Cuba has been abandoned by those who claim to challenge the unipolar order
First published at CADTM.
The title is taken from Josué Veloz Serrade’s important article1 published by the Cuban website La Tizza, “Cuba at the crossroads of hypocritical multilateralism”, written in March 2026 and subsequently published by CADTM (in Spanish and French). It was Aurélio Tejeda who sent it to me from Havana. In sending me the article by Josué Veloz Serrade, whom I did not know, Aurélio wrote: “This is the best thing I’ve read in recent months.” (“Esto es lo mejor que he leído en estos últimos meses”). This endorsement from Aurélio convinced me to read the article.
Aurelio Alonso Tejada, born in Havana in 1939, has been one of Cuba’s leading Marxist intellectuals and social analysts since the 1959 Revolution. A sociologist, philosopher and essayist, he is known for his work on Cuban socialism, religion, geopolitics and the transformations of contemporary Cuban society. I have known him personally for over 30 years. He has often expressed critical views on the situation in Cuba, and at times this has not been appreciated by the authorities, but he has always remained true to his revolutionary commitment and has stayed in Cuba, where his worth is widely recognised. Aurélio is one of the leading figures in contemporary Cuban critical thought. I met him at the same time as Fernando Martínez Heredia (1939–2017),2 Juan Valdés Paz (1938–2021), Rafael Hernández (1946), and Luis Suárez (1950).
Josué Veloz Serrade’s article is based on a fundamental idea: the current crisis facing Cuba, particularly the energy crisis, is not primarily the result of internal failings — although there are some — but the culmination of more than six decades of an economic blockade imposed by the United States. According to the author, the aim of this policy is not merely to sanction the Cuban government, but to gradually bring about an economic and social implosion with a view to bringing about regime change. One might add that Washington is seeking a surrender similar to that which it secured from the Venezuelan authorities in January 2026.
One of the central themes of the article is a critique of what the author calls “hypocritical multilateralism”. He argues that the major powers which present themselves as defenders of a multipolar world — in particular Russia and China — confine themselves to mere declarations of solidarity. They condemn the blockade in international forums, but refuse to take sufficiently strong concrete measures that would enable it to be circumvented, for example by supplying more oil, creating genuinely effective alternative financial mechanisms or ensuring the protection of supplies destined for the island. For the author, this attitude reveals that they seek above all to improve their position within the existing world order rather than to transform it.
The article also criticises the progressive governments of Latin America, notably those of Brazil and Colombia. Although they publicly express their support for Cuba, they are reportedly unwilling to engage in a genuine confrontation with US policy. The author considers this caution to be a strategic error, as abandoning Cuba actually weakens all the forces that claim to defend the sovereignty of the countries of the Global South. The author sums it up:
By allowing a sovereign project to be destroyed by the Empire without any consequences, they are sending a message to their own populations as well as to other secondary actors: solidarity is a luxury we cannot afford; when your turn comes, you will be on your own.
Another important idea is the rejection of the myth of self-sufficiency. According to the author, no country in the world is truly self-sufficient, not even the United States, China or Russia. Demanding that Cuba develop autonomously despite the blockade is therefore an unfair and unrealistic demand. This demand serves primarily to shift the blame for the crisis onto the Cuban authorities and to downplay the role of sanctions.
The author also challenges the narrative that portrays Cuba as a “failed state”. In his view, this characterisation confuses cause and effect. Economic difficulties, shortages and emigration are interpreted as evidence of the failure of the Cuban system, whereas, according to him, they are largely the result of external economic aggression. The “failed state” narrative thus serves the political function of justifying the abandonment of Cuba, or even of paving the way for future intervention.
To support its argument, the article draws several historical parallels. In particular, it compares Cuba’s situation to that of the Spanish Republic, which was abandoned by the Western “democracies” in the face of Franco, whilst Hitler and Mussolini intervened militarily to secure Franco’s victory. The article also refers to the experiences of Vietnam and Iran, which are said to illustrate the capacity to resist external aggression. These examples aim to show that abandoning a country under attack can have geopolitical consequences far broader than its national fate alone.
