Tuesday, May 26, 2026

Let’s stop Orbanization in Greece!

Tuesday 26 May 2026, by Andreas Sartzekis



As soon as he became prime minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis built parallel powers and, seven years later, he is swimming in scandals marking the privatization of the state for his own benefit and that of his relatives and the employers.

Thus, the ministers with fake diplomas, the Petsas list aimed at distributing subsidies to the friendly press, even if it is almost non-existent, the European agricultural subsidies paid on the basis of loyalty to New Democracy (ND, the party of the Mitsotakis family): this latest affair has alerted the chief prosecutor of the European Union, Laura Kövesi, immediately slandered by sources close to Mitsotakis.

This policy worried Amnesty International in its report for 2025: the Predator wiretapping scandal, which we know stems from Mitsotakis, illegal detention of refugees or pushbacks at sea, the law on the13-hour working day, repression against demonstrations for the victims of the railway crime in Tèmbior for Gaza and so on.

Incessant attacks, 2 symbolic cases

In recent weeks, the right has been unleashed inspired by Hungary’s Orbán: a bill aimed at completely neutralising the labour inspectorate, which would come under the supervision of the Ministry of Development; a revelation of the cynical use of masked immigrant groups to push refugees back to Turkey and repression in all directions: police sent to the universities to prevent any protest against the exclusion of thousands of students, harsh trials against local mobilizations in defence of the environment and so on/

If we retain priorities in this wave of repression, two cases call for immediate solidarity. First of all, Javed Aslam, president of the Pakistani Community of Greece. Known for his commitment against racism and for the rights of immigrants, for his important role in the indictment of Chryssi Avgi (Golden Dawn) after the murder of Shehzad Luqman in 2013, he is threatened with not having his residence permit renewed after 30 years in Greece, petty revenge of the minister of migration.

And at the end of April the teacher Chryssa Hotzoglou who, like thousands of her colleagues – now all threatened – had refused an evaluation procedure synonymous with authoritarianism and the “unloading” of public sector workers, will again appear before the disciplinary council,. Despite the unanimous negative opinion of a first council a year ago, she was suspended; she now faces dismissal. The battle against evaluation is that of the defence of an open and critical school against a school of obedience to the hierarchy, and the relentlessness of the authorities proves its desire to prohibit trade union action and mobilizations. Chryssa’s dismissal would be the first for union reasons in the public sector since the fall of the fascist colonels in 1974.

Against the Greek Orbán, international support for the resistance!

30 April 2025

Translated by International Viewpoint from l’Anticapitaliste.

 

Lenin versus democracy: A reply to critics of ‘Goodbye to Lenin and Leninism’

In “Lenin versus democracy,” Dan La Botz replies to criticisms of his article “Goodbye to Lenin and Leninism,” first published in LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal on April 25. La Botz’s rejoinder is appearing simultaneously on LINKS and Communis.

La Botz’s original article elicited the following responses: “Saying Goodbye to Lenin? A Response” by Paul Le Blanc, published in Communis and LINKS on April 30; “Lenin, democracy and the anti-Leninist shortcut” by Anthony Teso, published in LINKS on May 1; and “The Rise and Fall of ‘Leninism’” by John Marot published in LINKS and Communis on May 8.

I am pleased and thankful to see that Paul Le Blanc, Anthony Teso and John Marot took the time to critically engage with my essay, “Goodbye to Lenin and Leninism.” Leftists often have an uncritical fixation on Vladimir Lenin’s role. Moreover, the notion that his theories are a model for the left is a serious problem. So, I am glad these three well-informed socialist comrades have engaged in this debate. All three are knowledgeable about the issues and make some interesting points. However, I disagree with their views and methods.

Toward the start of my essay, I listed eleven different moments at which I believe Lenin made decisions that separated him from the tradition of Marxism and democratic socialism. I saw Lenin’s decisions as both a pattern and a cumulative process, each one making possible the next bad decision. To remind readers, these are what I saw as Lenin’s key political decisions:

  • The organization of the Bolshevik faction, which later became the Bolshevik Party, and then the Russian Communist Party;
  • The organization and execution of the Bolshevik coup, which detonated the October 1917 Russian Revolution;
  • The shutting down of the democratically elected Constituent Assembly in January 1918;
  • The establishment of a Bolshevik-led coalition Soviet government, which soon became simply a Bolshevik government;
  • The establishment of “one-man management” in Soviet industry;
  • The establishment of a political police, the Cheka, and unleashing of the Red Terror;
  • The establishment of War Communism and militarization of society to win the Civil War;
  • Russia’s war on Poland, which ended in defeat;
  • The crushing of the Kronstadt Rebellion;
  • The banning of factions in the Communist Party; and
  • Lenin’s empowerment of Joseph Stalin.

