Thursday, May 28, 2026

The Political Process In Morocco: Monarchy, Reform, And Incremental Democracy – Analysis

May 27, 2026 
By Dr. Mohamed Chtatou


This essay provides a comprehensive analysis of the political process in Morocco, examining the structural role of the monarchy, the development of constitutional governance, party politics, civil society, and the contested trajectory of democratisation. Drawing on comparative political theory, historical institutionalism, and empirical scholarship, it argues that Moroccan politics is best understood not as a failed or stalled democracy, but as a distinctive hybrid regime in which the Makhzen — the royal palace and its networks — continuously recalibrates relations with elected institutions, political parties, and social movements to preserve monarchical centrality while accommodating pressures for reform. The 2011 constitutional reforms, the rise and fall of Islamist party government, sub-national governance, gender politics, and the structural constraints imposed by rentier dynamics and regional geopolitics are examined in detail. The essay concludes that Morocco’s political trajectory reflects a calculated strategy of adaptive governance that, while preserving significant space for pluralism, stops well short of genuine power-sharing.


1. Introduction

Morocco occupies a singular position in the comparative politics of the Arab world. It is simultaneously one of the most politically liberalised states in the MENA region and a country in which real executive authority remains firmly concentrated in the hands of a monarch whose legitimacy is simultaneously constitutional, religious, and dynastic. This combination of formal pluralism and substantive monarchical dominance has attracted extensive scholarly attention, generating debates about whether Morocco represents a genuine experiment in gradual democratisation, a durable monarchy employing liberalisation as a regime-maintenance strategy, or something genuinely novel that resists familiar analytical categories (Brumberg, 2002; Maghraoui, 2002; Catusse, 2008).

The question is not merely academic. Morocco is a strategic partner of the European Union and the United States, a recipient of significant development assistance, a country that has managed thus far to avoid the violent ruptures experienced by its neighbours, and a society undergoing rapid socioeconomic transformation driven by urbanisation, demographic change, and integration into global markets. Understanding how its political system actually works — how power is organised, how demands are processed, and how change does or does not occur — is therefore a matter of both scholarly and policy importance (Denoeux & Gateau, 1995; Storm, 2007).

This essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 establishes the historical foundations of the modern Moroccan state, tracing the consolidation of the post-independence political order. Section 3 analyses the constitutional architecture and the structural role of the monarchy. Section 4 examines party politics and electoral institutions. Section 5 considers the dynamics of civil society and social movements, with particular attention to the 2011 protests. Section 6 addresses sub-national governance and decentralisation. Section 7 analyses gender and representation. Section 8 reflects on external dimensions of Moroccan politics, including the Western Sahara conflict. Section 9 offers concluding reflections on the prospects for political change.

2. Historical Foundations of the Modern Moroccan State

Modern Moroccan politics cannot be understood without reference to its pre-colonial, colonial, and immediately post-independence history. The Sharifian state — legitimised by the Sultan’s descent from the Prophet Muhammad — possessed a distinctive character that distinguished Morocco from the Ottoman provinces of the Mashriq. The Sultan’s dual role as political sovereign and Commander of the Faithful (Amîr al-Mu’minîn) fused temporal and religious authority in ways that proved extraordinarily resilient across the upheavals of colonialism and independence (Hammoudi, 1997; Pennell, 2000).

French and Spanish colonialism (1912–1956) paradoxically reinforced certain dimensions of this authority. The French protectorate, operating through the fiction of indirect rule, preserved the formal institution of the sultanate even as it hollowed out its effective power. This created a complex dynamic: the Sultan retained symbolic authority and became a focus of nationalist sentiment, while real administrative and economic power was exercised by the French Résidence. Sultan Mohammed V’s exile by the French in 1953 and his triumphant return in 1955 transformed him from a religious figurehead into a nationalist hero, dramatically amplifying the legitimacy of the monarchy in the post-independence period (Leveau, 1985; Pennell, 2000).

Morocco’s Mohammed V. Photo Credit: Fotograaf Onbekend / Anefo, Wikipedia Commons

Independence in 1956 inaugurated a struggle over the organisation of political authority. The Istiqlal Party, which had led the nationalist movement, anticipated a leading role in the post-independence order. Mohammed V, however, moved quickly to assert monarchical prerogatives, appointing governments, managing relations with political parties, and using the armed forces and security services as direct instruments of royal power. His son and successor Hassan II, who reigned from 1961 to 1999, institutionalised a form of royal autocracy that relied on divide-and-rule tactics among political parties, a sprawling patronage network known as the Makhzen, periodic but severe repression — particularly during the Years of Lead (les années de plomb) of the 1970s and 1980s — and the mobilising force of the Western Sahara issue, which became central to Moroccan national identity (Entelis, 1989; Slyomovics, 2005).

The transition from Hassan II to Mohammed VI in 1999 was widely anticipated as an opportunity for political opening. The new king initially signalled reformist intent, dismissing the powerful Interior Minister Driss Basri, establishing the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) to address past human rights abuses, and promising a new concept of authority (nouveau concept de l’autorité). These early gestures generated considerable optimism domestically and internationally, though scholars rapidly noted that structural reform of monarchical power remained off the table (Monjib, 2011; Vermeren, 2009).

3. Constitutional Architecture and the Role of the Monarchy

Morocco has had a succession of constitutions — in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, 1996, and most recently 2011 — each reflecting the political conditions of its moment and each preserving the structural centrality of the monarchy. The 2011 constitution, adopted by referendum in July of that year, represents the most significant formal expansion of parliamentary and governmental powers in Moroccan constitutional history, though its practical implementation has been characterised by what Fernández-Molina (2011) terms selective constitutionalisation — the selective uptake of constitutional provisions in ways that do not fundamentally alter the distribution of real political power (Chtatou, 2023, May 27 ; Chtatou, 2025, October 7).

