The Geography Of Terrorism Has Shifted – Analysis

July 13, 2026 
By Prof. Rohan Gunaratna

Key Takeaways:

Islamic State’s operational center has shifted to Africa: In the first half of 2026, Africa accounted for nearly 90% of ISIS-claimed attacks (up from 9% in 2018), with Nigeria (250 attacks), DRC (138), and Mozambique (56) seeing the highest activity and heavy casualties, especially in the DRC.

Syria remains ideological core while secondary hubs grow in Pakistan and Philippines: Syria focuses on symbolic and sectarian messaging; ISKP activity has largely moved to Pakistan (20 attacks but 248 casualties, high lethality), with smaller persistent operations in the Philippines.

Future threat is Africa-based with global reach: ISIS will increasingly launch or inspire attacks worldwide from African and South Asian hubs using digital networks, remote radicalization, AI tools, and diaspora communities, requiring counter-terrorism efforts to pivot toward Africa and Pakistan.

Introduction

From its epicentre in Iraq and Syria, the threat of terrorism by the Islamic State (ISIS) has moved in two directions. Two hubs have emerged, one in Africa, in the Sahel and another in South Asia, in Khurasan.

While terrorism by the Islamic State will continue to threaten Syria and Iraq, most attacks in the future will be conducted and organised in the two theatres of Africa and Afghanistan-Pakistan. The Islamic State is trying to revive in other regions like in Southeast Asia but countries like the Philippines and Indonesia are fighting them.

The Islamic State will conduct more attacks than Al Qaeda. After its leader Saif Al Adil moved from Afghanistan to Mashad and Tehran in Iran, the Al Qaeda has come under the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In the global terrorism map, the Islamic State will remain the most powerful non-state threat group in the immediate and short term.





The Context

The Islamic State has compiled its own attacks in the first six months of 2026. ‘Amaq News Agency of the Islamic State released an infographic on July 6, 2026 that identify Africa as the epicentre of Islamic State activity. Based on the data, attacks identified as “assaults,” refer to military raids, accounted for the majority (205), followed by bombings (75), and ambushes (51). Most of these strikes occurred in Africa, with Nigeria (250), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (138), and Mozambique (56) representing the largest share of activity. In terms of casualties, the DRC (769), Nigeria (696), and Niger (290) were the bloodiest.


Following is a translation of the infographic:

Results of Attacks by Islamic State Fighters During the First Half of the Year 2026

587 Operations205 Assaults
75 Bombings
51 Ambushes
30 Assassinations
8 Commando
218 Others
2529 Killed and Wounded, Including 25 Officers and Commanders
8 Aircraft Destroyed and Disabled
6 Drones
1 Helicopter
1 Civilian Craft
56 Vehicles Seized
380 Vehicles Burned and Disabled
67 Armored
196 Four-Wheel Drive
117 Others


Burned:17 Churches
84 Military Positions
1484 Houses

CongoAttacks: 138
Killed and Wounded: 769

NigeriaAttacks: 250
Killed and Wounded: 696

NigerAttacks: 39
Killed and Wounded: 290


PakistanAttacks: 20
Killed and Wounded: 248

MozambiqueAttacks: 56
Killed and Wounded: 150

Burkina FasoAttacks: 10
Killed and Wounded: 122

SomaliaAttacks: 25
Killed and Wounded: 113

SyriaAttacks: 31
Killed and Wounded: 50

MaliAttacks: 11
Killed and Wounded: 42

AfghanistanAttacks: 2
Killed and Wounded: 26

PhilippinesAttacks: 3
Killed and Wounded: 15

Iraq
Attacks: 2
Killed and Wounded: 8

The global operational architecture of the Islamic State (IS) has undergone a profound and measurable transformation. An analysis of independent data from BBC Monitoring alongside the group’s internal propaganda released via the Amaq News Agency for the first half of 2026 confirms a stark reality: the geographic epicenter of IS operations has unequivocally shifted to Sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, traditional strongholds in the Levant serve primarily as ideological anchors, while secondary Centers of Gravity (COGs) are consolidating in Khurasan (specifically Pakistan) and East Asia (the Philippines).

The African Epicenter: Territorial Expansion and Unprecedented Lethality

By the midpoint of 2026, Africa accounted for nearly 90% of all IS-claimed attacks globally. This represents a staggering escalation from just 9% in 2018. Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer just a wilayat (province) of convenience; it is the group’s undisputed operational core.

A comparative analysis of BBC Monitoring and Amaq data reveals not just the volume of attacks, but their devastating human cost. While independent monitoring tracks 217 attacks in Nigeria and 135 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Amaq inflates these slightly to 250 and 138, respectively. This minor discrepancy is typical of insurgent propaganda, yet both datasets confirm the macro-trend: West and Central Africa are absorbing the brunt of IS violence.