Josué Veloz Serrade presents Cuba as a political symbol. The author considers that the island stands as proof that it is possible to resist the world’s leading power for decades whilst preserving significant social achievements, particularly in the fields of healthcare, education and culture. It is precisely this capacity for resistance that makes Cuba a troubling example for the dominant international order.
The author also analyses the changes that have taken place within the Cuban diaspora, particularly that based in Miami. In his view, the Cuban community settled in the United States is no longer the same as it was in the 1960s. At that time, the exiles consisted largely of members of the former Cuban elites — landowners, entrepreneurs, professionals and political opponents who had left the island after the 1959 Revolution. This first generation formed the hard core of anti-Castro sentiment and played a central role in the formation of the powerful Cuban-American lobby in favour of maintaining the blockade.
The author argues that today the sociological composition of the diaspora has changed profoundly. The majority of Cubans living in the United States are now economic migrants who have arrived over the past few decades. They have generally maintained very close family, emotional and cultural ties with Cuba: parents, children, brothers and sisters still live on the island, and many regularly send remittances to their families.
Building on this demographic shift, Josué Veloz Serrade develops a political argument: in the event of a major escalation or even a hypothetical US military intervention against Cuba, Washington could no longer count on the unanimous support of the Cuban-American community, as might have been the case in the 1960s. For many Cuban-Americans, bombing or attacking Cuba would amount to putting their own families, loved ones and places of origin at risk.
The author goes even further by referring to a sort of “reverse fifth column”: whilst Miami was once seen as a rear base for the opposition to the Cuban Revolution, it could now, under certain extreme circumstances, become a hotbed of opposition to US policy towards Cuba. Emotional and family ties would then take precedence over ideological divisions.
Finally, the article concludes with a call to action. Declarations of solidarity are deemed insufficient. The author calls on those states that claim to support Cuba to take concrete measures: supplying oil, creating alternative financial mechanisms, safeguarding supplies and exerting genuine diplomatic pressure against the blockade. He also calls on international solidarity movements to put pressure on their governments so that support for Cuba ceases to be merely symbolic and becomes an effective policy.
Comments on the article ‘Cuba at the crossroads of hypocritical multilateralism’
I broadly agree with the analysis and views expressed by Josué Veloz Serrade. I would add the following observations.
1. Russia and China’s abandonment of Cuba.
The attitude of Russia and China is indeed as described by the author. The consequences of their inaction could be dramatic. Putin’s Russia is abandoning Cuba in the face of Washington and using this in its negotiations with Trump to ensure that the latter allows it maximum room for manoeuvre in Ukraine.3 Putin has done the same with regard to Venezuela, Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian people.
Since the start of his second term, Donald Trump has secured an agreement from Vladimir Putin that, beyond verbal protests, he will not react to acts of aggression and war perpetrated by Washington against Moscow’s allies, be it Venezuela or Iran, or in relation to the total blockade of Cuba in place since the end of January 2026. Trump has marked a shift from the policy adopted during his first term, in which he treated China and Russia as equals, viewing them as adversaries seeking to challenge the Washington-dominated international order.
Donald Trump is sending a message to Putin that he is prepared to accept Moscow’s use and abuse of force in its geographical sphere of influence – notably in Ukraine — just as Washington does in the Americas, the Middle East and elsewhere. Trump asserts his right to use force anywhere in the world and effectively recognises Putin’s right to do the same within a more limited sphere corresponding to part of the territory of the former Russian Empire during the Tsarist era and the former Soviet Union. This follows the classic logic of an implicit division of spheres of influence between major imperialist powers. Putin has stated that the international strategy document published by Trump in December 2025 largely coincides with Moscow’s vision.4
During the lengthy speech he delivered in St Petersburg in early June 2026 at the International Economic Forum before an audience of international figures (state representatives and business leaders), Putin made no reference to Cuba, Iran, Venezuela or Gaza.5 And he mentioned what he called the “conflict in Ukraine” only once. His speech as a whole confirms the criticism expressed by Josué Veloz.
