Monday, June 01, 2026

 African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 



AfCFTA As A Coordination Architecture For African Integration: From Institutional Design To Interface-Based Interoperability – Analysis


May 30, 2026 
By Danilo Desiderio


Building on earlier work that conceptualised the AfCFTA as a coordination architecture for fragmented integration, this analysis moves a step further by examining how that architecture operates in practice. It shifts the focus from institutional design to the functional interfaces through which continental interoperability is actually produced.

Much of the debate surrounding the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) relies on a restrictive market-access lens. Observers frequently point to to low intra-African trade volumes, limited evidence of trade conducted under AfCFTA preferences, and uneven regulatory harmonization and institutional uptake, as well as low awareness levels of AfCFTA rules, as evidence that the agreement is underperforming. While this perspective reflects genuine operational frustrations on the ground, it misinterprets the fundamental structural mechanics of continental integration in Africa.

The AfCFTA was never conceived as a top-down, rapid unification project designed to replace existing regimes with a single, seamless market overnight. It was introduced into an institutional ecosystem deeply stratified by decades of accumulation. This landscape is composed of a dense constellation of overlapping regional economic communities (RECs) and national trade regimes, corridor- and infrastructure-focused agreements, coalitions of the willing, and other sectoral cooperation frameworks. Rather than structural anomalies or architectural failures, these overlapping systems represent the realities of African integration.

Here, the concept of institutional layering offers a more precise diagnostic framework. Rather than treating fragmentation as a defect to be eradicated through displacement (the substitution of lower-level regimes by a superposed continental frameworks), the layering theory demonstrates that African integration advances through the gradual superimposition of new coordination mechanisms onto existing structures. Within this architecture, the AfCFTA functions not as a replacement mechanism, but as an overarching continental coordination layer. Its primary objective is to build functional interoperability across formally autonomous systems by mitigating friction at the exact operational interfaces where they collide. These collision points materialize as tariff schedule asymmetries, divergent rules of origin and value-added thresholds between the AfCFTA and RECs, overlapping corridor arrangements that coexist within and across parallel regional blocs, or regionally fragmented cross-border payment systems.


Under this layered model, existing structures are not absorbed. The RECs remain autonomous and active building blocks of integration governed by their own distinct legal and regulatory logics, while national institutions function as the primary operational engines of implementation. Continental bodies (including the African Union and the AfCFTA Secretariat) operate without supranational enforcement mandates. Consequently, their authority is inherently limited to coordination, alignment, and harmonization rather than top-down imposition.

However, this layered architecture is inherently prone to friction. It entrenches a complex “spaghetti bowl” of concurrent obligations, where sovereign states simultaneously operate across multiple regional frameworks with divergent rules, competing priorities, and asymmetrical interests. Institutional alignment is therefore structurally difficult to achieve.

This reality requires a more subtle interpretation of current implementation gaps. While the AfCFTA low regulatory, institutional, and business uptake reflect the immense difficulties of linking independently evolved systems, they also generate severe real-world costs. For small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) moving time-sensitive or perishable goods across borders, institutional friction is a costly operational reality that translates directly into border delays, capital losses, and eroded competitiveness. Any theoretical analysis of institutional layering must remain anchored in these material realities.


Furthermore, these institutional frictions are rarely accidental; they are often politically embedded. States do not operate within a single coherent regulatory space but across multiple overlapping regimes, and they frequently navigate this complexity strategically: through selective participation in different regional economic communities, regulatory forum shopping, or differentiated alignment depending on sectoral priorities and domestic political economy constraints. These behaviours are not exceptions to the system; they are part of how the layered architecture functions.

Consequently, evaluating the AfCFTA simply by asking whether implementation is slow obscures the real governance challenge. A more analytical question is: where exactly is interoperability breaking down, and why do specific institutional interfaces resist alignment?

The answers are found at the operational touchpoints where these distinct regimes collide. These include customs system interoperability, cross-border payment rails like the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), digital non-tariff barrier (NTB) reporting mechanisms, real-time cargo tracking, mutual standards recognition, and documentary harmonization.

Viewed through this lens, the primary challenge of the AfCFTA is not merely a lack of political will or institutional capacity. It is an engineering problem: the task of constructing functional interoperability across a deeply layered, partially conflicting governance architecture without possessing the supranational authority to erase the underlying layers. This is a structural reality that fundamentally distinguishes the African integration experience from the fundamentally top-down, supranational model of the European Union.

Accordingly, the metrics used to evaluate the AfCFTA need to be redefined. Assessing a deeply layered and evolving trade architecture solely through the analysis of macro-level indicators (such as increases in intra-African trade, the count of the number of ratified protocols, AfCFTA certificates of origin issued in the continent, or businesses and national administrations trained on the new rules), does not adequately capture the success of AfCFTA-driven continental integration. These indicators risk overlooking the fact that integration is an iterative, infrastructural process: what matters is not only statistical increase in trade flows or training initiatives or legal adoption uptake, but the gradual alignment of underlying systems that make trade possible.

In that sense, such metrics miss the deeper reconfiguration taking place within the architecture of African trade: the slow but fundamental alignment of institutional and operational layers beneath the surface.


Progress is ultimately located in the fine-grained architecture of functional touchpoints: the small but decisive interfaces where different systems meet and either connect or fail to connect. The real metrics of continental integration are therefore not abstract macroeconomic indicators, but the practical interfaces through which integration is actually performed. This includes, for example, the number of shared industrial standards adopted across regions or of mutual recognition agreements established at intra- and inter-regional levels to align health, quality, and product safety requirements; the extent of harmonisation of customs forms and other trade documentation; the volume of transactions processed through continental payment systems such as PAPSS; the resolution rate of non-tariff barriers through digital complaint platforms; and the degree of operational connectivity between national customs systems enabling automated data exchange.

In simpler terms, the key question is whether these interfaces function in practice (shared standards, harmonised documentation, interoperable payment systems, and customs data exchange) and whether, together, they are tangibly improving the speed, predictability, and ease of moving goods and services across borders.

Africa must move beyond the traditional 20th-century integration model, which conceives regional integration as a process of gradually transferring state sovereignty to supranational institutions. Africa is pioneering something entirely different: multi-level interoperability.

The value of the AfCFTA lies not in attempting to erase existing institutional arrangements, but in its capacity to coordinate them more effectively, functioning as a continental mechanism that connects a fragmented ecosystem without requiring the displacement of its underlying building blocks.

Africa is therefore not simply lagging behind a conventional model of regional integration. It is gradually developing a different one: a system in which integration is produced through the continuous alignment of micro-interfaces: product standards, payment systems, digital trade system connectivity, and regulatory touchpoints through which fragmented institutions become functionally interoperable.



THE DEEP STATE

China’s Ministry Of State Security: The Spies Disrupting The West – Analysis




May 30, 2026 

By Patrick Omam

In recent years, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has significantly expanded its foreign intelligence operations, targeting institutions and critical infrastructures. Focused on cyber-warfare and economic targets the MSS has become a central instrument in China’s pursuit of geopolitical and technological dominance. In doing so, it strategically challenges the resilience of Western institutions.

The MSS remains among the most opaque pillars of Xi Jinping’s political system. This invisible hand operating in cyber operations, human intelligence and economic espionage prides itself for its secrecy – cultivating it for operational necessity and strategic advancements. A unique characteristic making the MSS one of the most powerful and versatile intelligence service in the world.

