Wednesday, October 07, 2026

Jordan And The Palestinians – OpEd



King Abdullah of Jordan addresses the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2026. 
Photo Credit: kingabdullah.jo/


October 5, 2026

By Neville Teller


Key Takeaways:

The column answers King Abdullah’s Sept. 23 U.N. speech on occupation by recalling Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the West Bank, recognized only by Britain and possibly Pakistan, and King Hussein’s July 31, 1988 disengagement, which Human Rights Watch treats as leaving about a million residents stateless.

It recounts Black September, from the 1970 hijackings and martial law through the July 1971 expulsion of the fedayeen to Lebanon, with deaths commonly put in the low thousands, not Arafat’s figure of 25,000, and the later killing of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal.

The author’s point is that this record undercuts an unqualified denunciation of Israel; it does not claim the history settles the present legal questions.

On September 23, King Abdullah of Jordan addressed the UN General Assembly. He devoted much of his speech to lambasting Israel. He maintained that what he called “one of the world’s longest running occupations” broke international law, and that the world had ignored it for decades.

Of course he had nothing to say about the Jordanian monarchy’s​ unhappy relationship with the Palestinians, ​with its own history of violence, repression and unresolved grievance, nor of the several charges of flouting international law that Jordan has been accused of over the years.

In the 1948–49 war, for example, Jordan’s Arab Legion took control of the West Bank. On April 24, 1950, the Jordanian parliament approved its annexation, declaring “complete unity between the two banks of the Jordan” in a single Hashemite kingdom ruled by King Abdullah’s great-grandfather, Abdullah I. ​ Arabs resident in the West Bank became Jordanian citizens.


The Arab League refused to recognize Jordan’s annexation. So did the rest of the world, with the sole exception of Britain and, it has been suggested (though details remain unclear), Pakistan.

​The UN characterized Jordan’s annexation as lacking international legal validity. International law does not recognize the acquisition of territory through the use of force as a lawful basis for acquiring sovereignty.

If Jordan flouted international law when it annexed the West Bank, it compounded its disregard for the legal niceties when it reversed its decision.

Until July 31, 1988 ​most Arabs living in the West Bank were, as a matter of Jordanian law and practice, Jordanian citizens. On that day King Hussein, Abdullah’s father, announced that Jordan was ending its legal and administrative relationship with the territory with immediate effect. Under the disengagement regulations, some one million Arab​s resident in the West Bank were ​suddenly stripped of their Jordanian citizenship. All at once they were no longer Jordanian.

​Human Rights Watch describes them as becoming stateless Palestinians under Israeli occupation.​ Over time their Jordanian passports were replaced with temporary Jordanian travel documents that did not confer citizenship.


Loss of nationality had serious legal consequences. They had no right of residence in Jordan. Non-citizens could not vote or stand for office. They were excluded from state employment and faced serious obstacles in accessing work, education, health care and other services.

International human rights law prohibits​ the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.”

The fact that Jordan’s 1988 disengagement stripped a whole defined population of its existing nationality, without an individualized process and without a replacement nationality, makes the charge against Jordan of arbitrary illegality a powerful one.

In his speech​ to the UN, Abdullah called on world opinion to denounce Israel for Palestinian deaths. He might also have acknowledged that Yasser Arafat once accused King Hussein, his father, of killing 25,000 Palestinians – a figure generally believed to have been wildly exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

The episode is usually called Black September, although it lasted from September 1970 until the following July, and the death toll remains disputed. The commonly cited estimate of Palestinian deaths is in the low thousands, including both fighters and civilians. Jordanian soldiers also died. What is not disputed is that the events of 1970–71 left a deep and bitter Palestinian-Jordanian legacy.

​After the Six-Day War​ in 1967,​ it was from Jordan that Palestinian​ fighters began mounting guerrilla operations against Israel​. ​ By 1969 ​Arafat was leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella body in which his Fatah movement was dominant. The organization and its constituent groups ​started functioning increasingly from within Jordan. Armed groups established bases and checkpoints in and around cities and refugee camps ​acting as a law unto themselves, sometimes defying the police and civil authorities.

​Soon King Hussein ​was fac​ing an armed Palestinian movement operating inside his kingdom ​and challeng​ing the authority of the state.​ He decided to move against Arafat’s​ PLO and its armed forces, the fedayeen. ​


The crisis came to a head in September 1970. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)​, a constituent body of the PLO, hijacked several international passenger aircraft. Three aircraft were eventually taken to Dawson’s Field near Zarqa, Jordan, where passengers were removed and the aircraft blown up before the world’s television cameras – a spectacular display that humiliated the Jordanian authorities.​

For Hussein, the question was no longer how to restrain the fedayeen, but who governed Jordan. ​ On September 16 he declared martial law.​ The following day the Jordanian Army opened a major offensive against Palestinian positions in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid and elsewhere.​

​The operation was considerably more than a simple expulsion. For a ​time it amounted to a civil war between the Jordanian state and heavily armed Palestinian organizations. The fighting was intense and involved artillery, tanks and infantry. Jordanian forces attacked PLO positions. Palestinian fighters resisted and, in some places, effectively controlled territory.

A ceasefire ​hammered out in Cairo on September 27 ​proved totally ineffective. ​The Palestinian militias remained entrenched and operative within Jordan. In early 1971 Hussein resumed the campaign against the​m. ​Finally the Jordanian Army ​succeeded in driving the fedayeen out of their remaining urban strongholds. The ​last major ​encounter took place in July 1971​, and ​organized ​Palestinian resistance in Jordan was effectively destroyed.​ Arafat and senior PLO figures​ ​fled.