As for China, although Trump has launched an offensive against it, China has decided not to react and not to come to Cuba’s aid, with a view to limiting Washington’s economic, tariff and military aggression and retaining maximum room for manoeuvre in its sphere of influence, including with regard to Taiwan.
During the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains (June 2026), Donald Trump publicly stated that he was grateful to Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin for their ‘neutrality’ in the war with Iran;6 he could have added Cuba and Palestine to the list.
Failing to come to the aid of the Cuban people in danger serves as a bargaining chip for Russia and China in their negotiations with the United States. Russia and China could, either jointly or separately, challenge the total blockade imposed by Washington on Cuba without taking insurmountable risks.
2. The governments of Lula in Brazil and Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico
As regards the progressive governments of Latin America, I agree with the strong criticism levelled at them: their failure to take decisive action against Washington’s blockade of Cuba is detrimental. Josué’s criticism of Brazil is entirely justified. To place the stance of Petro’s Colombia in the same category as that of Brazil strikes me as an exaggeration. The Colombian government does not have the same power nor does it have a scope for manoeuvre comparable to that of Brazil.
Whilst Josué does not do so in his article, it is also legitimate to direct criticism at Claudia Sheinbaum’s government. However, the facts need to be clarified. Until the end of 2025, Cuba’s main oil supplier remained Venezuela. Reuters reported in January 2026 that in 2025 Venezuela had supplied the island with around 26,500 barrels per day, compared with around 5,000 barrels per day from Mexico, which was then in second place.7 It was only after Venezuelan shipments were halted, in late 2025 and early 2026, that Mexican deliveries became a particularly important source of energy for Cuba.8 Claudia Sheinbaum herself subsequently acknowledged that, in this new context, Mexico had become a “major supplier” to the island, whilst pointing out that this role had previously been played by Venezuela.9
Faced with the tariff and financial threats brandished by Donald Trump, Mexico then suspended its direct shipments of crude oil and redirected its aid towards humanitarian deliveries and diplomatic efforts.10 The criticism that can be levelled at the Mexican presidency is that it ceased a supply that had become crucial following the breakdown in relations with Venezuela. At the same time, Claudia Sheinbaum is actively negotiating with Washington to secure special exemptions so that Cuba can once again receive energy supplies.
As oil-producing and exporting countries led by progressive governments, Brazil and Mexico should send oil to Cuba even if the pressure, tariff reprisals and threats from Trump are intense. It should be noted that Brazil’s crude oil exports generally amount to between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day. Mexico’s oil exports amount to between 0.5 and 0.8 million barrels per day. Cuba needs to import 80,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. Supplying Cuba with oil is therefore feasible.
The best option would be an agreement between Lula’s government in Brazil and Sheinbaum’s government to jointly defy the blockade and regularly supply the oil Cuba needs, in addition to the humanitarian aid in the form of food, medicines, etc., which is currently being provided by these two governments. Ships carrying oil and other aid to Cuba should be jointly protected by the Mexican and Brazilian navies.
3. The trio of Spain, Brazil and Mexico has so far confined itself to verbal protests, whilst Cuba is in urgent need of practical support
In mid-April 2026, a summit entitled Global Progressive Mobilisation (GPM) was held in Barcelona. The figurehead was the Spanish Prime Minister, the socialist Pedro Sánchez. Also present were Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Claudia Sheinbaum, Gustavo Petro and the Uruguayan President Yamandú Orsi, as well as Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African President.
The Mexican, Spanish and Brazilian governments adopted a joint declaration in defence of Cuba against Trump’s policies, but they did not decide to jointly supply the oil that Cuba so desperately needs.
A solidarity front with Cuba led by the trio of Spain, Brazil and Mexico, with a view to jointly supplying oil to Cuba, would make it much more difficult for Trump to respond harshly. But as Josue Veloz makes clear in his article, merely issuing statements of support for Cuba is absolutely not commensurate with the stakes and the very real threats endangering the survival of the unique experiment that Cuba represents in the eyes of the world today.
A mobilisation campaign is needed in these three countries to put pressure on their governments so that, either separately or together, they supply the oil Cuba needs, in addition to delivering humanitarian aid (food, medicines) and equipment such as solar panels.
