Why Pakistan’s Afghan Policy Reached A Breaking Point – OpEd

April 22, 2026 
By Shafaq Zernab


The ongoing war between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the result of a gradually worsening security situation along the Durand Line rather than a sudden strategic shift. The core issue was not the absence of dialogue, but its inability to deliver binding results to the foremost security concern of for Pakistan: the use of Afghan territory by militant groups to attack Pakistan. When Pakistan in response switched to cross-border strikes in February 2026, the state had already gone through several years of attempted accommodation without securing any meaningful restraint from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by Kabul.


Contrary to the global perception of treating Afghanistan as a client state, Pakistan’s initial response after the Afghan Taliban’s takeover in August 2021 was, in fact, guarded and restrained. The immediate political aims of Islamabad concerning the fledgling Taliban government were to facilitate a stable transition, and prevent Afghanistan from falling into a new civil war. Pakistan also sought to safeguard its western border against militant spillovers and Indian ingress, and maintain the prospect of regional connectivity via Afghanistan to Central Asia. These objectives aligned with Pakistan’s cautious stance at the time, as earlier outbursts of unrest in Afghanistan had already demonstrated how easily instability across the border turned into a refugee crisis, contrabands, and even terrorism in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy still had an inherited assumption that historical contact, sectarian and tribal linkages, geographic interdependence, and the language of ‘brotherhood’ will yield reciprocal Afghan sensitivity to the fundamental security interests of Pakistan, but it did not. Contrary to what many believed in Islamabad, the Taliban were never ideologically oriented towards Pakistan. Engagement was conditional and interest-based. The socio-economic power structure of Afghan society is fundamentally neo-patrimonial in nature, where institutions exist but power continues to flow through personalities (warlords/ tribal chiefs), patronage networks, and armed militia. External players have historically exerted influence in Afghanistan by investing and militarizing the respective factions, and those power structures, in turn, dictated the central Afghan governing authority. These structures do not respond to sentiments; they are responsive to resources, incentives, and coercive balance. India identified these patronage structures before Pakistan did. Instead of relying on presumed affinity, India employed aid, infrastructure, and political access to consolidate its influence across several Afghan nodes. Since 2001, India has invested approximately $3 billion in Afghanistan. By the end of 2025, New Delhi also announced the re-opening of its embassy in Kabul.

Meanwhile, Pakistan had exhausted multiple non-military options since the Taliban took over. The pattern showed how Pakistan moved from concern, to negotiation to mediation. However, the negotiations collapsed due to contentious demands of parties, including the Durand Line issue, TTA’s refusal to hand over TTP leaders to Pakistan, and TTP’s demands to reverse the FATA merger. The trust further deteriorated as escalation persisted even during negotiations.

In parallel, the terrorist incidents surged in Pakistan, making it the most affected country in the world with a record 45 per cent increase in 2024 as per the Global Terrorism Index. The decisive moment came in February 2026 when a series of high-impact incidents, including the Bajaur checkpoint attack, the Bannu convoy bombing, and a suicide attack on a mosque in Islamabad, compelled Pakistan to take kinetic action. Pakistan carried out intelligence-based limited airstrikes on TTP infrastructure (militant bases such as centres associated with leaders like Maulvi Abbas and Mullah Rahbar) in Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika on 21-22 February.


26 February 2025 marked the start of direct confrontation between Taliban and Pakistan when the Afghan forces attacked border posts in Pakistan and also severed trade ties. On 27 February, Pakistan declared an ‘open war’ with Afghanistan by launching operation Ghazab Lil-Haq, targeting 313 Corps in Kabul, the Tarawo training camp in Kandahar, and the Sher-e-Nau camp in Paktia, along with other targets. The operational logic was clear: since militant forces operate within an enabling ecosystem, hitting forward cells would not be enough. The campaign was thus augmented to command and control, training, ammunition depots, and logistical nodes, which eventually compelled the Afghan Taliban to call for a ceasefire. As a result, terror incidents significantly reduced during this period. Pakistan thus transitioned from risk management to dealing with the environment from which the risk originated.

While the operation has yielded significant tactical gains, the limitations of force as a standalone instrument cannot be disregarded. The war imposed a staggering cost on Pakistan, which is not trivial for an economy whose foreign-exchange reserves are constantly under strain. But the reasoning of the current coercive stance is that the cost of sustained terrorist incursions would be ever greater. A frontier vulnerable to militants erodes sovereignty, discourages investment, and connectivity initiatives like CPEC, and places Pakistan in a perennially reactive position. Similarly, with the humanitarian condition worsening in Afghanistan, war is not the optimal choice. Since the issue is both geographical and territorial, it brings the discussion to its most critical point.

Coercion alone cannot offer a lasting resolution, unless it is linked to a political framework premised on four factors. Since TTA ideologically coincides with TTP, they can accommodate them according to custom; Kabul has to bear sovereign responsibility to ensure that the TTP does not use Afghan soil to wage war against Pakistan. This flexibility is crucial to alleviate worsening humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan must shift from episodic signalling to a steady Afghanistan policy (debated in Parliament) to curtail Indian influence against Pakistan through confidence-building measures and border management. Third, a monitoring system of credible regional powers such as China, Qatar, or Turkey should be established to ensure compliance. Fourth, economic incentives, such as phased reopening of trade, access to transit routes, revenue-sharing, and refugee management, can also strengthen the commitment to adherence. It is paramount for Pakistan and Afghanistan to have a stable relationship. Pakistan requires a western frontier that is not a platform of anti-state violence, and Afghanistan requires market access, transit, and at least a non-hostile neighbourhood in order to get out of isolation and frailty. The key is to seek a political settlement not on the basis of sentiment, but reciprocity, verification, and uniform state policy.



Shafaq Zernab is a Reseach Assistant at the Cnter for Aerospace and Security Studies, Islamabad.

Canada And India Have Many Good Reasons To Move Past The Issues – Interview

April 22, 2026 
By A. Jathindra


Yves Goulet is a retired civil servant who worked in the Canadian intelligence community for three decades. Beginning his career in 1994 with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, he worked on counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations before joining the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command as a senior analyst on international terrorism and later leading a team on hybrid threats.


He went on to hold senior leadership roles, including Director of National Security Operations at Public Safety Canada, Director of Strategic Analysis at the Department of National Defence, and Director of the National Fisheries Intelligence Service at Fisheries and Oceans Canada.

Since retiring, Yves has continued to advance the field of intelligence. He teaches an intelligence course at the University of Ottawa and serves as advisor on intelligence, law enforcement, and special operations with Earth League International.

In conversation with the Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TCSS), Yves Goulet offered his reflections on intelligence and security.

With Prime Minister Mark Carney now leading Canada, many observers view this as the beginning of a new chapter in India–Canada relations. How do you interpret the dismissal of earlier allegations against India—charges firmly rejected by New Delhi and subsequently set aside by a commission under Prime Minister Trudeau’s government? What signals might this send regarding the future trajectory of bilateral trust?


Indo-Canadian diplomatic relations have worsened significantly after the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported that Indian operatives were involved in electoral interference, violence—including accusations of involvement in the killing of Canadian Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar—intimidation, and organized crime targeting Indian, especially Sikh, communities in Canada. While these allegations were taken seriously, no conclusive legal action was taken against Indian officials, who could not be questioned due to diplomatic immunity. Therefore, the allegations were not dismissed.

Both Canada and India have many good reasons to move past these issues. India is a major country, with a large population and economy, that Canada—a much smaller nation—cannot ignore, especially given the current unstable global environment. It is also important to note that 1.8 million Canadians are of Indian origin, and over 390,000 Indians hold study permits in Canada. However, Canada will not forget the past allegations of serious Indian interference in its domestic affairs. Similar to its approach with China, Canada will continue to balance trust and security concerns while maintaining formal diplomatic relations with India. Canadian intelligence agencies will keep a close watch on Indian diplomatic activities, particularly those that may threaten national security or influence Canadian political processes.


