Brief, cross-partisan conversations about sensitive political topics have scant power to narrow divisions, study finds

by University of California - Berkeley

Credit: Pixabay/CC0 Public Domain

The premise is simple, and it seems like common sense: If Republicans and Democrats could come together for good faith dialogue, the conversations would reduce tensions and ease the corrosive polarization that threatens U.S. democracy.

But a new study co-authored by UC Berkeley political scientist David Broockman found that brief, cross-partisan conversations about sensitive political topics have scant power to narrow divisions. Conversation about neutral topics can create some goodwill, the authors found, but even there, the effect doesn't last.

"There's an assumption that these conversations will have positive consequences for democracy," Broockman said. "Under this assumption, someone might say, 'I've gotten to know the other side, and I like them more, and so now I'm more OK with my representative working with a representative from the other side, and I'm less likely to vote for a politician in my party who's going to try to disenfranchise the other side.'

"Basically, though, we didn't find any of that," he added. "Simply liking the other side's voters more doesn't appear to affect your political behavior."

The new research was released today in the journal Science Advances. It was co-authored by Broockman and Erik Santoro, a Ph.D. student in social psychology at Stanford University.

Broockman's recent research has focused closely on the dynamics of political division and the role of communication in nurturing more constructive engagement.

His work has found that political advocates going door to door to promote a cause can have a significant, long-lasting persuasive impact by listening effectively and by talking about people's life experiences. Earlier this year, he reported that conservative Fox News viewers who spent a month tuning to CNN instead experienced a broad shift in their political opinions—until they returned to watching Fox.

Another paper by co-authored by Broockman, forthcoming in the American Journal of Political Science, finds that reducing the hostilities associated with political polarization might not, in fact, improve the health of democracy.

Intriguing insights on what works—and what doesn't work

Alarmed by the increasingly vicious divide in the American electorate, a growing legion of organizations in the U.S. is working to bring right and left together for discussion and deliberation. For example, BridgeUSA, a 6-year-old nonprofit with close ties to Berkeley, is working on university and high school campuses to encourage discussion that transcends partisan rancor to focus on defining challenges and solutions.

Broockman, in an interview, stressed that his latest research doesn't contradict those efforts. Rather, he said, it's essential to study what kind of engagement works to ease polarization—and how to make positive results deeper and more long-lasting.

The research detailed in Science Advances covers two experiments. In one, the authors paired up hundreds of Republicans and Democrats for brief, one-on-one discussions about a topic that usually isn't controversial: What makes a perfect day?

Those conversations produced large reductions in polarization, Broockman and Santoro found. But within three months, the reductions had all but disappeared.

In the second experiment, the researchers repeated the first experiment, but also brought Republicans and Democrats together for one-on-one discussions that focused on potentially tense political topics. They were split into two groups—in one, pairs of Democrats and Republicans were assigned to talk about why they identify with their own parties, and in the other, they were assigned to discuss why they dislike each other's party.

These conversations had virtually no effect on reducing polarization.

Still, the study produced some intriguing insights about how we can all get along. Among those assigned to talk about what they liked about their own parties, the research subjects felt their discussion partners weren't really listening to them. Those conversations typically lasted about 13 1/2 minutes.

But those assigned to discuss what they disliked about the opposing political party seemed to have an easier time. Their conversations lasted much longer—nearly 18 minutes, typically.

While the chats didn't change political opinions, those individuals were more likely afterward to say that cross-partisan conversations were important. The study even found signals of hope that suggested very slight reductions in polarization and increases in warmth toward people in the opposing party.

"People tend to think their own party is OK, but they don't love their own party," Broockman explained. "Their feelings are lukewarm. And so when someone else says, 'Here's what I don't like about your party,' most people will agree and say, 'Yeah, my party isn't perfect.'"

As it turns out, real life is more civil than Facebook

That points to another insight from the study. With participants' consent, all of the conversations were recorded, and Broockman said he was struck by the consistently civil tone he saw in the transcripts.

"None of the conversations that I looked at devolved into the kind of arguments that you would see on Facebook," he said. "Our research participants didn't leave hating each other more. In some ways, this is maybe better than people would have expected.

"When we think about the other side, we tend to think about the people who show up on social media saying the most extreme things in the most uncivil way. But that really is not how the average person interacts when they're actually talking face-to-face."

Such insights—modest, but encouraging—suggest that further research could shed light on a recipe for political discussions that might reduce polarization and produce other democracy-enhancing effects.

For example, Broockman said it might be interesting to see what would happen if the person-to-person engagements were more extensive, longer-term discussions and not just one-offs. If researchers could find a way to reduce polarization through one-on-one engagements, he said, they could then study the interventions that could help to sustain and build on that trust.

But ultimately, Broockman advised, we probably should let common sense temper our optimism. Democracy is difficult; conflict and polarization are features, not bugs, of the system.

"Democracy exists to manage the inevitable differences of opinion that exist in any society," he said. "The differences of opinion are not themselves necessarily a problem. But people do need to be able to discuss them."When Fox News viewers flip to CNN, their opinions shift too, study finds

More information: Erik Santoro et al, The promise and pitfalls of cross-partisan conversations for reducing affective polarization: Evidence from randomized experiments, Science Advances (2022). DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abn5515

Journal information: Science Advances , American Journal of Political Science 

Provided by University of California - Berkeley 

USA

Denying Patients Physician-Assisted Suicide Is a Civil Rights Issue

It shouldn’t be a crime for those who are too sick to live to decide how and when to end their suffering.