​They escaped across the Jordanian-Syrian ​border​, and regrouped in Lebanon. Thousands of Palestinian fighters were ​driven out of Jordan and followed them. ​

It had been a bloody encounter. As well as Jordanian soldiers, thousands of Palestinians, including civilians​, had been killed. The episode produced a particularly bitter Palestinian-Jordanian legacy. In 1971 a militant Palestinian group, which subsequently called itself the Black September Organization, assassinated Jordan’s prime minister Wasfi al-Tal.

None of this ​unhappy history disposes of any moral or legal questions raised by the current situation, but it does complicate Abdullah’s posture of unqualified moral denunciation of Israel.

In short, standing at the UN podium vilifying Israel, King Abdullah might have borne in mind the old adage: “People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”


About Neville Teller
Neville Teller's latest book is ""Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020". He has written about the Middle East for more than 30 years, has published five books on the subject, and blogs at"A Mid-East Journal". Born in London and a graduate of Oxford University, he is also a long-time dramatist, writer and abridger for BBC radio and for the UK audiobook industry. He was made an MBE in the Queen's Birthday Honours, 2006 "for services to broadcasting and to drama."
View all posts by Neville Teller


If OPEC Is To Survive, It Must Reinvent Itself – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

On Oct. 4, 2026, seven OPEC+ countries, including Saudi Arabia and Russia, kept September output levels for November and set the next meeting for Nov. 1; the monitoring committee flagged attacks on shipping and energy sites as costly to repair and as a drag on net export proceeds.

The author wants “extraction” accounting for a finite asset, citing World Bank wealth methods and UN Resolution 1803, and floats Petro-Gold contracts and an investment-basket index (APRVI) so a higher dollar price is not mistaken for more buying power.
An advisory Organisation of Energy Extracting Countries is proposed for research and depletion data, not a com

The OPEC+ meetings of 4 October 2026 brought two concerns into focus: how much petroleum should enter the market, and how securely it can reach its destination. Seven participating countries, including Saudi Arabia and Russia, maintained September’s required production levels for November, with their next meeting scheduled for 1 November.

At its separate meeting, the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee stressed the importance of safeguarding international maritime routes and expressed concern about attacks on energy infrastructure. Restoring damaged facilities, it noted, is costly and takes considerable time. Such disruptions affect supply availability and undermine efforts to stabilise markets.

These concerns connect physical supply security with the preservation of petroleum value. Attacks on routes and facilities raise freight, insurance and repair costs, reducing the net proceeds available to the exporter. Rising prices for imported equipment and technology can then further erode what those proceeds can finance, including infrastructure protection and recovery. OPEC therefore needs to examine both the security of delivery and the purchasing power of the compensation received for a finite resource. Supply volumes alone cannot establish whether that exchange preserves national wealth.

Reform should build on OPEC’s achievements

OPEC’s achievements are substantial, despite the crises it has faced. As examined in “OPEC: Fifty Years of Crises and Achievements”, the organisation has defended member states’ resource rights, supported market stability and advanced producer-consumer cooperation. Its efforts to preserve the purchasing power of petroleum revenues relative to internationally traded manufactured goods remain particularly relevant.

Building on these achievements requires a fundamental change in how petroleum is understood. The conventional language of “production” should give way to “extraction”, recognising that each barrel is removed from a finite natural asset. Extraction generates economic value, but it also reduces the resource stock. The question therefore extends beyond output and revenue: does the wealth received compensate for the asset surrendered and help create productive capacity that will endure?


The distinction matters for fiscal policy and national accounting. Manufactured goods can be produced repeatedly; petroleum reserves cannot be replenished within a meaningful human timescale. Petroleum receipts cannot be evaluated as income without considering depletion. Financing recurrent expenditure without sufficient provision for replacing depleted wealth risks consuming the capital on which future prosperity depends.

The World Bank’s The Changing Wealth of Nations 2024 provides a relevant framework for distinguishing economic activity from the wealth that supports it. GDP growth alone does not establish that a country’s productive asset base has increased. For petroleum exporters, the national balance sheet must account for what is removed from the ground alongside what is acquired with the proceeds.

This concern predates the present debate. The 1984 master’s thesis, Oil and Industrialization in Arabia, treated petroleum as a depletable resource and examined how it could support economic capabilities enduring beyond the resource itself. Subsequent Al Eqtisadiah writings, including ‘Oil: A Game of Winners and Losers’, published in 2006, and ‘Relative Scarcity and Limited Production Capacity’, published in 2008, examined petroleum as finite national capital and the consequences of its depletion for future generations.

Sovereignty includes the terms of exchange

When OPEC was established in Baghdad in 1960, the central issue was sovereignty: who should determine how petroleum was extracted and priced, and how much of its value should accrue to the countries that owned it?

UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources”, adopted on 14 December 1962, provides an important foundation for this discussion. It affirms the permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources, linking its exercise to national development and public well-being.

Applied to petroleum policy, that principle supports informed decisions about extraction, contractual terms and the use of proceeds. Ownership has limited practical value if the owner lacks the information or institutional capacity to assess the exchange being made.

Resolution 1803 does not prescribe petroleum prices, settlement currencies or valuation formulas. Drawing on its principle of permanent sovereignty, this article proposes two approaches, Petro-Gold and the Asset-Based Petroleum Real Value Index, APRVI, to help resource owners preserve petroleum value and exercise their sovereignty more effectively, subject to applicable international obligations and contractual commitments. They address different aspects of the same problem. Petro-Gold would establish a possible contractual reference and settlement asset. APRVI would measure the investment purchasing power of net petroleum receipts.

Petro-Gold: a contractual alternative

The monetary conditions of 1971 offer a useful illustration. Before the United States suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold for official foreign monetary authorities, the official parity was $35 per troy ounce. Using an illustrative crude price of approximately $3.56, a barrel represented about 3.16 grams of gold at that rate.