Unlike Western intelligence agencies who have evolved on the basis of kinetic operations and direct threat elimination, the MSS has opted for a different approach. The MSS has developed a stringent reliance on low-friction operations: where acquiring intellectual property, trade secrets and new technologies securing China’s strategic advantages are prioritized. As a result, economic and technological espionage has become central to Beijing’s development.

Over the past decade, China’s hacking apparatus has rapidly expanded and methodically targeted Western entities. Malicious state-sponsored cyber groups have become a common threat for international tech companies – as MSS’s cyber espionage repeatedly impacted critical infrastructure sectors. Relying on its sophisticated programs and highly effective hacker networks, Beijing’s surveillance has compromised various North American, European, African and Asian entities.


These cyber operations provide China with intellectual property and research knowledge. A wide range of industry secrets and valuable exploits, the Chinese government uses to accelerate its military and economic parity on the global stage. Effectively, reducing Beijing’s cognisance gap in the field of space and information technologies.

The MSS understands the nature of hybrid warfare and intelligence exploits. This strategy became particularly visible in the 2024 cyber campaign led by the Salt Typhoon hacker group. The world witnessed how nine American phone companies were successfully infiltrated – granting the MSS direct access to communications of senior US officials.

Sensitive information China’s high officials subsequently leverage to undermine international negotiations, trade agreements and foreign economies. These MSS cyber operations cost billions of dollars to the US economy and its national security. And factually, US and Western agencies find themselves unable to contain China’s multifaceted cyber espionage.

Making it an existential threat for the West. But a resourceful spying activity for Beijing. While Beijing pursues technological dominance, large-scale hacking has become a Made in China trademark in the cyberspace. As cyber espionage operations further develop, the MSS implements clandestine human intelligence networks in its arsenal – a result-driven mechanism to steal US and international trade secrets in a bulletproof hybrid way.
China’s Expanding Network of Influence

Next to having the largest hacking program in the world, the extended arm of the MSS has a vast network serving human intelligence and influence.

Besides the standard agency-like intelligence collection, the MSS methodically influences foreign governments, parliaments, think-tanks and human rights organisations. Relying on both Chinese nationals and locals, the MSS has managed – and attempted – various intrusion on foreign soil.

The 2017 ornate Chinese garden operation is a clear depiction of the unfathomable influence of the Ministry of State Security. A construction team – funded and supervised by the Chinese government – was expected to build a $100 million classical garden in Washington.

Located on one of Washington’s highest geographical points, the 70 feet Chinese pagoda would have been just two miles away from the US Capitol. Had it not been for the FBI’s counterintelligence, Beijing’s attempt would have succeeded.

Facilitating China’s ability to direct signal interferences into the US legislative branch.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not stop at government-backed projects to further its national interests. The CCP recognizes the strategic importance of its diplomatic corps in collecting human intelligence. Evidently, China has developed the most expansive diplomatic network in the world: 274 diplomatic and consular missions posted around the globe.


A diplomatic presence, guaranteeing the MSS is capable of leveraging an entire society of public servants for intelligence collection purposes.

Because of this, the MSS is able to gather intelligence on a de facto continuous basis. Offering the Chinese intelligence service a shapeless nature where uncountable individuals contribute to the CCP’s ecosystem.

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) further reinforces this architecture. The groundwork cultivated by the UFWD actively conducts influence strategies against foreign individuals and states. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the UFWD rejuvenated its central position in coercing and exploiting individuals – that is an assertive tool in disseminating Chinese ideologies and narratives.

Although China’s influence is strongly promoted by the UFWD – MSS’s most consequential successes remain physical infiltrations into foreign state infrastructures.

The 31-year old student, Ji Chaoqun, successfully enlisted in the US Army Reserves and was tasked by the MSS to collect biographical information of certain individuals for further recruitment.

Similarly, the 58-year old Eileen Wang, serving as Arcadia’s mayor (California) proactively acted on behalf of China on US territory – by coordinating with locals and promoting Chinese interests.

Both have been charged for acting within the US as unregistered agents of the Chinese state. While Eileen Wang awaits her sentencing, Ji Chaoqun is serving an 8-year sentence. Although US counterintelligence thwarted both individuals, Chaoqun and Wang represent the sheer dedication imprinted in MSS’s DNA.

These influence operations highlight the adaptability and persistent nature of the Ministry of State Security – essential qualities to succeed with a long-term strategic horizon.

And, the MSS has shown that it does not exclusively lean on economic and strategic infrastructures to advance China’s interests.
Seizing the Academia

China’s espionage apparatus also recognizes the vitality of Western educational institutions as a bastion for intellectual property.

Elite US and European institutions such as the University of Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The Technical University of Delft (TU Delft) and Stanford University cultivate a tradition of cutting-edge innovation, science and technological research.

These globally recognized research leaders – housing elite students – are a hotbed for MSS’s espionage exploits. The Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) launched by the CCP, targeted foreign researchers and entrepreneurs. The state-sponsored program operating as a recruitment initiative sought to attract Chinese and non-Chinese scholars to China. Under the guise of technological development, the TTP incentivized the theft of foreign technologies on behalf of the Chinese government.


This talent plan actively preyed on acquiring disruptive technologies such as AI, quantum computing and biotechnology. This academic economic espionage scheme helped reduce China’s technological gap – simultaneously disrupting the Western academia landscape.

In January 2020, Charles Lieber, the chair of Harvard University’s chemistry and chemical biology departments, was arrested and charged following his participation in the TTP. Acting as chair of Harvard University while simultaneously receiving consequent sums of money from the CCP, for his work at the Wuhan University of Technology, which he omitted from US authorities – a classic example of Chinese influence in American universities.

European institutions have faced similar concerns. The Dutch TU Delft, recognized for its expertise in engineering has seen its share of Chinese interference. In joint-research program with Chinese university, the Dutch university has faced some of the Seven Sons of National Defense – the name given to a group of seven Chinese universities – known for having close ties with the defense and science sectors under the leadership of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

Rather than shying away from information gathering, the Chinese institutions’ approach invites Western education platforms – drawing down their ability to impose themselves while Chinese interferences are at play.

Basically, the MSS’s greatest strength: its ability to mobilize various networks rather than isolated operatives. Beijing’s ability to rely on a cohesive and interconnected network in pursuit of China’s national objectives is the grail of its intelligence modus operandi: a cornerstone the CCP leadership is far from abandoning. And as the MSS remains loyal to this multifaceted espionage strategy, China’s digital and military dominance are set to challenge global conventional powers – further destabilizing the international chessboard.


This article was published by TCSS
Trump’s Transactional Energy Deal: Europe Pays, America Wins – OpEd

US President Donald Trump. MAKING THE SIGN OF SILENCE
Photo Credit: POTUS, X


May 30, 2026 
By Guillaume Vadnais

After his trip to China, Trump dropped a blunt line on Taiwan. He stated he was “not looking for anyone to go independent there”, and he’s definitely “not interested in traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war”(1). That’s pure Trump: everything is a deal. Geopolitics, allies, the whole thing gets turned into leverage to extract concessions somewhere else.

This approach marks a clear departure from the longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan. National security as well as TSMC now have been openly linked to broader negotiations with Beijing. For Trump, allies’ interests can be weighed and traded, but American priorities should forever come first.