BY SHELBY WILDER
JUNE 23, 2022

Maia Calloway welcomes me into her home in Taos, New Mexico. It’s a warm and calming space surrounded by high desert. Calloway was first diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) at age thirty-three. In the nine years since then, she has experienced a steep decline, suffering from paralysis throughout parts of her body, debilitating episodes of pain, and cognitive and physical impairment. She needs full-time care.

Despite these challenges, Calloway has “stuck around” to speak out about one’s right to die and to educate people on the law in the United States. She believes that there is no better proponent for this case because, like many in her situation, she wants to end her own life.

Throughout her journey with MS, Calloway has desperately desired to leave her body, something that has robbed her of so much in recent years. “I would love to live,” she says. “But I can’t, because my level of disability is not acceptable for me; it’s not being true to myself. I have really lost a lot of who I was.”

Medical aid in dying, or MAID, which is legal in only a handful of states, allows doctors to prescribe lethal medication to terminally ill patients with less than six months to live. But even for those who try to legally end their life, like Calloway, many obstacles remain. The existing legislation specifically excludes individuals with degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, ALS/MND, and MS from qualifying for MAID.

While the campaign for MAID gains momentum across the country, it continues to work against some of the people who need it most. “The biggest part of my activism has been the realization that the right to die is as important as the right to live, that it’s a human rights issue,” Calloway says. “It’s a civil rights issue. It’s not a medical or moral issue.”

Calloway has tirelessly advocated for MAID, asking lawmakers to consider adding more compassionate expansions to existing legislation.

“We just need to look at countries that have experience with euthanasia,” she says. “We can look to models in Europe or Canada and see the success that they are having. Individuals should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.”

Last summer, New Mexico legalized MAID by passing HB 47, but it unfortunately does not pertain to Calloway’s case. Even though her medical diagnosis is incurable and debilitating, she is not considered “terminally ill” and is, as a result, not approved to receive the medication. “The irony is that if I waited until they deemed me ill enough,” she adds, “I still could not access MAID because I would not be able to swallow the drug on my own.”

In the final stages of MS, patients are bed-bound, often unable to move, and eventually unable to breathe, making it impossible to meet the law’s requirement that patients must be able to independently take the lethal medication.

Falling through the cracks of the law, Calloway spends most days in bed, her laptop serving as a window to the world. She has witnessed a growing underground movement of activists calling for “exit,” as it’s called online, among communities of people in chat rooms where many are trying to find ways to die.

Falling through the cracks of the law, Calloway spends most days in bed, her laptop serving as a window to the world.

From individuals documenting their travels to South American pet stores to buy Nembutal, a barbiturate that can cause death; to sharing home videos of people experimenting with pig salts they ordered online; to those offering DIY methods for death, like using a makeshift plastic bag, “People will go to extreme lengths to be able to end their suffering,” Calloway says. “We are forcing Americans to commit a hard suicide. And it doesn’t always work out.”

The discussion on MAID in the United States has been documented from various angles, but most people with degenerative diseases find themselves facing the same situation as Calloway: being denied the right to end their own lives in the manner of their choosing, a right that seems largely ignored or dismissed.

Right-to-die organizations often focus on legalizing MAID in other states over expanding existing laws, fearing that widening access will slow or completely stall the movement’s progress by sparking pushback claiming that these laws go too far. Such opposition typically consists of disability rights organizations and religious groups. “There is this irrational idea that all of a sudden we are going to have slippery slopes and people are going to be taken advantage of and coerced,” Calloway says. “These are scare tactics by the right-to-lifers.”

As Calloway notes, individuals seeking to use the law must pass a medical review board, a rigorous process that has many failsafes in place. This process cannot be easily completed, at least not in the United States, where many individuals die while waiting on the bureaucratic process for approval.

Due to her lack of legal options, Calloway plans to travel to Switzerland in the coming months; there, the criteria for assisted suicide are much broader.

“Patients from all over the world are traveling to countries that provide [assisted suicide or] euthanasia in order to have this option,” she says, “because many of them are denied this right in their own country, which is the same problem that I have.” Once she arrives at Pegasus, a nonprofit voluntary-assisted-dying organization, she will take a lethal intravenous substance and pass away within two minutes.

While she emphasizes how that moment will finally bring her the peace she seeks, Calloway understands that it does not come without financial and emotional hurdles.

Calloway must pay nearly $20,000 for travel and accommodation for herself and a caretaker.

Calloway must pay nearly $20,000 for travel and accommodation for herself and a caretaker. To help raise funds, she started a GoFundMe page titled “A good death.” But, while Calloway has raised more than $7,000 so far, the fact that she needs to travel to a clinic abroad in order to die humanely is an indictment in itself.

“I can’t die in my own bed with my family holding me,” she says, “because the law in America is so cruel.”

Worse still, the window of time for Calloway to travel to Switzerland is narrowing. As her mental and physical states decline, Swiss doctors must be able to certify that she’s cognizant before she can be approved for physician-assisted suicide.

“Choosing a date to die is the most difficult thing that any human being could ever have to choose,” she says. “There would always be another birthday, there would always be another family get-together. You [instinctively] keep delaying this decision but I have to make it soon if I want to have a dignified end.”

“MS is ending my life,” Calloway continues. “I’m just choosing to die one way as opposed to another on my own terms, with assistance from a doctor.”

The Other Americans: El Salvador’s Bitcoin House of Cards Falls

The collapse of cryptocurrency has cost the country millions of dollars, but President Nayib Bukele is telling residents not to focus on the economic downturn.

