Photo Credit: POTUS, X
May 30, 2026
By Guillaume Vadnais
After his trip to China, Trump dropped a blunt line on Taiwan. He stated he was “not looking for anyone to go independent there”, and he’s definitely “not interested in traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war”(1). That’s pure Trump: everything is a deal. Geopolitics, allies, the whole thing gets turned into leverage to extract concessions somewhere else.
This approach marks a clear departure from the longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan. National security as well as TSMC now have been openly linked to broader negotiations with Beijing. For Trump, allies’ interests can be weighed and traded, but American priorities should forever come first.
A similar dynamic is beginning to emerge in the sphere of U.S.–European energy cooperation. The U.S.–Greece “energy honeymoon” is now evolving into a more complex and conditional relationship, shaped not only by shared strategic goals, but also by shifting expectations and competing national interests.
May 30, 2026
By Guillaume Vadnais
After his trip to China, Trump dropped a blunt line on Taiwan. He stated he was “not looking for anyone to go independent there”, and he’s definitely “not interested in traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war”(1). That’s pure Trump: everything is a deal. Geopolitics, allies, the whole thing gets turned into leverage to extract concessions somewhere else.
This approach marks a clear departure from the longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan. National security as well as TSMC now have been openly linked to broader negotiations with Beijing. For Trump, allies’ interests can be weighed and traded, but American priorities should forever come first.
A similar dynamic is beginning to emerge in the sphere of U.S.–European energy cooperation. The U.S.–Greece “energy honeymoon” is now evolving into a more complex and conditional relationship, shaped not only by shared strategic goals, but also by shifting expectations and competing national interests.
I. From Taiwan to Europe: The Same Cold-Blooded Logic of Trump’s “Deal-Oriented Diplomacy”
While we lament Taiwan’s inability to escape its fate as a political chess piece, we must also remain vigilant about Europe’s vulnerable position on the U.S. strategic chessboard. Under the ironclad rule of “America First”, Europe’s energy security looks more and more like something Washington is willing to trade away.
In 2025, Trump struck a $750 billion energy deal with the EU (2). Under the agreement, Europe had to buy American liquefied natural gas at prices way above normal. This move locked Europe’s energy supply to the U.S. economy in a big way. Honestly, Trump’s approach remains unchanged when he deals with Taiwan or Europe. He treats alliances like business deals: friends are useful, but America comes first, always. That kind of cold, hard logic has left Europe exposed to strategic risks they haven’t faced before, even as we haven’t given up on talking about “transatlantic partnership”.
II. Greece: Trump’s Pivot
When it comes to U.S.-EU energy cooperation, Greece can be described as Trump’s absolute “favorite”. On the surface, the Vertical Corridor project (3) looks like a straightforward contribution to Europe’s security. American LNG would move through Greek terminals such as Alexandroupolis and onward to Central and Eastern Europe, offering a clear alternative to Russian pipeline gas. However, U.S. strategy in Greece has never been limited to energy supplies alone. It is quietly reshaping the country into a broader strategic outpost. While tightening Washington’s grip on the continent’s energy arteries, Trump can also check Chinese/Russian influence in the region.
1. The Vertical Corridor and the LNG Contracts
The Vertical Corridor would channel American LNG through Greek ports (such as the Alexandroupolis terminal) onward to Central and Eastern Europe. Greece signed a 20-year long-term contract to buy 700 million cubic meters of U.S. LNG annually from 2030.
But those projects carries real risks. American LNG is far more expensive (4) than the Russian gas it replaces. The high costs will eventually hit Greek consumers and European businesses. Building the necessary terminals and pipelines requires massive investment. Besides, U.S. cargoes often shift toward more lucrative Asian markets when prices rise (5), which brings serve supply stability concerns.With winter storage levels already low across parts of Europe (6), any disruption or redirection of supplies could quickly turn into a serious energy crunch.
2. Ionian Sea Drilling
In April 2026, Greece announced it would resume deep-sea natural gas drilling in Block 2 of the northwestern Ionian Sea starting in 2027 (7). ExxonMobil, Energean, and HelleniQ Energy will jointly develop the project. Early estimates suggest the block could hold as much as 270 billion cubic meters of natural gas. That volume would cover Greece’s domestic needs for decades and still leave room for exports to the rest of Europe. However, experts give the project only a 16 percent chance of success (8). It would also bring significant environmental risks in a sensitive marine area (9). Should the project succeed, the United States will further solidify its position as a “key energy supplier” to Europe and deepen its influence over the energy supply chains. For Greece, this raises a difficult long-term question: how much of its energy sovereignty it may ultimately have to trade away in return for investment and potential revenue.
3. The Port Standoff
As construction accelerates at the Port of Elefsina, the U.S. Ambassador to Greece has publicly expressed the expectation of Chinese firms withdrawing from the Port of Piraeus (10). The remarks underscore Washington’s broader strategic calculus: to position Greece more firmly within its orbit at a time of intensifying competition with China.
For Athens, the challenge is both evident and acute. Greek policymakers have sought to balance relations between the two powers, leveraging economic opportunities while preserving strategic autonomy. Yet, the space for such maneuvering appears to be narrowing. As U.S.-China rivalry deepens, Greece risks finding itself under growing pressure to align more decisively with one side, a position that carries clear political and economic costs.
From Washington’s perspective, a more assertive foreign policy posture leaves little tolerance for ambiguity. Any move by Greece perceived as “advancing Chinese interests” could invite diplomatic or economic repercussions. At the same time, Beijing has signaled its own red lines. With China’s increasingly confident approach to safeguarding its overseas investments, Chinese officials have emphasized that Port of Piraeus should not become “victim to geopolitical confrontation” (11). Consequently, it is highly likely that China will take further economic and political countermeasures to mitigate the risks posed by transatlantic energy cooperation.
This dynamic places Greece and the European Union in a complex and potentially unstable position. Efforts to maintain strategic balance will require extraordinary political wisdom and strategic acumen. The question is, do European leaders possess the cohesion and foresight necessary to navigate this evolving landscape? Are we really counting on von der Leyen and the EU’s current meager energy reserves?
Ultimately, the stakes extend beyond Greece itself. Europe’s ability to manage external pressures while addressing its own structural vulnerabilities in energy security and economic resilience, will shape its role in an increasingly polarized international system.
III. Europe Must Wake Up: Stop Being a “Bargaining Chip” and Take Back Strategic Autonomy
Right now, Europe has managed to cut its dependence on Russian pipeline gas and calm some fears about supply disruptions during this geopolitical mess. Still, that’s just a patch, not a solution. With Trump’s “America First” approach, where everything about Europe is up for negotiation, Europe risks getting squeezed even harder if it keeps playing as a U.S.-Europe Team. When it comes to energy, Europe has to accept that real independence is the only way out. That means moving away from relying on any one supplier, ramping up homegrown renewable energy, and making sure the internal energy grid is strong and connected.
Europe shouldn’t let others decide its fate or use it as leverage in their games. We must take strategic autonomy as our foundation, push for diverse energy sources, and commit to renewables. We must stop being “sacrificed” and finally taking charge of its own energy and economic future.This article was also published at EUAlive
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