A similar dynamic is beginning to emerge in the sphere of U.S.–European energy cooperation. The U.S.–Greece “energy honeymoon” is now evolving into a more complex and conditional relationship, shaped not only by shared strategic goals, but also by shifting expectations and competing national interests.

I. From Taiwan to Europe: The Same Cold-Blooded Logic of Trump’s “Deal-Oriented Diplomacy”


While we lament Taiwan’s inability to escape its fate as a political chess piece, we must also remain vigilant about Europe’s vulnerable position on the U.S. strategic chessboard. Under the ironclad rule of “America First”, Europe’s energy security looks more and more like something Washington is willing to trade away.

In 2025, Trump struck a $750 billion energy deal with the EU (2). Under the agreement, Europe had to buy American liquefied natural gas at prices way above normal. This move locked Europe’s energy supply to the U.S. economy in a big way. Honestly, Trump’s approach remains unchanged when he deals with Taiwan or Europe. He treats alliances like business deals: friends are useful, but America comes first, always. That kind of cold, hard logic has left Europe exposed to strategic risks they haven’t faced before, even as we haven’t given up on talking about “transatlantic partnership”.

II. Greece: Trump’s Pivot

When it comes to U.S.-EU energy cooperation, Greece can be described as Trump’s absolute “favorite”. On the surface, the Vertical Corridor project (3) looks like a straightforward contribution to Europe’s security. American LNG would move through Greek terminals such as Alexandroupolis and onward to Central and Eastern Europe, offering a clear alternative to Russian pipeline gas. However, U.S. strategy in Greece has never been limited to energy supplies alone. It is quietly reshaping the country into a broader strategic outpost. While tightening Washington’s grip on the continent’s energy arteries, Trump can also check Chinese/Russian influence in the region.

1. The Vertical Corridor and the LNG Contracts


The Vertical Corridor would channel American LNG through Greek ports (such as the Alexandroupolis terminal) onward to Central and Eastern Europe. Greece signed a 20-year long-term contract to buy 700 million cubic meters of U.S. LNG annually from 2030.

But those projects carries real risks. American LNG is far more expensive (4) than the Russian gas it replaces. The high costs will eventually hit Greek consumers and European businesses. Building the necessary terminals and pipelines requires massive investment. Besides, U.S. cargoes often shift toward more lucrative Asian markets when prices rise (5), which brings serve supply stability concerns.With winter storage levels already low across parts of Europe (6), any disruption or redirection of supplies could quickly turn into a serious energy crunch.

2. Ionian Sea Drilling

In April 2026, Greece announced it would resume deep-sea natural gas drilling in Block 2 of the northwestern Ionian Sea starting in 2027 (7). ExxonMobil, Energean, and HelleniQ Energy will jointly develop the project. Early estimates suggest the block could hold as much as 270 billion cubic meters of natural gas. That volume would cover Greece’s domestic needs for decades and still leave room for exports to the rest of Europe. However, experts give the project only a 16 percent chance of success (8). It would also bring significant environmental risks in a sensitive marine area (9). Should the project succeed, the United States will further solidify its position as a “key energy supplier” to Europe and deepen its influence over the energy supply chains. For Greece, this raises a difficult long-term question: how much of its energy sovereignty it may ultimately have to trade away in return for investment and potential revenue.

3. The Port Standoff


As construction accelerates at the Port of Elefsina, the U.S. Ambassador to Greece has publicly expressed the expectation of Chinese firms withdrawing from the Port of Piraeus (10). The remarks underscore Washington’s broader strategic calculus: to position Greece more firmly within its orbit at a time of intensifying competition with China.

For Athens, the challenge is both evident and acute. Greek policymakers have sought to balance relations between the two powers, leveraging economic opportunities while preserving strategic autonomy. Yet, the space for such maneuvering appears to be narrowing. As U.S.-China rivalry deepens, Greece risks finding itself under growing pressure to align more decisively with one side, a position that carries clear political and economic costs.

From Washington’s perspective, a more assertive foreign policy posture leaves little tolerance for ambiguity. Any move by Greece perceived as “advancing Chinese interests” could invite diplomatic or economic repercussions. At the same time, Beijing has signaled its own red lines. With China’s increasingly confident approach to safeguarding its overseas investments, Chinese officials have emphasized that Port of Piraeus should not become “victim to geopolitical confrontation” (11). Consequently, it is highly likely that China will take further economic and political countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by transatlantic energy cooperation.

This dynamic places Greece and the European Union in a complex and potentially unstable position. Efforts to maintain strategic balance will require extraordinary political wisdom and strategic acumen. The question is, do European leaders possess the cohesion and foresight necessary to navigate this evolving landscape? Are we really counting on von der Leyen and the EU’s current meager energy reserves?

Ultimately, the stakes extend beyond Greece itself. Europe’s ability to manage external pressures while addressing its own structural vulnerabilities in energy security and economic resilience, will shape its role in an increasingly polarized international system.

III. Europe Must Wake Up: Stop Being a “Bargaining Chip” and Take Back Strategic Autonomy


Right now, Europe has managed to cut its dependence on Russian pipeline gas and calm some fears about supply disruptions during this geopolitical mess. Still, that’s just a patch, not a solution. With Trump’s “America First” approach, where everything about Europe is up for negotiation, Europe risks getting squeezed even harder if it keeps playing as a U.S.-Europe Team. When it comes to energy, Europe has to accept that real independence is the only way out. That means moving away from relying on any one supplier, ramping up homegrown renewable energy, and making sure the internal energy grid is strong and connected.

Europe shouldn’t let others decide its fate or use it as leverage in their games. We must take strategic autonomy as our foundation, push for diverse energy sources, and commit to renewables. We must stop being “sacrificed” and finally taking charge of its own energy and economic future.This article was also published at EUAlive

Endnotes:
Syria-Jordan-Lebanon Energy Deal Could Fuel Huge Benefits Across The Wider Region – Analysis

May 30, 2026 
By Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

One of the latest and most important recent developments in the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Levant is a tripartite agreement this month on energy between Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

This pact, which facilitates the utilization of Jordanian infrastructure for liquefied natural gas imports and the reactivation of the Arab Gas Pipeline, ought to be considered a significant step toward practical regional cooperation.

There are several benefits to the deal. First of all, building on previous bilateral arrangements, it addresses immediate energy deficits in Syria while extending indirect benefits to Lebanon’s strained power sector. Considering that Syria is still at a critical juncture in its post-civil war reconstruction, it also offers a pragmatic foundation for broader collaboration extending far beyond energy alone.

The gas-exchange framework also demonstrates the potential of practical cooperation in an area long beset by conflict and institutional challenges. These mutual dependencies will also incentivize more engagements among the three nations.


For Syria, it adds essential electricity-generation capacity vital for reconstruction efforts and economic revival. It strengthens Jordan’s position as a regional logistical and energy hub. And it offers Lebanon partial relief from the chronic power shortages that have long undermined socioeconomic stability.

The collaboration will also establish trust and operational mechanisms that can gradually extend into more complex domains. In other words, these initial, pragmatic steps can pave the way for deeper cooperation.

Another significant aspect of the deal is that it can be used by the three nations as a starting point to foster expanded partnerships in four areas: security, humanitarian affairs, economic connectivity, and resource management. This will not only advance their own individual interests but also the stability and prosperity of the wider Middle East.