The 2011 constitution formally establishes Morocco as a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social monarchy (Article 1). It recognises Amazigh as an official language alongside Arabic (Article 5), incorporates a significantly expanded bill of rights including gender equality and protection from torture, and strengthens the independence of the judiciary (Articles 107–128). Crucially, it requires the king to appoint the prime minister — renamed Head of Government — from the party that wins the most seats in parliamentary elections (Article 47), a provision applied for the first time after the November 2011 elections (Madani, Maghraoui, & Zerhouni, 2012).

Nevertheless, the constitution preserves and in some respects reinforces extensive monarchical prerogatives. The king remains Commander of the Faithful (Article 41), chairs the Council of Ministers (Article 48), presides over the Supreme Security Council (Article 54), appoints ambassadors, senior military officers, and governors (Article 49), and retains the power to dissolve parliament (Article 51). The concept of royal arbitration (Article 42) gives the king an ill-defined but potentially expansive role as guardian of the constitutional order. Vairel (2014) argues that the 2011 reforms represented a defensive constitutionalisation designed to absorb protest energy without transferring genuine decision-making authority.

Scholars working within a comparative politics framework have debated how to classify the Moroccan regime. For Brumberg (2002), Morocco exemplifies liberalised autocracy — a regime that institutionalises enough pluralism to generate legitimacy and foreign support while preventing genuine contestation over fundamental power arrangements. Maghraoui (2002) speaks of political authority in crisis, pointing to the growing gap between formal institutional design and the personalised, patrimonial reality of how decisions are actually made. More recently, Dalmasso (2012) has applied the concept of authoritarian upgrading (Heydemann, 2007) to the Moroccan case, arguing that the 2011 reforms represent not liberalisation but adaptation — the reequilibration of the regime in response to changed constraints.

4. Party Politics and Electoral Institutions

Morocco has a large, fractured, and historically unstable multi-party system that reflects both the structural incentives created by royal divide-and-rule strategies and genuine ideological and social cleavages within Moroccan society. As of the mid-2020s, the party system includes parties rooted in nationalism (Istiqlal), the left (the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, USFP; the Party of Progress and Socialism, PPS), liberal conservatism (the National Rally of Independents, RNI; the Popular Movement, MP), Islamism (the Justice and Development Party, PJD), and royal-aligned technocratic formations (the Authenticity and Modernity Party, PAM) (Willis, 2012; Zerhouni, 2004).

The PJD’s trajectory over the decade following 2011 represents perhaps the most significant and instructive episode in recent Moroccan party politics. Having won the most seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections in the wake of the Arab Spring protests, the PJD formed a governing coalition under Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, who became widely popular for his combative, populist communication style. Benkirane’s government pursued a cautious reform agenda — fiscal consolidation, subsidy reform, and modest anti-corruption measures — while maintaining a broadly cooperative relationship with the palace (Daadaoui, 2013).

The limits of this cohabitation were made apparent in 2016–2017, when, following elections in which the PJD again performed strongly, King Mohammed VI declined to ratify Benkirane’s proposed coalition and eventually asked his less confrontational colleague Saad Eddine El Othmani to form a government instead. This episode — labelled the blocage (blockage) — crystallised for many observers the structural constraints on genuine parliamentary government in Morocco: even a party with a strong popular mandate governed within a framework set by the palace, and could be removed from that framework at royal discretion (Wegner, 2011; Catusse & Dazi-Héni, 2017).


The 2021 elections produced a further and more decisive reconfiguration of the party landscape. The PJD suffered a historic collapse, losing over ninety percent of its seats in a result many analysts attributed to a combination of policy failures — particularly in the management of COVID-19 and the normalisation of relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, both conducted without meaningful parliamentary consultation — internal divisions, and a campaign context in which PAM and RNI, both regarded as close to the palace, were electorally dominant. RNI leader Aziz Akhannouch was appointed Head of Government. The election underscored that while competitive elections impose real costs on parties that fail, the structural parameters of competition are set by the monarchy (Boussaid, 2022).

Electoral institutions in Morocco have been repeatedly modified in ways that fragment party representation and prevent any single party from accumulating a commanding parliamentary majority. Proportional representation with regional lists and low electoral thresholds encourages the multiplication of parties and coalition government, which in turn increases the palace’s role as coalition broker and reduces the leverage of any individual party or prime minister. Sater (2007) argues that this institutional design reflects a deliberate monarchical strategy of institutional proliferation — the creation of multiple, overlapping, competing political actors whose rivalry structures and stabilises monarchical governance (Chtatou, 2025, October 7).


5. Civil Society, Social Movements, and the 2011 Protests

Civil society in Morocco is extensive, heterogeneous, and politically consequential, though its relationship to formal political institutions remains complex and in many respects constrained. The associational landscape includes human rights organisations (notably the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, AMDH, and the Official Advisory Council on Human Rights, CNDH), women’s rights organisations, Amazigh cultural associations, development NGOs, trade unions, professional associations, and youth movements. This dense associational life reflects both genuine civic energy and, in part, the strategic cultivation of civil society by the state as an alternative arena for managing social demands that might otherwise take more disruptive forms (Cavatorta & Dalmasso, 2009).

The February 20 Movement (Mouvement du 20 Février, M20F) that emerged in the context of the 2011 Arab Spring represented the most significant mobilisation of popular political energy in contemporary Moroccan history. Beginning with a demonstration on 20 February 2011 that drew tens of thousands of participants in cities across Morocco, the movement called for a new constitution, an end to corruption, genuine parliamentary government, and the release of political prisoners. It drew together a heterogeneous coalition including secular leftists, Islamists from the banned Al Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Benevolence), youth activists, Amazigh organisations, and human rights defenders (Vairel, 2014; Zaki, 2011).