4. Solidarity among peoples
Josué Véloz is right to write:
Cuba can count on something that no blockade can completely strangle: the peoples of the world, more so than states. It can count on the solidarity movements which, in every country, come together, organise themselves and prepare aid shipments.
Solidarity campaigns with Cuba have a long history and are deeply rooted in the practices of a wide range of movements. Very soon after Trump’s announcement in late January 2026 that the blockade against Cuba would be tightened, an initiative for a flotilla of boats bound for Cuba emerged, somewhat in the mould of the Sumud flotilla for Gaza, and arrived in Cuba in March. Protests outside US embassies have taken place on several occasions in various countries.
In Mexico, a number of initiatives have been launched, notably by fishermen’s cooperatives, trade unions and political parties. In Brazil, trade unionists from the oil sector are calling on the government to supply oil to Cuba, as are left-wing parties and the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST). In May 2026, an oil workers’ trade union demonstrated outside the headquarters of the state-owned company Petrobras to demand that Brazil directly break the oil blockade by sending fuel to Cuba.
In Spain, the Rumbo a Cuba campaign was launched in March 2026. It brings together more than 20 social and political organisations to deliver emergency energy supplies to the island. These are organisations to the left of the Socialist Party, which leads the government but is taking no concrete action. The mission aims to supply and install photovoltaic solar panels at the Juan Manuel Márquez Paediatric Hospital in Havana. This initiative ensures the energy self-sufficiency of the intensive care unit, the laboratory and the intermediate care unit in the face of repeated power cuts in the Cuban electricity grid.
The operation relies on the chartering of the vessel Astral, owned by the maritime rescue NGO Open Arms. The ship set sail from the port of Barcelona in May 2026 and made solidarity and loading stops in Valencia, Málaga, Cádiz, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Lanzarote. It is heading for Cancún in Mexico and is expected to reach Havana in mid-July 2026. 150,000 euros have been raised to purchase the equipment being transported to Cuba.
It is also worth noting that more than 40 Spanish local authorities have resumed cooperation with Cuba. Furthermore, there are many aid initiatives being organised by various movements in the Basque Country.
However, it must be acknowledged that, so far, the solidarity movement amongst social movements and political organisations with the Cuban people has been far too weak, whilst the humanitarian situation on the island is deteriorating. Unfortunately, there has so far been no major protest movement in the United States against Trump’s criminal policy towards Cuba.
Under pressure and threats from Trump, major Spanish companies operating in the tourism sector, such as the Meliá hotel group, have announced that they are pulling out of the island. The flow of tourists has fallen sharply, further reducing foreign exchange earnings. Faced with the inaction of Russia, China, progressive Latin American governments, the Spanish government and the traditional left, the authorities in Havana find themselves at an impasse. Economic measures in response to Trump’s blackmail have been announced by the Cuban presidency.11 These will need to be analysed rigorously.
There is an urgent need to strengthen united initiatives of solidarity with Cuba in the face of the blockade. A race against time has begun.
The author would like to thank Christian Dubucq for his review of this article
Humanitarian aid provided by Lula’s Brazil and Sheinbaum’s Mexico
Between February and June 2026, Mexico chartered six official humanitarian aid convoys to Cuba. The first major shipment (February 2026): On the President’s direct instructions, two Mexican Navy logistics support vessels (the Papaloapan and the Isla Holbox) transported over 814 tonnes of supplies (including 536 tonnes of essential foodstuffs and hygiene items, as well as 277 tonnes of powdered milk).
The second major shipment (late February 2026): The navy vessels transported 1,193 tonnes of food, including a large proportion of beans and infant formula. Further deliveries (May–June 2026): Other cargo ships, such as the Asian Katra, which arrived at the port of Havana on 7 June 2026, continue to supply the island with basic foodstuffs to alleviate food shortages.
Humanitarian aid provided by Brazil. In February 2026, Brazil urgently airlifted 2.5 tonnes of essential medicines to Havana. During March, Brazil dispatched a further emergency consignment comprising 80 tonnes of medicines.