One of the key areas in which they can expand cooperation is efforts to combat drug smuggling and other transnational criminal networks. These networks exploit porous borders and instability. It is also worth noting that the production and trafficking of illegal substances such as captagon from areas within Syria and Lebanon fuel violence, strain law-enforcement resources, and pose significant public-health challenges across the Levant.

The ministerial-level dialogue established under the gas agreement can also provide the foundations of a platform for joint intelligence sharing and coordinated border patrols. The three countries need to integrate their counternarcotics initiatives to better disrupt illicit flows of drugs. This will also reinforce state authority and reduce spillover effects in neighboring markets, including those in the Gulf.

Another critical, and equally pressing, issue is related to the need for coordinated responses to the ongoing refugee crisis, particularly stemming from Syria. Jordan and Lebanon continue to host substantial refugee populations, which has created significant burdens on public services and social cohesion, and fiscal challenges remain acute.

The three nations can directly support improved conditions in refugee camps and host communities, as well as reintegration programs within postwar Syria. Such humanitarian and developmental programs can include livelihood initiatives and skills training. This can help transform a protracted challenge into an opportunity through shared investment in human capital. Trilateral mechanisms can also help to promote orderly, voluntary returns of refugees and sustainable resettlement, which is more likely to alleviate demographic pressures.

A third issue is linked to the strengthening of border security, which represents another critical avenue for collaboration among the three countries. The successful management of energy-related infrastructure near borders points to the feasibility of joint protocols for monitoring border security.

One way to adequately address the risks posed by nonstate actors is to enhance surveillance and modernize border-crossing facilities. This would also facilitate and allow the safe movement of goods and individuals across borders. In Syria’s post-conflict environment, such measures are essential because they increase legitimacy and further create conditions conducive to reconstruction.


In addition, the promotion of economic integration through increased trade and infrastructure connectivity is critical. This means the restoration and expansion of pipelines, roads and rail connections. This would position Syria as a vital regional corridor, leverage Jordan’s logistical strengths and access to ports, and utilize Lebanon’s maritime advantages.

However, this will require joint-investment frameworks, as well as the participation of the private sector to reduce costs. The importance of such a move lies in the fact that it can stimulate job creation. It will also accelerate post-war economic recovery by integrating the three economies more closely with broader regional and global markets.

Finally, the three countries can coordinate on the issue of water to address the interconnected challenges of drought and scarcity in the Levant. Specific projects could include shared management of aquifers, as well as energy-supported desalination projects. In other words, they can use the positive momentum from the gas accord to expand into renewable-energy projects.

The ramifications of such multifaceted cooperation would extend far beyond the three participating states. First of all, a more stable Levant would reduce the risks from a number of threats, including terrorism, irregular migration and illicit trafficking. This Arab-led model of pragmatic integration could also attract international investment and financing.

In a nutshell, the agreement between Syria, Jordan and Lebanon represents a positive and pragmatic move. It establishes a valuable platform for expanded collaboration in other critical areas, including efforts to combat drug smuggling, address the protracted refugee crisis, strengthen border security, enhance trade and infrastructure, and coordinate water and energy policies.

Such multifaceted integration would not only benefit the three countries through improved security, humanitarian outcomes and prosperity, it would also contribute in a meaningful way to broader regional stability across the Middle East. It would reduce transnational threats and create a model for pragmatic, Arab-led cooperation.

This article was published by Arab News
Deciphering The History Of Morocco: Continuity, Rupture, And The Making Of A North African Civilization – Analysis



May 30, 2026 

By Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

Abstract

This essay offers a comprehensive historiographical examination of Morocco from prehistoric settlement to the post-independence era. Drawing on archaeological evidence, medieval Arabic chronicles, colonial archives, and contemporary scholarship, the essay traces Morocco’s development as a distinct political and cultural entity at the intersection of Amazigh, Arab, African, Andalusian, and European civilizations. Particular attention is paid to the founding and succession of dynastic states—Idrisid, Almoravid, Almohad, Marinid, Saadian, and Alaoui—as well as to the processes by which Moroccan society negotiated Islamic identity, imperial ambition, and colonial penetration. The analysis situates Morocco within broader global and regional frameworks while foregrounding the agency of indigenous populations. The essay concludes by assessing Morocco’s post-1956 trajectory and the historiographical debates that continue to animate scholarly enquiry.

1. Introduction: The Challenge of Moroccan Historiography

Morocco occupies a singular position in global historical consciousness: it is at once the westernmost extension of the Arab world, the heartland of Amazigh (Berber) civilization, a conduit of trans-Saharan commerce, and a society shaped by successive waves of Andalusian, sub-Saharan African, and European influence without losing a recognizable core identity (Laroui, 1977). Yet precisely because of this complexity, Moroccan history has long resisted easy narration. Colonial-era scholars, most prominently those operating within the intellectual framework of the French Protectorate (1912–1956), produced accounts that systematically undervalued indigenous agency, projected racial and civilizational hierarchies onto the historical record, and privileged rupture over continuity (Burke, 1972). Postcolonial historians, Moroccan nationalists, and Anglophone social scientists have collectively worked to dismantle these distortions, though the field remains marked by productive methodological tensions.

This essay undertakes a synthetic reading of Moroccan history from the earliest documented human settlement through the consolidation of the post-independence state. It does not claim exhaustiveness but aims instead for analytical density: to identify the structural forces, key transitions, and recurring themes that give Moroccan history its distinctive shape. Following the influential framework proposed by Laroui (1977), the essay treats Moroccan history not as a series of discrete episodes but as a long-run dialectic between centripetal forces—Islamic universalism, makhzen authority, and urban scholarly culture—and centrifugal pressures—tribal autonomy, regional particularism, and external conquest. This dialectic, it will be argued, is the master key to deciphering Morocco’s past and anticipating its future.

2. Prehistoric and Protohistoric Morocco: The Amazigh Substratum

Any serious account of Moroccan history must begin not with the Arab conquest of the seventh century CE, as colonial historiography frequently implied, but with the Paleolithic populations whose material culture has been recovered from sites across the Maghreb. Fossil evidence from the Jebel Irhoud site in western Morocco, dramatically reanalyzed by Hublin et al. (2017), places anatomically modern Homo sapiens in this region approximately 300,000 years ago, predating previously accepted chronologies by a substantial margin and positioning Morocco as one of the probable zones of human cognitive emergence. This discovery carries profound implications for the self-understanding of the region’s indigenous inhabitants, the Imazighen (singular: Amazigh), whose ancestors populated North Africa long before the first historical civilizations of the Mediterranean littoral established themselves.


By the first millennium BCE, Berber-speaking populations had established complex agropastoral societies across the Maghreb, engaging in trade with Phoenician colonies on the northern Moroccan coast—most notably Lixus (near present-day Larache) and Tingis (Tangier). These contacts introduced literacy, coinage, and Mediterranean commodity networks but did not fundamentally alter the Berber social structure organized around lineage groups, transhumant pastoralism, and confederal political authority (Camps, 1987). The Mauretanian kingdoms that emerged in the last centuries BCE—particularly that of Juba II (c. 25 BCE–23 CE), a Romanized client king whose court at Caesarea blended Hellenistic, Roman, and Berber cultural elements—demonstrated the capacity of Amazigh elites to selectively appropriate external cultural frameworks while maintaining indigenous political forms (Roller, 2003). Rome’s incorporation of Mauretania Tingitana as a province in 40 CE extended imperial administration into northern Morocco but never achieved effective penetration of the mountainous interior, a pattern of partial external control that would recur throughout Moroccan history.