The monarchy’s response was rapid, strategic, and ultimately effective in demobilising the movement. In a landmark speech on 9 March 2011, King Mohammed VI announced a process of constitutional reform, ultimately producing the July 2011 constitution described above. By accepting the form of the movement’s constitutional demands while retaining control of the drafting process through a royal commission rather than an elected constituent assembly, the palace channelled protest energy into a controlled institutional channel. The M20F’s demand for a real constitution articulated by the people was deflected into a royal constitution endorsed in a referendum marked by high official turnout figures that many civil society organisations disputed (Sater, 2016; Maghraoui, 2011).

Since 2011, social mobilisation has continued in various forms. The Hirak Rif movement emerged in the northern Rif region in 2016 following the death of fishmonger Mouhcine Fikri, initially focusing on socioeconomic grievances — unemployment, lack of development, and historical marginalisation of the Rif — before escalating into broader demands for political accountability. The movement’s leaders, including Nasser Zefzafi, were arrested in 2017, tried for threatening state security, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in proceedings that attracted significant criticism from international human rights organisations (Amnesty International, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2017). The Hirak episode illustrated both the vitality of grassroots mobilisation in Morocco and the firm limits the state places on movements it judges to constitute a structural challenge to the existing order (Chtatou, 2023, May 27).

6. Sub-National Governance and Decentralisation

Morocco’s 2011 constitution and subsequent organic laws introduced a significant reform of sub-national governance, formally establishing the principle of advanced regionalisation (régionalisation avancée) and creating twelve new regions with elected regional councils and presidents. This reform was framed by the royal discourse as a means of devolving power, enhancing local democracy, and accelerating development, particularly in peripheral regions — the Oriental, the south, and the Rif — characterised by high rates of poverty and emigration (Bergh, 2012).

In practice, decentralisation in Morocco reflects the general pattern of Moroccan political reform: a genuine extension of formal institutional capacity at the sub-national level combined with the continuation of significant central oversight through appointed Walis and governors who represent the Ministry of the Interior and retain substantial de facto authority. Regional councils have real budgetary resources and administrative competencies, but major development projects continue to be driven by royal initiatives through specialised agencies — such as the Agence du Sud, which coordinates development in the southern provinces — that operate outside the regular democratic framework (Catusse, Destremau, & Verdier, 2010).

The relationship between decentralisation and democracy in Morocco thus exhibits what Bergh (2012) calls a dual track: a formal track of elected regional governance with increasing technical capacity, and an informal track of royal-appointed technocratic management that handles the most strategically significant investment and development decisions. Whether this duality will evolve towards a more integrated and genuinely participatory model of sub-national governance remains an open and contested question in both scholarship and political debate (Chtatou, 2025, October 7).

7. Gender, Representation, and the Politics of Women’s Rights

The politics of gender in Morocco illustrates, with particular clarity, the complex interplay between top-down royal reform, bottom-up civil society pressure, Islamist political mobilisation, and patriarchal social structures that characterises Moroccan political life more broadly. The 2004 reform of the Mudawwana (family code), which raised the minimum age of marriage for women to 18, introduced judicial divorce on the wife’s initiative (khul), restricted polygamy, and equalised parental authority, is widely regarded as among the most significant legislative achievements in Morocco’s post-independence history. The reform was made possible by a distinctive political conjuncture: sustained mobilisation by women’s organisations, the political marginalisation of Islamist opposition following the 2003 Casablanca bombings, and the personal endorsement of King Mohammed VI (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006; Charrad, 2001).


Political representation of women has been addressed through a combination of reserved seats, national lists, and party quotas, producing a gradual but uneven increase in parliamentary representation. Women held approximately 21% of seats in the House of Representatives following the 2016 elections, a figure that, while well above the regional average, remains far below gender parity and reflects the limited organic integration of women into party structures and local political networks (Sater, 2007; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021). At the local government level, the 2015 elections produced significant increases in women’s representation on communal councils, partly as a result of a legislative requirement that one-third of seats on municipal councils be allocated to women through dedicated lists (Benali & Moudden, 2016).


Formal legal progress coexists with persistent structural challenges. Violence against women, discrimination in inheritance law, and the practical inaccessibility of certain family law provisions continue to draw criticism from feminist organisations and international monitoring bodies. The intersection of gender with class, rural-urban divides, and regional disparities means that the experience of Moroccan women is highly heterogeneous: urban, educated, middle-class women have generally benefited most from formal rights reforms, while rural, less-educated, and poorer women face more significant barriers to accessing legal protections (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006; Ennaji, 2016).

8. External Dimensions: Western Sahara, Regional Politics, and International Pressures

The Western Sahara conflict represents the most consequential external dimension of Moroccan domestic politics, functioning simultaneously as a source of national mobilisation, and a permanent fixture of Moroccan foreign policy. Morocco occupied the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara in 1975 following the Green March organised by Hassan II, and has since administered most of its territory, claiming sovereignty not recognised by international law or the United Nations but supported by key partners including France and the United States (Jensen, 2005; Zunes & Mundy, 2010).

The Sahara issue exercises a significant disciplining effect on Moroccan domestic politics. The boundaries of legitimate political debate are defined in part by an implicit consensus that Morocco’s claim to the territory is non-negotiable, and critics — including journalists, bloggers, and political activists — who have questioned this consensus have faced criminal prosecution under provisions of the penal code relating to threats to territorial integrity. The 2020 US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, secured as part of the Abraham Accords normalisation of relations between Morocco and Israel, represented a significant diplomatic achievement for Rabat and further entrenched the monarchy’s role as manager of Morocco’s strategic interests (Maghraoui, 2021).

