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Showing posts sorted by date for query KOSOVO HUMANITARIAN WAR. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Saturday, July 04, 2026

NATO 3.0: Alliance or Military-Industrial Investment Fund?


July 3, 2026

NATO defense ministers conference at NATO HQ in Brussels. Photo: U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, Dept. of Defense.

These are difficult times for anyone who has consistently criticised NATO. From the era of ‘defending the Free World’ against communism, through the age of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘Global War on Terror,’ to today’s supposedly existential struggle against almost the entire non-Western world, the Alliance has repeatedly reinvented the narratives that justify its existence. The language changes; the underlying logic does not. NATO remains indispensable, and every new enemy (whether discovered, exaggerated, or actively produced) becomes further proof of its necessity.

For decades, critics coming from anti-militarist, anti-hegemonic or left perspectives had to work hard to deconstruct this mythology against the combined efforts of political elites, mainstream media, academic institutions and security experts. The intellectual task itself was never particularly difficult. The contradictions, hypocrisies and devastating consequences of NATO’s interventions have remained visible long after the bombs stopped falling. What required courage was speaking against the prevailing consensus.

Ironically, today the Alliance’s own leaders have become its most effective truth-tellers. Donald Trump has repeatedly stripped away the moral language that traditionally surrounded NATO. Mark Rutte, the Alliance’s Secretary General, has become equally candid, while Germany’s Chancellor and France’s President increasingly speak with remarkable openness about Europe’s military future. Yet the privilege of telling the truth about what NATO has become belongs only to those in power. As the repression of protest movements ahead of the Ankara summit demonstrates, citizens may know the truth about this military giant—but they are not expected to organise against it.

The Ankara Summit has not even begun, yet its conclusions are already known. The phrase ‘historic summit’ has become so overused that it has almost lost its meaning. Some observers expect the ‘Europeanisation’ of NATO, with European allies assuming greater responsibility for financing and leading the Alliance. But this remains largely rhetorical. Europe cannot replace the United States as the Alliance’s military backbone. It can, however, willingly tighten the noose around its own neck—and perhaps around the world’s. While Atlanticists remain preoccupied with the Washington-Brusselsrelationship and whether Trump truly intends to reduce America’s commitment, a more significant transformation is taking place within Europe itself. New military coalitions are emerging inside NATO. The Baltic states and Poland increasingly pursue their own security agenda, driven by historical grievances and profound Russophobia. Sweden and Finland, once symbols of neutrality, have rapidly embraced militarisation, with Helsinki now evenpermitting the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory (American weapons, naturally, making these states ever more deeply integrated into Washington’s strategic architecture). Similar regional military configurationsare quietly taking shape in the Balkans, where Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria and Kosovo increasingly speak of strengthening their own defence cooperation: NATO within NATO.

What truly distinguishes NATO 3.0, however, is not merely its willingness to name Russia and China explicitly as strategic adversaries or to proclaim its global ambitions. Rutte himself has explained that NATO is indispensable because it enables the United States to project power globally through Europe. Europe, in other words, functions as both a platform and force multiplier for American global strategy (as shown by the Epic Fury operation).

More revealing still is the language in which NATO now describes itself.Rutte proudly speaks of a ‘defence industrial revolution.’ The expression is revealing. Just as the First Industrial Revolution transformed production through factories and mechanisation, NATO 3.0 seeks to reorganise military production on an entirely new scale, not primarily for defence, but for permanent profitability. Behind the rhetoric of ‘collective security,’ ‘strategic autonomy,’ and ‘deterrence’ lies a far simpler reality: NATO increasingly functions as a mechanism for transferring unprecedented amounts of public money into private corporate hands.

Hence NATO 3.0 represents yet another mutation: an alliance whose principal historical mission increasingly appears to be the permanent militarisation of Western economies, and most probably, a new war with Russia.

The timing is remarkable. For decades, governments insisted that public finances required austerity. Hospitals, universities, pensions and social welfare supposedly had to accept painful budget discipline. Suddenly, none of these fiscal constraints apply to military expenditure. Deficits that were politically impossible for healthcare or education have become entirely acceptable for weapons procurement. Defence spending is no longer presented as a burden but as an investment strategy and an excellent possibility for job openings (they don’t mention the expanded graveyards that usually go along with warfare).