The Amazigh substratum is not merely an archaeological or prehistoric phenomenon; it is a continuous living presence in Moroccan history. Tamazight languages—Tachelhit in the Anti-Atlas and Souss, Central Atlas Tamazight, and Tarifit in the Rif—remained spoken by substantial majorities of the Moroccan population throughout the Islamic period and into the twenty-first century. The cultural practices, customary law (izerf), and social organization associated with Amazigh communities shaped the texture of Moroccan life in ways that Arabic chronicles systematically obscured (Gellner, 1969; Hammoudi, 1997). Acknowledging this substratum is therefore not an act of romantic primordialism but a historiographical corrective essential to any accurate account of what Morocco is and how it came to be.

3. The Arab Conquest and the Islamization of Morocco (647–788 CE)


The Arab Muslim conquest of North Africa, launched from Egypt in the mid-seventh century, reached the Moroccan interior only after decades of fierce Berber resistance. ʿUqba ibn Nafiʿ’s celebrated raid to the Atlantic shore (c. 682 CE) was less a conquest than an extended razzia; effective Islamic administration in Morocco was not established until the campaigns of Musa ibn Nusayr in the first decade of the eighth century (Brett & Fentress, 1996). The resistance of the Berber warrior leader known in Arabic sources as al-Kahina—whose identification, historicity, and significance remain subjects of scholarly debate—has become a potent symbol of Amazigh agency against Arab imperialism, though contemporary historians caution against reading modern nationalist categories into early medieval social conflicts (Modéran, 2003).

The process of Islamization was gradual, uneven, and deeply conditioned by Berber social structures. Islam spread not primarily through military coercion but through the activities of traveling scholars, Sufi orders (turuq), and the prestige associated with Arabic literacy and Islamic law. Crucially, the Kharijite movement—a puritanical Islamic tendency emphasizing the equality of all Muslims regardless of ethnic origin—found enormous resonance among Berber populations resentful of Arab fiscal exploitation and social condescension (Savage, 1997). The Kharijite revolts of 739–743 CE were among the most serious challenges ever faced by the Umayyad caliphate and effectively ended Arab imperial control over the Maghreb, opening the political space in which the first distinctly Moroccan Islamic dynasty would emerge.


That dynasty was the Idrisid, founded by Idris ibn Abdallah, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who fled the Abbasid massacre of Alid partisans and found refuge among the Berber Awraba confederation of northern Morocco in 789 CE (Terrasse, 1949–1950). His son Idris II (r. 804–828 CE) founded the city of Fez, which would become the intellectual and spiritual capital of Morocco for twelve subsequent centuries. The Idrisid state was politically fragile—fragmenting rapidly after Idris II’s death among competing princely lines—but its symbolic legacy was immense: it established the template of a Morocco governed by a sharif (descendant of the Prophet) who derived legitimacy simultaneously from Islamic genealogy, Berber tribal alliance, and urban scholarly endorsement. This tripartite legitimation formula would underpin Moroccan political culture down to the present day (Waterbury, 1970).

4. The Berber Imperial Dynasties: Almoravids, Almohads, and Marinids (1040–1465)


The eleventh century inaugurated what many historians regard as Morocco’s most consequential contribution to world history: the rise of the Almoravid and Almohad movements, which projected Moroccan power across the entire western Mediterranean world. The Almoravid (al-Murabitun) movement originated among the Sanhaja Berbers of the western Sahara, inspired by the reformist teaching of Abdallah ibn Yasin, who had studied with the Maliki jurists of Kairouan and returned determined to impose orthodox Islamic practice on the lax religious environment of the Saharan confederation (Messier, 2010). The movement combined military discipline, puritan religious reform, and shrewd political organization: by the 1060s the Almoravids had conquered Morocco and founded Marrakech (1070) as their imperial capital; by 1086 they had crossed into the Iberian Peninsula in response to appeals from Andalusian Muslim rulers threatened by the Christian Reconquista, decisively defeating Alfonso VI of Castile at the Battle of Sagrajas (Bosch Vilá, 1956).


The Almoravid empire at its height encompassed Morocco, western Algeria, much of West Africa, and al-Andalus, making it one of the largest Islamic states of its era. Yet it proved institutionally fragile. The second generation of rulers, acculturated to the luxury of Andalusian court life, lost the austere reforming energy of the founders, and the movement was ultimately overthrown by an even more radical reformation emerging from the High Atlas Mountains: the Almohad (al-Muwahhidun) movement, founded by Ibn Tumart, an Amazigh scholar from the Masmuda confederation who had studied in the Islamic East and returned convinced that the Almoravids had lapsed into anthropomorphism and juridical rigidity (Fierro, 2011). The Almohad caliphate (1121–1269) represents the apogee of medieval Moroccan imperial power, reuniting the Almoravid domains under Abd al-Mumin and his successors and briefly controlling the entire Maghreb.

The cultural achievement of the Almohad courts of Marrakech and Seville was equally remarkable. These courts patronized Ibn Rushd (Averroes), whose Aristotelian commentaries shaped the entire trajectory of European scholasticism; Ibn Tufayl, the philosopher-novelist; and Maimonides, the Jewish theologian born in Cordoba, whose intellectual formation occurred in part within Almohad cultural orbit (Urvoy, 1991). This efflorescence—the product of precisely the multi-civilizational confluence that characterizes Moroccan history—has sometimes been overshadowed by scholarly emphasis on Almohad religious intolerance, but it represents a genuine intellectual achievement of world-historical significance. The Almohad collapse, precipitated by military defeats in Iberia (Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212) and by internal tribal rebellions, eventually produced the Marinid dynasty (1244–1465), another Berber confederation that established its capital at Fez, rebuilt the great madrasas of that city, and struggled perpetually to maintain control of al-Andalus and fend off internal challenges (Shatzmiller, 1976).

5. Sharifi Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Moroccan State (1465–1664)


The decline of the Marinids inaugurated a prolonged political crisis in which religious legitimacy increasingly displaced genealogical Berber identity as the primary currency of political authority. The Wattasid regents who displaced the Marinids lacked effective control over the countryside, and their inability to resist Portuguese expansion along the Atlantic littoral—Ceuta fell in 1415, Arzila and Tangier in 1471—created a legitimacy crisis that sharifi religious movements were well positioned to exploit (Cour, 1920). The Saadian dynasty (1509–1659), originating in the Draa Valley of southern Morocco and claiming Prophetic descent, built its power on a combination of religious prestige, anti-Portuguese jihad, and control of the trans-Saharan gold and salt trade.

The Saadian victory at the Battle of the Three Kings (Wadi al-Makhazin, 1578)—in which the Portuguese king Sebastian I, a Moroccan pretender backed by Portugal, and the reigning Saadian sultan Abd al-Malik all perished—became one of the most celebrated military episodes in Moroccan national memory and definitively ended Portuguese ambitions of territorial conquest in Morocco (Bovill, 1958). The subsequent reign of Ahmad al-Mansur (1578–1603) marked the summit of Saadian power: his conquest of the Songhai Empire in 1591, deploying a Moroccan army across the Sahara to seize the Niger Bend, projected Moroccan influence deep into sub-Saharan Africa and temporarily monopolized the gold trade that had for centuries underpinned North African commercial prosperity (Hunwick, 1999).