Recent visits by Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Adviser Nathalie Drouin to New Delhi and India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to Ottawa resulted in a shared plan for cooperation on security and law enforcement. In your assessment, does this framework provide a meaningful foundation for addressing the Khalistan issue, particularly in light of India’s expectation that Canada adopts a more resolute stance toward groups it designates as terrorist threats?

Canada clearly wants to improve relations with India, including cooperation on national security issues, for some of the reasons mentioned above. The shared plan for security and law enforcement cooperation is a concrete step toward closer collaboration with India, including addressing the Khalistan issue.

Canada’s security agencies have long monitored Sikh extremism, especially since the 1985 Air India bombing. Canada has conducted thorough investigations into these groups and will likely continue to do so. The Canadian government has not ignored or downplayed this issue for domestic political reasons. Canada takes any potential terrorist threats against India, including those from Khalistani extremists, very seriously. Still, there are limits to how much Canada can accommodate India’s demands.

Indian authorities need to understand that Canadian supporters of a Khalistani state have a constitutional right to express their views, as long as they do not promote violence. Free speech is a fundamental Canadian value that the government cannot violate. It is a core part of Canadian political life. Unlike India, Canada does not have laws like the colonial-era sedition law that criminalize speech or actions undermining sovereignty or promoting secession. Canada even allows strong secessionist movements, such as those in Quebec and Alberta.

Canada could address India’s concerns about the Khalistani issue by updating its list of terrorist entities. Currently, Canada lists two Sikh groups as terrorist entities: Babbar Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation. India’s list includes these two groups plus four others: Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Zindabad Force, Khalistan Liberation Force, and Khalistan Tiger Force. To add any of these four groups, Canada must determine if they meet the criteria set by its Criminal Code. Indian authorities would need to provide credible intelligence showing reasonable grounds to believe these groups have participated in or supported terrorist activities.


Adding these four groups to Canada’s terrorist list might ease India’s concerns, but being listed in Canada has limited consequences. Surprisingly, it is not a crime simply to be listed. However, it is illegal to knowingly participate in or support any activities that help a terrorist group carry out terrorist acts. Property belonging to terrorist entities can be seized or forfeited, and Canadian financial institutions must report and block access to such property.

Prime Minister Carney’s recent visit to Beijing, where he announced alongside President Xi Jinping that “Canada is forging a new strategic partnership with China,” has been noted by some observers as reminiscent of Cold War-era strategies, when China sought to leverage Canada’s position in its rivalry with the United States. From your perspective, how might Canada’s engagement with China be interpreted within this broader historical and geopolitical context?

The arrival of the Trump administration brought a strong political stance against a value-based international order and multilateralism. Its use of punitive tariffs had a significant impact on the Canadian economy, and its frequent calls to absorb Canada into the United States has significantly changed the situation. Americano-Canadian diplomatic relationships are on all time low, and Canadian authorities understand that there is a need to reshuffle the deck. On April 19, Prime Minister Mark Carney released a short YouTube video stating that Canada’s close partnership with the United States is now a weakness that needs to be addressed. Canada is actively working to reduce its dependence on the United States by strengthening economic and political ties, especially in the growing Indo-Pacific region and with the European Union.

Currently, Canada is using its relationship with China to counterbalance the United States rather than the other way around. Strengthening political and trade relations with China is seen as a way to lessen American pressure and show Washington that Canada has alternatives. However, Canada’s policy is shaped by geography, and China will never replace the United States. About 76% of Canadian exports go to the United States, supporting 2.3 million Canadian jobs, while only around 4% of exports go to China. Canada also shares language, democratic values (though recently tested), and decades of close military partnerships with the United States. China cannot replace the United States, and Canadians fully understand this.

At the same time, recent studies—such as Dragon at the Door—have raised concerns about potential risks to Canadian democracy from Chinese influence. As a former intelligence analyst, how would you evaluate the espionage challenges posed by China, and what broader strategic considerations—both opportunities and risks—do you see shaping Canada’s relationship with China in the years ahead?

China presents both economic opportunities and national security challenges for Canada. Canada is carefully balancing these factors while avoiding conflicts with the United States, which views China as a peer competitor and often pushes for stricter, coordinated restrictions against it.

With 1.4 billion consumers, China offers a significant commercial opportunity that Canadian companies can hardly ignore, especially as Canada seeks to diversify its trade away from the United States. Diplomatically, Canada must engage with China due to its global influence. There are also opportunities for collaboration on environmental sustainability and clean energy technologies, such as solar power and electric vehicles, where China leads, benefiting both countries economically and environmentally.

However, the threat of Chinese interference in Canadian domestic affairs is serious and well documented. A 2025 public inquiry and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service have identified China as the main source of foreign interference in Canada. China targets Canadian democratic institutions through election meddling, targeting politicians, and spreading disinformation. It is considered Canada’s top national security threat due to extensive economic and political espionage, aggressive cyber activities, and influence operations. This threat is expected to continue.

While economic incentives encourage closer ties with China, Canada also faces risks such as unpredictable market access restrictions, due to its authoritarian regime, if it challenges China on human rights or geopolitical issues. Therefore, despite wanting to reduce its dependence on the United States, Canada remains cautious about supply chain vulnerabilities and intellectual property theft.

This article was published at TCSS

A. Jathindra

A. Jathindra is the head of the think tank Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TCSS) and a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst.

EU Ministers Step Up Calls For Sanctions On Israel Following Orbán Loss

April 22, 2026 
EurActiv
By Thomas Moller-Nielsen


(EurActiv) — Ministers from Spain, Belgium, and Ireland have vehemently denounced Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and crackdown on Palestinian rights, as an imminent change of government in Hungary raises the prospect of EU sanctions on the Jewish state.

Speaking before a meeting of foreign ministers in Luxembourg on Tuesday morning, Spanish foreign minister José Manuel Albares – whose government has been one of the most vocal critics of the US-Israeli war on Iran – said the bloc risks losing its “credibility” if it fails to impose punitive measures on Israel.

“If we are not capable of saying today to Israel that respecting human rights, respecting international law, not making war its only foreign policy tool, and accepting that there must be a different way to relate with its neighbours … than just waging war, we are going to lose our credibility,” said Albares.

“We have to say the same thing that we say to Russia concerning Ukraine, and that we say in other scenarios,” he added.

Albares’ remarks were echoed by Maxime Prévot, Belgium’s foreign minister, who condemned Israel’s “attitude” towards Lebanon as “totally unacceptable” – although he also denounced the Iran-backed Hezbollah militant group for having “dragged Lebanon into a war it did not want”.

“Israel’s disproportionate and indiscriminate reaction is completely problematic and reprehensible,” said Prévot, adding that he was in Beirut on ‘Black Wednesday’ on 8 April, when Israel launched more than a hundred strikes across Lebanon that killed more than 300 people.

The remarks come as Viktor Orbán’s recent loss to Péter Magyar in the Hungarian parliamentary elections raises the possibility of a significant shift in EU policy toward Israel, whose war on Iran is currently subject to a shaky ceasefire that is set to expire on Wednesday.

Orbán has previously blocked EU sanctions on Israeli settlers and is set to hand over the Hungarian premiership to Magyar next month.

Helen McEntee, Ireland’s foreign minister, cited Israel’s recent introduction of the death penaltyfor Palestinians, restrictions on aid into Gaza, and the expansion of settlement activity in the occupied West Bank as additional reasons to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which governs trade relations between the EU and Israel.

