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Parts of Nigeria face unprecedented levels of hunger, UN warns

The WFP's biggest donor, the United States, has slashed its foreign aid under President Donald Trump

Reuters – A surge in militant attacks and instability in northern Nigeria is driving hunger to record levels, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) said on Tuesday, warning that nearly 35 million people could go hungry in 2026 as it runs out of resources in December.


Issued on: 25/11/2025 - RFI

Millions of people are suffering from malnutrition in northeastern Nigeria. 

© AFP/Joris Bolomey

By:RFIFollow

The projection, based on the latest Cadre Harmonisé – an analysis of acute food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel and West Africa region, is the highest number recorded in Nigeria since monitoring began, the WFP said.

Violence has escalated in 2025, with attacks by insurgents including al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which carried out its first strike in Nigeria last month, and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Recent incidents underscore the crisis: ISWAP fighters killed a brigadier-general in the northeast, while armed bandits abducted more than 300 Catholic school students in a mass kidnapping days after storming a public school, killing a deputy head teacher and seizing 25 schoolgirls.

'Repeated attacks'

“The advance of insurgency presents a serious threat to stability in the north, with consequences reaching beyond Nigeria,” said David Stevenson, WFP Nigeria country director.

“Communities are under severe pressure from repeated attacks and economic stress.”

Rural farming communities have been hit hardest. Nearly 6 million people lack basic minimum food supplies in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, while 15,000 in Borno are projected to face famine-like conditions.

Malnutrition rates are highest among children in Borno, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara, WFP said.

Almost a million people in the northeast currently rely on WFP aid, but funding shortfalls forced the agency to scale down nutrition programmes in July, affecting more than 300,000 children.

In areas where clinics closed, malnutrition worsened from “serious” to “critical” in the third quarter.

The WFP's biggest donor, the United States, has slashed its foreign aid under President Donald Trump, and other major nations have also made or announced cuts in assistance.

WFP warned it will run out of funds for emergency food and nutrition aid by December, leaving millions dependent on its support without assistance in 2026.

US signals broader efforts to protect Nigeria's Christians following Trump's military threat

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Republican president has kept up the pressure as Nigeria faced a series of attacks on schools and churches in violence that experts and residents say targets both Christians and Muslims.

Ope Adetayo, Sam Metz and Ben Finley
November 24, 2025

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump’s administration is promoting efforts to work with Nigeria’s government to counter violence against Christians, signaling a broader strategy since he ordered preparations for possible military action and warned that the United States could go in “guns-a-blazing” to wipe out Islamic militants.

A State Department official said this past week that plans involve much more than just the potential use of military force, describing an expansive approach that includes diplomatic tools, such as potential sanctions, but also assistance programs and intelligence sharing with the Nigerian government.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also met with Nigeria’s national security adviser to discuss ways to stop the violence, posting photos on social media of the two of them shaking hands and smiling. It contrasted with Trump’s threats this month to stop all assistance to Nigeria if its government “continues to allow the killing of Christians.”

The efforts may support Trump’s pledge to avoid more involvement in foreign conflicts and come as the U.S. security footprint has diminished in Africa, where military partnerships have either been scaled down or canceled. American forces likely would have to be drawn from other parts of the world for any military intervention in Nigeria.

Still, the Republican president has kept up the pressure as Nigeria faced a series of attacks on schools and churches in violence that experts and residents say targets both Christians and Muslims.

“I’m really angry about it,” the president said Friday when asked about the new violence on the “Brian Kilmeade Show” on Fox News Radio. He alleged that Nigeria’s government has “done nothing” and said “what’s happening in Nigeria is a disgrace.”

The Nigerian government has rejected his claims.

A comprehensive approach

Following his meeting Thursday with Nigerian national security adviser Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Hegseth on Friday posted on social media that the Pentagon is “working aggressively with Nigeria to end the persecution of Christians by jihadist terrorists.”

“Hegseth emphasized the need for Nigeria to demonstrate commitment and take both urgent and enduring action to stop violence against Christians and conveyed the Department’s desire to work by, with, and through Nigeria to deter and degrade terrorists that threaten the United States,” the Pentagon said in a statement.

Jonathan Pratt, who leads the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, told lawmakers Thursday that “possible Department of War engagement” is part of the larger plan, while the issue has been discussed by the National Security Council, an arm of the White House that advises the president on national security and foreign policy.

But Pratt described a wide-ranging approach at a congressional hearing about Trump’s recent designation of Nigeria as “a country of particular concern” over religious freedom, which opens the door for sanctions.

“This would span from security to policing to economic,” he said. “We want to look at all of these tools and have a comprehensive strategy to get the best result possible.”

