The European Union voted on April 22 to simultaneously unlock its long-delayed €90bn EU loan for Ukraine and adopt the stalled twentieth sanctions package against Russia, in a diplomatic double act that had been blocked for months by Hungary and Slovakia — both of which finally stood aside once the first Russian oil began flowing again through the repaired Druzhba pipeline.
EU ambassadors meeting in Brussels launched a written procedure, giving member states up to 24 hours to register any objections. Cyprus, which holds the rotating presidency of the EU Council, said the procedure was expected to conclude by the afternoon of April 23.
The vote has been long delayed by vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia due to the Druzhba row. Former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who agreed to approve the loan at the EU summit in December, reversed his position after a drone attack on the Soviet-era pipeline cut off oil deliveries to Hungary from Russia. Kyiv dragged its heels on repairs as part of its strategy to starve the Kremlin of oil and gas revenues. “No oil, no money” Orban told Kyiv.
However, everything changed after newly installed Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar landslide victory ousting Orban last weekend. Magyar also insisted that the oil flows resume before approving the loan, which happened on April 22 just before the vote.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico also threatened to continue the veto ahead of the vote but has also climbed down. Slovakia also received assurances from Kyiv that the Druzhba pipeline would be functioning again by the time of the vote. Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár said his country was also ready to support the twentieth sanctions package once Russian oil was physically delivered.
Diplomats said both Budapest and Bratislava would wait for physical confirmation that Druzhba oil had arrived in their territory before formally clearing the path — meaning final approval was unlikely before the morning of April 23.
The money is desperately needed in Kyiv, which is running out of money and faces a macroeconomic collapse within a month if the fresh funding is not released immediately.
The €90bn loan, originally agreed by all 27 EU member states in December, will provide Ukraine with two tranches of €45bn each in 2026 and 2027, with €28bn per year reserved for military spending and €17bn for general budget needs — covering roughly two-thirds of Ukraine's financing requirements over the period. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czechia secured exemptions from participating in the joint EU borrowing that will fund the package.
The saga highlights the growing disunity in the EU and underscores the emerging Eurosceptic-lite policies emerging amongst more and more EU members, where they put national interests ahead of wider EU policy goals dictated by the European Commission (EC) executive, like sanctioning Russia.
Inside the sanctions package
Embarrassingly, the twentieth sanctions package was supposed to be released on the fifth anniversary of the start of the war on February 24 but was flummoxed by vested interests in the EU – not just Hungary and Slovakia. Greece and Malta were also instrumental in blocking the latest package which targets Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers, to which both nations contribute heavily in a lucrative business exploiting loopholes in the sanctions. Greek tankers, flying an EU flag and subject to EU regulations, make up a fifth of Russia’s shadow fleet.
The new package originally banned all EU vessels from working for Russia, but according to reports, that clause has been removed from the latest draft. At the same time, sanctions on buying Russian oil introduced at the end of 2022 have also been eased as a result of the oil shock unfolding as a result of the Iran war.
In parallel, the US has already eased sanctions on buying Russian oil already at sea last month, stored in tankers, by issuing a 30-day waiver to India to alleviate upward price pressure on oil. That waiver expired last week, but was almost immediately renewed by the US Treasury Department after a two-week ceasefire failed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. On April 22, US President Donald Trump unilaterally extended the ceasefire indefinitely as he struggles to find a way to end the conflict. In the meantime, Tehran remains in complete control of the passage of tankers through the Strait.
Billed as the most ambitious expansion of Russia's sanctions regime since the invasion, the reality is that the twentieth package will have little effect on Russia’s oil exports or revenues, which are expected to enjoy a windfall from the soaring oil prices.
Like most EU sanctions, the key element has been fudged in an effort to please everyone. The centrepiece measure — a complete prohibition on the provision of services related to the maritime transportation of Russian oil and petroleum products — has been agreed in principle but will not take effect until Brussels reaches agreement with the G7.
Brussels concluded that activating an additional squeeze on Russian oil supplies without coordinating with Washington — which has no interest in further oil price rises — would be both economically reckless and politically unworkable.
The measures that do take effect immediately are directed at Russia's Arctic LNG industry, which has so far been the most significant gap in the sanctions architecture. While imports of Russian oil have been banned for three years already, LNG was exempted as there is no viable alternative supply. That shortfall has only been made worse by the halt of Qatari LNG exports by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
On paper the EU has vowed to ban the import of Russian LNG completely by the start of 2027. In practice, the volumes of LNG imports continue to rise and the EU remains Russia’s top LNG customer. Europe bought every single shipment of LNG produced by Russia's Yamal LNG plant in February and would have bought more if Russia had produced it as a gas crisis starts to unfold in Europe thanks to the low level of gas storage ahead of the next heating season.