“I’m not sure whether we’ll reach an agreement on certain specific issues today,” McEntee said. “[But] I hope that we will get to a point where there is an agreement to take action and to respond to what have been completely unacceptable actions.”

However, German foreign minister Johann Wadephul downplayed this possibility, saying the suspension of the Association Agreement or the imposition of individual sanctions on Israel would be “inappropriate”.

Suspending the trade part of the Association Agreement requires the support of a ‘qualified majority’ of EU countries – a threshold which, EU diplomats say, would only be reached if Italy or Germany backed the move. Sanctions, meanwhile, require the unanimous support of all 27 EU capitals.

“We continue to insist that a two-state solution must be made possible, but this must be done in a critical, constructive dialogue with Israel,” Wadephul said.

Ministers were, however, uniformly optimistic that Orbán’s defeat could soon see Budapest lift its veto on fresh sanctions on Russia and unblock a stalled €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine.

“I, of course, can’t speak for the new Hungarian government,” said Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief. “But, of course, a lot of issues

Hormuz Crisis Has Supercharged The Middle Corridor Trade Route – Analysis

The Middle Corridor -- or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route -- is a network of roads, railroads, and ports that connect China to Europe. It offers an alternative to a northern route which largely passes through Russia, and to maritime routes. Credit: RFE/Rl

April 22, 2026 
 RFE RL
By Zamira Eshanova


While diplomatic efforts struggle to stabilize access to the Strait of Hormuz amid tensions between the United States and Iran, Eurasian trade is increasingly being redirected toward overland alternatives, with the Trans-Caspian Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, emerging as a key diversification route in Eurasian logistics.

The World Bank described the Middle Corridor back in 2023 as a strategically important but structurally constrained route. While geopolitical fragmentation driven in part by Russia’s war in Ukraine has increased the demand for alternative corridors, the World Bank emphasized that the corridor’s long-term viability requires coordinated investment, the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks, and improved cross-border customs and transport procedures.

To address these roadblocks, the World Bank and its partners on April 14–15 committed $3.3 billion to strengthening key missing links along the corridor, including $1.9 billion for Turkey’s Istanbul North Rail Crossing and a $1.4 billion investment in the reconstruction of Kazakhstan’s Karagandy–Zhezkazgan highway.

On the same day that this was announced, Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz underscored the importance of such investment at a meeting in Astana.

“The Northern Corridor [through Russia] has become unpredictable due to geopolitical tensions. The southern route is pushing the limits of its capacity,” he said. “This situation has made the Middle Corridor not an alternative but a mandatory choice.”

Dosym Satpayev, director of the Risk Assessment Group in Almaty — an independent think tank analyzing political risks, corruption, and foreign policy processes in the region — says that Russia’s war in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions deepened global dependence on maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. but the current crisis has potentially long-term consequences for global trade.

“Even if the Strait of Hormuz is reopened, I believe that the image of it as a stable transport and logistics route has been damaged for many years, if not permanently,” Satpayev said. “The same applies to the stereotype that the Persian Gulf and Middle Eastern countries can guarantee stable supplies of energy resources and other goods through the Strait of Hormuz.”

Uncertainty is already reshaping global pricing and trade behavior, he added, saying that a “risk premium” will most likely be embedded in prices of oil and nitrogen fertilizers.

“About 25–35 percent of global fertilizer supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz, and this will inevitably be reflected in final prices. Therefore, many countries will seek to diversify routes regardless of how the situation develops. Most likely, instability will persist for a long time, which means risks will remain high. And this is bad for business, because business needs predictability.”

A Region Surrounded By Geopolitical Chaos

A key factor behind the growing appeal of the Middle Corridor, Satpayev says, is the relative stability of the regions it passes through. Despite the conflicts raging nearby, Central Asia and the Caucasus have “demonstrated stability in the conditions of geopolitical chaos.”

“This has increased interest in it as a platform for transport and logistics projects,” he said. “As a result, the region’s status at the global level has risen.”

The Middle Corridor suits everyone, he added, except Russia.

“We see that major geopolitical players are seeking to strengthen their positions in the region, primarily in the economic and transport-logistics spheres. China and the European Union are particularly active,” Satpayev said.

“The Samarkand summit last year demonstrated the EU’s interest in developing the Middle Corridor, including investments in hubs around the Caspian Sea. The United States is also showing interest in the Middle Corridor, as it seeks access to critical materials and rare earth metals in Central Asia.”

However, some analysts caution that the Middle Corridor is not yet capable of fully replacing existing trade routes, especially the northern land route via Russia.

Central Asia analyst Temur Umarov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that while geopolitical narratives increasingly favor diversification, the physical and logistical realities of trade still impose clear constraints.

“The Middle Corridor, however interesting and potentially ambitious it may appear, is not yet developed to a level where it can replace the northern flows through Russia,” Umarov said. “The issue is not a lack of interest in the Middle Corridor, but the simple fact that it is technically impossible, for now, to reroute the entire flow of goods and energy resources through it instead of the existing northern routes.”

He adds that this structural limitation is not only about infrastructure gaps, but about time and scale.

“From a practical perspective, it is still too early to expect the Middle Corridor to absorb full trade volumes. It will require sustained investment, coordination between multiple countries, and years of development before it can operate at the scale of established northern routes.”

What Does The Middle Corridor Mean For Kazakhstan?

For Kazakhstan, the significance of the World Bank-backed highway project extends beyond infrastructure financing. It signals the country’s growing role as a central transit hub in a rapidly evolving Eurasian logistics landscape, one increasingly defined not only by geography but by geopolitics, risk diversification, and the search for resilient trade routes.

If Central Asian governments manage the process effectively, investments in the Middle Corridor could also translate into tangible benefits for ordinary people in the region, Satpayev maintains.

“Infrastructure such as railways and roads, especially given the size of Kazakhstan, can revive certain regions that are economically depressed,” he said. “From the perspective of building hotels, gas stations, services, and maintenance infrastructure, this can create a multiplier effect that gives such regions a second life.”

He added that this potential is not automatic but depends on governance and implementation quality.

“There’s hope that if this is implemented under the supervision of investors and international organizations financing these projects, it will also to some extent improve the well-being of citizens in our countries.”

The Middle Corridor, formally the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, was established in 2014 by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to connect China and Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus, with onward links through Turkey. For years, it remained secondary to the Russian-led northern route.

The corridor is supported by a mix of multilateral lenders such as the World Bank, EBRD, and ADB, alongside EU funding initiatives and major state-led investments from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, with China acting as a key trade driver through its Belt and Road connectivity.Zamira Eshanova is a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service.

Kremlin Used AI, Fake Author To Pass Off Propaganda


Using reverse-image searches, Code for Africa was able to show that the photo provided with articles purportedly written by fake author “Dr. Manuel Godsin” was taken from that of a legal student in Russia named Mikhail Malyarov Yurievich.

 CODE FOR AFRICA

April 22, 2026 
By Africa Defense Forum


Social media companies have uncovered an effort by Russia to create a fake expert to spread false information in Africa. Russian operatives used a popular artificial intelligence platform to create content for a fictitious academic and geopolitical commentator named “Dr. Manuel Godsin” to infiltrate mainstream media in Africa with pro-Kremlin propaganda.

OpenAI said it received a tip from Meta, which owns and operates Facebook, that a Russian network was targeting African audiences with content generated by its large language model application, ChatGPT. The app is trained on vast amounts of text data to understand and generate human-like language, code, and content

“The ChatGPT account’s main activity was generating social media posts and long-form commentary articles about geopolitics in sub-Saharan Africa,” OpenAI wrote in a February 25 report on malicious uses of its model. “The user mainly prompted in English but sometimes input Russian-language instructions that they attributed to their manager.”

Meta said it discovered and shut down 37 Facebook accounts and 29 pages for violating its policy on “Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior.”