A sign reads "aceptamos bitcoin" ("we accept bitcoin").

BY JEFF ABBOTT
JUNE 30, 2022

Bitcoin, the best-known of the world’s virtual currencies, has collapsed, losing trillions of dollars in the process along with all of the other cryptocurrencies. This has created massive losses for the nation of El Salvador, which in 2021 became the first country in the world to accept Bitcoin as legal tender. It is estimated that the fall in Bitcoin’s value has cost the Central American government more than $50 million.

“The failure of Bitcoin has freed us from a catastrophe.”

Nayib Bukele, resident of El Salvador, invested more than $100 million in the digital currency after a law was pushed through the country’s legislative branch in less than seventy-two hours last September. The law was approved without any oversight or fiscal research into what the cryptocurrency would mean for the country’s economy.

But the crypto crash is not being felt equally: the majority of Salvadorans remained skeptical of the currency and did not utilize Bitcoin.

“Most people still use dollars to make their transactions,” Ricardo Castaneda, a Salvadoran economist with the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies, tells The Progressive. “The main impact is the loss of public money that had been used to buy Bitcoin. The fall of Bitcoin does have implications directly because of the money that [the people] have paid through their taxes.”

He adds, “It is as if someone went to bet in a casino with the people’s money, and they are currently losing.”

The lack of popular support for the use of Bitcoin throughout El Salvador means that the effects of the loss on residents have yet to be seen.

“The failure of Bitcoin has freed us from a catastrophe,” Carlos Acevedo, an economist and former president of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, tells The Progressive. “If Bitcoin had been successfully received that would have meant people were using Bitcoin, that taxes were being paid through Bitcoin, that people were sending remittances through Bitcoin. Then this fall in the price of Bitcoin would have been catastrophic, but almost no one is using it.”

El Salvador was the first country in the world to recognize cryptocurrency as legal tender; it was presented as a cheap and easy way for migrants to send remittances from the United States home to family members.

But nearly one year after the country adopted Bitcoin, the government found the population resistant to adopting it. Initially, the government had given $30 to every user that opened a Chivo account. But this backfired.

“They took out the $30, but just to [keep as cash],” Morena Herrera, a feminist and human rights deffender in El Salvador, tells The Progressive. “It is a currency that is of little interest to the people.”

According to Acevedo, only around 2 percent of remittances are sent back through the cryptocurrency, and no one is paying their taxes with it.

Bukele had promised the public that Bitcoin would reach a value of $100,000 per coin by the end of the year, but it never reached that level—rather, it fell drastically. But as the country faces the collapse of Bitcoin, Bukele is urging the population to not focus on the collapse.

“Bukele made a statement telling people to not look at the Bitcoin chart,” Herrera says. “He said ‘It will go up, enjoy life.’ ”

El Salvador has seen a rapid deterioration of conditions within the country in the three years since Bukele took power. Since March, the president has ruled the country under a State of Emergency to combat gangs, resulting in the incarceration of more than 40,000 people.

Bukele requested the emergency declaration following the deaths of more than eighty people in one weekend, and has since accused the gangs of trying to form a guerrilla movement against the power of the state.

“This government came in with a huge anti-corruption discourse. But in practice, what we have found with the facts is that there has been a systematic practice of hiding information.”

Human rights organizations have criticized the declaration and the violation of rights. In addition to those who have been arbitrarily arrested under the state of emergency, at least forty people have died in prison since March, according to human rights organizations.

The state of emergency was extended yet again for another thirty days on June 21.

At the same time, Bukele has overseen the systematic co-optation of the state in a move that many have referred to as authoritarian. He maintains direct control over all branches of the state as part of an attack on democratic institutions, which has meant that corruption is running rampant.

“This government came in with a huge anti-corruption discourse,” Castaneda says. “But in practice, what we have found with the facts is that there has been a systematic practice of hiding information.”

He adds, “In the government’s discourse, yes, it is fighting corruption. But in practice, what it is doing is destroying any and all efforts that really fight corruption.”

In June 2021, the administration shut down the Organization of American States-backed International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador. An action that was met by dismay from the United States, which had invested two million dollars in the anti-corruption body just months prior.

Throughout all of this, the adoption of Bitcoin has further permitted corruption and strengthened Bukele’s control over the country.

As Castaneda says, “The president has control of all institutions.”


Jeff Abbott is an independent journalist currently based out of Guatemala. “The Other Americans” is a column created by Abbott for The Progressive on human migration in North and Central America.

READ MORE BY JEFF ABBOTT

Economic crisis is forcing Brits to opt for gambling, crypto: Report

British households are grappling with the highest rate of inflation out of the Group of Seven advanced economies.

Image for representational purpose only (iStock)

By: Chandrashekar Bhat

Britain’s worsening cost-of-living squeeze is pushing some people into gambling and cryptocurrency investments in last-ditch attempts to make ends meet, a gambling charity warned on Thursday.

GamCare said it had increasingly received calls from people receiving state welfare payments who had gambled in the hope they could cover soaring energy and food bills, and lost.

The charity reported that some people who it had helped successfully in the past had relapsed into gambling again under the growing financial pressure.

British households are grappling with the highest rate of inflation out of the Group of Seven advanced economies, which hit a new 40-year high of 9.1% in May. The Bank of England has warned of inflation exceeding 11% by October.

A YouGov survey of more than 4,000 people commissioned by GamCare and published on Thursday showed 46% were worried about their financial situation.

More than half of those polled said they had gambled over the past 12 months, and most of this group had lost money.