This was a monetary equivalence, not evidence that every petroleum transaction involved physical gold. Nor does it establish that 3.16 grams represented petroleum’s intrinsic value. It illustrates how a nominal price can be related to an asset reference, and why changes in the monetary system matter to resource owners.

A proposed Petro-Gold arrangement would allow willing exporters and buyers to negotiate contracts expressing petroleum value in a specified gold weight. Settlement could occur through physical gold, a verified claim on allocated gold or an agreed currency equivalent, according to contractual terms.

The gold quantity would itself require commercial negotiation. Historical equivalence cannot automatically determine a contemporary price, because petroleum markets, extraction costs and gold prices have changed.

A gradual approach could begin with a limited number of voluntary contracts. These would permit assessment of transaction costs, liquidity, custody and the exporter’s ability to convert receipts into the assets needed for development. Any preference for gold settlement would need to reflect commercial benefits rather than an assumed discount.

Gold-backed digital instruments could eventually facilitate transfers, but they would require credible ownership rights, independent reserve audits and enforceable redemption. Tokenisation would change the means of transferring a claim; it would not eliminate custody, legal or operational risk.

Petro-Gold could diversify the reference used in petroleum trade and reduce dependence on a single currency. It would not guarantee constant purchasing power. Gold prices fluctuate, and gold holdings do not automatically finance productive investment. Its merits must therefore be assessed against the exporter’s development objectives.
APRVI: measuring what petroleum receipts can buy

APRVI offers a different approach. Rather than requiring a change in contractual currency, it would measure the capacity of petroleum receipts to acquire productive assets. Three functions must be distinguished: the currency of quotation, the currency of settlement and the measure of real value. Under the APRVI option, the dollar could continue to perform the first two, while an investment basket supplied the third.


A higher dollar price does not necessarily improve the exporter’s position. If net petroleum receipts rise by 10 per cent while the relevant machinery and equipment become 20 per cent more expensive, investment purchasing power falls despite increased nominal revenue. The proposed core measure would adjust net receipts using an investment-price index. The resulting purchasing power could then be compared with an independently specified investment target per barrel, representing a disclosed quantity of productive goods rather than simply reproducing the prevailing petroleum price.

An initial basket could cover machinery and equipment, with comparable domestic goods added where reliable data permit. The IMF’s Export and Import Price Index Manual: Theory and Practice provides methodological guidance relevant to constructing such indices, including weighting and quality adjustment. It does not endorse APRVI, which would require its own design and testing.

Extraction and delivery costs would be deducted under transparent accounting boundaries. Freight, insurance and security expenses are particularly relevant to the October warning. An increase in the selling price can be partly absorbed by more expensive delivery. Expenses already included in freight or insurance should not be counted again as a separate security allowance.

APRVI would measure investment purchasing power, not the intrinsic value of petroleum or the success of investments subsequently undertaken. Its basket, benchmark and assumptions would need disclosure, historical testing and comparison with simpler measures.

Valuation must account for depletion


Neither a gold reference nor an investment index fully measures the finite asset surrendered. Depletion requires a related assessment. A Petroleum Reference Value could examine extraction and delivery costs, the investment objective and an allowance for depletion and opportunities forgone. That allowance should rest on evidence about recoverable reserves, future costs and alternative uses, with safeguards against counting the same component twice.

Such a reference would inform the seller’s decision without guaranteeing that buyers would accept the resulting terms. Sovereignty includes the authority to evaluate an offer; it does not create an unlimited ability to determine market prices.

A barrel left underground is not necessarily a barrel lost. It retains an option of later extraction, including for domestic industrial use. Future demand, competing technologies and reservoir conditions may reduce that option’s value. Retention must therefore be compared with the income and investment returns available from extraction today.

This approach is consistent with the Abanamay Sovereignty Spectrum Theory Formula, ASTF, which examines the practical exercise of sovereignty under interacting internal and external conditions. Petroleum ownership matters alongside the capacity to choose extraction timing and terms, supported by technology, information and effective institutions.

From OPEC to an advisory OEEC

OPEC could support these decisions through an independent petroleum-value and depletion observatory. It could publish gold comparisons, investment purchasing-power series and resource assessments alongside its market research. Members would retain authority over contracts, extraction and investment.

Over time, this could support an advisory Organisation of Energy Extracting Countries, OEEC. Its purpose would extend attention beyond exports to the management of finite natural assets. A change of name would have a meaning only if accompanied by a substantive change in institutional responsibilities. An advisory mandate should concentrate on transparent research and valuation standards. It should avoid confidential future prices or sales plans, prescribe no common selling price and organise no extraction restrictions to enforce its benchmarks.

Regular dialogue with consuming countries would be another responsibility. The 2008 article “Oil Price Stability: The Exporters’ Perspective” called for an international meeting involving producers, consumers, major oil companies and international organisations. The October warning supplies a current reason for continuing cooperation on maritime protection, emergency repair and delivery costs.

That dialogue should also examine the terms of exchange. Paragraph 4(j) of UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), adopted in 1974, calls for an equitable relationship between developing countries’ export prices and the goods and capital equipment they import. APRVI could help examine one aspect of that relationship, without implying that the resolution establishes a petroleum price or endorses the proposed index.

The October 4 meetings show why OPEC’s task must extend beyond deciding how many barrels enter the market. Its members need secure delivery and a clearer account of what their petroleum receipts can purchase. Petro-Gold and APRVI offer distinct options for examination, but their value must be judged against the same objective: converting a finite resource into wealth capable of sustaining future generations.