My argument is that Lenin’s decisions proved incapable of defending and advancing a democratic socialist revolution — in fact, they contributed to the frustration and failure of the revolution, the results of which we are all familiar with. Yes, the objective conditions were terrible, oppressive, practically overwhelming, etc. But even within that context, the question remains: were there no alternatives to Lenin’s strategic decisions? Might other approaches have led to different outcomes? There is no guarantee, of course; but they might have. So, the question deserves discussion.

Paul Le Blanc

I will take the essays up in the order they came to my attention, starting with Paul Le Blanc’s piece, “Saying goodbye to Lenin?” Paul is a Lenin scholar who has read just about everything there is to read about Lenin and has at hand a wealth of information and an abundance of quotations. He devotes much of his essay to refuting my claim that Lenin was an authoritarian or, as I wrote, that “Lenin’s conception of the party was from the beginning authoritarian, and as the man who dominated the party’s leadership, he was the ultimate authority.”

To refute my claim, Paul quotes people from all social classes, walks of life and political stripes. Here are a few examples of what Paul writes:

According to so sharp a political opponent as the prominent Menshevik Raphael Abramovitch, who knew him personally and spent time visiting with him and his companion Nadezhda Krupskaya in their 1916 Swiss exile, “it is difficult to conceive of a simpler, kinder and more unpretentious person than Lenin at home.”...

“I have never met anyone who could laugh so infectiously as Vladimir Ilyich,” commented Maxim Gorky. “…implacable in his hatred of the capitalist world, could laugh so naively, could laugh to tears, barely able to catch his breath.”

While interesting anecdotes, they do not address my argument. In writing about Lenin’s authoritarianism, I was not talking about his social graces. Lenin may have been a delightful dinner party guest, a wonderful conversationalist and a man who enjoyed a good laugh. But the issue is not his personality; it is his political character and mentality. The question is not whether Lenin was a nice guy in social situations, but whether his political decisions — especially the eleven that I listed — had an authoritarian character and a dangerously anti-democratic impact.

Paul quotes from different documents in which Lenin wrote about the importance of democracy. Lenin often wrote about the significance of democracy but, to put it crudely, talk is cheap. Or as Stalin once said (and others before and after him have said): “Paper will put up with anything that is written on it.” The question is not what Lenin said or wrote, but what he did.

In the eleven cases I gave, he chose an authoritarian position over a democratic one. As a counterexample, had Lenin taken a different approach to politics from the start — one that involved compromise and coalition-building — he might have been able to create a genuine multi-party governing coalition with the several working-class parties in the soviets, an alliance that could have withstood the challenges of the revolution’s first couple of years.

Anthony Teso

In his reply, “Lenin, democracy and the anti-Leninist shortcut,” Teso writes:

La Botz’s argument is weakened by its historical framing. He interprets the revolution’s degeneration primarily as a product of Lenin’s moral failures, largely abstracted from its material context: civil war, foreign invasion, economic collapse, famine, social fragmentation and international isolation. Lenin appears as a moral tragedian rather than an historical actor shaped by objective forces. Such an approach substitutes moral condemnation for historical materialist analysis grounded in concrete conditions.

Teso’s is the classic Trotskyist argument: that the revolution was frustrated and degenerated because of the factors he lists. This argument is not wrong. Those overwhelming factors were tremendously important, and I mentioned all of them in my article. But my question is still: given those factors, what decisions did Lenin and the Bolsheviks make at each turn?

Teso writes, quite rightly: “Revolutions are not mechanical sequences; each Bolshevik decision was shaped by the shifting and coercive pressures of war, famine, sabotage and social disintegration.” I hardly disagree at all with Teso’s explanation, and he agrees with a good deal of my criticism, writing:

Lenin must be criticized rigorously: the ban on factions, the suppression of Kronstadt, one-party rule, the subordination of unions, and the roots of substitutionism, all demand serious reckoning. But that criticism should be conducted from within a Marxist framework, not from the standpoint of a disillusioned liberal democrat startled by the violence and complexity of revolutionary history.

Again, I do not disagree with putting criticism in its historical context. But that history — ruthless and relentless as it was — did not deprive Lenin and the Bolsheviks of their volition.