“Our helpline advisers are hearing that the cost of living is impacting people’s gambling behaviours – particularly those gamblers who have recovered,” said Anna Hemmings, chief executive of GamCare.

“We also know that our team are hearing from more and more people who are reaching out for help around crypto trading.”

Someone who paid in sterling to invest in Bitcoin six months ago to help hedge against the rising cost of living would have lost 55% of their investment as of Thursday.

GamCare said 43% of problem gamblers had invested in cryptocurrency, and 25% out of this group said they wanted to invest more to chase losses – compared with only 7% of the wider population of crypto investors.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Orthodox church: Where religion meets geopolitics and war

In Ukraine and North Macedonia, the Orthodox Church is facing deep, even violent, splits, on the one hand; and is edging closer to resolving decades-old disputes,  or Not

Engjellushe Morina @EngjellusheM on Twitter
Senior Policy Fellow
Andrew Wilson
Senior Policy Fellow

Commentary
23 June 2022

Two men in military uniforms check out the shop in an Orthodox church in Kyiv, Ukraine
Image by Konrad Lembcke

The Russian Orthodox Church has played a crucial supporting role in the rule of Vladimir Putin. And, with research suggesting a strong association in the Orthodox world between people’s religion and their national identity, church affairs hold particular importance for temporal leaders. This is whether they are, in the case of Ukraine, seeking to defend against an external aggressor; or, in North Macedonia, looking to complete state-building business with legacies left over from Yugoslavia. Recent developments in each country reflect the political divides in eastern Europe, with one sinking into deeper, violent, division and the other on the verge of resolution.

The Russian Orthodox Church – whose leader, Patriarch Kirill, the European Union recently sought to sanction – is the largest and richest church within Eastern Orthodoxy. The worldwide church is headed by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, with whom the Russian Orthodox Church broke in 2018 over the issue of the autocephaly (self-government) of the then newly formed Orthodox Church of Ukraine, whose autocephaly Bartholomew had granted. Now, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ordinary Ukrainians seem to be rapidly turning away from the Russian Orthodox Church – which still has many churches in the country in the form (since 1990) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). The UOC-MP is part of the broader Russian church but has a measure of self-government. Meanwhile, another crucial decision by Bartholomew has seen him broker a solution to a seemingly intractable dispute, namely: persuading the Serbian Orthodox Church (traditionally backed by Russia) to accept the full independence of what will now be known as the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Archdiocese of Ohrid.

Ukraine

The UOC-MP has long retained an important presence in Ukraine, making up one-third of all the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church. The UOC-MP dislikes the ‘Moscow Patriarchate’ tag, arguing that it is based in Ukraine. But it has long resisted pressure from the Ukraine side to adopt autocephaly, most notably at the same Sobor (bishops’ council) of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000 that canonised Nicholas II and his family.

In Ukraine, the two principal rival churches have diverged over time, in three phases, the first of which began in 2014. The Maidan Revolution in February that year began the process towards creating the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Amid the wider geopolitical tensions, that July the UOC-MP saw the death of its relatively ecumenical patriarch, Volodymyr, and his replacement by the more radical Onufrii, a strong supporter of Putin’s re-imperialising ‘Russian World’ doctrine.

The second phase began in 2018 with a campaign by Russia to strangle the Orthodox Church of Ukraine at birth. Bartholomew provided a formal letter (or ‘Tomos’) of approval of the church’s autocephaly on Orthodox Christmas Day in January 2019. The Kremlin, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Orthodox oligarchs pressured the other Orthodox churches not to recognise this. As of mid-2022, only the churches of Greece, Cyprus, and Alexandria and All Africa have recognised the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. When the Russian Orthodox Church broke with Bartholomew, it dubbed him a US puppet and described his mere “Istanbul Patriarchate”. It campaigned to reverse the decision and undermine his authority, and even set up two new dioceses in Africa to poach off the Alexandrian church.

If Russia were to prevail, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would be suppressed, with parishes transferred directly to the Russian Orthodox Church

The third phase – Russia’s current war on Ukraine – raises the stakes much higher. If Russia were to prevail, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would be suppressed, with parishes transferred directly to the Russian Orthodox Church, as is already happening in occupied territories. Kirill has echoed Putin’s language of Ukrainian-Russian “unity” on Russian terms and endorsed the war against “evil forces”, even comparing it to a metaphysical struggle against gay pride parades. On 12 May the UOC-MP issued a statement saying that religious policy in Ukraine was “one of the reasons for the military invasion of Ukraine”.

In the event of Ukrainian victory, or even just survival, the UOC-MP will come under strong pressure to cut its ties with Russia and negotiate a modus vivendi with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. However, 400 UOC-MP priests have appealed against what they term Kirill’s “heresy,” and more than 400 parishes have left the UOC-MP since the invasion began. To forestall further radical moves, the UOC-MP has lately become more critical of the war. On 27 May, a special Sobor “condemn[ed] war as a violation of God’s commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill!’” In a minimal formulation, it “expresse[d] condolences to all those who suffered in the war”,” without explicitly blaming Russia. More clearly, the church formally “disagree[d] with the position of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’ on the war”. The Sobor also declared “independence”, although not full autocephaly.

Ukrainian critics thought this move did not make the UOC-MP independent enough; that it was window-dressing, or “little rain from a large cloud”. The Russian parent church thought it made them too independent: on 7 June it retaliated by annexing all three dioceses in Crimea to create a Metropolitanate of Crimea. This is the second such takeover: a multi-ethnic Metropolitanate of Gothia existed until the departure of Crimean Christians in 1778, some of whom founded Mariupol. The Russian church took over, and a Tavrian Eparchy was established in 1859.