About Dr. Rashed M. Aba-Namay
Dr. Rashed M. Aba-Namay is a legal scholar specializing in institutional resilience and coercive statecraft. He developed the Abanamay Sovereignty Spectrum Theory and its analytical formula, which examines how authority is distributed in complex states and how external pressure produces divergent socio-political and legal outcomes. He is president of the National Law Center, a Riyadh-based legal firm specializing in energy security, maritime law, and strategic infrastructure analysis.
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Myanmar Junta Airstrikes Target Civilians To Coerce Arakan Army Into Peace Talks



Myanmar’s junta bombs Htun Ya Wai village, in Rakhine state’s Rathedaung township on May 13, 2025. (Citizen photo)




 RFA
By Wai Hnin Htut


Key Takeaways:

RFA reports a military airstrike on a Kyauktaw market on Sept. 28, 2026, that the Arakan Army says killed at least 50 people, including children and pregnant women; the U.N. human-rights office called it one of the deadliest Rakhine strikes since the 2021 coup, and Fortify Rights said it could be a war crime.

Analysts and the AA say talks invitations have run alongside more than 130 civilian deaths in AA areas from April 21 to Sept. 30, while fighting continues around Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, and Manaung; the Kachin and Karen forces are also major holdouts.

A pro-military analyst said groups that keep fighting will face military responses; the Arakan National Party said striking civilians cannot build the trust talks need. The military spokesman did not answer RFA.



Myanmar’s military-backed government is increasingly resorting to attacks on civilians as a means to bring the rebel Arakan Army in the western coastal state of Rakhine to the negotiating table, Rakhine politicians and analysts told Radio Free Asia.

The government launched an airstrike on the town of Kyauktaw, dropping bombs on a crowded marketplace and other civilian areas killing at least 50 people, including children and pregnant women, according to the Arakan Army, or AA, an armed ethnic group which controls most of the towns in Rakhine.


The U.N. Human Rights Office released a statement noting that this attack was one of the deadliest airstrikes in Rakhine State since the military took control of the country in a coup in 2021. Fortify Rights Friday released a statement saying that the attack could constitute a war crime.

Several other ethnic groups, some of whom had been allied with and fought alongside the AA after the coup, have begun participating in peace talks over the past few months. The AA is one of several major holdouts nationwide, including the Kachin Independence Army and the Karen National Union.

The attacks on civilians are one of several tactics by the military meant to force the AA into making peace, Sai Kyi Zin Soe, a Myanmar security analyst, told RFA.

“One side has laid out the path it wants. But they are using various forms of coercion to pressure the other side to reach that intended path,” he said. “This includes military force. There are also efforts to apply political and economic pressure in coordination with neighboring countries. You can, in other words, say this part of the military’s tactics.”

He said that attacks causing mass civilian fatalities, like the Kyauktaw attack, may also be intended to intimidate civilians to discourage them from accepting AA authority.
Violence for peace?

The attack only justified the fight against the military, Khaing Thu Kha, a spokesperson for the AA told RFA after the attack on Monday.


“We will continue to seek justice for those we’ve lost in this violent attack by identifying anyone involved in the act and taking actions against them,” he said. We will retaliate against each and every one of them.”

The AA reported that over a five-month period from April 21 to to September 30 the military government extended an invitation for peace talks while simultaneously killing more than 130 civilians in AA-controlled areas in airstrikes and heavy artillery attacks.

But no faction wants to accept a peace invitation while under constant attack, Zaw Wai Soe, a minister in Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government, made up democratically elected leaders who were ousted in the coup, told RFA.

“The bombing didn’t just start now. They’ve been doing it all along. It has gotten worse in recent days,” he said. “They drop bombs despite knowing civilians are present. So who would want to meet them? It’s not just the AA, any group would feel the same way.”
Current battlegrounds

Since early this month, the AA has engaged in fierce clashes around military-controlled Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, and Manaung townships. Meanwhile, military government forces are advancing into Rakhine from Chin State, and the Magway and the Ayeyarwady regions. Residents report that airstrikes continue in AA-controlled territories.

Direct military confrontation will continue as long as armed combat persists on the ground, Thien Tun Oo, executive director of the Thayninga Institute for Strategic Studies, a pro-military think tank in Naypyidaw, told RFA.

“We will hold discussions for peace. However, for those who continue to rely on military means on the ground, they will naturally face head-on military confrontations,” he said. “Those relying heavily on military force will encounter military responses.”

RFA attempted to contact Brig. Gen. San Nyo Win, military spokesperson for Rakhine state, for comment on the situation, but phone calls went unanswered.


The airstrikes make it more difficult for the AA to accept an invitation to peace talks, Thar Tun Hla, chairman of the Arakan National Party, which represents the interests of Rakhine nationalists, told RFA.

“The peace process requires trust,” he said. “Firing on civilian targets cannot be viewed as a trust-building process.”


About RFA
Radio Free Asia’s mission is to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press. Content used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.
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AI Can Shop, It Should Not Set Its Own Budget – OpEd


The essay says September made agentic shopping real: Meta’s Muse topped U.S. and Canadian app charts and was blocked by Amazon; Mastercard Agent Connect and a planned India UPI agent system add rails, while NatWest, Bank of America, and ING warned on Sept. 22 about fraud and privacy.

Visa research cited finds only 23% of U.S. consumers trust generative AI to pay for them; a Guardian report said Muse shared a user’s home address and booked a Marketplace pickup without his knowledge.

The rule offered is that agents may search and reorder staples inside limits they cannot rewrite—caps, merchants, expiry, no self-delegation—while discretionary buys stay with the person.


Agentic commerce is moving from recommendations to transactions. Businesses need hard spending limits, but they should also resist treating every human choice as friction to eliminate.