“We disrupted a network originating in Russia that targeted audiences in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Angola, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa,” Meta wrote in a March report on threats. Mali, Nigeria, Togo and Uganda also were targeted.

“The network also used AI-generated content to make its accounts appear more authentic to local users, including in the Page’s visual branding, such as profile photos and advertisements promoting the Page, as well as in its influence operation materials. We shared this information with our partners at OpenAI who conducted an independent investigation into the network, leading to the removal of the network from their platforms.”

Forensic analysts with Code for Africa (CfA), a data journalism nonprofit, verified the Russian media campaign, which “copies similar ‘information laundering’ and ‘paid punditry’ techniques pioneered by Chinese state agencies in the early 2020s,” according to a March 17 report by the African Digital Democracy Observatory (ADDO).

“The content was also amplified by fake think tank websites, with some of the articles republished on global platforms, such as the Microsoft-owned global news portal MSN, as supposed credible ‘expert analysis,’” according to ADDO.

CfA investigated the fake writer and his AI-generated articles — 38 pieces of manipulated content published 73 times on at least 27 different websites in eight African countries.

“CfA’s investigation built on OpenAI’s case-study, confirming that ‘Dr. Manuel Godsin’ is a fictitious identity — a sockpuppet created to launder Russian narratives into the mainstream media ecosystem by posing as an independent commentator,” ADDO said.

In author bios given to African media outlets, Godsin is described as having a master’s degree in international crisis management from the University of Oslo and a Ph.D. from the University of Bergen.

CfA and OpenAI were unable to find him in the University of Bergen’s library. The University of Oslo said that it doesn’t offer programs in international crisis management and had no record of a current or previous student named Godsin.

Reverse-image searches on the profile photo attached to Godsin’s articles found a match with a law student in St. Petersburg, Russia, named Mikhail Malyarov Yurievich, who posted his photo on a Russian legal networking site in the 2010s. Godsin also is described as an author of several books, none of which CfA could find in any catalogues or databases.

“The Godsin operation appears interwoven with a broader Kremlin-aligned propaganda machine targeting Africa,” ADDO concluded. “A central node in that ecosystem is African Initiative, a Moscow-based state-funded agency focused on Africa, which was launched in 2023.”

CfA analyses showed that mainstream news websites published several of Godsin’s articles shortly after African Initiative posted similar commentaries on the same subjects.

“The planting of misinformation, and in some cases of clear disinformation, in mainstream media is not only about pushing a particular narrative,” according to the ADDO article. “It is also an attack on the integrity of the news ecosystem, with a concomitant effect on trust in news media that serves the ends of actors intent on destroying the integrity of information in general.”

Putin’s Duma Candidates Could Lose For Same Reasons Orbán’s Did In Hungary – Analysis

April 22, 2026 
By Paul Goble


Most international commentaries on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s loss in the Hungarian parliamentary elections and his fall from power have focused on the consequences for European support for Ukraine’s continuing fight against the Russian invasion (see EDM, April 15). Russian analysts are focusing on that too, but some are worried that what happened in Hungary could happen in Russia’s September Duma elections, given parallels between Orbán’s Fidesz party and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party. Both parties and the electoral systems of the two countries have experienced a decline in support (Kommersant; RBC, April 13). A few Russian commentators are even predicting an equally revolutionary change, with United Russia losses triggering a Russian Maidan and regime change, or at least a growing threat to Putin’s continued rule (Svobodnaya Pressa, April 15). Such notions are almost certainly overblown given the differences between the two countries. Russia is not a parliamentary system in which the country’s leader must have a majority in the legislature. The Kremlin leader has shown himself even more willing than Orbán to use falsification and brute force to maintain his rule. Despite that, the appearance of such worries is likely to shape Russian politics in the coming months (RBC, April 13).

Observers are focusing on how Orbán’s defeat will impact EU support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. For senior members of United Russia, however, there may be a more immediate threat, Russian analyst Sergey Aksyonov suggests (Svobodnaya Pressa, April 15). To make his case without landing himself in trouble with the Kremlin, Aksyonov summarized the arguments of Anatoliy Shariy, a Russian-speaking Ukrainian commentator who has often been accused of being pro-Kremlin (see EDM, August 4, 2020). In a reaction to the Hungarian elections, Shariy argued that Orbán’s defeat was the product of “a series of errors that bear a striking resemblance to the well-known blunders committed by Ukraine’s former ruling party in the run-up to the 2014 Maidan protests,” a parallel that he implies Russia’s current rulers should be aware of (Svobodnaya Pressa, April 15).

Shariy himself draws a direct comparison between the two Viktors—Orbán and President Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine a decade ago. He points to “not only … the politicians’ physical stature but also … their political profiles.” He features Shariy’s comment that “Fidesz is essentially [Yanukovich’s] Party of Regions all over again,” with corrupt officials having entrenched themselves and feeling they need not answer to the people (Govorit Evropa, April 13). He continues, “Those who previously voted for Orbán’s party are now voting against it; they can no longer tolerate the local bosses who have become entrenched in power and, as a form of protest, are backing its opponent.” He justifies this by arguing that soon-to-be Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s affiliation with the Tisza Party is “merely nominal”—all developments with potential Russian parallels.

Tisza’s new constitutional majority reflects this popular anger and “the specific features of the electoral system,” and Orbán introduced these features to serve his ruling Fidesz Party. They now, as the election has shown, have led to his party’s crushing defeat and his own ouster from power. Aksyonov, echoing Shariy’s argument, explains that Hungary’s majoritarian system amplifies electoral swings. One hundred six of the 199 parliamentary seats are elected in single-member constituencies, and any votes cast for a “winning candidate in excess of the minimum required threshold are not discarded, but added to the party list voting,” thus magnifying any victory. That is because “this mechanism grants a massive bonus to the leading party, enabling it to attain a constitutional majority (two-thirds of the seats) even without enjoying a commensurate level of support among the general population,” something very different from the rest of Europe and Russia (Svobodnaya Pressa, April 15).

There is a feature of the Hungarian electoral system that Russia does share, the two say. The government frequently redraws election districts to make it easier for incumbents to remain in power. Russia has regularly changed the boundaries using the “petal principle,” whereby a major city is carved up even more frequently than Orbán did in Hungary and then attached to a vast, neighboring rural district—an area where “loyalty to the authorities is traditionally higher, and opposition votes are effectively diluted,” Aksyonov, following Shariy, says. Russian incumbents from the ruling party remain confident they can remain in power indefinitely, especially as this system is “fine-tuned by domestic ‘inventors’ within the Central Election Commission and capped off with a dome of additional filers and options designed to provide a 100 percent guarantee of the desired outcome,” including more easily falsifiable multi-day voting (Svobodnaya Pressa, April 15).


Putin and his regime are counting on that arrangement to hold in the September Duma elections. Shariy asks what would happen if “this multilayered construct—designed to dispel any doubts regarding United Russia’s success—were to yield a completely different, indeed diametrically opposite, result” as it did in Hungary and earlier in Ukraine. In that event, the long-entrenched United Russia “princelings” “could well be soundly defeated—just as the Hungarians routed the ossified ‘Orbánites,’” Shariy and Aksyonov argue. “Everything the Presidential Administration has spent years building to prop up the ruling party would then turn against it.”

The two suggest this could have revolutionary consequences. Russia is not a parliamentary system, and a loss of United Russia seats in the Duma would not force Putin to leave office. United Russia would also be prepared to resort to even more falsification of the results to ensure its desired outcome. As Shariy implies, even if the party does so, that could backfire. If manipulating the reported vote becomes too obvious, that alone could trigger a popular uprising, something similar to the Maidan,or at least the protests of 2011–2012 when Putin returned to the presidency after Dmitry Medvedev. As a result, Putin’s system and Putin himself could suffer a greater defeat than the losses in the parliamentary votes might suggest, another parallel with Hungary.