The Alaoui dynasty, which traces its lineage to the Prophet through the Hasanid line and has governed Morocco continuously from the mid-seventeenth century to the present, emerged from the chaos of Saadian collapse. The founder Moulay al-Rashid (r. 1664–1672), and especially his successor Moulay Ismail (r. 1672–1727), reconstructed the Moroccan state on foundations of extraordinary durability: a professional army composed largely of sub-Saharan African soldiers (abid al-Bukhari), a network of royal residences and garrisons across the country, and a sophisticated manipulation of religious symbolism that made the sultan simultaneously Commander of the Faithful, protector of Islamic scholars, and cosmic mediator between the divine and the Moroccan community (Ennaji, 1999; Laroui, 1977). The Alaoui state thus institutionalized the legitimation formula first articulated by the Idrisids—Islamic genealogy, tribal alliance, and scholarly endorsement—in a durable administrative form.

6. Morocco in the Age of European Imperialism (1800–1912)


The nineteenth century subjected the Moroccan state to pressures of a qualitatively different order from anything previously experienced. The expansion of European industrial capitalism, backed by overwhelming military force, systematically dismantled the political and economic autonomy of non-European polities across the globe. Morocco’s experience of this process was mediated by its geostrategic position—its Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines made it a focal point of European imperial rivalry—and by the relative sophistication of its diplomatic class, which skillfully played European powers against one another for several decades before the logic of informal and then formal empire became irresistible (Burke, 1976).


The French conquest of Algeria (1830) immediately transformed Morocco’s strategic situation, creating a land frontier with a European imperial power and generating a flow of Algerian refugees—most notably the resistance leader Abd al-Qadir—that repeatedly dragged Morocco into conflict with France. The Battle of Isly (1844), in which a French force routed a Moroccan army that had been supporting Algerian resistance, demonstrated the disparity of military capability and forced Morocco into a humiliating treaty (Julien, 1964). The simultaneous Spanish bombardment and occupation of Tetouan during the First Moroccan-Spanish War (1859–1860) compounded this lesson in strategic vulnerability, as did the growing penetration of the Moroccan economy by European commercial interests backed by extraterritorial legal privileges.

The Moroccan sultans of the second half of the nineteenth century—Muhammad IV, Hassan I, and Abd al-Aziz—pursued contradictory strategies of reform and resistance. Hassan I (r. 1873–1894) undertook the most sustained modernization effort of the pre-Protectorate era, reorganizing the army on European lines, reforming the tax system, and dispatching diplomatic and military missions to Europe, but his reforms were consistently undermined by fiscal exhaustion produced by the indemnities and commercial concessions extracted by European creditors (Burke, 1976). The Algeciras Conference of 1906, at which the major European powers effectively decided Morocco’s fate without Moroccan participation, crystallized the structural logic of colonial partition: Morocco was too weak to defend its sovereignty, too wealthy and strategically positioned to be left independent (Andrew & Kanya-Forstner, 1981).

The Treaty of Fez (1912), by which Sultan Abd al-Hafid accepted French and Spanish protectorates over Morocco, formally ended Moroccan sovereignty. It did not, however, end Moroccan resistance. The rural insurrection of Ahmad al-Hiba briefly seized Marrakech in August 1912 before being suppressed by French forces under Hubert Lyautey. More sustained resistance came from the Rif and Atlas Mountains, where Amazigh tribal confederations mounted military campaigns that taxed colonial resources for decades. The Republic of the Rif, established by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi (1921–1926), was the most remarkable of these formations: a proto-state with its own constitution, diplomatic apparatus, and military force that inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the Spanish Army of Africa at Annual (1921) before being suppressed by a combined Franco-Spanish force employing chemical weapons (Woolman, 1968; Pennell, 2000).

7. The French Protectorate: Colonial Transformation and Nationalist Response (1912–1956)

The French Protectorate in Morocco is conventionally divided between the architectonic phase associated with Resident-General Lyautey (1912–1925) and the subsequent period of more conventional colonial exploitation. Lyautey’s ideology of respectful domination (politique des égards) involved preserving the formal apparatus of the Moroccan sultanate, maintaining the medinas as living urban heritage, and governing through existing social hierarchies—a strategy that differed rhetorically, if not always practically, from the assimilationist model pursued in Algeria (Rivet, 1996). The physical separation of colonial villes nouvelles from preexisting medinas—visible today in Fez, Marrakech, Casablanca, and Rabat—embodied this philosophy in stone and brick while simultaneously revealing its underlying spatial logic of racial segregation.


Economically, the Protectorate transformed Morocco in ways that were profound and largely asymmetrical. The construction of modern infrastructure—railways, ports, roads, telegraph networks—integrated Morocco into the circuits of the world economy primarily as an exporter of phosphates (discovered at Khouribga in 1920 and developed into the world’s largest known reserve), agricultural products, and labor. The colonization of agricultural land by European settlers dispossessed thousands of rural families and contributed to the explosive growth of Casablanca, which expanded from a small coastal town of approximately 20,000 inhabitants in 1907 to a metropolis of over 600,000 by 1952 (Adam, 1968). This urbanization created the social conditions—literate young men displaced from rural communities, exposed to egalitarian ideologies through both Islamic reformism and secular nationalism—in which the independence movement would be forged.

The Istiqlal (Independence) Party, founded in 1943, articulated a nationalism that fused Islamic modernism, Arabism, and constitutional liberalism. Its founding manifesto simultaneously presented to the Allies, Sultan Muhammad V, and the French authorities demanded Moroccan independence under the sultan’s leadership. The French decision to depose and exile Sultan Muhammad V to Madagascar in August 1953 galvanized Moroccan public opinion in ways the colonial administration had catastrophically failed to anticipate (Halstead, 1967). The sultan’s exile transformed him from a cautious constitutional monarch into a symbol of national resistance, fusing religious, dynastic, and nationalist legitimacies into a single powerful identity. His return in November 1955 and Morocco’s formal independence on March 2, 1956 represented the triumph of this fusion and set the terms of the political settlement that would govern independent Morocco for generations.

8. Independent Morocco: Authoritarianism, Reform, and Contested Liberalization (1956–Present)

The trajectory of independent Morocco under Muhammad V (r. 1956–1961) and Hassan II (r. 1961–1999) was shaped by three fundamental tensions: between monarchical authority and pluralist political aspiration; between Islamic identity and secular modernization; and between national sovereignty and continued economic dependency on former colonial powers. Hassan II, who possessed formidable political intelligence and ruthless pragmatism, navigated these tensions through constitutional manipulation, selective repression, and strategic deployment of religious symbolism. The so-called Years of Lead (années de plomb)—the period from the late 1960s through the 1980s during which political opponents, leftists, Islamists, and Amazigh activists were imprisoned, tortured, and disappeared—represent the most serious indictment of the Alaoui monarchy’s postcolonial record (Slyomovics, 2005; Amnesty International, 1991).

The same period nonetheless witnessed substantial economic development, the consolidation of national institutions, and Morocco’s contested claim to the Western Sahara following the Green March of November 1975—a masterstroke of political theater in which Hassan II led 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians across the border into the Spanish-controlled territory (Hodges, 1983). The Western Sahara conflict, which pitted Morocco against the Polisario Front backed by Algeria, remains unresolved and constitutes the most consequential open question in contemporary Moroccan geopolitics, with the United Nations peace process deadlocked and tens of thousands of Sahrawi refugees still living in camps near Tindouf, Algeria (Shelley, 2004).