September turned agentic commerce from a product demo into a market contest. Meta’s Muse can shop, book travel, fill forms and keep working after a user closes the app. Reuters reported that Muse quickly rose to the top of U.S. and Canadian app-store rankings, while Amazon blocked the agent from shopping on its site. Mastercard Agent Connect is connecting merchants, agents, platforms and payment providers, and India is preparing agentic payments on UPI with spending limits, identity checks and liability rules.

This is no longer mainly a question about whether AI can help people shop. It can. The harder business question is how much authority to hand over once an agent can create a real obligation, and how much ordinary human choice we should be eager to automate away.

Banks are already asking the first half of that question. On September 22, NatWest, Bank of America, ING and other financial institutions warned that AI shopping agents could increase fraud, scam and privacy risks and called for stronger safeguards, transparency, interoperability and consumer choice. The commercial transition is larger than a new checkout button. Software that once compared prices or summarized an invoice is beginning to acquire the ability to pay, subscribe, reserve and procure.

The first rule should therefore remain simple: an AI agent should never be able to set or expand its own spending limits.

The payment credential is only one layer


Payment networks are building useful safeguards around agentic transactions. Mastercard describes verifiable intent for consumer-authorized purchases. Visa’s agentic-commerce work emphasizes spending controls, authentication and trusted identity. Those mechanisms can help establish that a transaction came from an authorized agent and matched a defined payment instruction.

Corporate authority sits one level above that transaction. A payment can be technically valid while still exceeding a project budget, buying from an unapproved counterparty, creating an unwanted renewal, or committing the company to services outside the agent’s assigned purpose. The payment rail can enforce the instruction it receives. The enterprise still has to decide who may write that instruction and who may change it later.

That distinction already exists in financial regulation. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s market access rule requires covered broker-dealers to maintain controls designed to prevent orders that exceed preset credit or capital thresholds and certain erroneous orders. Its legal scope is specific, but the control logic travels well: consequential transaction authority should sit behind limits administered independently from the actor using that authority.

Build the authority map before the wallet

A business preparing to deploy financial agents should map authority before it maps features. Reading an invoice, recommending a payment, executing a payment, creating a contractual commitment and delegating work to another agent are different permissions. Each should have a purpose, an accountable owner, an expiry condition and a limit the agent cannot rewrite.

The control plane should express more than a single dollar ceiling. It may need merchant restrictions, transaction categories, time windows, cumulative exposure, geographic limits, renewal rules and approval requirements for exceptions. Those controls should be stored and enforced outside the agent’s own execution environment. Revoking a permission should not require the agent’s cooperation.

Cumulative exposure deserves particular attention. One hundred small purchases can create a larger obligation than a single blocked purchase. Several agents working for the same department can do the same thing in parallel. Delegation should carry the original restrictions forward rather than quietly creating a fresh allowance.

Some friction is worth keeping

The second half of the problem is more human. The industry’s language often treats friction as a defect: fewer clicks, fewer approvals, fewer reasons to leave the sofa. That is useful when the task is repetitive. Nobody needs a ceremony around reordering printer paper, renewing an approved software seat or replenishing a household staple.

But not every act of choosing is wasted time. Shopping can also be comparison, curiosity, taste, conversation, a walk through a neighborhood, a visit to a local store, or simply the pleasure of deciding for oneself. Businesses should be careful about designing a future in which every ordinary choice is converted into an optimization problem and then delegated because delegation is technically possible.

Visa’s September consumer research captures the hesitation. It found that while AI assistants are already widely used for product discovery, only 23 percent of U.S. consumers said they trusted generative AI to handle payment transactions on their behalf. That gap suggests people may welcome help narrowing choices without wanting the final act of choosing to disappear.

The boundary can become unexpectedly personal. On September 28, The Guardian reported that a Meta Muse user discovered that the agent had shared his home address and arranged a Facebook Marketplace pickup without his knowledge. The incident concerned privacy and permission rather than a corporate budget, but the business lesson is the same: a task that sounds simple can contain smaller decisions about price, identity, location and human interaction that the user may never have meant to delegate.

A mature agentic-commerce model should therefore preserve an easy human off-ramp. Let the agent search, compare and prepare. Let it automate routine purchases inside a narrow envelope. For discretionary purchases, unfamiliar merchants, meaningful commitments or situations where the experience itself matters, keep the person visibly in the loop. Convenience is valuable. Choice is valuable too.

Automation still needs room to be useful

None of this requires a human to approve every coffee, cloud-compute charge or routine replenishment. Constant approval would erase much of the value of agentic commerce. Routine and reversible transactions can proceed automatically inside a defined envelope. New counterparties, material increases in exposure, unusual contract terms or purchases outside the assigned purpose can receive additional review.

The same design should include continuity. If the control service fails, a blanket payment freeze can interrupt wages, transportation, communications or other essential services. Organizations need a preauthorized fallback with smaller scope, known users and a defined expiration. A resilient control system can become stricter without becoming unusable.

Testing should focus on authority rather than conversational fluency. Can the agent exceed a monthly cap by splitting purchases? Can it regain a revoked permission? Can it route a transaction through another agent or payment method? Does a misleading invoice cause it to buy from the wrong counterparty? And when an agent recommends a purchase, can the user still understand the alternatives well enough to make a different choice?


The strongest evidence is preventative. A polished explanation after an unauthorized purchase is weaker than a control that blocked the purchase before money moved. Logs should preserve the authorization actually applied, including exceptions, so finance teams, auditors and counterparties can reconstruct why a commitment was permitted.

The global payment race is becoming an authority race

India’s planned UPI framework, the card networks’ agentic-commerce products, Meta’s rapid consumer push and the warnings from global banks all point in the same direction. The infrastructure for AI-initiated transactions is arriving before the governance model is settled. The commercial winners will not be determined only by which agent finds the lowest price or checks out fastest.

