major economic driver and a critical source of livelihoods. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the most powerful violent extremist organization in the Sahel, primarily profits from gold through taxation of mining sites and transport routes, and has engaged in gold-for-weapons barter exchanges. By defending miners’ access to sites against state crackdowns, JNIM also builds legitimacy with local populations. Heavy-handed state security responses, including the targeting of mine sites, have compounded the security challenge.”
GI-TOC is calling for a fundamental overhaul of the international response, including mandatory supply-chain due diligence, stronger anti-money laundering oversight, enhanced scrutiny of international bullion centres, improved customs and trade data collection, and legally binding global standards governing gold supply chains. Existing voluntary frameworks, it argued, have proven insufficient to address increasingly sophisticated criminal activity.
"The gold market can become more resilient to crime, but only if the actors with the greatest systemic influence accept that their economic interests are better served by a more transparent, rules-based market than by the opacity that currently prevails," GI-TOC senior expert Sophia Pickles said.
Africa emerges as a frontline of illicit gold flows
Zimbabwe is emerging as an increasingly important node in Africa’s illicit gold economy, where organised crime, arms trafficking, insurgent financing and cross-border smuggling are becoming deeply interconnected, according to GI-TOC.
The report argues that illicit gold has evolved into a strategic source of financing for organised crime, armed groups and corrupt political networks. It warns that gold is no longer merely a commodity but increasingly functions as "a weapon of war and geopolitics", financing conflict, sanctions evasion and transnational criminal activity across multiple continents.
The study places several other African countries among the world's highest-risk jurisdictions for illicit gold influence, including Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, South Africa and the DRC. According to GI-TOC's new risk framework, these countries combine substantial gold production with elevated levels of organised criminal activity linked to natural resources.
The report finds that criminal convergence around gold is accelerating across Africa. Gold trafficking increasingly intersects with arms smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, financial crime and corruption, involving not only criminal syndicates but also politically connected actors and private-sector facilitators.
"Criminal convergence is increasingly a central feature of organized crime operations in gold-rich regions," the report states.
For southern Africa, the findings are particularly relevant to Zimbabwe. The report identifies the country as part of a regional network of illicit gold flows that stretches from South Africa through Zimbabwe and onward to international trading hubs. Zimbabwe is identified by the report's risk-assessment framework as a jurisdiction facing elevated exposure to illicit gold-market influence despite comparatively modest officially recorded gold trade volumes, reflecting concerns that significant illicit flows may be escaping official statistics.
The report argues that African conflicts are increasingly shaped by competition over gold resources. In the Sahel, militant organisations such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province have expanded their influence over mining regions, taxing production, controlling transport corridors and using gold revenues to finance military operations.
"Gold plays a critical role in armed groups' efforts to build legitimacy, exemplified in West Africa," the report notes, adding that foreign actors are increasingly influencing African conflicts through financing arrangements and gold sourcing networks.
The report also links African gold markets to broader geopolitical competition, arguing that states are increasingly using illicit commercial networks to pursue strategic objectives. Russia's activities in Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic receive particular attention. The report notes that Russian-linked entities have secured privileged access to gold resources in exchange for security support and military assistance.
Sudan is cited as one of the clearest examples of gold's strategic role in modern conflicts. According to the report, both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have benefited from external backing linked to gold revenues, while international actors have sought access to Sudanese gold through refining, trading and investment arrangements.
Dubai and regional hubs under scrutiny
The study also identifies Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Cameroon and Egypt as important transit or laundering hubs where gold originating in conflict zones can enter formal international supply chains with limited scrutiny. Rwanda receives particular attention because official export volumes have significantly exceeded estimated domestic production in recent years, raising questions about the origin of some exports.
Dubai remains the dominant destination for much of Africa's artisanal and small-scale gold output. The report notes that the UAE continues to receive substantial volumes of African gold, including material linked to conflict zones and illicit supply chains. Despite regulatory reforms introduced in 2023, GI-TOC argues that implementation gaps remain significant.
Global oversight struggles to keep pace
One of the report's central conclusions is that current international responses remain inadequate because they focus too narrowly on artisanal mining and conflict minerals. Instead, the organisation argues that illicit gold now permeates the entire ecosystem, from extraction and processing to international bullion trading, financial markets and even central-bank purchasing programmes.
"The systemic vulnerabilities that enable its circulation span physical and financial supply chains," the authors write.
The report warns that foreign financing is driving the industrialisation of illicit mining operations across Africa, allowing criminal groups to control processing plants, logistics networks and export channels.
"Criminal mining operations are increasingly industrialized and growing in scale," GI-TOC states, adding that foreign investment is a key driver of this trend across Africa, Latin America and Asia.
The GI-TOC identifies four distinct clusters of risk:
■ High-production, high-criminality producer countries. Russia, China, Ghana, Indonesia, Peru, Mexico, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa, Venezuela and the DRC produce substantial volumes of gold under conditions of significant criminal influence. Several other countries are closely clustered in this group, reflecting the visibility and reach of non-renewable criminal influence in gold-producing states.
■ High-import, high-criminality hubs. The UAE, Switzerland, China, Hong Kong SAR, Turkey and India sit at the top centre of the chart, where large refining and trading volumes meet high resource crime exposure.
■ High-impact destination markets with moderate criminal influence. The UK, the US and Singapore sit further to the right of the chart, lower on the criminal influence axis but with import volumes large enough that any illicit gold entering these markets has outsized downstream consequences. Countries on the fringe can also play a key role as transit or laundering hubs. For example, Armenia was reported to be key to Russian sanctions evasion, importing billions of dollars’ worth of Russian gold in 2023 and 2024.
■ High-criminality jurisdictions with low recorded flows. The scoring also accounts for countries where highly organised crime scores coincide with low recorded gold production and import volumes. The absence of recorded volumes is not evidence of low risk but its opposite: criminality is extensive enough for substantial illicit flows to escape official statistics; for example, known gold producers and transit hubs Myanmar, South Sudan, Rwanda, Chad and Cameroon.
GI-TOC concludes that Africa sits at the centre of a rapidly evolving global gold economy in which criminal organisations, insurgent groups, foreign governments and international traders increasingly intersect. Without stronger transparency requirements, more rigorous due diligence and tighter oversight of global bullion centres, the organisation warns that illicit gold markets will continue to outpace enforcement efforts and undermine efforts to improve transparency across global commodity supply chains.