Morocco’s relations with the European Union, its primary trade partner and a major source of development assistance and remittances, are structured through an association agreement and bilateral arrangements covering trade, migration management, fisheries, and agricultural exports. The EU’s democracy promotion agenda has had limited effect on Moroccan political reform, partly because EU member states, particularly France and Spain, prioritise the strategic management of migration and security cooperation over normative pressure for democratisation. Scholars working on EU-MENA relations have identified Morocco as a paradigm case of the disjunction between the formal democracy-promotion rhetoric of EU external policy and the actual incentive structures shaping bilateral relations (Bicchi, 2007; Cavatorta & Durac, 2010).

9. Conclusion: Adaptive Governance and the Prospects for Political Change

Morocco’s political process, as this essay has demonstrated across multiple dimensions, is characterised by a distinctive and durable form of hybrid governance. The monarchy has shown remarkable capacity to adapt to changed circumstances — the 1999 royal transition, the 2003 terrorist attacks, the 2011 Arab Spring, the COVID-19 pandemic, shifting regional geopolitics — without relinquishing its structural centrality. Constitutional reform, electoral competition, civil society activity, and significant legislative changes across multiple domains have all occurred within a framework that consistently preserves the monarchy’s ultimate authority over major national decisions (Chtatou, 2023, May 27).

This essay has argued, following Heydemann (2007), Dalmasso (2012), and others, that this pattern is best understood as adaptive governance — a regime strategy that employs liberalisation instrumentally, tolerates and even encourages pluralism within defined limits, and responds to mobilisation not with simple repression but with a sophisticated combination of co-optation, institutional reform, and, when necessary, targeted repression of those who transgress structural limits. The comparison with the Arab Spring trajectories of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria underscores the relative effectiveness of this strategy in terms of regime survival, though whether it constitutes a path to genuine democratisation or merely its indefinite simulation remains deeply contested (Chtatou, 2025, October 7).

Several dynamics may put pressure on this equilibrium in the coming decades. The youth bulge — a large, educated, urbanised, and digitally connected young population with high unemployment and frustrated aspirations — generates ongoing demand for more genuine political participation and economic inclusion. The weakening of traditional party organisations, the rise of new forms of social mobilisation, and the increasing salience of corruption as a political issue all create new sources of pressure. Climate change and water scarcity, to which Morocco is acutely vulnerable, will test governance capacity in ways that formal institutions may be poorly designed to address.

Ultimately, the prospects for political change in Morocco will depend on whether the monarchy can continue to manage these pressures through its established repertoire of adaptive strategies, or whether the accumulation of unmet demands generates mobilisation sufficient to force a genuine redistribution of political authority. The scholarly consensus, as of the mid-2020s, inclines toward continuity over transformation.

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In Sudan’s war economy, gold keeps flowing as miners risk mercury and collapse



Published:

Miner Atta al-Khazin, right, shows a gold nugget produced by artisanal miners after processing ore at a mining site in Dalago Mahas, Sudan's Northern State, Friday, May 8, 2026.(AP Photo/Mohnd Blal)

DAGALO MAHAS, Sudan — The men carried metal detectors as they scanned a mountainous area in northern Sudan in search of gold. One man knelt to examine the ground with a digging tool for the precious metal in an environment that lacks even the most basic safety measures.

They are unregulated miners working in a small-scale private gold mine in the northern town of Dalgo Mahas. The mine is one of thousands of small-scale and artisanal mines scattered across Sudan, part of a sector that is at the center of the devastating war that has at times pushed parts of the country into famine.

Gold has become a major source of funding for Sudan’s treasury after the country lost over two-thirds of its oil revenues with the secession of South Sudan in 2011. The precious metal accounted for 70 per cent of national revenues in the years that followed South Sudan’s departure, providing the Sudanese government with much-needed foreign currency.

Most recently, gold has been at the center of the ongoing war between the military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Large quantities of gold have been smuggled out of the country to finance paramilitaries, who control gold-producing areas in Darfur and Kordofan regions, according to United Nations-commissioned experts.

The conflict has killed at least 59,000 people, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, a U.S.-based war tracking group that says its toll is almost certainly an underestimate, given the difficulties in reporting.


The war also created the world’s largest humanitarian disaster, forcing over 10 million people to flee their homes. Many displaced people joined the mining industry in order to make ends meet for their families.

“Gold mining is the only thing I can rely on,” said Atta al-Khazin, a 28-year-old miner who abandoned his previous profession as a farmer. “Due to the high oil prices, agriculture no longer covered expenses.”

Zahir Adam, a 35-year-old father from the Darfur city of el-Fasher who worked in gold mining for more than a decade, said the sector has drawn many people since the war broke out over three years ago.

They had “no other option,” he said. “Many young people, and many families, depend on mining.”

Sudan produced 70 tons of gold last year, up from 64 tons in 2024, according to official figures, making it one of Africa’s top producers. Gold generated about US$1.8 billion in revenues in 2025, figures from the state-run Sudanese Mineral Resources Company showed.

Artisanal and small-scale gold mining accounts for the majority of gold extracted in the sprawling country, where safety standards are largely ignored.

Artisanal miners like the men in Dalgo Nahas usually extract the gold, then crush the ore before applying toxic mercury to create the amalgam. The amalgam is then heated, usually on a stove, to evaporate the mercury and recover the gold.

The process, which includes using hazardous chemicals, is also risky for people living near the mines.

Many of these mines are not controlled by the government. The U.N. panel of experts said in their 2024 report that more than 50 per cent of the gold mined in Sudan was not traded through formal channels but was smuggled out of the country.

Deadly mine collapses are not uncommon in Sudan, where safety standards are not widely applied. Last month, at least seven miners were killed in a mine collapse in the Red Sea province. Thirteen others were killed in another collapse in South Kordofan province in January.

A civilian transitional government that ruled the country for over a year after the military overthrow of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 attempted to regulate the crucial industry.

However, its efforts were aborted by a military coup in October 2021, and the war that began in 2023.