A useful agent must make its authority legible. The buyer should know how much it can commit, for what purpose, to whom, for how long and who can change those boundaries. Just as important, the buyer should be able to decide which parts of everyday life are worth delegating and which are worth keeping.

The point of automation should be to remove drudgery, not to turn human participation into a design flaw. If AI gives us time back, the best use of that time may sometimes be to step outside, look around, talk to someone and make a choice that no model needed to make for us.

The agent can shop. The budget must remain outside its control. Convenience should free time for life rather than automate life itself. We should remember that life happens in motion, and that some of its rewards still come from the effort of showing up.



About Burak Oktenli
Burak Oktenli holds an MBA and a Master of Professional Studies in Applied Intelligence from Georgetown University. His research addresses the governance of authority in autonomous and AI-enabled systems, and his writing has appeared at the Modern War Institute at West Point, RUSI, RealClearDefense, RealClearMarkets, and Geopolitical Monitor. He is the author of Authority Architectures for Autonomous Systems, a ten-volume series on how authority in autonomous systems is delegated, monitored and recovered, at authority-architecture.me.
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COP31 co-presidents Turkey and Australia two of world’s worst coal culprits, shows report

COP31 co-presidents Turkey and Australia two of world’s worst coal culprits, shows report
Turkey's coal-fired Afsin-Elbistan power station. In early 2024, Turkey overtook Germany to become Europe’s top user of coal in the production of electricity. / Javabite, wiki, public domainFacebook
By IntelliNews Turkey desk October 5, 2026

Turkey and Australia, co-presidents of the upcoming United Nations COP31 climate summit, are connected by a coal supply chain responsible for more than 75mn tonnes of CO₂ emissions since the signing of the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement on climate action, reveals a new report released on October 4 by 350.org.

The report, compiled with UN Comtrade data, also shows that the two countries are not only retaining their bilateral coal ties, they are also expanding fossil fuels by broadening their trade into liquefied natural gas (LNG).

In May 2024, IntelliNews reported on how Turkey had overtaken Germany to become Europe’s top user of coal in the production of electricity.

350.org, an international environmental organisation and grassroots climate movement, warned that entrenched fossil fuel interests compromise Australia and Turkey’s willingness to lead the transition away from fossil fuels despite COP31 happening amidst the biggest fossil fuel crisis in history. 

The group pointed out that Turkey has lately proposed the expansion of the CENAL coal power plant in Karabiga, Canakkale. It would add 1,050 MW of new coal capacity to an existing 1,320 MW plant and lock in further dependence on imported coal, it said.

Efe Baysal, 350.org Türkiye manager, said: “By hosting COP31, Türkiye has a chance – and a duty – to show that climate leadership starts at home. But Türkiye still generates more coal power than any other country in Europe, with no phase-out date in sight.

“Recent growth in wind and solar power shows the country can move in a better direction to strengthen energy security and shield families from fossil fuel price shocks. COP31 gives Türkiye a platform to build on that progress. It must now act to stop new coal projects, set a clear date to phase out coal, and lay out a credible national plan to leave fossil fuels behind.”

350.org called on both Turkey and Australia to announce national plans to transition away from fossil fuels, with the inclusion of planned coal phase-out dates. Both Turkey and Australia are among the very few industrialised countries without such a specified announced schedule.

The report has been released ahead of the preparatory Pre-COP to the 2026 UN Climate Change Conference, which is being held on South Pacific Ocean island nation Fiji.

Australia is the second largest coal exporter in the world and is dominant in the global coal expansion, accounting for 56% of the global coal mine project pipeline. Turkey’s energy plan envisages roughly 30% more coal and gas power capacity by 2035, said 350.org.

The COP31 summit, which will take place in the Turkish Mediterranean city of Antalya, is just a month away. Australia will serve as “president of negotiations”.

Australia’s prime minister, Anthony Albanese, is expected to join representatives of more than 50 countries for the pre-COP, where the plight of low-lying island nations exposed to rising sea levels will be high on the agenda.

COP31 co-presidents Turkey and Australia have largely ignored fossil fuels – the primary cause of the climate crisis – in public statements made before the summit, according to 350.org. Three letters to countries outlining the summit mission, two from the Turkish government and one joint letter with the Australians, did not mention fossil fuels. Albanese, meanwhile, did not mention fossil fuels in a keynote speech at Climate Week in New York two weeks ago, according to the Guardian.

Andreas Sieber, 350.org head of political strategy, concluded: “As people are hit by soaring oil prices and horrible climate impacts, the presidencies of COP31 keep ignoring the core problem, fossil fuels. Our report exposes that Türkiye and Australia are bound together by a dirty coal trade whose emissions exceed those of many developing countries, while both continue to expand fossil fuels incompatible with the Paris Agreement they are tasked to shepherd.

“Prime Minister Albanese and [Turkish] President Recep Tayyip Erdogan should start announcing overdue coal phase out dates at home. Both should also lay out a clear indication that COP31 will address the core problem behind climate breakdown and volatile energy bills: our dependence on fossil fuels.”















 

Indonesia targets 2mn hectare plantation expansion for domestic E20 biofuel mandate

Indonesia targets 2mn hectare plantation expansion for domestic E20 biofuel mandate
/ Victoria Priessnitz - UnsplashFacebook
By IntelliNews - Surabaya Bureau October 7, 2026

The Indonesian government plans to expand domestic sugarcane and cassava plantation areas to secure feedstock for its incoming E20 biofuel policy, which mandates a 20% bioethanol blend in commercial gasoline, Antara News reports.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Indonesia International Sustainability Forum in Jakarta on October 6, Coordinating Minister for Food Affairs Zulkifli Hasan confirmed that current domestic sugarcane supplies remain insufficient to meet blending requirements independently.