The reasons the UOC-MP has sought to distance itself are not hard to guess. Before the war began in February, 40 per cent of Ukrainian believers in one independent poll backed the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and 20 per cent the UOC-MP. A further 33 per cent called themselves “just Orthodox” But now, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine claims the support of 52 per cent of people, with the figure suggesting “just Orthodox” down to 11 per cent, and followers of the UOC-MP at just 4 per cent. An opinion poll in April showed 74 per cent of Ukrainians wanted the UOC-MP to cut its ties with Russia and 51 per cent wanted it banned.

The future of these churches is tightly bound up with the wider political and security concerns. In March, members of the Ukrainian parliament introduced two bills that could lead to a ban on the UOC-MP. There are also two new laws on collaboration and aiding and abetting an aggressor state that could be applied against the church. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine is targeting key properties currently controlled by the UOC-MP and seeking to establish its own rival monastery at the important Pecherska Lavra. Many see the presence of the UOC-MP at this site – in the heart of Kyiv – as a security threat.

The 2018 solution of having two canonical Orthodox churches in Ukraine seems unlikely to survive the current war. It may not even survive the current phase of the war, as Ukraine presses ahead with derussification on other fronts, including restrictions on Russian books and music in June.

North Macedonia

On 12 June – Pentecost Sunday – North Macedonia’s prime minister, Dimitar Kovacevski, attended the divine liturgy held in St George’s Cathedral of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. Bartholomew presided, celebrating it together with the Archbishop of Ohrid to mark the resolution of the long-running dispute between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Archdiocese of Ohrid.

This disagreement stretched back to 1967 when the Macedonian Orthodox Church seceded from the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Macedonian church then spent decades formally in isolation from the rest of the Orthodox world until 19 May this year, when its status of equality with the other Orthodox churches was unblocked by the Serbian church. The decision was also celebrated with the Serbian patriarch, Porfirije, in Belgrade. All this preceded an earlier meeting of the Holy Synod (of the worldwide church) and its recognition of what is termed the Ohrid Archbishopric, which will have jurisdiction only within the boundaries of the state of North Macedonia. The Ecumenical Patriarchate excluded the recognition of the name Macedonia as part of the name of the church, and any other derivate of Macedonia.

Although the conflict between the two churches seems to have been resolved fairly quickly, the process of dialogue was set in motion back in 2018 and was deliberately kept out of the public eye. This was at a time when parallel efforts were in full swing to resolve the name dispute with Greece that had long lingered over what eventually became North Macedonia. The resolution to this problem ultimately unlocked North Macedonia’s path to NATO and potentially the European Union. Zoran Zaev, then the country’s prime minister, together with the church, approached Batholomew to ask him to help end the ecclesiastical isolation. At that time, they hinted that they were open to a name change to “Ohrid”. Bartholomew replied that he was willing to assist and take the initiative to restore the church to the Orthodox canonical framework. This in itself was something of a victory, as until that point Bartholomew had hesitated to get involved and would instead only encourage the Macedonian church to talk to its Serbian counterpart.

Some believers in North Macedonia remain concerned at how other churches, in particular the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, may react

Bartholomew’s decision to welcome the Macedonian church into communion came on 9 May, when he also issued a request for the Serbian church to resolve “administrative issues” with the Macedonian church. Porfirije handed the Tomos to Archbishop Stefan of Ohrid, fully confirming the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Archdiocese of Ohrid. The Tomos notes that autocephaly must be submitted for approval by other churches within the Orthodox church.

While the Serbian church has moved towards a smooth resolution of what seemed an intractable dispute, some believers in North Macedonia remain concerned at how other churches, in particular the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, may react, considering that Bulgaria has been blocking North Macedonia’s future EU accession by insisting that Macedonian language and identity are of Bulgarian origin. Given that the Byzantine name of the Bulgarian church is “Archdiocese of Ohrid” there are worries that Bulgaria will not accept the name and new requirements may be added to existing ones.

The Russian Orthodox Church has been keeping tabs on this issue: it branded Bartholomew’s decision an “irregular and politically motivated intrusion” and called on other churches not to recognise his authority in the matter. This indicates the long and close relationship between Russia and Serbia in the resolution of such issues. But its tone altered drastically when the Serbian church accepted the change.

Although the cases of Ukraine and North Macedonia are sharply contrasting, each still faces an uncertain future in which the place of their Orthodox churches are entangled in wider disputes with, or aggression from, neighbouring states. The war in Ukraine in particular has exposed and exacerbated deep rifts within the Orthodox world, with even the Russian Orthodox Church apparently splitting as a consequence of the conflict. The remaining presence and role of the churches in Ukraine will reflect the results of the war and provide symbolic meaning to the contested questions of nationhood and independence there.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

The Great Orthodox Battle Amid the Russian Invasion

How can the Russian Orthodox Church exert influence in Ukraine with its leader’s clear support of the invasion?

Christine Karelska

 

Future of Ukraine Fellow

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has only exacerbated the tension between Orthodox churches in the country.

The history of the Ukrainian Church is rich and dates back to the times of Kyivan Rus and Prince Volodymyr the Great. They received Christianity from Constantinople in 988, a watershed event that spiritually united the Ukrainian nation. Through centuries, it has also fueled Russia’s obsession to exert more control over Ukraine, rewrite history based on cynical lies and try to establish its religious dominance in its near abroad and far beyond it. In times of war, religion plays one of the most pivotal roles in uniting people and helping them believe in peace and good. 