Russia is obviously not Ukraine or Hungary. Its political culture is fundamentally different, but the fact that Yanukovich and Orbán lost power despite overwhelming organizational advantages is certain to be much on the minds not only of analysts, but of those in the Kremlin. This precedent raises the stakes of the upcoming legislative election and is likely to cause United Russia to take further measures to secure its position.

This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation

Paul Goble

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .

Why Spain Chooses Engagement With China – Analysis


Pedro Sánchez, Prime Minister of Spain, and Li Qiang, Premier of the People’s Republic of China, preside over the signing of agreements between Spain and China in Beijing (04/14/2026).

 Photo: Pool Moncloa/Borja Puig (CC BY SA 2.0).

April 22, 2026 0 Comments

Elcano Royal Institute
By Miguel Otero Iglesias and Mario Esteban


The fourth visit to Beijing in four years by Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s Prime Minister, has again raised eyebrows across Europe and the Atlantic. In an era marked by growing tensions between China and the US and by the EU’s emphasis on ‘de-risking’, Spain’s sustained high-level engagement with China is often interpreted as strategic divergence.

That reading, however, misinterprets both Spain’s intentions and its strategic logic.

Spain’s approach is not about challenging the transatlantic relationship or aligning with China against the US. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic assessment of what Europe must do to better protect the prosperity and security of its population. From Madrid’s perspective, that requires more than defensive de-risking. It requires building greater European capacity and engaging China in ways that expand Europe’s room for manoeuvre rather than narrow it.

China is not a marginal actor that Europe can afford to sideline. It is a central pillar of global industrial production, a key player in green technologies, and an indispensable partner in addressing global challenges. For Spain, therefore, the question is not whether to engage with China, but how to do so in a way that strengthens economic resilience and contributes to Europe’s broader strategic autonomy.


This pragmatism is rooted in Spain’s historical experience. Periods of closedness have coincided with stagnation, while openness to trade, investment and ideas has driven modernisation and growth. This legacy informs a clear preference: protectionism is not seen as a viable long-term strategy, but as a source of weakening.

At the same time, Spain is above all a committed European actor. The government fully supports the EU’s framework that defines China as partner, competitor and systemic rival, and participates in efforts to strengthen economic security. Spain does not seek to break ranks with Brussels; it aims to shape the EU’s China policy from within.

What Spain does question is the tendency to reduce Europe’s China debate to risk reduction alone. If the objective is to better protect prosperity and security, focusing only on reducing dependencies on China is too narrow and ultimately myopic. Strategic autonomy is not autarky. Europe will remain interdependent with the outside world, and its task is to manage those interdependencies in ways that reduce vulnerability while also creating leverage, resilience and opportunity.

In this context, Spain’s engagement with China is an attempt to recalibrate the current focus on ‘de-risking’ to a more effective approach that combines reactive and proactive initiatives: protecting critical sectors where necessary, but also investing, negotiating and cooperating where engagement can help Europe upgrade its capabilities.

Spain’s alternative is therefore not naïve openness, but structured and conditioned engagement. While it welcomes Chinese investment, especially in renewable energies and electric vehicles, to upgrade industrial capacity, it also recognises the risks associated with asymmetries, dependencies and industrial competition.

Yet the answer cannot be limited to retreat. Europe also needs to seize the opportunities that China offers, especially in sectors where Spain and the EU can gain scale, technology, market access or greater relevance in global value chains. If Europe wants to protect its prosperity and security over the long term, it must become more capable and more strategically indispensable, not simply less exposed.

It is precisely because of these concerns and opportunities that engagement must be accompanied by clear expectations.

Sánchez’s dialogue with Chinese leadership places him in a good position not only to convey European concerns directly, but also to explore openings that could make the relationship more balanced and productive. His message in Beijing was not of unconditional cooperation. Rather, it stressed the need for a relationship with China that enhances reciprocity, strengthens resilience and reduces the appeal of more protectionist approaches inside the EU.

In the future, there are several areas where such progress could take shape, and it is very likely that they have been discussed by Sánchez and Xi.

First, ensuring stable access to critical inputs is essential. Avoiding export restrictions on rare earths and magnets for European partners would reduce supply-chain uncertainty and build trust.

Secondly, Beijing needs to address the concerns raised by the European business community. This would send a strong signal. Issues related to market access, regulatory transparency and level playing field conditions remain central. Improvements here would demonstrate China’s commitment to reciprocity.


Third, opening the services sector to European companies represents a major opportunity. Europe, and Spain in particular, holds competitive advantages in areas such as insurance, health, tourism, engineering and logistics.

Finally, the broader geopolitical context cannot be ignored. Europe’s security environment is shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s position is closely watched. Greater Chinese engagement to help end the conflict in a way acceptable to the invaded party would have a significant positive impact in Europe.

Spain’s frequent visits to China reflect an effort to preserve room for manoeuvre, diversify partnerships, and contribute to a more balanced and autonomous European position. For the Spanish Government and regions, engaging with China is not an alternative to protecting Europe’s security and prosperity; it is part of how that protection should be pursued, provided it is guided by the principles of reciprocity, realism and clear European interests.

Whether this approach becomes a broader European paradigm will depend on the evolution of China’s own policies as much as on Madrid’s capacity to persuade other capitals. Productive engagement must ultimately be built on a two-way street.

About the authors:

Miguel Otero-Iglesias is Senior Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute, Professor at the IE School of Global and Public Affairs, and Research Director at the Center for the Governance of Change at IE University. He is the co-founder and coordinator of the European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC) and is also a Research Associate at the EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management in France.

Mario Esteban is Senior Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute and Full Professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid, where he is the Director of the Centre for East Asian Studies. He has been senior researcher of projects funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Korea Foundation. He has served as external expert for the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Spanish Ministry of Defence.


Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

The Elcano Royal Institute (Real Instituto Elcano) is a private entity, independent of both the Public Administration and the companies that provide most of its funding. It was established, under the honorary presidency of HRH the Prince of Asturias, on 2 December 2001 as a forum for analysis and debate on international affairs and particularly on Spain’s international relations. Its output aims to be of use to Spain’s decision-makers, both public and private, active on the international scene. Its work should similarly promote the knowledge of Spain in the strategic scenarios in which the country’s interests are at stake.

Correlating US Aggression On Cuba, Venezuela And Iran: The Oil Factor – Analysis

April 22, 2026
Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
By Dr. Saurabh Mishra

Venezuela and Iran, the two countries that President Trump has targeted for military operations to date, along with the US, account for about one-third of global oil reserves. The endgames of the US aggression against Venezuela, Iran, and possibly Cuba in the near future may focus on long-term deals that include oil benefits. The Trumpian economic strategy hinges on access to cheap oil.

At the beginning of 2026, United States (US) forces abducted President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela with the intention of regime change, although the stated goals were different. We also witness the US facing extreme difficulty in breaking Iran’s will to fight, and Tehran is resisting regime change despite immense losses to its top leadership, military and civilian infrastructure. Cuba, too, has a standing threat issued by President Trump, who had been projecting himself as the ‘President of Peace’ until a few months ago.

Trump threatened Cuba with a “friendly takeover”[1] in “some form”,[2] along with choking the country by blockading its oil imports and threatening its suppliers. The country has been under duress with chronic blackouts due to a fuel shortage. Cuban authorities confirmed that there was no oil shipment from January 2026 until the end of March, when a Russian oil tanker arrived with a consignment of 730,000 barrels.[3] President Trump has repeatedly indicated that he would be focusing on his next target, Cuba, once the conflict with Iran is over.[4]

Venezuela and Iran are very different in terms of their political composition, power and identity, and neither of them is/was an imminent military threat to the US. Although Trump’s military actions have been framed as preemptive responses to the threat to US citizens, its core security interests and safety of assets, one factor that Trump has downplayed or not mentioned while stating his objectives is the presence and potential of oil reserves in the two countries.