Mohnd Blal, The Associated Press


Libya ‘Central Node’ In RSF’s War Machine



Colombian mercenaries Photo Credit: La Silla Vacía, via ADF



May 28, 2026 
By Africa Defense Forum

New reporting on Colombian mercenaries in Sudan’s civil war shows how outside forces have prolonged the conflict and eroded regional stability.

With the help of a Libyan militia called the Subul al-Salam Battalion, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group used southern Libya as a transit corridor, support base and rear operations center in its war against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The Subul al-Salam Battalion, which is associated with the Libyan National Army, facilitated the transfer of recruits, including Colombian mercenaries, weapons and fuel across the border to support the RSF, according to an April 19 report by a United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya.

“The Panel found that Subul al-Salam was involved across multiple stages of the supply chain to the Rapid Support Forces,” the report stated. “Subul al-Salam exercised functional control over key logistical, security and facilitation components required to sustain the transportation of fighters, fuel, arms and related materiel, including militarized vehicles.”

The experts said the RSF in 2025 used a rear base in Libya controlled by Subul al-Salam to coordinate logistical operations from Libyan territory, access the Maateen al-Sarrah Air Base and use the al-Kufra Air Base, which “served both as transit points for Colombian fighters and as sites for the modification of vehicles imported through Libya.”

Colombian mercenaries supplied by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) gave the RSF crucial military support for and participated in the gruesome siege of El-Fasher, North Darfur, in October 2025, according to an April 2026 report by security analysis organization Conflict Insights Group.

“This is the first research where we can prove UAE involvement with certainty,” managing director Justin Lynch told the BBC for an April 22 article. The group’s report “shows mercenaries involved with drones travelling from a UAE base to Sudan before the RSF takeover of el-Fasher.”

As many as 380 Colombian mercenaries have deployed to Sudan since 2024, according to La Silla Vacía, a news website based in Bogotá, Colombia. The mercenaries, known as the Desert Wolves, were associated with a UAE-based company with documented ties to senior Emirati government officials, the report found. The UAE has repeatedly denied accusations by international groups that it provides support to the RSF.

The Desert Wolves brigade, which is composed of four companies of retired Colombian military personnel, reportedly served the RSF as drone pilots, artillerymen and instructors, including “training child soldiers.” In a February 2026 report, the U.N. said that RSF forces committed “widespread atrocities that amount to war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.”

Lynch said his group’s report assessed that the UAE-backed Colombian mercenary network “bears shared responsibility for these outcomes. The scale of atrocities and siege in el-Fasher wouldn’t have happened without the drone operations the mercenaries provided.”

In Libya, Subul al-Salam “directly supported” RSF armed operations by deploying units, providing foreign recruits and escorting RSF-affiliated factions across Libyan territory. The RSF remained present in Libya during the U.N. experts’ reporting period from October 2024 to February 2026, resulting in armed clashes with the SAF in Libya in June 2025.

Seeking to disrupt the RSF’s supply route, the SAF in November 2025 launched airstrikes that targeted shipments of vehicles and foreign fighters in transit from Libya to Sudan.

Ismail Jibril Tisso, a prominent Sudanese researcher and author, said southeastern Libya has become an open corridor for war.

“Libya has shifted from being merely a neighboring state to becoming a central node in a transnational supply network, fueling the Sudan conflict with foreign fighters and military equipment amid a growing war economy,” he wrote in an April 5 analysis for Sudanow Magazine.

“As the conflict expands, the fundamental challenge remains whether states and the international community can contain these networks and restore regional security — before the entire region devolves into an open theater of endless conflict.”


AU CONTRAIRE

Ukrainian Crisis Isn’t Worth A New Cold War – OpEd



BRESHNEV AND KISSINGER
Graffiti painting from 1990 on the Berlin Wall called "My God, Help Me to Survive This Deadly Love", Photo Credit: Joachim F Thurn, German Federal Archives, Wikimedia Commons



May 28, 2026 
IDN
By Jonathan Power

Both the West and Russia have a responsibility to make sure they don’t throw the baby out with the bath water as their quarrel over Ukraine continues. So much has been achieved since the end of the Cold War. Why throw it away because of Ukraine?

Ukraine is, to exaggerate a bit, a marginal country. The tail should never be allowed to wag the dog. Ukraine has never really counted in world affairs in the 200 years of its existence. Only unthought-through politics can inflate a misdemeanour into a capital offence.

Instead, front and centre of their minds, Russia and the Nato countries should think over what they achieved in the years immediately following the Cold War- nothing less than laying the bedrock of a global security system. There were major agreements concluded to ensure control over nuclear and conventional weapons and to guarantee non-proliferation and liquidation of weapons of mass destruction (including Russia’s withdrawal of that part of its nuclear arsenal based in Ukraine).

The UN began to play a much greater role in peacekeeping operations- 49 of the deployments carried out before 2000 were carried out in the 1990s. The number of international conflicts decreased quite significantly. Russia, China, and other former socialist countries, despite differences in their political systems, were integrated into a single global and financial-economic system.

Several attempts were made to legally formalise the new balance of power, culminating in 1990 in a treaty on the reunification of Germany, signed by West and East Germany, the Soviet Union, the US, the UK, and France. There were the Paris Charter of 1990 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, which gave Russia important representation at the NATO table. In addition, the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces Europe Treaty was signed in 1999, and negotiations were held on the joint development of missile defence systems.

The young people of today, not least those who triggered the upheavals in Ukraine with their demonstrations in the Maidan in Kiev over a legal document whose essence few people understood- an association agreement with the EU- were of an average age of approximately 25. That means that when the Cold War ended, and the above efforts to create a new world order were put in place, they were in junior school or early in high school. What did they know? And today’s politicians don’t remind them. Instead, they seem to support a new Cold War by other means.
Russia, NATO, and the Failure of Strategic Vision

In the Russian foreign policy magazine, Russia in Global Affairs, Alexei Arbatov of Moscow’s Institute of World Economy and International Relations, observes that “in the early 1990s the US had a unique historical chance to lead the creation of a new, multilateral world order. However, it unwisely lost this chance. The US suddenly saw itself as ‘the only superpower in the world’. Gripped by euphoria, it began to substitute international law with the law of force, legitimate decisions of the UN Security Council with the directives of the US, and OSCE prerogatives with Nato actions”.