The accession of King Muhammad VI in 1999 inaugurated a carefully managed political liberalization. The Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance Équité et Réconciliation, IER), established in 2004, investigated past human rights abuses, acknowledged state responsibility, and awarded compensation to thousands of victims—an unprecedented exercise in transitional justice for the Arab world, though critics noted its circumspect treatment of individual accountability (Slyomovics, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2005). The Mudawwana reform of 2004, which substantially expanded women’s rights within the family code, and the constitutionalization of Tamazight as an official language in 2011 represented significant departures from the ethnic and gender hierarchies of previous reigns.

The Arab Spring of 2011 tested Morocco’s model of managed liberalization under democratic pressure. Nationwide protests organized by the February 20 Movement demanded deeper structural reform; the king responded with constitutional amendments—ratified by referendum in July 2011—that formally reduced royal prerogatives, strengthened the prime minister’s powers, and recognized Morocco’s plural cultural identity. Scholars remain divided on the significance of these reforms: optimists point to Morocco’s relative political stability by comparison with post-2011 Egypt, Libya, and Syria; critics argue that the fundamental architecture of royal predominance remained intact and that reforms were designed to co-opt rather than genuinely transform (Maghraoui, 2011; Kausch, 2015). The question of whether managed liberalization can deliver sustainable democratic governance remains one of the defining challenges of contemporary Moroccan politics.

9. Thematic Synthesis: Interpreting the Longue Durée

Several overarching themes emerge from this survey that merit explicit analytical attention. First is the durability of Morocco’s political institutions by comparison with other postcolonial states. The Alaoui monarchy has governed continuously since the seventeenth century, survived the colonial period with its legitimacy enhanced rather than destroyed, and navigated postcolonial transitions without the coups, civil wars, or state collapse that have destabilized many comparable polities. Scholars have explained this institutional resilience variously in terms of the sultan’s religious authority as Commander of the Faithful, the patrimonial character of the Moroccan state in which distinctions between royal patrimony and public treasury were systematically blurred (Waterbury, 1970), and the political acuity of individual Alaoui rulers (Hammoudi, 1997).

A second theme is the persistent tension between urban-literate Islamic orthodoxy and rural-tribal customary practice—a tension that Gellner (1969) famously theorized in terms of high and low Islam but that subsequent anthropological research has considerably complicated by demonstrating the fluidity and contextual character of these categories in practice (Eickelman, 1976; Combs-Schilling, 1989). The periodic renewal movements that have animated Moroccan religious life—from Almoravid puritanism to twentieth-century Salafi modernism—can be read as attempts to resolve this tension by projecting urban scholarly standards into the countryside, but these attempts have repeatedly encountered the resilience of Sufi brotherhoods, saint veneration (maraboutism), and local customary law as competing sources of religious authority.


A third theme is Morocco’s distinctive relationship with the African continent south of the Sahara. Colonial and postcolonial scholarship has frequently treated Morocco as part of a Mediterranean or Middle Eastern cultural zone, implicitly detaching it from sub-Saharan Africa. Recent historiography has forcefully challenged this assumption by emphasizing the trans-Saharan commercial networks, slave trades, and cultural exchanges that connected Morocco to Mali, Songhai, Hausaland, and the Saharan oasis communities for over a millennium (McDougall & Scheele, 2012; Lydon, 2009). The substantial Haratin and sub-Saharan African communities within Morocco, the Arabic-language manuscript tradition of Timbuktu, and Morocco’s active twenty-first-century diplomacy toward sub-Saharan Africa are all legacies of this deep continental entanglement.

Finally, the question of Amazigh identity and its relationship to Moroccan national identity demands sustained attention. The decades-long suppression of Tamazight language and culture under the pressures of Arab nationalist ideology, and the more recent official embrace of Amazigh heritage—embodied in the creation of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) and the 2011 constitutional provision making Tamazight an official language—represent a fundamental shift in official Moroccan self-understanding. Whether this shift represents genuine pluralistic recognition or a strategic de-radicalization of Amazigh political claims remains contested (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). What is certain is that any account of Moroccan history treating the Amazigh dimension as a pre-Islamic prologue rather than a continuous and central thread is fundamentally incomplete.

10. Conclusion


Morocco’s history cannot be deciphered through any single interpretive framework. It is neither a simple story of Islamic civilization nor a narrative of Berber resistance, neither a tale of colonial victimhood nor a celebration of unbroken dynastic continuity. It is, rather, a history of complex entanglement: between the sedentary and the nomadic, the literate and the oral, the orthodox and the mystical, the cosmopolitan and the local, the imperial and the tribal. The historians who have illuminated this complexity most powerfully—from Ibn Khaldun, whose theory of the cyclical dynamics of tribal power and urban civilization was derived in large part from his observation of Maghrebi history, to Laroui (1977), Burke (1976), and the current generation of Moroccan and international scholars—have been those willing to hold multiple analytical frames in simultaneous tension.

Morocco in the twenty-first century faces challenges that are continuous with the longue durée of its history: the governance of ethnic and regional diversity, the negotiation of Islamic tradition and liberal modernity, the management of economic inequality in a society undergoing rapid urbanization, and the assertion of sovereignty in a global order still structured by post-colonial asymmetries of power and knowledge production. The history traced in this essay is not merely background context for these challenges; it is constitutive of them. To decipher Morocco’s history is to illuminate the choices and constraints that face one of the world’s most historically layered and consequential societies—and to appreciate that those choices remain genuinely open.


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From Consumer To Co-Developer: Japan’s Bet On GCAP – Analysis



May 30, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Pratnashree Basu

The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) marks one of the most consequential defence-industrial and strategic partnerships Japan has entered into since the end of the Second World War. Bringing together Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy to jointly develop a sixth-generation combat aircraft by 2035, GCAP is more than a fighter jet programme. It reflects Japan’s evolving strategic outlook, its growing willingness to engage in high-end defence industrial cooperation beyond the United States alliance framework, and the broader emergence of trans-regional security linkages between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic theatres.

GCAP represents both strategic necessity and political transformation for Tokyo, with its decision to mergeits indigenous F-X fighter programme with the United Kingdom’s Tempest initiative in 2022. While the US-Japan alliance remains the bedrock of Japanese security policy, Tokyo increasingly recognises the value of operational flexibility, technological diversification, and defence-industrial resilience. Unlike the F-35 programme, where the United States retains significant control over upgrades, software access, and technology transfer, GCAP is explicitly structured around sovereign capability. Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom have emphasised equality in decision-making, industrial participation, and technological access. This is a particularly significant departure for Japan, whose post-war defence procurement model was historically characterised by dependence on licensed production arrangements with the United States and constraints that limited the development of indigenous innovation.

The strategic rationale behind GCAP is also closely tied to Japan’s changing regional threat perceptions and uncertainty surrounding long-term American defence-industrial reliability. China’s increasing military assertiveness in the East China Sea, regular incursions near the Senkaku Islands, and rapid advances in fifth- and sixth-generation aerospace technologies have compelled Tokyo to prioritise air superiority and long-range strike capabilities. Simultaneously, North Korea’s missile advancements and Russia’s continued military activities around Japan’s northern periphery reinforce the need for next-generation integrated combat systems rather than standalone fighter platforms.