Some LNG restrictions are slated to come into effect before the January 1, 2027 deadline for a complete ban. From April 25, the provision of technical, financial and brokerage services related to Russian icebreakers and gas carriers is prohibited. The EU has also banned Russian LNG imports in January 2026 for short-term contracts effective from the same date. From January 1, 2027, the ban extends to foreign icebreakers and gas carriers operating in Russia's interests that are aimed at the Yamal Arctic LNG-2 project operated by Russia’s Novatek.
Of the 15 Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers built for Novatek and capable of navigating the Arctic Northern Sea Route independently, 11 are owned or managed by European companies. In 2025, these firms facilitated more than 70% of LNG shipments between Yamal and Europe. The Yamal fleet's Arc7 carriers are serviced and repaired in European yards, and the service ban is designed to cut off that maintenance lifeline. However, the phased implementation — and wording that means foreign-operated vessels have until 2027 — gives a significant portion of the fleet time to complete servicing before the door closes.
A separate measure directly targets the Yamal project's corporate structure. The direct and indirect provision of terminal services to LNG projects in which Russian entities own more than 50% is prohibited — a measure that catches Novatek, which holds a 50.1% stake in Yamal LNG. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the new measures would "go beyond previous rounds by targeting the maritime backbone of Russia's LNG trade."
It remains unclear how the EU will supply itself with natural gas if it cuts itself off from Russian LNG imports completely. Russia used to send some 140bn cubic metres (bcm) to Europe a year pre-war. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the piped gas imports have fallen to near zero, but LNG imports soared to a post-war record in 2025 of circa 20bcm, or about 14% of its total gas imports at a cost of €7.2bn. Including the piped gas to Central Europe and Russia still accounts for 12% of the EU’s total gas imports, down from 40% in 2021.
The US has become Europe’s largest LNG supplier, accounting for around 56% of the LNG market, but question mark now hangs over the reliability of US supplies as Europe now finds itself in competition with Asia that is willing to pay higher prices, after the Qatari supplies stopped due to the Gulf war. Several tankers bound to Europe have already been diverted to Asia after Europe was outbid by Asian buyers.
Shadow fleet and financial crackdown
Another element of the twentieth package is a further crackdown on individual vessels: 46 vessels will be added to the EU shadow fleet blacklist, bringing the total to more than 600 — a list that now encompasses a substantial proportion of the tanker fleet Russia relies on to move crude to Asian buyers outside the price cap framework.
The idea of targeting individual ships and shipping companies, rather than relying on a price cap mechanism or restrictions on maritime insurance was pioneered to great effect by the Biden administration with its harshest ever oil sanctions in January 2025.
Crucially, the twentieth package also introduces a ban on direct sales and resale of tankers to Russian companies, with all contracts required to include relevant clauses — an attempt to choke off future fleet expansion at source, as Russia has built up its own fleet by buying end-of-service-life tankers, particularly from Greek shipping companies.
On the financial side, 120 individuals and legal entities will be added to the sanctions list, including 20 banks and financial intermediaries, among them institutions that have been facilitating sanctions evasion in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Laos. Transaction bans will apply to the ports of Murmansk and Tuapse, seven Russian oil refineries — Ryazan, Komsomolsk, Angarsk, Achinsk, Tuapse, Afipsk and Usinsk — as well as the oil companies Bashneft and Slavneft.
Notably, Gazprombank — which has never appeared on the EU's own sanctions list despite being sanctioned by the US in November 2024 — is again absent from the twentieth package, even as the volume of Russian gas it processes for EU buyers shrinks toward zero ahead of the 2027 import ban.
Kyrgyzstan faces specific punishment for its role in routing sanctioned goods, including through the A7 cryptocurrency platform: the export of metalworking machine tools and telecom equipment to the country will be banned.
The package also expands the EU's legal toolkit against Russian asset expropriation. European companies will now be able to file claims in the EU for damages suffered as a result of third-country court decisions enforcing Russian court rulings — a measure designed to protect Western firms whose assets have been seized in Russia from finding themselves without legal recourse.
What comes next
With Hungary's blockade lifted, Brussels expects to return to a more regular rhythm of sanctions packages. The 21st package of sanctions is already in preparation, according to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. Officials also note that broader package sanctions do not exclude targeted individual measures — including the prospect of entry bans on participants in the war against Ukraine.
The sequencing of the maritime oil services ban remains the most consequential outstanding question. Its activation depends on whether the G7 — and specifically the United States — judges that global oil market conditions have stabilised sufficiently to absorb a further tightening of Russian supply. As long as Iranian oil exports remain disrupted and the Strait of Hormuz contested, that judgment is unlikely to be made in a hurry.