This raises further profound questions. If cloud computing, artificial intelligence, satellite communications and autonomous weapons are increasingly developed by private technology corporations, who ultimately controls national security? If governments become structurally dependent upon commercial providers, where does democratic accountability remain? When military procurement begins to resemble venture-capital investment, who actually benefits from permanent insecurity? These questions receive surprisingly little attention.

Instead, we hear only the language of emergency. Europe must rearm immediately. Industrial production must accelerate. Procurement rules must be simplified. Military investment cannot wait. Yet history teaches us that emergencies rarely remain temporary. Exceptional measures gradually become permanent forms of governance. Under conditions of continuous perceived threat, extraordinary military spending begins to appear normal, while demands for investment in education, healthcare or social justice suddenly become fiscally irresponsible.

Security colonises politics. What emerges before our eyes is a model in which war itself becomes increasingly privatised. Private defence contractors, technology firms, logistics companies and AI developers become indispensable actors within the military ecosystem. Even warfare itself becomes increasingly remote. Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and digital infrastructures allow military operations to be outsourced, automated and commercialised in unprecedented ways. War does not necessarily require mass mobilisation; it requires investment portfolios.

For small member states that expected welfare instead of warfare, the implications are particularly sobering. Increasing defence budgets is presented as solidarity with the Alliance, but in reality, it often resembles compulsory participation in a vast military-industrial investment scheme. Citizens finance weapons they neither produce nor control, purchasing protection against threats that are frequently amplified by the very geopolitical logic that sustains the system.

NATO has never been merely a military alliance within the UN-based international order. It has always been an expression of the Western strategic worldview. Today it is becoming something even more complex: a system where security policy, industrial policy, technological power, and capital accumulation increasingly merge. The Ankara summit will not only discuss defence and deterrence; it will reveal how deeply the future of capitalism, technology and organised violence has become intertwined. It will be yet another chapter in the political economy of permanent mobilization for warfare.

Biljana Vankovska is a professor of peace studies and head of Global Change Center, Skopje, Macedonia.

Thursday, May 28, 2026

Plans for Gaza International Stabilisation Force in question as troop pledges stall


Copyright AP Photo

By Gavin Blackburn
Published on 28/05/2026

The Iran war has made it more difficult for Arab and Muslim leaders to openly cooperate with the United States and Israel, which many in the region view as aggressors.

The International Stabilisation Force for Gaza was announced at the inaugural meeting of US President Donald Trump's Board of Peace in February but three months on, none of the five countries that pledged troops have come through with any significant contributions.

Efforts to shore up the fragile ceasefire between Israel and the Gaza-based militant group Hamas have stalled, with Hamas refusing to disarm and Israel continuing to strike what it says are militant targets, often killing civilians.

Meanwhile, the Iran war has made it more difficult for Arab and Muslim leaders to openly cooperate with the United States and Israel, which many in the region view as aggressors and the resulting global energy crisis has put a strain on their resources.

The biggest blow to the planned force came about a week after the US and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February, when Indonesia put its commitment of 8,000 troops on indefinite hold.

Some 1,000 were to have been sent in April, followed by the remainder in June.

US President Donald Trump holds up a signed resolution during a Board of Peace meeting in Washington, 19 February, 2026 AP Photo

Indonesia's pledge was by far the largest of the group, which also includes Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania. US Major General Jasper Jeffers, who spoke at the Board of Peace event, was to command the force.

Indonesia suspended its plans over what Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin said last week seemed to be a lack of commitment from a distracted Washington, saying “we have not yet received any implementation guidelines.”

“New dynamics have emerged,” he told parliament. “Because the intensity of the conflict between US and Iranian forces remains very high, the BoP has tended to be left behind. Since the BoP has been left behind, the ISF has also been left behind.”

Domestic issues may have factored into Indonesia's decision, said Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat, director of the Indonesia-Middle East/North Africa desk at Jakarta's Centre for Economic and Law Studies.

The Iran war is extremely unpopular in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country. The economy is suffering from soaring prices as a result of the conflict and there is widespread scepticism about the Board of Peace.

“If you talk to the people on the street, I don’t think they believe that the Board of Peace will actually help the people of Gaza,” Rakhmat said. There are also concerns about sending troops to the Middle East when the economy is faltering, he added.