President Trump’s actions against Cuba are perplexing as to why he would threaten a tiny island nation that cannot pose any real military or economic threat in the context of contemporary global geopolitics. The return of Cuba, which has gradually been phased out of high-level geopolitical discussions since the end of the Cold War, into US grand-strategic calculations, needs explanation. This brief examines President Trump’s desire to “take over” Cuba and highlights the oil variable correlating his rhetoric and actions on Cuba with operations in Venezuela and Iran.

The Façade and the Truth in Venezuela Operation

On 3 January 2026, US forces abducted President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, along with his wife, in Operation Absolute Resolve. The couple was accused of heading a drug network impacting the youth and families in the US. President Trump, who previously had reduced US foreign military commitments, expressing a desire for peace and economic prosperity of the US, has ironically been successful in putting military pressure on Venezuela to open up for ‘reforms’ and make structural changes to its economy, especially in the oil sector, so that it could facilitate foreign (US) investments. Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves, constituting approximately 17 per cent of the global total.[5] The stated objective of eliminating the drug and refugee problems emanating from Venezuela was soon overshadowed by the real calculations and strategies of developing oil fields in the country by US companies with a planned investment of US$ 100 billion over time.[6] The military threat over Venezuela, however, lingers to the degree of the Venezuelan regime’s non-cooperation with the US.[7]

The Bogeyman of Imminent Threat in Iran

Within a couple of months of the Venezuela action, the US, along with Israel, attacked Iran on 28 February 2026 and decapitated its leadership by killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with other high-ranking politicians and military officers, in Operation Epic Fury. The stated objectives were “eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime” and to “ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon”.[8] Obliterating the Iranian missile industry, annihilating their navy and disabling their regional proxies were a few other stated objectives.[9]

It must be noted that the claims of both the US and Israel after the 12-day war in June 2025 had ranged between “obliteration” of Iran’s nuclear bomb building capability and a “setback” in “Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons by many years”. The assessments claimed that it might take Iran many years to reconstitute the lost capability of enriching Uranium and build a weapon out of it.[10] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office had also claimed, “The achievement can continue indefinitely if Iran does not get access to nuclear material”.[11] Moreover, Joe Kent, Director, National Counterterrorism Centre in the US, resigned, saying, “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby”.[12]


Therefore, a surprise attack on Iran only within a year, against assessments of the country not posing an immediate threat to the US, along with the targeted assassination of its highest leadership and administrators, reveals a calculated intention for regime change with strikes for which no immediate provocation by Iran was visible. President Trump called on the people of Iran to take over the regime, as this might be their chance that they have had in generations.

The range and nature of the targets selected at the beginning of the US–Israeli joint strikes were beyond what was required to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability, which was allegedly achieved in June 2025 itself. Therefore, the US’s emphasis on the nuclear dimension as justification for the attacks seemed more like a bogeyman. At the same time, the real objectives were different and linked to the long-term Trumpian grand strategy to be achieved through regime change in Iran. President Trump, known for his transactionalism, is spending billions of dollars on military adventures in Iran. Hence, the question is what motivated him to go to this war.

Did Israel Pull Trump into the War?

It is speculated that President Trump was led into the war by Israel. Israel’s objectives and motivations for the strikes can be understood in light of its antagonistic relationship with the country. Israel had been looking for an opportunity to bring the US on board with its designs to eliminate the Iranian regime, and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel succeeded with President Trump this time. But the question again is why Israel could convince Trump.

Given his inclinations and transactional temperament, President Trump should not join a war without concrete business incentives. His real motivations in this war, however, are less understood and quite obfuscated. Differences of opinion have also appeared within the Make America Great Again (MAGA) leadership about the ways of the movement that thrusted him to power. There is a divide within, and Trump, with his adventures in Venezuela and Iran, stands for his own faction. His war on Iran has received credible backing by the Republican Party supporters,[13] anointing his actions as the legitimate MAGA approach. Therefore, to understand his motivations and adventures, we must look into his policy and strategic outlook.

President Trump, in his address after the strikes, mentioned every long-term threat posed by Iran to the US interests in the region, but left out one aspect, i.e. oil. The US has historically had an interest in Iranian oil, but the aspirations to get hold of the source were jeopardised by the Iranian Islamist Revolution in 1979.[14] The Israeli objective of regime change or weakening Iran to a point of no return was deemed as a chance that converged with President Trump’s long-term strategic goals, hinged on an oil vision.

Trump’s approach, discernible in the National Security Strategy 2025, introduces oil as a correlating variable to be discussed in relation to his global strategic adventures, leading to military actions that began in Venezuela.[15] In 2023, Iran accounted for 12 per cent of the global oil reserves and 24 per cent of the Middle East.[16] The two countries that President Trump has targeted for military operations to date, along with the US, account for about one-third of global oil reserves. President Trump’s eagerness to end the war and expression of desire to control Kharg Island and the Iranian oil amidst the conflict alludes towards the original motive of controlling the Iranian oil with a brief blitzkrieg of air power, eliminating its leadership. No other economic factor explains President Trump’s allowing himself to be led into this expensive war.


As there was no immediate provocation by Iran, the US stated objectives appeared to align with Israeli objectives at the outset. However, as the conflict unfolded and the US (especially Trump) considered ending it even without the Strait of Hormuz reopening to normal operations, this revealed the US’s eagerness to get out of the expensive quagmire it had fallen into.[17] This also exposed the difference in goals between the two partners, despite their shared means of regime change. Israel’s motivation for the attack was a shift in the regional strategic balance and long-term security through regime change and weakening of Iran, and this could provide President Trump access to Iranian oil. A Venezuela-like cooperation from the Iranian leadership post the initial strikes appears to have been expected, but the dynamics of the conflict have set back US expectations.
The Centrality of Crude Oil in Trump’s Domestic and Global Strategy

President Trump started his second term with the slogan “drill baby drill”.[18] He concluded that producing more oil would help grow the US economy faster and secure its future hegemony.[19] His pursuit of foreign oil resources is also important to study, as President Trump himself has highlighted that the US is a net energy exporter and does not need foreign oil as it did in the past.[20] It is noteworthy that within a month of the inauguration of his second stint, President Trump signed an executive order stating his administration’s policy of “making America energy dominant”.[21] To this end, the order established the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) under the Executive Office of the President.[22]

Now, the question is: why does the US need this Council to dominate energy if the country has a surplus, and who is supposed to be dominated? The executive order, however, did not explicitly mention any other country or region to be dominated; and instead focused on planning from a “long-term” energy perspective towards increasing production of “reliable energy”. For this, the Trump administration prioritises oil drilling over green policies favouring renewables as he has reversed policies that supported and promoted electric vehicles.[23] The Endangered Species Committee in the US has also recently cleared oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, exempting it from environmental rules, a move that could threaten a rare whale species and other marine life.[24] The Trumpian economic strategy clearly hinges on access to cheap oil.

Why the Threat to ‘Take Over’ Cuba?

After Venezuela and Iran, which are oil-rich countries, Cuba is a curious case that has not been in global news for its oil reserves. The island, home to around 10.9 million people, located only 90 miles off the southern US state of Florida, is associated with President Fidel Castro, its communist revolution, and its very close relationship with the Soviet Union (USSR) despite being a ‘non-aligned’ country during the Cold War. Cuba was governed by the Castro family under the banner of the Communist Party of Cuba, with single-party rule from 1959 to 2018. And, since then, it has been ruled by President Miguel Díaz-Canel under the same system.