Nigeria’s violence ‘will not be reversed overnight’

The violence in Nigeria is far more complex than Trump has portrayed, with militant Islamist groups like Boko Haram killing both Christians and Muslims. At the same time, mainly Muslim herders and mostly Christian farmers have been fighting over land and water. Armed bandits who are motivated more by money than religion also are carrying out abductions for ransom, with schools being a popular target.

In two mass abductions at schools this past week, students were kidnapped from a Catholic school Friday and others taken days earlier from a school in a Muslim-majority town. In a separate attack, gunmen killed two people at a church and abducted several worshippers.

The situation has drawn increasing global attention. Rapper Nicki Minaj spoke at a U.N. event organized by the U.S., saying “no group should ever be persecuted for practicing their religion.”

If the Trump administration did decide to organize an intervention, the departure of U.S. forces from neighboring Niger and their forced eviction from a French base near Chad’s capital last year have left fewer resources in the region.

Options include mobilizing resources from far-flung Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and from smaller, temporary hubs known as cooperative security locations. U.S. forces are operating in those places for specific missions, in conjunction with countries such as Ghana and Senegal, and likely aren’t big enough for an operation in Nigeria.

The region also has become a diplomatic black hole following a series of coups that rocked West Africa, leading military juntas to push out former Western partners. In Mali, senior American officials are now trying to reengage the junta.

Even if the U.S. military redirects forces and assets to strike inside Nigeria, some experts question how effective military action would be.

Judd Devermont, a senior adviser of the Africa program for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said if Trump orders a few performative airstrikes, they would likely fail to degrade the Islamic militants who have been killing Christians and Muslims alike.

“Nigeria’s struggles with insecurity are decades in the making,” said Devermont, who was senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council under Democratic President Joe Biden. “It will not be reversed overnight by an influx of U.S. resources.”

Addressing the violence would require programs such as economic and interfaith partnerships as well as more robust policing, Devermont said, adding that U.S. involvement would require Nigeria’s cooperation.

“This is not a policy of neglect by the Nigerian government — it’s a problem of capacity,” Devermont said. “The federal government does not want to see its citizens being killed by Boko Haram and doesn’t want to see sectarian violence spiral out the way it has.”

US intervention carries risk

The Nigerian government rejected unilateral military intervention but said it welcomes help fighting armed groups.

Boko Haram and its splinter group, Islamic State of West Africa Province, have been waging a devastating Islamist insurgency in the northeastern region and the Lake Chad region, Africa’s largest basin. Militants often crisscross the lake on fast-moving boats, spilling the crisis into border countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

U.S. intervention without coordinating with the Nigerian government would carry enormous danger.

“The consequences are that if the U.S deploys troops on the ground without understanding the context they are in, it poses risks to the troops,” said Malik Samuel, a security researcher at Good Governance Africa.

Nigeria’s own aerial assaults on armed groups have routinely resulted in accidental airstrikes that have killed civilians.

To get targeting right, the governments need a clear picture of the overlapping causes of farmer-herder conflict and banditry in border areas. Misreading the situation could send violence spilling over into neighboring countries, Samuel added.

___

Adetayo reported from Lagos, Nigeria, and Metz from Rabat, Morocco.
Associated Press religion coverage receives support through the AP’s collaboration with The Conversation US, with funding from Lilly Endowment Inc. The AP is solely responsible for this content.

Why schoolchildren are often abducted in Nigeria and who the usual kidnappers are

ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — School kidnappings have come to define insecurity in Africa’s most populous nation, and analysts say it's often because armed gangs see schools as “strategic” targets to draw more attention.

Associated Press
November 24, 2025


ABUJA, Nigeria (AP) — Nigeria suffered its second mass school abduction this week with authorities confirming an attack on a Catholic school in the conflict-battered northern region of the country on Friday.

A total of 303 schoolchildren and 12 teachers were abducted in Friday’s attack at St. Mary’s School in Niger state’s Papiri community. It wasn’t immediately confirmed who the attackers were. Local police said they have deployed a team to rescue the children.

Friday’s attack happened four days after 25 students were abducted in neighboring Kebbi state.

Niger state closed all its schools following the latest abduction.

School kidnappings have come to define insecurity in Africa’s most populous nation, and analysts say it’s often because armed gangs see schools as “strategic” targets to draw more attention.

UNICEF said last year that only 37% of schools across 10 of the conflict-hit states have early warning systems to detect threats.

The kidnappings are happening amid U.S. President Donald Trump’s claims of targeted killings against Christians in the West African country. Attacks in Nigeria affect both Christians and Muslims. The school attack earlier this week in Kebbi state was in the Muslim-majority Maga town.

Kidnappers in the past have included Boko Haram, a jihadi insurgency that carried out the mass abduction of 276 Chibok schoolgirls more than a decade ago, bringing the Islamic extremist group to global attention.