Editor’s Pick: The Battleground for Ukraine’s Liberal Soul

The Church can serve as a soft power instrument to justify war crimes, sow more hatred and cause more social divisions. The never-ending battle for ‘hearts and minds’ not only between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) vs the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) but also between the whole Orthodox global community vs the Russian Orthodoxy seems to be reaching its peak amid the Russian invasion. Who will be the winner? 

How is Putin instrumentalising religion as his tool during the invasion? Can the Church become a robust and reliable peace actor that can be conducive to the conflict resolution in Ukraine and the unity of the Ukrainian nation in the battle for sovereignty? Is there any future for the ROC, Patriarch Kirill and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP

The Russian Orthodox Church — A Dangerous Player

The strong national aspirations of the Ukrainian Church and the religious diversity demonstrate that Ukraine is one of the most religious countries in Europe. Indeed, its Church is a potent soft power instrument for uniting people in challenging times. Social polls show that 63.5 per cent of Ukrainians trust the Church, even more than the authorities. 

The Ukrainian religious landscape is unique and known for its ecumenical cooperation despite inter-church misunderstandings that occur from time to time. The unique structure, namely, the All-Ukrainian Council of Religious Churches and Associations of Ukraine, unites various religious denominations (three Orthodox churches, the Greek-Catholics, the Roman Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Baptists, Jews and Muslims). The organisation grants chairmanship every six months to each denomination that symbolises the true essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine.  

Now, in times of war, there is a more dangerous outside player than ever, encroaching on Ukraine’s spirit — the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), one of the most potent weapons in Putin’s hybrid warfare toolbox, dubbed as the ‘supplier’ of the Kremlin’s ideology. It has always been a vital instrument of the Russian foreign policy in promoting ideas of the so-called ‘Russian World’ and justifying Putin’s aggression and imperialism. Dr Cyril Hovorun explains Putin’s formula of all his wars: ‘Putin’s regime supplies guns, the church supplies ideas.’ 

After centuries of religious oppression, the Ukrainian Church became more united than ever after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. The Revolution of Dignity was a catalyst for uniting various churches that acted as mediators. Ukraine’s inspiration to have an independent national church came as a natural and logical process. But the Ukrainian state lacked a piece to complete its complicated puzzle on the path of breaking away from the Russian orbit of influence toward true European civilisation.

After unsuccessful attempts to get canonical independence, on 9 January 2019, a remarkable event occurred — the Ecumenical Patriarchate Bartholomew, ‘first among equals,’ signed the Tomos (a decree of independence) in Istanbul. As a result, the newly-established Orthodox Church of Ukraine was granted its canonical independence from the Russian Church after seven centuries.

It united the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and some parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP). Metropolitan Epifaniy became Head of the new denomination, pointing out that — ‘the Russian Orthodox Church is the last advance post of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine and that the appearance of the OCU undercuts the imperial goals of the leader in the Kremlin.’ 

This canonical independence was considered an affront to the Kremlin’s worldview that deems Ukraine as a failed state and Ukrainians as a second-class nation. Thus, the reaction of the ROC was predictable: it unilaterally severed ties with the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew I and the churches of Greece, Cyprus and Alexandria, which recognised the independence of the Ukrainian Church. It was just a mere act of retaliation that Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria, who has ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Africa, recognised the independence of the Ukrainian Church.

The Tomos has undermined, to some extent, the ROC’s influence in Ukraine before the invasion. It strengthened Ukraine’s independence and united Ukrainians spiritually. At the same time, it led to the further radicalisation of the ROC, nourishing Kirill’s obsession with accusing the West of dismantling Orthodox unity and his desire to establish Moscow’s dominance in the Orthodox world. He was a long-time staunch ally of Putin’s plan, who justified and fully abetted the Russian invasion since its very start. As for the ROC, this war is against sin, imminent threats from the liberal West, ‘gay parades,’ and ‘excess consumption.’ It is a crusade to defend the divine law and ‘tried-and-true’ conservative values. Anyone opposed to the so-called ‘special military operation’ automatically becomes a pagan enemy.

Putin’s Religious Rationale for Invading Ukraine

Behind Putin’s ostentatious piety, there is a clear goal to fill the ideological void after the collapse of the Soviet Union and create a new, purely Russian identity, ‘defending’ its values and all Russians in the world. 

2021 Putin’s ‘notorious’ essay on the ‘Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians‘ showcased the imperialistic ambitions of the Kremlin’s dictator from many convoluted angles, particularly the spiritual one: ‘Most importantly, people both in the western and eastern Russian lands spoke the same language. Their faith was Orthodox. The unified church government remained in place until the middle of the 15th century. The secular authorities, making no secret of their political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split, to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They must destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs.’ 

On 21 February, an hour-long lecture by Putin on his personal beliefs on history endorsed the distorted religious subtext of this war as well: ‘In Kyiv, they are preparing reprisals against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our history, culture and spiritual space.’ 

But it is the Russian invaders who continue to destroy the religious sites. Even the Svyatogorsk Lavra, a symbolic church for the ROC, was shelled and burned down, having claimed the lives of three priests. The Russian troops bombed Mariupol levelling everything in the city, including sacred sites. A Ukrainian priest, Father Pavlo Tomaszewski, managed to escape. He gave the following testimony ‘They bombed and shelled us without any break for four days — since our monastery had no cellar for hiding in, we could see tall apartment blocks exploding in front of us…By the end, we had lost contact with parishioners or the outside world.’ 