The situation was complex and a Marxist framework is useful in understanding it. However, I do not believe that war, foreign invasion, a bad harvest and starvation determined Lenin’s and the Bolsheviks’ behavior. They still exercised free will and made crucial decisions that ultimately determined the revolution’s course. Is it not the case that at each turning point Teso lists, Lenin chose an authoritarian response? And that those decisions accumulated, creating an ever more authoritarian culture, party and regime?

I do disagree strongly with one claim Teso makes, however. He writes: “The Bolsheviks did not secure power solely through manipulation or organizational centralism.” No, not solely. But their organizational centralism and manipulation were fundamental to their methods. The Bolsheviks seized state power without polling the working class and without consulting the other workers’ parties, who were simply informed that parliament had been dispersed and the soviets were now the state. The Bolsheviks also misled the public about the Kronstadt Rebellion they crushed. Centralism and manipulation were key to the Bolshevik revolution.

John Marot

Marot, an incisive historian of the Russian Revolution, turns away from my questions about the decisions Lenin and the Bolsheviks made, arguing we can only understand the issues in terms of “the social-property relations of late Imperial Russia.” In his response to my article, “The rise and fall of ‘Leninism’,” Marot writes:

We cannot ignore the constraints and opportunities for historic action that the Bolshevik Party, the peasantry, the proletariat, and the petty bourgeoisie faced after the destruction of the landed aristocracy and its near-absolutist feudal state.

This is another, more complicated and subtle, version of Teso’s argument: the conditions Russian revolutionaries faced determined the outcome of the revolution. Again, I agree, but the question is still: what did Lenin and the Bolsheviks do, given those “constraints and opportunities”? Marot’s approach, like Teso’s (even if they would disagree about particulars) asks us to look at the big picture, the historic context, to explain and justify Lenin’s decisions.

The largest elements of that bigger picture are Russia’s backwardness, enormous peasantry, reactionary tsarist feudal rulers, and retarded and underdeveloped bourgeoisie. Within that context, Russia’s revolutionaries faced civil war, foreign invasion, harvest failures and starvation, leading to rebellions against the new revolutionary government. Marot writes:

If social-property relations are at all relevant in political matters, as Second International Marxists affirmed, then socialism was not possible in NEP Russia — no matter what policy was pursued. But if socialism was possible had the Bolsheviks adopted “democratic” policies, as Dan La Botz argues in “Goodbye to Lenin and Leninism,” then social-property relations were not an insurmountable obstacle to socialist progress — if there was a democratic will, there was a democratic way. Holding both positions is untenable.

In my essay, I never argued the Russian Revolution could have been saved if Lenin had chosen to fight for more democratic structures. I do not know — and no one can know — if democratic decisions would have opened a democratic path that could have saved the revolution from its terrible destiny.

But let us look at the case Marot raises. He analyzes and justifies Lenin’s dispersal of the Constituent Assembly, chosen by the country’s first democratic election, on the basis that the peasants, who made up the majority of the Russian population, had voted the wrong way and voted for the wrong party. Both the Right (and Left) Social Revolutionaries (SRs) leaders and cadres, Marot tells us, were almost exclusively drawn from “zemstvo [local government] administrative personnel: surveyors, teachers, nurses, agronomists, veterinarians, lawyers, doctors and other professionals.” The Right SRs opposed distributing land to the peasants and thus became counterrevolutionaries.

One wonders if, rather than dispersing the assembly, Lenin and the Bolsheviks — who, after all, had 25% of the Constituent Assembly and a majority in the soviets — could have carried out a campaign in the assembly, the soviets and in society to win over the peasant majority to the Bolshevik’s Land Decree, which abolished private land ownership, confiscated without compensation land from the nobility, church and monasteries, and authorized its redistribution among the peasantry? Instead, the Bolsheviks used force to disperse the assembly and proclaimed the rule of the soviets, which they dominated.

Peasants seized and distributed land, though a few years later, amid the civil war, the Bolsheviks organized grain seizures for the army and the cities. Then, as Marot explains, in just over a decade, “Twenty-five million peasant households were forcibly transformed into a few thousand collective farms, the kolkhoz.” Peasants no longer owned their land and had no right. Was Lenin’s path really the only option?

Le Blanc, Teso, and Marot are all correct to argue that one must look at the larger historical context. Karl Marx wrote in his famous pamphlet, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.