But dozens of bandit groups have become active in the hard-hit northern region, often targeting remote villages with a limited security and government presence.

At least 1,500 students have been seized in the years since the Chibok attack, many released only after ransoms were paid.

Here’s what’s to know about northern Nigeria’s widespread insecurity.

Boko Haram and an Islamic State affiliate

Boko Haram has long menaced large parts of Nigeria’s north, especially the northeast, as well as parts of neighboring Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The militant group has sought to impose an Islamic state in the region and its name — meaning “books are forbidden” — rejects Western education.

In 2014, Boko Haram burst onto the global stage with the Chibok abduction. Four years later, its fighters abducted 110 schoolgirls from a college in Yobe state in the northeast.

The militants have mounted a strong resurgence this year after splitting in the past, with many fighters now aligned with a local affiliate of the Islamic State group. The exact number of fighters with each group is unknown, though they are estimated in the low thousands.

The groups continue to recruit, sometimes forcibly, youth who have been left vulnerable in a region that Nigerian authorities and humanitarian organizations struggle to serve safely. The Trump administration’s deep cuts in foreign aid to Nigeria this year haven’t helped.

Abductions for ransom

Other armed groups in northern Nigeria carry out abductions, largely for ransom. Authorities have said they include mostly former herders who took up arms against farming communities after clashes between them over increasingly strained resources.

Schools have been a popular target of the bandits, who are motivated more by money than religious beliefs. The attacks often occur at night, with gunmen at times zooming in on motorbikes or even dressed in military uniforms and then disappearing into the vast, under-policed landscape.

There is growing concern about links between the bandits and the militant groups, notably in the northwest.

“While often conflated with the militant Islamist groups, the bandits operating in northwestern Nigeria are a distinct driver of instability in this region,” the U.S.-backed Africa Center for Strategic Studies said earlier this year, noting that the bandits are thought to be responsible for about the same number of deaths there as Boko Haram and the IS affiliate are in the northeast.

In 2020, gunmen on motorcycles attacked a government secondary school in Katsina state and abducted more than 300 boys. The state government announced their release within a week. In 2021, gunmen abducted more than 300 schoolgirls in a nighttime raid on a government secondary boarding school in Zamfara state. Within weeks, all were released after the apparent payment of a ransom.

And in 2024, gunmen on motorcycles abducted 287 students at a government secondary school in Kaduna state.

Nigeria’s security challenges

Nigeria has struggled for years to combat Boko Haram and other armed groups, at times striking and killing civilians in mistaken air assaults meant for militants. The military also has carried out airstrikes and special operations targeting the hideouts of armed gangs.

But Islamic extremists in recent months have repeatedly overrun military outposts, mined roads with bombs and raided civilian communities despite the military’s claims of success against them. That surge in activity has strained security efforts across Nigeria’s north.

Last month, President Bola Tinubu replaced the country’s security chiefs.

Earlier this year, the U.S. government approved the sale of $346 million in arms to strengthen Nigeria’s fight against insurgencies and criminal groups. More recently, however, Trump has threatened Nigeria with potential military action — and a halt to all aid and assistance — while alleging that Nigeria’s government is failing to rein in the persecution of Christians. Nigeria has rejected the claim.

Associated Press religion coverage receives support through the AP’s collaboration with The Conversation US, with funding from Lilly Endowment Inc. The AP is solely responsible for this content.

Why Nigeria's schools remain unsafe for pupils

Abiodun Jamiu

DW

November 24, 2025

Nigeria launched its Safe School Initiative in the aftermath of the Chibok mass abduction more than a decade ago. Today, the country is still struggling to stop kidnappings and protect its pupils.

Two mass abductions at schools in Nigeria have grabbed headlines in November

Image: Sunday Alamba/AP Photo/picture alliance

Gunmen forced their way into the St. Mary Catholic Secondary School in Agwara, a town in eastern Nigeria, on November 21. Their gunfire ripped through the silence in the dormitories where pupils were still asleep. They then led the students, 303 in total, and 12 teachers away.

It was the second mass abduction in Nigeria in less than a week. Four days earlier, about two dozen girls were taken at gunpoint from a school in neighboring Kebbi state.

Nigeria hit by second mass school abduction in days  01:49

The mass abductions came after a warning by US President Donald Trump of military action against Nigeria over the alleged persecution of Christians in the country.

Nigeria has dismissed the claim, but it is facing multiple overlapping insecurity crises across its central and northern regions. Terrorists are laying siege to communities, carrying out mass abductions and kidnappings for ransom.