The Orthodox Wingman of Putin’s Regime

Kirill is a big fan of boasting Russian Orthodoxy’s might, its new identity intertwined with Putin’s militarism. A symbol of this new might was introduced to the general public in 2020 — the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed forces, rumoured to have cost more than 80 mln dollars. 

Its mosaics depict all of Russia’s wars and military interventions. Paradoxically, the idea behind creating such a shrine belongs not to Kirill but to Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, who hopes to add more mosaics regarding what is happening now. This likeness of the Church was another religious symbol of the upcoming invasion with nostalgic tones for its grandeur during the Great Patriotic War.

On 23 February, Defender of the Fatherland Day, a symbolic holiday for Putin, the Primate of Moscow and all of Russia, Kirill (Volodymyr Gundyaev) warmly congratulated the Kremlin’s leader, pointing out his active role in ‘preserving national historical memory and affirming the principles of traditional morality in the lives of contemporaries.’ 

Such a gentle hint at future ‘defence’ of Russia’s ‘historical’ borders in the face of non-existent threats was thrown by one of the spiritual creators of the doctrine of the ‘Russian World,’ the embodiment of Putin’s ethnic cleansing. After the unjustified invasion, he continued to echo standard Russian propaganda ‘grand’ narratives in his sermons. On 28 February, he cynically prayed for peace in ‘Russian lands,’ including Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

In his homily, delivered on 6 March before the start of Orthodox Lent, he accused the West of the atrocities in the Donbas region for the last eight years without breathing a word about the current war atrocities in Ukraine: ‘Today, our brothers in the Donbas, Orthodox people, are undoubtedly suffering, and we cannot but be with them, first of all in prayer. It is necessary to pray that the Lord would help them preserve the Orthodox faith, not succumbing to temptations and temptations.’ 

He openly ignited Putin’s religious purge in his sermon speeches at a metaphysical level. He deliberately avoided the word ‘war’ but used euphemisms such as ‘military actions’ or, more generally ‘, events’. Moreover, he even gave a military icon to the Director of the Russian Guard of the Russian Federation, General Viktor Zolotov, to inspire young soldiers. One example of this blind veneration of the Russian state ideology espoused by the Kremlin was a symbol Z on Easter cakes to support Russian soldiers in their ‘noble mission.’

However, Patriarch Kirill, Putin’s spiritual advisor, insists that there is no invasion of Ukraine but a battle against ‘external and internal enemies,’ ‘Neo-Nazis’ who are in the way of the historic ‘unity’ between the Slavs of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus.

UOC-MP Versus UOC: Is Mutual Understanding Possible?

This war was a great challenge for the UOC-MP, which mirrored and cherished Russian propaganda in Ukraine before the invasion on a large-scale basis and did not speak out during eight years of the undeclared Russian war. Its interests were lobbied by the pro-Russian oligarch from Mariupol, Vadim Novinsky, who was ordained a deacon by Onufry. It is no surprise that now the position of the UOC-MP and its further steps are monitored under a microscope as it has been a vital propaganda instrument in the Kremlin’s hands. 

Since the start of the war, the Primate of the UOC-MP Onufri supported the Ukrainian soldiers. It appealed to Putin to stop the fratricidal war, comparing the invasion with the sin of Cain. 

Before the Easter holidays, Onufri suggested holding a religious procession to ‘Azovstal’ in Mariupol to contribute to the resolution of the tragic humanitarian crisis there. Still, it was not accepted by the Russian side. 

It is worth mentioning that the influence of the UOC-MP is stronger than the UOC even after the Tomos. It has more parishes across Ukraine than the UOC, more than 12 000, and still plays a considerable role for most Orthodox Christians in Ukraine. However, this war has caused a max exodus from the UOC-MP. Most of its parishes are joining the UOC rapidly, and most of the clergy, bishops, and lay people are appalled by Kirill’s distorted religious backing of the invasion. Meanwhile, Rovenkivska Diocese in the Luhansk region, Crimea, and Sevastopol Diocese refused to cut their ties with the ROC, which will definitely strengthen Russian influence on the temporarily occupied territories and further impose ideas of the so-called ‘Russian World.’ 

In temporarily-occupied parts of the Donbas region and Crimea, all Christian denominations — except those that fall under the MP jurisdiction — were brutally persecuted by the ROC. 

Appeals from the dioceses of the UOC-MP to bishops not to commemorate Kirill in the Liturgy sound louder each day. However, top-ranking clerics hesitate to join this symbolic protest. Some continue to put their signatures on the petition to convene an inter-church court over Kirill. The procedure is complicated and lengthy but sends a clear-cut signal to the Primate of the Moscow Church that his stance will not go unnoticed and he will face judgement. Some went further: the Volodymyr-Volyn eparchy called upon Metropolitan Onufry to convoke an All-Ukrainian council to petition Patriarch Kirill for autocephaly. 

However, autocephaly for the UOC-MP is a distant prospect that can last centuries. The UOC is a living example of it. There is still a powerful pro-Russian lobby of the UOC-MP that supports the ROC. One vivid example is the dean of one of the Mariupol districts of the UOC-MP warmly greeting a puppet leader of the so-called DNR, Denis Pushilin and the Russian invaders.

Fr. Andrii Pinchuk strongly criticised Kirill’s rhetoric, alluding to the historical precedent when phyletism was condemned in 1872 at the Council of Constantinople. He said, ‘We are convinced that the idea of ‘Russkyi mir’ should be condemned, which is essentially a kind of ethnophiletism, which puts national and political interests above religious ones.’