“This policy laid time bombs under the new world order: Nato’s eastward enlargement (begun by President Bill Clinton against all the advice of the US’s academic foreign policy elite, I should add), the forceful partitioning of Yugoslavia and Serbia, the illegal invasion of Iraq, the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The US treated Russia as if it were a loser country, although it was Russia that put an end to the Soviet Empire and the Cold War”.

Russia, under Boris Yeltsin and then Vladimir Putin, took many of these blows on the chin. They decided not to make a fuss. But then, as the blows accumulated and appeared to be hitting harder, Putin decided to go on the offensive and step by step create a bloody-minded Russia. Now, as Arbatov explains, “What ‘world imperialism’ was formerly blamed for- the policy of building up weapons, muscle-flexing, the establishment of military bases abroad and rivalry in arms trade- is now lauded in Russia. Nuclear weapons have acquired an exceptionally positive meaning.”

Russia may have only 3.5% of the world’s GDP- as against the US’s 26%, the EU’s 19%, Japan’s 4% (to give a Western percentage total approaching 50%)- but it has nuclear weapons.

It is time for the older people of the West and Russia- and, most importantly, young people who can barely remember the Cold War- to read their history and demand a stop to the present dangerous confrontation. “Patriotism”, wrote Samuel Johnson in 1775, “Is the last refuge of a scoundrel.” And, as Trotsky wrote, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”

In the last UK election, foreign policy was hardly discussed, likewise in France. In the US, all front-runners in the last election showed little awareness of the good side of the history of the last quarter-century. Are we going to throw the baby out with the bathwater?

The UK Needs A Fairer Voting System – Analysis


May 28, 2026 
 Elcano Royal Institute
By William Chislett

The replacement of Sir Keir Starmer would bring to five the number of UK Prime Ministers since 2022. Of those since 2010 only one of them remained in the post more than three years. None of them was able to convert winning a majority in the general election into completing their five-year mandate. Such political instability is usually associated with third world countries, not with a nation often described as a home of pragmatism.

What are the reasons for this? The most common ones given are the impact of the divisive Brexit, agreed by a narrow margin (52% to 48%) in a referendum in 2019 and which a majority of voters would now like to overturn, the UK’s economic decline and the impact of social media that has deepened polarisation.

But another factor is also increasingly being blamed for the topsy-turviness: the first-past-the-post voting system (FPTP), under which the candidate with the most votes –even when far short of a majority– wins. Not for nothing is FPTP known as ‘winner takes all’, leaving the other parties that fielded candidates with nothing. This would, prima facie, seem fair. After all, there is only one winner in most competitions, and elections are a competition. But deciding which party will govern a country under FPTP is not the same as winning a board game. There are no consolation prizes, which might often soften disappointment and reward effort; those leaving who voted for the losing parties are left feeling disenfranchised.

FPTP gave Britain stable single-party majority governments with both the Conservatives and Labour tending to last their full five-year term in office until 2017 when Teresa May called a snap election in the hope of winning a bigger majority (which did not happen). Boris Johnson then called another early election in 2019. FPTP is used in around one-third of countries, notably in the US and also in Canada and India. MPs serve the constituency they campaign in. As a result they remain in touch with local issues, tackle local problems and have face-to-face contact with their constituents.

A shift occurred in the 2024 election when a record one-third of voters supported none of the three main parties, Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrats. Close to 60% of voters got an MP they did not vote for. Starmer led Labour to a landslide victory, with 411 of the 650 MPs (63.2% of the total) on a mere 33.7% of the vote (see Figure 1). Labour, on that basis, was the most over-represented party, while the hard-right populist Reform UK was the most under-represented (0.8% of the seats on 14.3% of the vote). The Liberal Democrats won a smaller slice of the vote (12.2%) than Reform but because of the nature of FPTP captured 11.1% of the seats.

The UK’s Electoral Reform Society says FPTP is ‘bad for voters, bad for government and bad for democracy’. It said the 2024 result was ‘not only the most disproportional election in British electoral history, but one of the most disproportional seen anywhere in the world’. David Cameron, the Conservative Prime Minister between 2010 and 2016, said the proportional representation (PR) system would allow people into parliament who did not finish first in their constituency in an election and would create a ‘parliament full of second-choices who no one really wanted but didn’t really object to either’. In return, however, for the support of the Liberal Democrats, which enabled him to be able to form a government, Cameron agreed to a referendum in 2011 on the so-called Alternative Vote system –often called Instant Runoff Voting in the US–. It is not a form of PR and is designed to deal with vote splitting. It was rejected by 67% of those who voted.

Spain uses the d’Hondt system of PR. It has produced stable governments, with the Socialists and Popular Party (PP) alternating in power and tending to last their full four-year term in office until 2015 when the political system fragmented with the entry into parliament of two new parties, the hard-left Podemos and the would-be centrist Ciudadanos, and then in 2019 the hard-right VOX. This system, widely used, divides total votes by a series of divisors (1,2,3…) to determine seat allocation and is generally considered to favour larger parties, which helps to form stable majorities.