"E20 can be derived from sugarcane and cassava, among others," Hasan noted. "Should we aim for sugarcane, it is necessary to open new plantations because we are still lacking feedstock."

The agricultural expansion follows specific directives issued during a restricted cabinet meeting on September 16, where President Prabowo Subianto instructed Agriculture Minister Andi Amran Sulaiman to prepare two million hectares of sugarcane plantations within a two-year timeframe.

As part of the institutional rollout, President Prabowo tasked Indonesia's newly established sovereign wealth fund, Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), with mobilising capital and structuring industrial capacity for the domestic bioethanol processing sector.

The E20 directive serves as an intermediate stepping stone toward higher blending ratios, according to Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia.

Speaking on September 21, Lahadalia stated that Indonesia aims to progress toward an E50 standard without relying on imported bioethanol, framing the initiative as a key pillar of national energy sovereignty.

"We cannot afford to roll out E10, E20, or E50 while procuring ethanol from abroad," Lahadalia stressed. "If we can achieve the E50 standard, we will meet our target of no longer importing finished gasoline products."

 SPACE/COSMOS


The Algorithm Is Part Of The Telescope: Publish Its Blind Spots – Analysis


The essay says automated filters are now part of the instrument: Rubin may issue about seven million alerts a night, and brokers using machine learning decide which events astronomers see.

CHIME/FRB’s injection of 587,367 synthetic bursts into the live pipeline is cited as the right way to map what is missed; a SETI lunar-soil search is praised for reporting no technosignature while stating what the method could have found.

The ask is a published selection record—software version, recovery rates, weak coverage, rejected samples, and a trail from raw data to claim—so a null result is a coverage map, not proof of absence.


Astronomy is entering an era in which software decides which signals become candidates, which become noise, and which receive scarce follow-up time. The selection function of that software should be treated as part of the measurement.

September offered a useful glimpse of where astronomy is heading. A Nature Astronomy study used fast radio bursts to probe how matter clusters across the universe. Caltech described future arrays that could detect tens of thousands of FRBs, turning brief radio flashes into precision tools for cosmology. The same week, the SETI Institute highlighted a proposal to search lunar soil for microscopic technosignatures with modern materials analysis and AI-assisted imaging.

These projects ask very different scientific questions. They share a methodological problem. The more discovery depends on automated filtering, classification, reconstruction, and prioritization, the more the software becomes part of the measuring instrument.


At modern data volumes, an algorithm increasingly does more than accelerate what a scientist would otherwise inspect by hand. It determines which observations reach human attention at all.

The NSF-DOE Vera C. Rubin Observatory makes the scale visible. Rubin expects to generate about seven million alerts per night. Those alerts flow to community brokers that filter, cross-match, classify, and prioritize events, often using machine learning. No research team can inspect the entire stream manually. The broker is therefore more than a convenience layer. For many scientific programs, it is part of the route by which the observable sky becomes the studied sky.

Astronomy should respond by treating an algorithmic selection function as a scientific result in its own right.
What the pipeline misses can change the science

Fast radio bursts show why. A catalog records the events an instrument and its software detected under particular observing conditions, rather than a neutral inventory of everything that occurred in the sky. If broad, faint, scattered, or otherwise unusual bursts are less likely to survive the pipeline, conclusions about the underlying FRB population can inherit that bias.


The CHIME/FRB collaboration has moved in the right direction. Work using its second catalog has employed 587,367 synthetic bursts injected into the live search pipeline to estimate how detection probability changes across observable properties. The resulting selection function is part of the evidence needed to move from “these are the bursts we detected” to “this is what the burst population may actually look like.”

The importance grows as FRBs become tools for questions far beyond their own origin. If researchers use them to infer the distribution of matter, constrain astrophysical feedback, or eventually sharpen cosmological parameters, the pipeline’s blind spots can propagate into claims about the universe itself.

A major pipeline revision should therefore publish more than an accuracy score. It should state which signal families were used in testing, where recovery is weak, how candidate acceptance changed from the previous version, and which observations were removed before a scientist ever saw them.

Synthetic injections are especially useful because they test the complete path from input to detection. Their limits matter as well: every simulation contains assumptions chosen by its designers, and an unfamiliar physical event may violate them. Surveys should also preserve a strategically sampled set of low-scoring or rejected observations for independent inspection. Otherwise, the mechanism built to find the unexpected can be calibrated mainly on examples of what researchers already know how to imagine.
A null result also needs a coverage map

Technosignature research makes the same issue visible from the opposite direction. A search can find nothing convincing and still produce valuable science. The value depends on being able to say what the search was capable of finding.


The new lunar proposal is careful on this point: the researchers report no evidence of extraterrestrial technology and present the work as a framework for making a new class of search testable. That discipline should become standard across AI-assisted searches for unusual signals.

A classifier that assigns low probability to every candidate does not establish that the searched phenomenon is absent. A null result becomes informative when it is paired with a coverage statement: what target population was examined, what sizes or signal strengths were detectable, what backgrounds can mimic the signature, which assumptions control sensitivity, and where the analysis loses discrimination.

This is particularly important in technosignature science because the hypothesis space is unusually broad. Radio emission, infrared waste heat, artifacts, atmospheric chemistry, and microscopic engineered materials test different possibilities. Failure to find one selected signature should narrow that hypothesis, not silently become a statement about the absence of technology in general.
Preserve the measurement trail

Selection is only one part of the problem. Scientific AI can also correct detector response, remove noise, reconstruct missing values, reject observations, and transform raw measurements into cleaner products. Those operations can be useful while making the route from measurement to conclusion harder to inspect.