On 27 May, the Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church declared complete independence from the ROC. The UOC-MP did not cut its ties with its mother church, ROC, but ultimately rejected Patriarch Kirill’s stance on the invasion of Ukraine and called to stop bloody atrocities without indicating the name of the aggressor country. Amendments were made in the Statute (as of writing, it is not officially published yet), but it is just the facade without the exact outcome. 

Metropolitan Epiphanius of the UOC insists on further dialogue and creating a one and only Ukrainian Orthodox church to beat the aggressor. The support from civil society for such unity is more prominent than ever. This seems to be the only viable solution, but neither of the churches wants to give up its position and prefers to sit on the fence. 

There is also the option to join a possible Ukrainian exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople if there is a will of the Ecumenical Patriarch to intervene. However, it can add fuel to the war and will be perceived by Moscow as further encroachment on its daughter church.

International Reaction and the Role of Pope Francis

Patriarch Kirill’s abetment of the Kremlin’s war machine and war crimes has united not only Ukrainians but also world Orthodoxy in the face of his claims and blatant violation of God’s Commandments, particularly the sixth one ‘thou shalt not kill.’ Kirill’s rhetoric shook and shocked Orthodoxy across the globe. The appeal from Human Rights Without Frontiers calls for action ‘to hold personally accountable and prosecute Vladimir Mikailovitch Goundiaiev, known as Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, for inspiring, inciting, justifying, aiding and abetting war crimes (Art. 8 of the Rome Statute) and crimes against humanity (Art. 7) perpetrated and being perpetrated by the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.’

Hundreds of Russian Orthodox clerics signed a letter calling for a halt to the war. ‘The life of every person is a priceless and unique gift of God, and therefore we wish for the return of all soldiers — both Russian and Ukrainian — to their homes and families safe and sound.’

Pope Francis is the most influential figure in the Orthodox world who can influence the war’s outcome. He can play a crucial role in the war, if not by stopping it, but by at least mitigating it with various diplomatic channels at his hand. But it is not as simple as it seems. His rhetoric was a bit ambiguous from the start. He did not directly rebuke Putin but put a pinch of the blame on NATO for ‘barking at the gates of Russia,’ leaving no other choice for Russia but war. However, during the video conference on 16 March, the Pope asked Kirill not to be ‘Putin’s altar boy’ as the language of politics is not the language of Jesus. The pontiff also appealed to Putin to lift the blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports — ‘heartfelt appeal not to use wheat, a basic foodstuff, as a weapon of war,’ pledging to find any diplomatic means to stop this bloodshed. 

‘Do Not Venerate Idols — Venerate Only God’

The religious subtext of the current war is vital and should not be ignored in trying to understand the rationale behind Putin’s invasion. There are many reasons behind the war, and religion is one of them. Orthodox unity in the face of Russia’s invasion is set to be tested more than ever. Various religious denominations across the globe will further support Ukraine in resolving the severe humanitarian crisis and helping Ukrainian refugees. It is a practical manifestation of genuine Orthodoxy as a tool of peace within itself, unlike the pernicious Russian Orthodoxy, pitting nations against each other.

The UOC voice will get stronger, and there is a window of opportunity to be recognised by other churches. But, the chasm between the ROC and the Western Church will be hard to overcome soon. 

Putin has subsidised the ROC to restore its ‘greatness,’ and the church ‘repays’ by ideologically supporting Putin’s aggression. This Russian National Orthodoxy is aimed at crushing not only any dissent at home but advancing its ideas abroad and acting as an ‘alternative’ to the liberal West’s ‘decadent civilisation.’ 

Ukraine is just the initial phase in this grand ‘religious crusade.’ The ROC and Putin aim higher, seeking the restoration of the Russian Empire, the heir to ‘Byzantium’s fallen Orthodox greatness.’ 

The ‘crusade against the West and gays’ weakened and will further diminish the position and credibility of Kirill as a Patriarch and the ROC in Orthodoxy. More churches abroad will move away from the ROC. After the EU tried to include Kirill in its sixth package of sanctions but failed due to Orban’s objections, he became a persona-non-grata in the Orthodox world. Great Britain has already showcased it by imposing sanctions on him. There seems to be no other choice for the World Council of Churches but to oust the ROC from the Orthodox family.

The religious instigation of violence must be investigated. Kirill must face the Tribunal by a Council of Orthodox Patriarchs and be stripped of his Patriarchy, possibly anathematised, as soon as possible, just like Moscow Patriarch Nikon in 1666. A person who exploits religion as an excuse for war and serves the geopolitical goals of Putin in return for revenue has no moral right to be a Patriarch. The ROC has to be deputinised and demilitarised.

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Published as part of our own Future of Ukraine Fellowship. Read more about the project here and consider contributing here.

Picture: Kremlin.ru, Vladimir Putin at the Sretensky Monastery (2017-05-25) 07, Cropped and Filter added, CC BY 4.0

Christine Karelska

Future of Ukraine Fellow

Christine Karelska is an alumna of the College of Europe in Natolin and the Democracy Study Centre in Kyiv. Her main specialization is the European Neighborhood Policy. Christine was an intern-analyst of the Public Association “Community Associations” in Odesa. Her main academic spheres of interest are security studies, international relations, gender equality and local governance. Currently, she is working as an Advisor on International Relations of the Vice Mayor of Odesa and as an Assistant to the Deputy of the Odesa City Council. Previously, she worked as a Project Manager of the Ze!Women movement aimed at gender equality and promotion of the First Lady of Ukraine Olena Zelenska’s projects in the Odesa region.

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