Notably, GCAP is not merely about producing an aircraft. It is envisioned as a system of systems that combines crewed and uncrewed platforms, enhanced sensors, data fusion, electronic warfare capabilities, AI-enabled battle management, and network-centric operations across several domains. This reflects the growing centrality of information dominance in modern warfare. Japan’s participation, therefore, enhances its access to cutting-edge technologies in areas such as stealth engineering, advanced propulsion, sensor fusion, and collaborative combat aircraft systems.

The collaboration with the UK is very significant for Japan. Through reciprocal access agreements, defence exercises, cyber cooperation, and maritime deployments, Japan-UK security relations have improved significantly over the last ten years. This strategic convergence is institutionalised by GCAP. Indeed, Japanese officials have increasingly been framing Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security as interrelated theatres, especially in light of the strategic collaboration between China and Russia. In 2025, Tokyo noted that UK-Japan defence ties had reached an “unprecedented” level, with GCAP functioning as a central pillar of this relationship.

Italy’s role within GCAP is equally important, though often underappreciated in Indo-Pacific discussions. Rome brings substantial aerospace expertise through Leonardo and its long experience in multinational combat aircraft projects. More importantly, Italy acts as a bridge between Indo-Pacific geopolitical priorities and European defence-industrial ecosystems. Japan’s collaboration with Italy, in turn, extends its European defence partnerships beyond conventional political diplomacy.


Institutionally, GCAP has evolved rapidly over the past two years. In 2025, the three countries operationalised the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO) and launched Edgewing, the joint industrial venture bringing together BAE Systems, Leonardo, and the Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Company. The creation of a unified headquarters in Reading, United Kingdom, was an important step in simplifying programme governance and industrial cooperation. In April 2026, the first joint international contract worth £686 million was awarded to Edgewing, focusing on design and engineering and marking the first time the programme moved away from separate national contracts toward a unified multinational framework.

Yet, despite its strategic promise, GCAP faces substantial challenges. Timelines for the programme remain rather ambitious. Delivering a sixth-generation platform by 2035 requires three nations with different strategic cultures and procurement systems to synchronise complex technological development cycles, industrial coordination, political consensus, and budgetary commitments. Moreover, cost escalation is already becoming a major concern. Italy recently approved approximately EUR 8.8 billion in funding for the programme through 2037, while revised estimates suggest significantly higher long-term expenditures than initially anticipated.

For Tokyo in particular, an emerging concern is whether domestic political and industrial expectations can remain aligned with the programme’s pace. Japanese stakeholders view 2035 as a hard deadline for replacing the country’s ageing F-2 fighter fleet. By contrast, the United Kingdom and Italy possess somewhat greater flexibility due to their Eurofighter Typhoon inventories. With growing Japanese frustration over delays linked to uncertainties in the British defence budget, a temporary stopgap arrangement was recently signed to prevent disruption to ongoing work while London finalises its long-term defence investment plan. Nonetheless, London is reportedly preparing to approve a long-term funding package for GCAP, in a move aimed at stabilising the programme after months of Japanese concerns.

These tensions highlight a broader structural issue within multinational defence projects: the difficulty of balancing industrial sovereignty with programme efficiency. GCAP’s promise of equal partnership is politically attractive, particularly for Japan, but equal governance can also complicate decision-making. Divergent strategic priorities, budgetary cycles, and export policies could create friction over time.


Membership expansion is another important question. Germany has apparently featured in talks about future participation, while Saudi Arabia has been mentioned as a possible participant on several occasions. Italy, in particular, appears open to broadening participation to offset rising programme costs and expand export markets. However, Japan remains cautious. Tokyo’s hesitancy reflects concerns over technology security, export sensitivities, and the possibility that additional partners could delay timelines or dilute Japanese influence within the programme.

Indeed, one of GCAP’s most strategically significant dimensions is Japan’s gradual reinterpretation of its defence export and industrial policies. Tokyo’s post-war restrictions on arms exports long constrained its ability to participate meaningfully in multinational defence production networks. Recent policy revisions have relaxed some of these constraints, enabling Japan to envision GCAP not only as a procurement initiative but also as a platform for defence-industrial competitiveness. The programme’s success could fundamentally reshape Japan’s role in the global defence market.

The trajectory of GCAP will shape not only the future of combat aviation but also the credibility of trans-regional strategic partnerships in the coming decades. For Japan, the programme represents a test of whether it can transition from a constrained security consumer into a co-developer of next-generation military power. The stakes, therefore, extend far beyond aerospace technology.About the author: Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
Mexico Strengthens Security Measures Ahead Of World Cup

File photo of police officers in Mexico City. Photo Credit: Ralf Roletschek, Wikipedia Commons



June 1, 2026 
By The Watch

Mexico has deployed more than 100,000 security officers and has tightened security at high-profile tourist sites for the upcoming World Cup soccer tournament. The moves accelerated in April 2026 after an isolated mass shooting unrelated to cartel violence prompted authorities to speed up additional security measures ahead of the global event.

The quadrennial sports tournament will take place in Canada, Mexico and the United States beginning in June. The three partner nations have closely collaborated on joint security measures in preparation for a nearly six-week tournament expected to draw millions of visitors to North America. In March 2026 congressional testimony, Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was confident the games would proceed without incident. “This summer, the strong military relationships among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico will be on full display as our forces work together to ensure a safe World Cup,” Guillot said. “The USNORTHCOM relationship with Mexican military partners stands strong and pays lasting dividends for the security of both the United States and Mexico. USNORTHCOM maintains its longstanding relationships with the Mexican Department of the Navy (MARINA) and Department of National Defense (DEFENSA) and addresses shared security challenges by, with, and through our Mexican partners.”

Mexico has worked hard to improve internal security since President Claudia Sheinbaum took office in 2024. The government has aggressively confronted transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) including the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. Mexico City has extradited dozens of cartel leaders to the U.S. for trial. Increased training and collaboration between U.S. and Mexican special forces and other military units has built trust and capabilities that were demonstrated in the daring raid that resulted in the death of Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” in February.

In 2025, Mexican military personnel trained with the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Mexican and U.S. Soldiers conducted mirrored patrols along the Mexico-U.S. coordinated by Joint Task Force-Southern Border. Naval exchanges and growing partnerships with U.S. National Guard forces also demonstrate strong military ties, Guillot noted in his March testimony.

The April shooting at the Teotihuacan pyramids — a UNESCO Heritage Site and one of Mexico’s most frequented tourist attractions — killed a Canadian tourist and injured a dozen more, according to The Associated Press. Sheinbaum dispatched police with bomb-sniffing dogs to the site. Overall, the government has deployed 100,000 security personnel in advance of the Cup, the AP reported. But the Mexican president said the shooting by the lone gunman, wasn’t an indication of future violence during the Cup. “Our obligation as a government is to take the appropriate measures to ensure that a situation like this does not happen again. But clearly, we all know — Mexicans know — that this is something that had not previously taken place,” Sheinbaum said April 21 during her daily morning news conference, the AP reported.

More than $1 billion has been allocated to protect the estimated 6 million fans who will attend 104 matches in 16 venues in the three countries, according to the soccer federation FIFA. The U.S. has dedicated $115 million in counter-unmanned aerial systems technology and the FBI, Secret Service and the Department of Homeland Security are coordinating security for the U.S. events at a level commensurate with presidential inaugurations, FIFA states. FIFA has spent $625 million on security, the organization said.

This article was published at The Watch