The PR system is more representative of the electorate and delivers fairer treatment of minority parties and independent candidates. It encourages people to vote and reduces apathy: fewer votes are ‘wasted’ as more people’s preferences are taken into account. It rarely produces an absolute majority for one party and often leads to greater consensus in policy-making. Spain has had majority Socialist and Popular Party governments, partly because in the smaller of the 50 provinces (those with 2-6 seats in Congress) and the way d’Hondt works only the two main parties tend to get elected. Over- and under-representation in PR is much less prevalent than under FPTP. In the 2023 election, the PP, the dominant party, won 39.1% of the seats on 33.1% of the votes (see Figure 2). VOX and the hard-left Sumar won 33 and 31 seats, respectively, on 9.4% and 8.8% of the vote. The Catalan and Basque parties do quite well because they only field candidates in their regions and not nationally.

The disadvantages of PR are that it makes it easier for extreme parties to gain representation (that system applied in the UK’s 2024 election would have given Reform UK around 100 MPs), it can create political gridlock (Spain had four elections between 2015 and 2019 ) and it favours compromise and coalitions that are not always the wisest course when a strong majority government is required to push through much-needed reforms (which some would argue is what Spain needs). It is no surprise that Reform UK is leading the call for PR –it needed 823,522 votes to elect an MP compared with 23,622 for Labour–. It used to be the Liberal Democrats who complained most about FPTP until they did very well in 2024.

Eric Maskin, a Nobel laureate in economics, says PR would make polarisation and fragmentation worse, and voters would no longer have a local MP directly accountable to them. The voting system that would best suit the UK, he argues, is Majority Rule (MR), as it would retain Britain’s traditional and much-loved single-member constituencies, a feature that many would like to keep and which is one of the main reasons why voters are reluctant to move to PR.

Under MR voters would rank the candidates in their constituency (or as many of them as they wish) in order of preference. The winner is then the candidate who would defeat each rival in a head-to-head contest according to the rankings. Maskin compares MR to 10 friends choosing a restaurant for dinner. ‘The four carnivores all prefer Steakhouse to Salad Bar to Tofu Table. Three of the vegetarians have the ranking Salad Bar > Tofu Table > Steakhouse, and the remaining three, Tofu Table > Salad Bar > Steakhouse. Under first-past-the-post, the meat-eaters win; Steakhouse comes first with 40%. But Salad Bar –the winner under MR– is a more democratic choice: 60% prefer it to Steakhouse, and 70% rank it above Tofu Table’.

A fairer voting system than FPTP would not in itself resolve the profound malaise in British politics, but it would make the electorate feel better represented and produce more collaborative governments that, in turn, might put an end to the quick turnover in Prime Ministers.About the author: William Chislett (Oxford, 1951) is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute. He covered Spain’s transition to democracy for The Times of London between 1975 and 1978. He was then based in Mexico City for the Financial Times between 1978 and 1984. He returned to Madrid on a permanent basis in 1986 and since then, among other things, has written more than 20 books on various countries.
Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute
‘No To Ten Million’ Vote: Should Switzerland Cap Its Population? – Analysis


May 28, 2026
By Balz Rigendinger


On June 14, Swiss voters will head to the polls to decide on the “No to ten million” initiative, which seeks to cap immigration. What impact would such a restriction have on the country?

How did this initiative come about?

The right-wing Swiss People’s Party launched the “No to ten million” immigration initiative, arguing that immigration had increased in an uncontrolled manner since 2007 and that the population could soon exceed the ten-million mark (it is currently 9.1 million). Now, it says, it is time for Switzerland to pull the emergency brake.

After previous immigration initiatives in 2014 and 2020, this is the third time Switzerland’s largest party has put forward a proposal with a similar aim. Voters narrowly backed the mass immigration initiative in 2014, but the People’s Party argues that it has not been properly implemented.

What’s the goal of the initiative?

With the “No to ten million” immigration initiative, the People’s Party aims to force the government to ensure that the permanent resident population does not exceed ten million before 2050. If the population reaches 9.5 million before then, the government and parliament would already be required to step in.

In the asylum sector, this would mean that provisionally admitted people would no longer be granted permanent residence permits. Family reunification would also be restricted.

As for regular immigration, Switzerland would in a second stage have to renegotiate international agreements that contribute to population growth. If that proved insufficient, it would ultimately have to terminate its free movement of people agreement with the European Union.

What are the supporters’ arguments?

The People’s Party believes that immigration is putting a strain on Switzerland, referring to it as “pressure from population density”. It points to overcrowded trains, congested roads, a tight housing market, rising crime, high social security costs and other negative trends which it attributes to immigration.

Hence it is calling for “sustainable population development”, which is why it also refers to the proposal as the “sustainability initiative”. “We have lost control. Many people increasingly feel like strangers in their own country,” says co-initiator and People’s Party parliamentarian Thomas Matter.

The party’s key argument is the so-called immigration spiral. It claims that population growth driven by immigration requires even more immigration to meet the people’s needs. This vicious cycle must be broken, it says.

The initiative distinguishes between asylum and regular migration. It emphasises that “too many and the wrong people” were immigrating to Switzerland. Based on this, it proposes initial measures in the asylum sector which would still allow up to 40,000 skilled workers or other individuals to enter the country each year.

What are the opponents’ arguments?

Opponents warn that the proposal could jeopardise Switzerland’s prosperity. They have dubbed it the “termination initiative”, saying it would ultimately lead to the termination of Switzerland’s agreements with the EU. It is also labelled the “chaos initiative” for the uncertainty it would create.

The government and parliament reject the initiative, arguing that it would undermine the bilateral approach with the EU and that Switzerland was dependent on immigration. This, they say, is not only because of a shortage of skilled workers in the economy, but also because of demographic developments in the resident population. They stress that the social security system, based on a pay-as-you-go model, depends on continued contribution from the working population.

They also claim that, so far, Switzerland has absorbed immigration well and that there was no “pressure from population density”. Integration and growth, they say, are part of Switzerland’s success model.

The left is particularly critical of regulating the asylum sector, which accounts for only a small part of immigration. Meanwhile, centre-right parties warn that chaos could descend on the asylum system especially if, in a worst-case scenario, the Schengen and Dublin agreements governing this sector were to be terminated.