Indonesia lost four peacekeepers who were part of the United Nations mission in Lebanon during fighting between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah. That has further soured public opinion on such international commitments, he said

Tents are scattered among the widespread destruction in Jabalia, 7 December, 2025 AP Photo

Forces committed but none known to be deployed

Kazakhstan has said its support for the stabilisation force would be limited to “the humanitarian component,” including sending medical units with a field hospital. Its Foreign Ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Albania's Defence Ministry also declined to comment on its troop commitment, saying it was a “dynamic and ongoing process.”

Earlier this month, its chief of staff Lieutenant General Arben Kingji told reporters that while the military had “participated in reconnaissance activities,” no troops had yet been sent.

US President Donald Trump stands with other world leaders before a Board of Peace meeting in Washington, 19 February, 2026 AP Photo

He said only a few would be dispatched as part of the stabilisation force headquarters, without giving numbers, adding that further contributions would be considered.

Kosovo, which is expected to send 20 troops, said in April that it was in the “final phase of preparations.” The Defence Ministry did not reply to a request for an update.

Morocco's Foreign Ministry also did not reply. At the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace, Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said it would deploy “high-level military officers to the joint military command of the ISF.”

Board of Peace blames stalled ceasefire on Hamas

The US military’s Central Command declined to comment or make Jeffers available for an interview, referring all queries to the Board of Peace.

Board of Peace spokesperson Brad Klapper also declined to comment on Indonesia's decision or the future of the force, pointing instead to 21 May remarks at the UN by Nickolay Mladenov, a former Bulgarian defence minister who Trump appointed as the board’s director.

Mladenov said the international force would not be able to begin operations until there was agreement and implementation of a second phase of the ceasefire, which would see Hamas disarm and Israel begin to withdraw. Israeli troops control some 60% of Gaza.

High Representative for President Donald Trump's International Board of Peace Nickolay Mladenov speaks to the media in East Jerusalem, 13 May, 2026 AP Photo

Mladenov has blamed the deadlock on Hamas, saying its disarmament is “non-negotiable” and is holding up progress on other fronts, including Israel's withdrawal and reconstruction.

“You cannot build a future with armed groups running the streets, hiding in tunnels and stockpiling weapons,” Mladenov said in Jerusalem this month.

“You cannot deliver reconstruction with militias on every corner.”
Hamas blames delays on Israel

Hamas says Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire, holding up its further implementation, and has accused Mladenov of siding with Israel.

Israeli strikes have killed more than 880 Palestinians since the ceasefire, according to local health officials. Israel says it was responding to violations of the truce.

Fighters from Hamas’ Qassam Brigades seen in Gaza City, 19 January, 2025 AP Photo

Hamas is also demanding Israel withdraw from areas seized since the start of the ceasefire, according to an Egyptian official with knowledge of the discussions, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss closed-door talks. Egypt has long served as a mediator with Hamas.

Many of the countries that have pledged forces have refused to send troops without a deal on Hamas disarming, the official said.

Thursday, March 26, 2026

 

Iran’s electric grid is one of the most decentralised in the world

Iran’s electric grid is one of the most decentralised in the world
Damavand Power Plant in Iran / bne IntelliNewsFacebook
By Ben Aris in Berlin March 27, 2026

US President Donald Trump threatened to bomb Iran's power grid into oblivion. However that could prove more difficult to do than say as the Iranian electricity grid is one of the most decentralised in the world making it extremely resistant to attack, says bne IntelliNews’ military analyst Patricia Marins.

Unlike many countries that rely on a handful of large generating hubs, Iran’s grid is unusually dispersed making it very difficult to attack. There are no significant targets to destroy. Instead a network of small interlinked power stations is much more suited to absorbing strikes and still able to provide electricity to the whole country.

"The Iranian electric grid is one of the most decentralised in the world, with around 130 to 150 power plants, primarily gas-fired thermal plants," Marins says. "No individual plants dominate large portions of the country’s electricity generation."

The dispersion is striking when set against the size of the system. Iran’s total installed capacity is approaching 100GW, according to official figures, yet even its largest facility plays only a marginal role.

"The largest power plant in the country, Damavand, located near Tehran, has a capacity of approximately 2,868 MW, representing only about 2.9% of the total installed capacity."