Cuba is known for its famous cigars, sugar production (once among the highest globally but currently at record-low levels and negligible on a global scale), world-class rum, and pristine beaches, but not for oil. It is also recorded in modern history and international relations for the infamous Cuban Missile Crisis, which took the world to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962. The US had blockaded the country during the Crisis, and it has been under a strict US sanctions regime since then. The end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the weakening and reinvention of Russia as a successor state and polity, reduced Cuba’s strategic importance in global geopolitics. The state, however, remains a communist-run system with currently declining industrial and well-being indicators. It has ideological opposition to US policies, but cannot pose any military or political threat in the post-Cold War scenario.

Due to the historical baggage, Cuba keeps good relations with countries that oppose US hegemonic policies and its ambitions of unipolarity. Therefore, in the executive order signed on 29 January 2026, President Trump found Cuba’s “policies, practices and actions” as constituting “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to the “national security and foreign policy of the United States”. The allegations are that Cuba has relations with “numerous hostile countries”, “terrorist groups”, and “malign actors hostile to the United States” that include Russia, China, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. Citing Cuba’s relations with these actors and blaming it for having “Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility” and “deep intelligence and defence cooperation” with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the executive order links it with the US’s notion of Western Hemisphere security and dominance.[25] The country, in fact, has been doing this for decades, but still cannot pose any real threat to the US.

A situation that was considered non-threatening and manageable with sanctions has now been categorised as a “national emergency”. The reasons for this shift are President Trump’s ideological perspective and the resulting threat perception, which makes him sensitive to anything linked to China in the American neighbourhood. Trump has concluded that he needs to push back against the increasing Chinese reach and penetration into the economic and strategic sectors in Latin America, especially in countries ruled by left-leaning leaders. Venezuela and Cuba, from the US perspective, are seen as classic autocratic ideological opponents in the region. Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, too, have left-leaning leadership. Still, they are viewed as functional democracies and may be more difficult to handle due to their size, resources, political culture and international relations. Colombia is a case in which there is a left-leaning government for the first time in modern history, and the upcoming presidential elections may alter the current government. Power in these countries may change hands between the right and left, but Cuba is different. President Trump’s military threat to the country is not justified by any explicit economic reason. The reasons cited are strategic, and Cuba has also been designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism” for sheltering members of US-designated terror organisations.[26] It may be noted that Trump had similar allegations against Venezuela and Iran, which also have the common mineral resource factor of substantial oil reserves that could be turned into long-term energy and economic benefits for the US. Given the absence of a large oil industry, Cuba, at the surface, seems to be a different case altogether. But, with a further inquiry into the country’s crude oil potential, the perception changes.

Cuba as a Potential Petro Power in the Western Hemisphere

Cuba currently has only 124 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, ranking it the 67th largest reserve holder.[27] The US and Cuban geological surveys estimate recoverable oil reserves between 4.6 and 20 billion barrels, respectively.[28] Various geological assessments of Cuba, especially its northern offshore Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) blocks, identify and acknowledge its potential to catapult itself among the top 20 largest proven oil reservoirs in the world and become a significant player in the oil economy of the Latin American Region. Even if the mean potential of the reserves is realised, only Venezuela and Canada would be able to surpass Cuba in terms of per capita oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere.[29] The estimates for the Cuban offshore fields are at least half the size of the US’s Alaskan oil reserves.[30]

Since the discovery of Cuba’s oil potential in the early 21st century, the country has sought to reduce its energy dependence on Venezuela and Mexico amid the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape. Oil companies from Canada, China, Russia, Spain, Norway and India had shown interest and invested in Cuba’s offshore exploration blocks, but nothing productive has come of it. Almost 80 per cent of the exploration area lies in deep or ultra-deep waters, and oil cannot be easily extracted with old technology.[31] The state-of-the-art exploration technology is owned and controlled by the US, which has imposed sanctions and a blockade against Cuba, making it difficult to drill due to technology and investment denial, and practically choking the country from becoming energy self-reliant.[32] The development of offshore oilfields over time could boost the Cuban economy and national prosperity, making Cuba a significant player in the region’s petroindustry, although possibly at the cost of economic diversification.[33]

US companies in the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors have been pressing, sometimes successfully, for relaxations or normalisation of relations with Cuba to gain better access to its lucrative business opportunities.[34] Similarly, US oil companies have also been, though unsuccessfully, lobbying the US Congress to permit them to bid for oil and gas exploration in Cuban Waters. With only a small fraction of the world’s proven oil reserves open to foreign involvement,[35] they do not want to be left out of the race.[36] Former US President Barack Obama took steps to ease sanctions and build a normal relationship with the country. But, his efforts were thwarted by President Trump’s reversal of his policy towards Cuba. President Trump not only reinstated stringent sanctions on Cuba but also choked its essential crude supplies responsible for more than 80 per cent of its electricity generation.[37]

Amidst the downplayed oil dimension in Venezuela and Iran adventures, President Trump’s attention on Cuba as well as the US companies’ interest in exploration of its oilfields converge at a point where the country needs to be opened up for exploration. President Obama took a few steps towards engagement, but President Trump has a different way of achieving his goals. The oil potential of Cuba fits into his long-term scheme of Making America Great Again (MAGA), for which dominating the global energy market, along with the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere, is an important condition.

The Political Dimensions of a Cuban Energy Self-Reliance

Industry experts do not expect any global disruption due to the availability of Cuban oil in future, and the realisation of the estimated potential may not impact the global prices in general. But, Cuba shall be energy self-reliant with the realisation of even the lower end of the estimates.[38] Further, the country’s transition to being a net oil exporter will have a positive impact on its economy, leading to the failure of the long-term US sanctions policy against Cuba.[39] Hence, it is imperative from the US perspective to keep Cuba energy-starved until the geopolitical and economic positions of the two countries are aligned. The alignment is possible either with regime change in Cuba or a paradigm shift in the US policy to engage the country with its political system intact. President Obama’s efforts to engage and relax sanctions on Cuba faced tough resistance, especially by migrant Cubans who have a grudge against the Communist regime.

President Trump, however, in the new geopolitical context of increasing influence of China and Russia in the Latin American Region, wants to decisively change the long-maintained status quo to benefit the US through regime change. His rhetoric on Cuba is explained by the convergence of his strategic visions of securing the Western Hemisphere for the US by driving China and Russia out, and of dominating the global energy market. As President Trump’s actions in Cuba are being analysed more from strategic and high-level geopolitical perspectives rather than economic ones, the correlation with oil has received little attention from analysts, who focus only on the country’s current proven reserves and production capacity.[40]

Trumpian Actions Have a Long-Term Economic Perspective on Oil

The US military actions and objectives on Venezuela and Iran are being shaped from a long-term Trumpian economic and strategic perspective, and Cuba is no exception. The exploration and development of oil fields in these countries may take around a decade or more and require heavy investment. Cuba, with its oil potential, is also among the top global producers of Cobalt and Nickel (critical metals for electric vehicle battery production) that may be important to a futuristic US foreign policy. But, President Trump has already ‘debunked’ US policy supporting and promoting electric vehicles by prioritising oil and gas over green and renewable energy sources.[41] Hence, oil has emerged as a clear priority in his calculations for engaging or targeting countries to achieve his strategic and foreign policy goals. In the context of Cuba, too, potential oil fields have to be given greater weight than renewables and critical minerals to understand the Trumpian economic and strategic calculus.