On the basis of those circumstances, men and women nevertheless do make decisions, and there are usually alternatives that could have been chosen.

My view is that full socialism was impossible in Russia in 1920, but different decisions could have led to a democratic state, one that in the future could have led to a socialist society. And yet Lenin tended to choose the alternative that kept power in his hands, increasing the Bolsheviks’ control over events while rejecting other more democratic options. Would the revolution have been saved if Lenin had made more democratic decisions? We will never know. But we do know that the decisions he made piled up until finally leading to the bureaucratic collectivist, totalitarian state that was the Soviet Union.

Let me end with the same words I ended my original essay with:

One does not need Lenin to be a socialist or a revolutionary. One does not need Lenin to create a socialist organization. One needs only socialist principles, democratic discussion and members’ commitment and self-discipline. Our socialist organizations must be genuinely and thoroughly democratic, including in their relations with the labor and social movements. Democracy is at the heart of our socialism. Luxemburg was right: there is no socialism without democracy, and no democracy without socialism.

Dan La Botz is editor of New Politics. You can find out more about La Botz and his writings at danlabotzwritings.com




When Our Word Is No Longer Good

by | May 26, 2026 Antiwar.com

The pattern of media reports – based on White House leaks – that an agreement with Iran is almost completed has become predictable. Where once the markets fluctuated wildly (and some insiders made huge profits with the information), each time we hear that the deal is almost complete only to see it fall through, the markets barely move.

It is dangerous to have a US Administration that no one in the US or the rest of the world believes. When White House “sources” claim a deal is in sight only to have President Trump post another AI graphic of the US military – or himself – firing missiles at Iran, the futility of engaging with the United States becomes reinforced to the rest of the world.

This is not projecting strength. It is signaling moral and ethical bankruptcy. And it is dangerous. In a world where no other country sees value in negotiating to end disputes with the US government, the only solution is to prepare to use force against it.

A US government whose word is no good will soon find a world that refuses to speak with it.

That is what we have seen with the Iranian response to the US surprise attacks of last June and this February 28th. Two times the US used lies and deception that we were negotiating as an honest partner as cover for a pre-planned attack. How can any country negotiate in such circumstances?

There is a word for this: nihilism. It is the belief that there is no truth. Only the convenient lies and deceptions to force one’s will. Governmental nihilism leads to bankruptcies both financial and moral. Nearly $40 trillion in debt demonstrates the former bankruptcy, while our foreign policy of war and aggression demonstrates the latter.

A world that sees force as the only way to negotiate with the United States may not attack us immediately. But it will prepare to do so. That is what Iran has done for the past four decades. That is what our “rivals” China and Russia have done. Others are following suit.

The government and its neocon mouthpieces continue to propagandize the American people that we have the strongest military in the history of the world. And while it is true that we have a powerful military, more expensive than most others combined and capable of projecting force worldwide, it is also irrelevant.

Despite the relentless propaganda of “War Secretary” Hegseth, we are slowly learning the truth about the US war of aggression against Iran. Just a few weeks of fighting has nearly depleted our arsenal while barely denting that of Iran. Despite the US Administration’s initial claims that 90 percent or more of Iran’s military was destroyed, we now know that the opposite is the case: nearly 90 percent of Iran’s military remains intact.

What we should have learned from 20 years wasted in Afghanistan – that a nation fighting for its homeland has an immense advantage – has still not been learned.

Having the “most powerful military in the world” is irrelevant if the US continues to pursue a global military empire. There will never be a military strong enough for that. It is a lesson we have just learned in Iran.

If the American people are not willing to demand that their elected officials uphold the Constitution and restore our good name as honest brokers, I am afraid the future consequences of our current nihilism will be grave.

Ron PaulRon Paul is a former Republican congressman from Texas. He was the 1988 Libertarian Party candidate for president.

Support Our Troops: What It Really Means

by | May 25, 2026Antiwar.com

The other day, I was reading an old Atlantic Monthly and came across the following cartoon:

That is one powerful image. I like the tiny heads on the pallbearers. They make me think of the posturing politicians who tell us to “support our troops” while sending them to die in illegal, immoral, and unconstitutional wars.

That cartoon was published near the end of 2007, when America’s disastrous war of choice in Iraq was supposedly improving due to the Petraeus Surge. Of course, General David Petraeus qualified his surge by saying its gains might prove “fragile” and “reversible.” And so they proved.