Mexico’s humanitarian aid to Cuba is, on the whole, more substantial, more frequent and more direct than that provided by Brazil.
Mexico is deploying its own military: President Claudia Sheinbaum is directly using Mexican Navy warships (such as the Papaloapan, the Isla Holbox and the Huasteco) to break Cuba’s maritime isolation. These government military vessels deliver cargo from port to port.
Brazil, to avoid yet another conflict with Trump, goes via the UN: Brazilian aid takes the form of a pledge of foodstuffs channelled through the multilateral channels of the World Food Programme (WFP). Brazil supplies the goods, but their distribution depends on third-party logistics or on the ability of Cuban vessels to collect them.
Brazil is protecting itself legally: To prevent its companies (such as Petrobras) from being targeted by US sanctions, Brazil strictly classifies its shipments as multilateral ‘humanitarian donations’.
Mexico sends its military vessels directly into Havana Bay. Brazil, by contrast, delegates the entire management of the supplies to the UN and the World Food Programme (WFP). This is essential but ‘neutral’ aid, which does not carry the same political connotations.
- 1
Josué Veloz Serrade is a Cuban psychologist, essayist and researcher based in Argentina. He holds a degree in psychology from the University of Medical Sciences in Pinar del Río and a master’s degree in clinical psychology from the University of Havana, and is currently pursuing doctoral research in social sciences and psychology in Argentina. He is a member of the editorial board of La Tizza, a Cuban journal of critical thought, as well as of the Gramsci Chair at the Juan Marinello Institute.
- 2
Fernando Martínez Heredia interviewed by Éric Toussaint, ‘From the 19th to the 21st century : a historical perspective on the Cuban Revolution’; in Spanish: Fernando Martínez Heredia interviewed by Eric Toussaint, ‘Cuba from 1959 to 1999 from a historical perspective
- 3
Russia sent an oil tanker to Cuba, which arrived at the port of Matanzas at the end of March 2026 with a cargo of oil sufficient to meet the country’s needs for around fifteen days. It was the first oil tanker to reach Cuba since January 2026. Trump allowed this to happen despite the total embargo imposed on oil deliveries to the island’s authorities. This is likely a gesture by Trump towards Moscow in connection with the ongoing war in the Middle East. In April–May 2006, Russia did not send any oil tankers to Cuba.
- 4
Dmitry Peskov, the Russian president’s spokesperson, commented on the national security strategy document during an interview on 7 December 2025 with the Russian state journalist Pavel Zarubin for the Rossiya 1 channel, which was widely reported by Russian media outlets such as Interfax, Fontanka and TASS: “The adjustments made to the US national security strategy largely correspond to our vision.” Source: fontanka.ru
- 5
Putin’s speech was translated and published in French by Le Grand Continent, which added its own commentary: “The new multipolar order according to Vladimir Putin”, Le Grand Continent, 6 June 2026,See the Spanish translation: https://legrandcontinent.eu/es/2026/06/07/el-nuev-orden-multipolar-de-vladimir-putin-x/
- 6
Reuters, Steve Holland and Trevor Hunnicutt, “Trump thanks China’s Xi, Russia’s Putin for being ‘neutral’ in Iran war”, 17 June 2026.
- 7
Reuters, “Clock ticks in Cuba as Trump cuts off Venezuelan oil”, 13 January 2026.
- 8
Reuters, “Mexico’s Sheinbaum does not deny halting oil shipment to Cuba”, 27 January 2026
- 9
Reuters, “Sheinbaum says Mexico has not increased oil shipments to Cuba amid Venezuela situation”, 7 January 2026
- 10
Reuters, ‘Mexican ships carrying humanitarian aid enter Havana Harbour’, 12 February 2026
- 11
EFE, “Díaz-Canel calls on non-government experts and critics to put forward proposals for economic reform in Cuba”, 17 June 2026; EFE, “Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel makes a surprise announcement of a package of economic reforms”, 12 June 2026 and “Cuban lawmakers approve sweeping reforms to socialist model amid US pressure
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