Conclusion

The oil potential of Cuba would be an unsaid benefit for the US if the stated strategic objectives are achieved through regime change. US involvement in oil exploration and production in Cuba could be a viable option for the communist Cuban government as well, but it cannot happen without the US securing guarantees to protect its stated strategic interests in the country. President Trump had already indicated the possibility of a deal between the two countries without an invasion, referring to a takeover in “some form”. Any deal, however, would depend on the Cuban government’s willingness to shed its ideological opposition to the US government. Apart from the US desire to detach Cuba from China, Russia and other unfriendly states in the region, oil exploration could be another lucrative potential benefit for the Trump Administration.

President Trump’s conflict with countries that posed no immediate or imminent military threat to the US should at least be explained by economic logic and motivation. Any conflict initiated for any reason ultimately has its economic endgame. And, as we examine here, oil fits in as the variable correlating to Trump’s aggression and military threat against Venezuela, Iran and Cuba. The presence of the correlation is further highlighted by President Trump’s statements and executive order regarding his energy policy. The US–Israel–Iran war has not yet concluded, and the outcomes may not be as the US expected, but oil could be a benefit in all the three. The endgames of the US aggression against Venezuela, Iran and Cuba may focus on long-term deals that include oil benefits.

The focus on the nuclear material issue might be more useful for legitimising the catastrophe unleashed. But, from the perspective of Trumpian MAGA priorities, the success, rationale, wisdom and the economics of these military adventures would remain highly questionable in the absence of any energy/oil deals.

Endnotes:

“Trump Threatens Cuba Again, Says Island Nation May Face ‘Friendly Takeover’”, Al Jazeera, 10 March 2026.

“Trump Says ‘Taking’ Cuba Would Be ‘Big Honor,’ That President ‘Can Do Anything I Want With It’”, USA Today Channel on YouTube, YouTube, 17 March 2026.

Will Grant, “Russian Oil Tanker Docks in Cuba Ending Near-Total Blockade”, BBC News, 31 March 2026.

“Cuba War Next? Trump Drops ‘Wait for Two Weeks’ Bombshell as Iran Conflict Explodes”, The Times of India Channel on YouTube, YouTube, 6 March 2026.

“Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela”, Energy Information Administration, United States of America, p. 5.

Lauren Aratani, “Trump Promises Oil Companies ‘Total Safety’ in Venezuela as He Urges Them To Invest Billions”, The Guardian, 9 January 2026.

Michael Scherer, “Trump Threatens Venezuela’s New Leader with A Fate Worse than Maduro’s”, The Atlantic, 4 January 2026.

“President Donald Trump’s Video Statement After the Attack on Iran”, Truth Social, 18 February 2026.
Ibid.

“Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Have Been Obliterated – And Suggestions Otherwise Are Fake News”, The White House, 25 June 2025.

“Statement by the Prime Minister’s Office on behalf of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, 25 June 2026.

“As Fire and Fury Hit MAGA Tent, Vance Walks the Tightrope for 2028”, The Hindu, 18 March 2026.

Anthony Zurcher, “Iran War Splits Older And Younger Conservatives – As Pressure Builds For Trump To Find Exit Ramp”, BBC News, 28 March 2026; “US Senate Republicans Reject Efforts to Halt Trump’s Iran War”, The Times of India, 16 April 2026.

“Statement of Policy by the National Security Council (NSC 5402)”, Office of the Historian, Washington, USA, 2 January 1954.

National Security Strategy 2025, pp. 5, 14, and 28.

“Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela”, no. 5, p. 1.

Alexander Ward and Meridith McGraw, “Trump Tells Aides He’s Willing to End War without Reopening Hormuz”, The Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2026.

“President Donald Trump’s Inaugural Address”, The White House, 25 January 2026.
National Security Strategy 2025, p. 14.

Daniel Dale, “Fact Check: Despite Claims Of Trump-Era ‘Energy Independence,’ The US Never Stopped Importing Foreign Oil”, CNN, 15 March 2022.

“Establishing the National Energy Dominance Council”, The White House, 14 February 2025.
Ibid.

Jeremy M. Michalek, “Trump Reversed Policies Supporting Electric Vehicles − It Will Affect The Road To Clean Electricity, Too”, The Conversation, 8 September 2025.

“Trump’s Endangered Species Committee Exempts Oil And Gas Drilling In The Gulf From Rules”, PBS News, 31 March 2026.

“Addressing Threats to The United States by the Government of Cuba”, The White House, 29 January 2026.

“State Sponsors of Terrorism”, U.S. Department of State.

“Cuba Oil Summary Table”, Worldometer, 15 April 2025

.
H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, International Journal of Cuban Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2019, pp. 43–44.
Ibid.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute”, Florida International University, November 2006, p. 6.

H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, no. 28, p. 48.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute”, no. 30, p. 4.
H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, no. 28, p. 50.
Ibid., pp. 54–55.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute”, no. 30, p. 2.
H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, no. 28, p. 55.

“Where Does Cuba Get Its Electricity?”, International Energy Agency, 7 April 2026.
Robert Sandels, “An Oil-Rich Cuba?”, Monthly Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2011, pp. 40–45.
Ibid.

Arnab Chakrabarty, “Cuba – Cracks in the Red Citadel, and the US’ Unfinished Geostrategic Dream”, Indian Council of World Affairs, 7 April 2026.

Jeremy M. Michalek, “Trump Reversed Policies Supporting Electric Vehicles − It Will Affect The Road To Clean Electricity, Too”, no. 23.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

About the author: Dr. Saurabh Mishra is a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Prior to MP-IDSA he was an Associate Professor at the Amity Institute for Defence & Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Noida, preceded by his assignments as Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), an autonomous think-tank of the Ministry of External Affairs, India and Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA),

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Pan-African Activist Kemi Seba Detained in Pretoria as Rights Groups Fight Benin Extradition

Last updated: April 20, 2026 



Prominent Beninese pan-African activist Kemi Seba remains in custody in South Africa following his arrest earlier this week, as extradition proceedings to Benin get underway. Human rights activists and his legal team are mobilizing to block the extradition, arguing that he would not receive a fair trial in Benin due to political persecution.

Seba (real name Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi) was arrested on Monday in a sting operation at a Pretoria shopping centre alongside his 18-year-old son and a facilitator. Authorities say the group was attempting to cross illegally into Zimbabwe en route to Europe, paying around 250,000 rand for assistance. South African police acted on a Benin-issued international arrest warrant from December 2025.

Benin accuses Seba of “inciting rebellion,” “advocating crimes against state security,” and supporting a failed coup attempt in December 2025. He appeared in court and has been remanded in custody until April 20, 2026, with local charges of conspiracy and immigration violations also filed.

Human Rights Concerns and Opposition to Extradition

A growing number of activists, pan-African voices, and legal supporters — including prominent French lawyer Juan Branco — are campaigning against Seba’s extradition. They describe the case as politically motivated persecution by Benin’s government under President Patrice Talon, claiming the country’s judicial system, particularly the special court (CRIET), lacks independence and is used to silence dissent.


Critics argue Seba faces a high risk of an unfair trial, prolonged detention without due process, and harsh treatment as a high-profile government opponent. His legal team is also leveraging his Nigerien diplomatic passport, asserting immunity and political refugee status. Supporters highlight recent arrests of Seba’s family members in Benin as further evidence of targeted harassment.

International and regional human rights observers are watching the case closely, with calls for South Africa — which has a history of protecting political refugees — to carefully review any extradition request under principles of non-refoulement (not returning individuals to places where they risk persecution or unfair trials).

Background on Kemi Seba

The 45-year-old activist is known for his strong anti-colonial, anti-Western rhetoric, promotion of pan-Africanism, and large social media following. He has previously staged symbolic protests, such as burning French currency.


Benin authorities maintain the charges are legitimate national security matters following the foiled coup, which resulted in multiple arrests.

Seba’s next court appearance is scheduled for April 20, 2026, where extradition arguments, including human rights objections, are expected to be central.