Every consequential AI-assisted result should therefore retain a recoverable measurement trail: the relevant original observations, calibration state, software and model versions, processing steps, thresholds, exclusions, and places where information was reconstructed rather than directly measured.

The principle is consistent with the FAIR data stewardship framework, which extends reproducibility concerns beyond a final dataset to the tools and workflows needed to understand and reuse it. The practical goal is simple. Another qualified researcher should be able to identify which parts of a result came from the instrument, which came from the transformation, and which assumptions materially affect the conclusion.

Independent reviewers also need intermediate products. A final image can look persuasive even when a threshold, calibration revision, or exclusion rule changes the interpretation. If access to the essential evidence is limited by data volume, proprietary constraints, or security, the answer should be proportionate preservation and controlled review. The strength of the public claim should follow the evidence that can actually be inspected.
Publish the algorithmic selection record

A workable reform can avoid archiving every rejected byte forever while still creating a standard scientific record for the parts of the pipeline that can change what researchers are allowed to see.


For major AI-assisted surveys, that record should include the software and model version, the tested operating domain, recovery rates from synthetic injections or other challenge tests, known regions of weak coverage, representative rejected cases, changes in selection behavior after updates, and the uncertainty or assumptions that most strongly affect the final inference.

For high-profile null results, add a compact coverage map describing what the experiment could and could not have detected. For discovery claims, preserve enough intermediate evidence for an independent team to test whether the feature survives reasonable changes in calibration and processing.

These requirements make the algorithm’s scientific influence visible without pretending to make it infallible.

Astronomy has always calibrated its instruments. A detector’s sensitivity, noise, field of view, and response curve belong in the interpretation because they determine what can be measured. As machine learning becomes part of detection and triage, its selection behavior deserves the same status.

The next major discovery may come from an event that an algorithm ranks highly. It may also come from a class of events the algorithm has been quietly pushing aside. Science should be prepared for both possibilities.

The algorithm is now part of the telescope. Its blind spots belong in the published evidence.


About Burak Oktenli
Burak Oktenli holds an MBA and a Master of Professional Studies in Applied Intelligence from Georgetown University. His research addresses the governance of authority in autonomous and AI-enabled systems, and his writing has appeared at the Modern War Institute at West Point, RUSI, RealClearDefense, RealClearMarkets, and Geopolitical Monitor. He is the author of Authority Architectures for Autonomous Systems, a ten-volume series on how authority in autonomous systems is delegated, monitored and recovered, at authority-architecture.me.
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Poland's Creotech releases first Mikroglob-1 satellite images, boosting shares 8.2%

Poland's Creotech releases first Mikroglob-1 satellite images, boosting shares 8.2%
Part of New Orleans imaged using Creotech's NIR (near-infrared) channel. / CreotechFacebook
By bne IntelliNews October 6, 2026

Poland's Creotech Instruments, the country's largest space mission integrator, released the first Earth observation images captured by its Mikroglob-1 satellite on October 5, sending its Warsaw-listed shares up 8.2% on the day.

The satellite, operating as part of the Mikroglob Satellite Earth Observation System (SSOZ), was developed under a contract with Poland's Armament Agency and was launched into orbit on July 7, 2026. The released imagery includes images of Los Angeles International Airport, the Los Angeles metropolitan area, New Orleans Airport, and the city of Dalian in China.

"The first images represent an important milestone for us, as this is the first time we can publicly present data acquired by a satellite that forms part of the Earth Observation System we are building. The system enables both detailed observation of individual objects and the acquisition of data covering much larger areas," said CEO Grzegorz Brona.

Brona also highlighted the satellite's ability to capture imagery across different spectral ranges, including near-infrared, which provides additional information about the characteristics of the observed terrain.

"Mikroglob demonstrates that domestic solutions can combine high imaging detail, flexibility in the use of data, and the ability to carry out tasks that are important from a security and defence perspective. The next stages of the project will further increase these capabilities as the entire constellation is developed," he said.

The presented images were captured during the satellite's acceptance phase.



Poland's BGK to channel €114mn into space technology companies via new Vinci fund

Poland's BGK to channel €114mn into space technology companies via new Vinci fund
By bne IntelliNews October 7, 2026

Poland's state development institution Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) said on October 6 it would allocate PLN500mn (€114.4mn) to investments in high-growth space technology companies through a new vehicle, the Vinci Space Tech Fund.

The fund will offer financing of between PLN10mn and PLN100mn per company, with a portfolio expected to ultimately comprise 15-20 firms. Investments will primarily target Polish companies, though the fund's strategy does not exclude European companies with their core operations in Poland.

"Today, technology is not just about the economy and innovation — it is also about Poland's security. In the space sector, we now see solutions that enable us to respond more quickly to threats, better protect critical infrastructure, support energy security, and monitor the situation within our territory and in the surrounding area. That is why investment in the space sector is, at the same time, an investment in Poland's modern economy and competitiveness," said Andrzej DomaÅ„ski, minister of economy and finance and the fund's originator.

Satellite reconnaissance specialist ICEYE, described as a global leader in its field, is to serve as the fund's strategic partner, contributing expertise in scaling a global business. Further strategic partners include the Kraków Technology Park, the Ministry of Development and Technology, and the Polish Space Agency.

The fund's strategy covers six key investment areas: satellites, optics and Earth observation; satellite communications; electronics and photonics; rockets and propulsion; and data and artificial intelligence.

The Vinci Space Tech Fund will be the third vehicle managed by Vinci, bringing BGK's total committed capital across the three funds to PLN1.6bn. Vinci has to date invested in two space technology companies: ICEYE and Sybilla Technologies.