Other major plants, such as Shahid Salimi Neka, Rudeshur and Kerman, as well as hydroelectric facilities like Karun-3, operate in the 1.6–2.2GW range. Even taken together, Marins notes, "the 5-10 largest plants account for only a modest share, probably less than 15–20% of the total. The rest of the capacity is spread across dozens of smaller and medium-sized facilities."

This fragmentation is compounded by the nature of Iran’s generation mix. Around 80–85% of electricity is produced from natural gas, distributed across numerous thermal plants rather than concentrated in a few strategic nodes. The result is a grid that is inherently resilient to targeted strikes.

"Iran appears to have been designed for this kind of battle against the world’s leading military power and the strongest air force in the Middle East," says Marins.

Military planners familiar with infrastructure targeting say that while strikes on major plants or substations could trigger localised blackouts — particularly in high-demand centres such as Tehran — they would be unlikely to produce an immediate nationwide collapse. Recent analysis suggests that even coordinated attacks would primarily generate “serious domestic disruption and economic strain” rather than decisively degrading Iran’s military capabilities.

That resilience has strategic implications. US President Donald Trump threatened to blow up all of Iran’s power resources on March 21 if the Strait of Hormuz were not opened within 48 hours. However, he backtracked almost immediately, extending the deadline by another five days to March 28, after Tehran threatened to destroy all the power assets in the entire Gulf region in retaliation if the US carried through on its threat. That deadline has now been extended again to April 6.

"Attacks on its electrical infrastructure would take several days to have a significant effect and would almost certainly be followed by a retaliation that could leave the Gulf in the dark," says Marins.

Energy infrastructure across the Gulf is tightly interconnected and highly exposed, particularly in export-oriented economies dependent on desalination plants and air conditioning. Any escalation targeting grids risks rapid regional spillover that would have serious humanitarian consequences – especially if the desalination plants went offline, which provide drinking water for almost all the countries in the region. And this was no idle threat, experts say.

"After 26 days of war, Iran continues to launch between 30 and 40 missiles daily while deploying additional air defences, leading to a gradual increase in incidents of aircraft being hit," says Marins. "The country has effectively absorbed the coalition's strikes. Meanwhile, the coalition's strategic options are dwindling as stockpiles of both offensive and defensive munitions reach critical levels."

This raises questions about the viability of coercive strategies centred on infrastructure destruction.

"I see very few options powerful enough to genuinely force the Iranians into negotiations," says Marins, who adds that the comparison with other energy-heavy states is also misleading.

"If Washington’s political thinking ever drew a parallel, I would say there is virtually nothing similar between Iran and Venezuela other than oil production."

Bombing power sectors into ruins has become a fairly standard tactic in wars. The Nato allies destroyed 80% of Serbia’s power sector during the Kosovo war in 1999, saying it was a legitimate military target.

"Yes, I'm afraid electricity also drives command and control systems. If President Milosevic really wants all of his population to have water and electricity all he has to do is accept Nato's five conditions and we will stop this campaign," Nato’s Chief Spokesman Jamie Shea said at the time. "But as long as he doesn't do so we will continue to attack those targets which provide the electricity for his armed forces. If that has civilian consequences, it's for him to deal with."

Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted the same tactic in the Ukraine war, destroying much of Ukraine’s power sector over the last two years, building up to a crescendo when he tried to freeze Ukraine into submission during one of the coldest winters in a decade. Only an estimated 20% of Ukraine’s pre-war generating capacity has survived, experts say.

Unlike Serbia, Ukraine or Venezuela, where the grid is heavily centralised and vulnerable to cascading failure, Iran’s network reflects decades of sanctions-era adaptation — a system built not for efficiency, but for survival.

"Trump’s threat highlights a broader strategic dilemma: even overwhelming military superiority does not guarantee leverage when the target has engineered its infrastructure to withstand precisely that kind of pressure," says Marins.

Tuesday, March 24, 2026

A Breakthrough Or Buying Time? Trump’s Claim Of Talks With Iran Raises Questions – Analysis


By 

By Frud Bezhan

President Donald Trump’s claim that the United States has held talks with Iran has raised hopes of an end to the weekslong war rocking the Middle East.

But it is unclear if the purported talks — dismissed as “fake news” by Tehran — are a sign of a potential breakthrough, intended to calm panicked financial and global energy markets, or simply to buy Trump more time.