What does the initiative mean for the Swiss Abroad?

How the initiative would affect the Swiss Abroad remains unclear as the federal and cantonal authorities still need to work out the measures. The proposal defines the permanent resident population in a way that excludes the 830,000 Swiss Abroad.

The Council of the Swiss Abroad warns that, if accepted, the initiative could jeopardise the free movement of people and therefore recommends rejecting it. It argues that the approximately 475,000 Swiss Abroad living in the EU/EFTA area have a strong interest in preserving free movement.

What are the economic implications?

“The Swiss economy has always relied on foreign workers,” the Swiss People’s Party writes at the outset of its proposal. While it argues that immigration is largely to blame for the shortage of skilled workers, opponents point to the existing shortage of skilled labour.

Opponents argue that many sectors depend on foreign labour, including healthcare, construction, hospitality, agriculture and tourism. “Switzerland is growing and growing and growing,” says People’s Party’s president Marcel Dettling. Yet the benefits of this growth do not reach the population and that immigration does not address the shortage of skilled labour, he says.

The Swiss business federation economiesuisse warns of uncertainty, bureaucracy and a worsening shortage of labour, if the initiative is accepted.
What are the implications for the relationship between Bern and Brussels?

If accepted, the initiative would put the free movement of people at risk in the long term and create new uncertainties in the relationship between Bern and Brussels as a population cap contradicts the fundamental principle of free movement.


In the worst case, Switzerland would have to renegotiate the free movement of people, or at least secure a safeguard clause. However, the safeguard clause negotiated in the new agreements with the EU would not be compatible with the initiative’s objectives. If Switzerland were to terminate the free movement of people agreement because of the initiative, the existing bilateral agreements with the EU would also be null and void.
The United States: A Major Energy Exporter And Importer, Especially In Petroleum – Analysis




May 28, 2026 
By EIA


Total energy exports from the United States reached a record 31 quadrillion British thermal units (quads) in 2025, 2% more than the previous record set in 2024. U.S. energy imports were 21 quads, down 5% from 2024. Taken together, net trade—total imports less total exports—reached 11 quads of net exports in 2025, a record and 20% more net exports than the previous record set in 2024.

Petroleum accounts for most U.S. energy trade and is the largest source of both exports and imports. U.S. petroleum exports remained near records in 2025, with most exports going to other countries in North America, Europe, and Asia.

Energy companies in the United States trade with others across the world in a global market. In general, energy companies in the United States can:Sell products to U.S. customers

Export products to customers in other countries

Import products from other countries

Store products for later

Petroleum companies in the United States can also import crude oil and petroleum products to be further processed and sold, either domestically or re-exported to other countries. Crude oil must be processed at refineries before it can be used as petroleum products, such as motor gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.

Petroleum has been the largest source of U.S. energy exports since 1999 and accounted for 63% of total energy exports in 2025. U.S. petroleum exports grew substantially during the past decade in part because:The United States removed restrictions on crude oil exports in 2016.
Domestic production and export infrastructure expanded.
Global demand increased, including from Europe’s recent ban on seaborne crude oil imports from Russia in 2022 and petroleum products in 2023.

The Gulf Coast region is the only net petroleum-exporting region in the United States, but its net exports are enough to outweigh the net imports of all other regions, making the United States as a whole a net petroleum exporter. Petroleum has been the largest source of total U.S. energy imports since at least 1949, our earliest year on record, and in 2025 accounted for 83% of imports. In 2025, total petroleum imports into the United States were 17 quads, down 6% from 2024.

Natural gas has been the second-largest source of U.S. total energy exports since 2016. In 2025, U.S. natural gas exports were a record 9 quads, accounting for 29% of total energy exports. From 2015 to 2025, natural gas exports from the United States quadrupled as both domestic production and LNG export capacity increased to meet global demand. Similar to petroleum products, demand for U.S. LNG in Europe increased as countries sought alternative supply sources after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.


Natural gas has been the second-largest source of total U.S. energy imports since the late 1950s and accounted for 16% of total imports in 2025. Natural gas imports from Canada are important to help stabilize the U.S. market during periods of supply and demand imbalance, such as during cold winter months.

In our Monthly Energy Review, we convert energy sources measured in different units to common units of heat, called British thermal units (Btu). We use Btu to compare different types of energy that are not directly comparable, such as barrels of petroleum and cubic feet of natural gas.

Principal contributor: Mickey Francis

Source: This article was published by EIA

 

Output of Czech hydro plants drops by 30-50% amid continued drought

Output of Czech hydro plants drops by 30-50% amid continued drought
A CEZ hydropower plant in Czechia. / CEZFacebook
By Albin Sybera in Prague May 27, 2026

The output of Czech hydro plants is down by nearly a half as country copes with continued drought.

“In comparison to long term average the production of hydroelectric plants as between about 50-70%,” Martin Schreier, spokesperson of majority state owned energy utility ČEZ, was quoted as saying by online news outlet Seznam Zprávy (SZ).

Last year the output at hydroelectric plants dropped by 40% as a result of drought, with which the country has been coping in recent years, SZ reported, noting that Czechia is among the fastest warming countries in Europe and that the drought has already impacted freight via country’s rivers, including the Elbe river, an important northern freight route to Germany.  

Besides the rising temperatures, Czech soil also suffered from decades of industrial and agricultural use which significantly decreased its ability to retain water.

Earlier this month, SZ reported that this year’s drought could be the worst one in 65 years, noting that in March and April the country registered only 32 millimetres of rainfall, which is the least since 1961, according to the Czech Hydrometeorological Institute (ČHMÚ).

From January to April, the country registered only 101 millimetres of rainfall and is on course to register lower rainfall in the first half of the year than in last year, when it was 222 millimetres, the least on record since 1965.