“Support our troops” is a catchphrase, almost a mantra, often used by cynical politicians to suppress dissent about their disastrous wars of choice. Basically, dissenters are accused of being unpatriotic because their criticism allegedly betrays the troops and weakens national resolve. It’s a BS argument but it’s often compelling and even convincing to some.

Americans have a civic religion defined by the Pledge of Allegiance, the flag, the National Anthem, military parades and pageantry, and U.S. history taught as heritage and as a celebration of American goodness and greatness. When you step outside of that, when you criticize it, dissent from it, you must be prepared to be attacked as a heretic.

Back in 2010, I wrote an article for TomDispatch in which I argued that not every American troop is a hero. I argued instead that real heroes are few and far between, and that the ideal of heroism shouldn’t be associated so closely, even almost exclusively, with military service. These are obvious points (to me, at least), but I took some flak for suggesting that merely donning a military uniform doesn’t and shouldn’t make one a “hero.”

I remain convinced that hyping the troops as universal “heroes” isn’t a form of support. The troops know better. If you truly want to support them, listen to them. Be an informed and knowledgeable citizen. Speak your mind and don’t be afraid to criticize those who seek to use the military for dishonorable or indefensible purposes.

Since this is America, theoretically land of the free, feel free as well to speak out against the military. Our founders were suspicious of large standing armies and were wary of wars as being especially pernicious to democracy.

We Americans celebrate our troops for defending freedom, yet we paradoxically attack those who try to exercise their freedom by denouncing war and militarism. You can’t have it both ways. Unless you want hypocrisy instead of democracy, you can’t celebrate freedom while denying it.

This was, of course, the so-called original sin of the American republic: celebrating freedom while also enshrining the institution of slavery. Rank hypocrisy led inexorably to the U.S. Civil War.

As a retired U.S. military officer, I’ve been thanked for my service more often than I’ve been denounced as a murderous agent of American empire. It’s easy to accept the thanks; slurs and attacks are what they are. People sometimes think to defame or demean others is a way to elevate themselves. So be it.

Another aspect of “support our troops” is communal ritual to mark the passing of local “heroes.” Such rituals take various forms. In my community, one involves a mass motorcycle ride in memory of “fallen” troops killed since 9/11. The language used is that of America’s civic religion, celebrating our “great country” and those “heroes” who’ve made the “ultimate sacrifice.”

It’s easy to acquiesce to that language and sentiment. It’s also easy to attack it and dismiss it as patriotic claptrap.

I see it as something else: a communal rite. A recognition of sacrifice. Even if that sacrifice was not in a worthy cause.

I’m not a fan of these communal rituals and the often cynical uses to which they’re put, but I recognize their potency and the need of some people to participate in them. It’s a collective expression of belonging, of grief, of community. A place to find meaning.

A reader put it very well to me in response to my article on heroes in 2010. I saved the letter and have never quoted from it before but I’d like to do so now:

I think the reason we see the “heroification” of so many is a desperate need of so many to feel a sense of self worth. This is especially true in the working class, who have seen their cultural value, their hopes for the future and the quality of their lives decline so radically in recent decades.

This week here in town we see the massive outpouring for the fallen Marine by those who need so desperately to feel a part of something bigger than themselves, when someone like themselves is honored. I see this as poignant in ways that go far beyond the family’s loss.

This is well and sensitively put. How often in our communal settings are “ordinary” people celebrated for anything? Our culture most often celebrates the rich, the powerful, Hollywood and sports “stars,” while neglecting the everyday heroism (or, if not heroism, acts of generosity) of people from all walks of life.

In sum, “our” troops don’t want to put on pedestals and plinths. They certainly don’t want to be carried in flag-draped caskets. And most don’t want to be celebrated as heroes because they know they haven’t earned it. What they want, I think, is to be understood. What they don’t want is to be wasted, to be betrayed, to be misused.

Who among us would want to see their life as a waste, who would wish to be betrayed, who would seek to be misused?

With Memorial Day approaching, it is good to ponder the wise words of Andy Rooney in the video below. Troops don’t give their lives. Their lives are taken from them. Something so precious shouldn’t be taken so lightly by leaders with neither compassion nor conscience. Even better, as Andy Rooney suggests, is a future where war withers away and peace brings out the very best in us.

Reprinted from Bracing Views with the author’s permission.

William J. Astore, a retired lieutenant colonel (USAF), professor of history, and a senior fellow at the Eisenhower Media Network (EMN), an organization of critical veteran military and national security professionals. His personal substack is Bracing Views.