Crucially, the lethality in the DRC outpaces Nigeria. According to Amaq’s internal metrics, the 138 assaults in the DRC resulted in 769 casualties, compared to Nigeria’s 696 casualties across 250 attacks. The BBC report corroborates this, noting that Christian civilians in the DRC are bearing the brunt of these operations. The group is actively claiming territorial expansion in North-West Nigeria and Haut-Uele province in the DRC, signaling a shift from asymmetric insurgency to attempts at localized governance and control.

The Ideological Core: Syria’s Enduring Role

Despite the massive shift in kinetic operations toward Africa, Syria remains the ideological heartbeat of the Islamic State. With 30 claimed attacks in the first half of 2026, Syria is the busiest operational theater outside of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, its value is overwhelmingly symbolic and messaging-driven.

As noted in the group’s al-Naba editorials, Syria is utilized to delegitimize regional authorities— framing President Ahmed al-Sharaa as “Agent 90” and exploiting localized sectarian tensions. IS strategically claims targeted killings of religious minorities to foster insecurity, using Syria not for immediate territorial reconquest, but to project enduring relevance and attract foreign fighters.
Secondary Centers of Gravity: The Khurasan Shift and East Asia

Perhaps the most critical intelligence gathered from the recent data sets is the strategic relocation of secondary IS threats. The Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), historically viewed as a Western-facing threat emanating from Afghanistan, has drastically reduced its footprint within Afghan borders, claiming only two attacks. Instead, the operational weight of this region has shifted across the border into Pakistan.

While the volume of attacks in Pakistan remains comparatively low (20 attacks), the lethality is disproportionately high, resulting in 248 casualties. This indicates a highly refined, targeted campaign.

Operations in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region are marked by targeted assassinations of political opponents and Shia Muslims. This high casualty-to-attack ratio demonstrates a lethal outshoot Center of Gravity that requires immediate counter-terrorism focus.

Concurrently, the Philippines maintains a low but persistent operational tempo with 3 claimed attacks. While seemingly negligible compared to African figures, the persistence of IS in Southeast Asia ensures the group maintains a foothold for regional network facilitation and radicalization.

The Future

To survive, sustain, flourish and thrive, threat entities moves rapidly to border regions, ungoverned territories, and under-governed spaces. Africa and South Asia and parts of Southeast Asia feature prominently. The world will increasingly witness terrorism both in Africa and South Asia. In the immediate, short and mid term, the world will also witness attacks mounted elsewhere but originating from Africa and Asia.

Although the geography of terrorism has shifted, by exploiting the digital networks, the threat groups are able to conduct long range deep penetration strikes. Technologically, the most advanced Islamic State affiliate, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has provided a template. The ISKP actively radicalises and recruits those in their territory and overseas. In addition to mounting attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, their operators coordinates with likeminded threat entities as well as susceptible individuals in the diaspora and migrant communities. After radicalisation and recruitment, the ISKP recruiters handle the operators remotely. Their financiers resource them with funds and their combat tacticians with their knowhow.

Through sophisticated digital networks, the group bypasses physical borders to inspire, guide, and radicalise supporters and sympathisers worldwide turning them into attackers. The group’s remote recruitment and attack model relies on several distinct tactics the ISKP utilizes invitation-only channels on apps like Telegram to vet prospective recruits and deepen ideological engagement. Multilingual propaganda operations—led by outlets like the official al-Azaim foundation—translate extremist content into various languages, including Pashto, Urdu, Tajik, Uzbek, and English, to broaden their global reach. The ISKP also exploits Artificial Intelligence (AI) for automated recruitment, tailoring radicalisation pathways to individual vulnerabilities and operating continuous chatbots to mimic human interaction. Operatives rely on decentralised communication to remotely incite and guide individuals to form cells, networks and groups in diaspora and migrant communities, orchestrating planned attacks without directly training the operatives on the ground.

Conclusion

The first half of 2026 data categorically proves that the Islamic State is no longer a Middle Eastern insurgency with global aspirations; it is an African insurgency with global outshoots. Counter-terrorism coalitions must recalibrate their resource allocations. While vigilance in the Levant remains necessary to suppress ideological resurgences, the kinetic fight must pivot entirely to Sub-Saharan Africa, with specialized intelligence efforts directed at dismantling the highly lethal, evolving networks in Pakistan and the Philippines.


About Prof. Rohan Gunaratna
A specialist on the global threat environment, Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technology University and the founder of Singapore's International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research.
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