THE DEEP STATE

China’s Ministry Of State Security: The Spies Disrupting The West – Analysis

May 30, 2026 

By Patrick Omam

In recent years, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has significantly expanded its foreign intelligence operations, targeting institutions and critical infrastructures. Focused on cyber-warfare and economic targets the MSS has become a central instrument in China’s pursuit of geopolitical and technological dominance. In doing so, it strategically challenges the resilience of Western institutions.

The MSS remains among the most opaque pillars of Xi Jinping’s political system. This invisible hand operating in cyber operations, human intelligence and economic espionage prides itself for its secrecy – cultivating it for operational necessity and strategic advancements. A unique characteristic making the MSS one of the most powerful and versatile intelligence service in the world.

Unlike Western intelligence agencies who have evolved on the basis of kinetic operations and direct threat elimination, the MSS has opted for a different approach. The MSS has developed a stringent reliance on low-friction operations: where acquiring intellectual property, trade secrets and new technologies securing China’s strategic advantages are prioritized. As a result, economic and technological espionage has become central to Beijing’s development.

Over the past decade, China’s hacking apparatus has rapidly expanded and methodically targeted Western entities. Malicious state-sponsored cyber groups have become a common threat for international tech companies – as MSS’s cyber espionage repeatedly impacted critical infrastructure sectors. Relying on its sophisticated programs and highly effective hacker networks, Beijing’s surveillance has compromised various North American, European, African and Asian entities.


These cyber operations provide China with intellectual property and research knowledge. A wide range of industry secrets and valuable exploits, the Chinese government uses to accelerate its military and economic parity on the global stage. Effectively, reducing Beijing’s cognisance gap in the field of space and information technologies.

The MSS understands the nature of hybrid warfare and intelligence exploits. This strategy became particularly visible in the 2024 cyber campaign led by the Salt Typhoon hacker group. The world witnessed how nine American phone companies were successfully infiltrated – granting the MSS direct access to communications of senior US officials.

Sensitive information China’s high officials subsequently leverage to undermine international negotiations, trade agreements and foreign economies. These MSS cyber operations cost billions of dollars to the US economy and its national security. And factually, US and Western agencies find themselves unable to contain China’s multifaceted cyber espionage.

Making it an existential threat for the West. But a resourceful spying activity for Beijing. While Beijing pursues technological dominance, large-scale hacking has become a Made in China trademark in the cyberspace. As cyber espionage operations further develop, the MSS implements clandestine human intelligence networks in its arsenal – a result-driven mechanism to steal US and international trade secrets in a bulletproof hybrid way.
China’s Expanding Network of Influence

Next to having the largest hacking program in the world, the extended arm of the MSS has a vast network serving human intelligence and influence.

Besides the standard agency-like intelligence collection, the MSS methodically influences foreign governments, parliaments, think-tanks and human rights organisations. Relying on both Chinese nationals and locals, the MSS has managed – and attempted – various intrusion on foreign soil.

The 2017 ornate Chinese garden operation is a clear depiction of the unfathomable influence of the Ministry of State Security. A construction team – funded and supervised by the Chinese government – was expected to build a $100 million classical garden in Washington.

Located on one of Washington’s highest geographical points, the 70 feet Chinese pagoda would have been just two miles away from the US Capitol. Had it not been for the FBI’s counterintelligence, Beijing’s attempt would have succeeded.

Facilitating China’s ability to direct signal interferences into the US legislative branch.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not stop at government-backed projects to further its national interests. The CCP recognizes the strategic importance of its diplomatic corps in collecting human intelligence. Evidently, China has developed the most expansive diplomatic network in the world: 274 diplomatic and consular missions posted around the globe.


A diplomatic presence, guaranteeing the MSS is capable of leveraging an entire society of public servants for intelligence collection purposes.

Because of this, the MSS is able to gather intelligence on a de facto continuous basis. Offering the Chinese intelligence service a shapeless nature where uncountable individuals contribute to the CCP’s ecosystem.

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) further reinforces this architecture. The groundwork cultivated by the UFWD actively conducts influence strategies against foreign individuals and states. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the UFWD rejuvenated its central position in coercing and exploiting individuals – that is an assertive tool in disseminating Chinese ideologies and narratives.

Although China’s influence is strongly promoted by the UFWD – MSS’s most consequential successes remain physical infiltrations into foreign state infrastructures.

The 31-year old student, Ji Chaoqun, successfully enlisted in the US Army Reserves and was tasked by the MSS to collect biographical information of certain individuals for further recruitment.

Similarly, the 58-year old Eileen Wang, serving as Arcadia’s mayor (California) proactively acted on behalf of China on US territory – by coordinating with locals and promoting Chinese interests.

Both have been charged for acting within the US as unregistered agents of the Chinese state. While Eileen Wang awaits her sentencing, Ji Chaoqun is serving an 8-year sentence. Although US counterintelligence thwarted both individuals, Chaoqun and Wang represent the sheer dedication imprinted in MSS’s DNA.

These influence operations highlight the adaptability and persistent nature of the Ministry of State Security – essential qualities to succeed with a long-term strategic horizon.

And, the MSS has shown that it does not exclusively lean on economic and strategic infrastructures to advance China’s interests.
Seizing the Academia

China’s espionage apparatus also recognizes the vitality of Western educational institutions as a bastion for intellectual property.

Elite US and European institutions such as the University of Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The Technical University of Delft (TU Delft) and Stanford University cultivate a tradition of cutting-edge innovation, science and technological research.

These globally recognized research leaders – housing elite students – are a hotbed for MSS’s espionage exploits. The Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) launched by the CCP, targeted foreign researchers and entrepreneurs. The state-sponsored program operating as a recruitment initiative sought to attract Chinese and non-Chinese scholars to China. Under the guise of technological development, the TTP incentivized the theft of foreign technologies on behalf of the Chinese government.


This talent plan actively preyed on acquiring disruptive technologies such as AI, quantum computing and biotechnology. This academic economic espionage scheme helped reduce China’s technological gap – simultaneously disrupting the Western academia landscape.

In January 2020, Charles Lieber, the chair of Harvard University’s chemistry and chemical biology departments, was arrested and charged following his participation in the TTP. Acting as chair of Harvard University while simultaneously receiving consequent sums of money from the CCP, for his work at the Wuhan University of Technology, which he omitted from US authorities – a classic example of Chinese influence in American universities.

European institutions have faced similar concerns. The Dutch TU Delft, recognized for its expertise in engineering has seen its share of Chinese interference. In joint-research program with Chinese university, the Dutch university has faced some of the Seven Sons of National Defense – the name given to a group of seven Chinese universities – known for having close ties with the defense and science sectors under the leadership of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

Rather than shying away from information gathering, the Chinese institutions’ approach invites Western education platforms – drawing down their ability to impose themselves while Chinese interferences are at play.

Basically, the MSS’s greatest strength: its ability to mobilize various networks rather than isolated operatives. Beijing’s ability to rely on a cohesive and interconnected network in pursuit of China’s national objectives is the grail of its intelligence modus operandi: a cornerstone the CCP leadership is far from abandoning. And as the MSS remains loyal to this multifaceted espionage strategy, China’s digital and military dominance are set to challenge global conventional powers – further destabilizing the international chessboard.

This article was published by TCSS