Even if there is a concerted diplomatic push, a huge gap remains between the United States and Iran. Tehran’s chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, a key artery for global oil supplies, also gives it leverage in any negotiations to end the war, experts say.

Despite the talk of diplomacy, the war with Iran showed no signs of de-escalation on March 24. The United States and Israel launched a new round of air strikes on Iran, which fired missiles at Israel and hit energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.

“I don’t think Trump is seeking an off-ramp and an end to the war yet,” said Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute.

Trump still has “escalatory options to attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and to coerce the Islamic republic to accept his terms,” he said, including the possible use of US troops to seize Iran’s Kharg Island, which serves as the country’s key oil terminal, or capture Iranian territory with the aim of ending Tehran’s effective closure of the narrow waterway.

US media reported last week that two American expeditionary units, with thousands of Marines and supporting ships and aircraft, were on their way to the Middle East.

Experts said Trump’s claim of talks with Tehran provided the US president an opportunity to walk back from his threat to “obliterate” Iran’s power plants if Tehran did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas are shipped. Trump, who had issued a 48-hour ultimatum on March 21, said he was postponing the strikes to allow time for talks to succeed.

“Backing down from his ultimatum and specifically the threat to destroy Iranian power plants probably had more to do with the risks involved with such an action, which could lead Tehran to strike reciprocal targets in the Persian Gulf, with potentially devastating humanitarian and economic consequences for both sides,” said Sabet.

“He likely faced intense pressure not to follow through on this threat,” he added. “There was also likely an element of Trump trying to manipulate global energy prices by giving the impression of de-escalation, coaxing them to go down, even if temporarily.”

‘Very Strong Talks’

Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform on March 23 that the ⁠United States and Iran had held “very good and productive” conversations about a “complete and total resolution of hostilities in the Middle East.”

Trump later told reporters that his special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner had held discussions with an unnamed top Iranian official in recent days.

“We have had very, very strong talks. We’ll see where they lead. We have major points of agreement, I would say, almost ⁠all points of agreement,” Trump said.

Trump’s comments quickly sent oil prices falling. But they rose back above $100 a barrel after Iran said there had been no direct talks with the United States.

“No negotiations have ⁠been held with the U.S., and fakenews is used to manipulate the financial and ‌oil markets and escape the quagmire in which the US and Israel are trapped,” Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Iran’s powerful speaker of parliament, wrote on X.

Later, the White House said the situation was “fluid” and cautioned that no formal meetings between any US and Iranian officials had been scheduled.

Amid the contradictory claims from the United States and Iran, there appears to have been at least initial contact between the sides through intermediaries, according to US media reports.

‘Permanent Political Solution’

Even if there is a genuine push to end the war, the gap between the sides remains significant and the likelihood of a breakthrough is low, experts say.

Trump has demanded an end to all nuclear enrichment and the elimination of all of Iran’s uranium stockpiles that could be potentially used to make a bomb.

Iranian officials have made their own demands, including guarantees that the United States and Israel will not attack Iran again, the lifting of crippling US sanctions, the closure of US military bases in the Persian Gulf, and war reparations from Washington and Israel.

“The Iranians are aiming for a more permanent political solution rather than de-escalation or a cease-fire,” said Sina Azodi, an expert of Iran’s military and history and an assistant professor of Middle East politics at George Washington University.

Iranian officials have said they do not want a repeat of the 12-day war with Israel and the United States in June 2025 which ended with a cease-fire, only for a new war to erupt on February 28.

“They believe that if they stop now, Israel and the US will come back in six months if not a year,” Azodi added. “Their aim is to deter future attacks since they believe this is a fight for their survival.”

Iran’s demands, experts say, reflect its belief that it will come to any negotiation from a position of strength.

US-Israeli strikes have degraded but not destroyed Iran’s ability to fire missiles and drones at Israel and America’s allies in the Persian Gulf. Tehran still maintains a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium remain buried underneath nuclear sites damaged by US-Israeli strikes.

“Right now, Iran has the upper hand in terms of its ability to deny the US a victory,” said Azodi.

  • Frud Bezhan is Senior Regional Editor in the English-language Central Newsroom at RFE/RL, leading coverage of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. Previously, he was the Regional Desk Editor for the Near East, with a primary focus on Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. As a correspondent, he reported from Afghanistan, Turkey, Kosovo, and Western Europe.