In a speech at the UN on November 18, rapper Nicki Minaj came out in support of the Trump administration's claim of Christian persecution in Nigeria

Image: Angela Weiss/AFP

Ambitious initiative to protect Nigeria's schools

According to the Lagos-based SBM Intelligence consulting firm, at least 2.57 billion naira ($1.7 million, or €1.5 million) was paid to kidnappers between July 2024 and June 2025.

Schools are particularly soft targets. In the last 10 years, criminal gangs and Islamist militants have abducted no fewer than 1,880 pupils across Nigeria. Many were released, but some were killed.

The West African country is still scarred by the kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls in northeastern Chibok in 2014 by Boko Haram militants. Some of the former students, most of whom were between the ages of 16 and 18 at the time, are still missing.

The government subsequently launched its Safe School Initiative (SSI) to protect schools, particularly those in high-risk areas, from terror attacks. Despite the initiative, which cost an initial $30 million, Nigeria is still struggling to stop mass abductions and protect children at schools.

Five hundred schools were supposed to benefit from the first phase, with 30 selected for the pilot project. The aim was to fortify schools with barbed-wire fences, deploy armed guards, provide staff training and counselling, and develop security plans and rapid response systems.

These Nigerian schoolgirls were released by kidnappers

 in northern Kaduna state in March 2024

Image: Ibrahim Yakubu/DW

While a few SSI successes were recorded, including the provision of prefabricated classrooms and learning materials for children in displacement camps, momentum soon dipped. This was due in large part to a change in government in 2015, which many believe shifted priorities.

"It was meant to be the turning point in how Nigeria protects its schools," Seliat Hamzah, an inclusive education advocate in Nigeria, told DW. The big disconnect remains "weak, inconsistent implementation," she said.

"On paper, the framework covers everything; infrastructure, safety, emergency readiness, community engagement, teachers' training and the early warning system. But in many schools, especially in high-risk regions like the north, very little of these has materialized."

What's holding back school safety?

The implementation of the SSI has been slow. Four years ago, when the abductions at schools peaked again, particularly in the northwest region where criminal gangs prowl, authorities floated a four-year national financing plan for the SSI, with a total investment of 144.7 billion naira starting in 2023.

In 2021, an official assessment of roughly 81,000 schools found many to be vulnerable to attacks. So far, according to the National Safe School Response Coordination Center, only 528 of the country's schools are registered with it for the SSI.

Nigeria's school kidnappings highlight lawlessness in north  02:49

"It's quite apparent, because look at the widespread kidnappings that have been happening in recent times in schools across the country," said Hassana Maina, executive director of the Abuja-based ASVIOL Support Initiative, a civil society group that monitors school abductions.

"The gap is clear: the guidelines are there, but we don't have execution. The implementation is always patchy, monitoring is weak, and most interventions are one-off projects."

Analysts say coordination among Nigeria's security agencies, along with a funding crunch, is crippling the initiative. They note that the initiative's top-down approach prevented many communities from taking ownership of the SSI.

"Overreliance on security deployments without building community-based protections or early warning systems remains a major problem," said Maina. "Schools are always within a community, so we must ask questions [about] what the ideas are that we have about early warning systems, how we have built and fortified [them] into communities."
Can Nigeria's security initiative still work?

If the SSI is to live up to expectations, authorities would need to strengthen security measures in rural communities and bolster inter-agency coordination, said Hamzah.

"Community roles are still underutilized, and attackers continue to exploit the same long-standing vulnerabilities. So, we need to strengthen our security governance and improve coordination across agencies and bring communities to the center of the safety ecosystem."

Can Nigeria tackle recurring kidnapping patterns?  02:31

Confidence MacHarry, a senior analyst at SBM Intelligence, told DW: "There is no magic bullet to improving security in schools and protecting schools in the long term."

He warned that focusing solely on protecting critical infrastructure like schools without addressing the broader threats facing rural communities would amount to a mere drop in the ocean.

"If we want to improve protection and security in schools across Nigeria, we have to take a holistic approach because where criminal groups attack communities, no matter how strong the security in the schools is, it is going to psychologically discourage parents from wanting to send their kids to school."

Edited by: Benita van Eyssen

Abiodun Jamiu Abiodun Jamiu is a Nigerian freelance multimedia journalist.

How Nigeria is reintegrating repentant former Boko Haram fighters

Tens of thousands of voluntary or forced members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa have surrendered over the past 10 years. Nigeria is drawing on transitional justice – a set of mechanisms used to confront legacies of mass violence in the interest of accountability, reconciliation and lasting peace – to help former fighters return to their communities and live alongside victims of the jihadist groups.


Issued on: 21/11/2025 - RFI

Former members of Boko Haram and ISWAP at the Hajja camp in Maiduguri, 30 May 2023, prior to their release following a five-month rehabilitation programme. 

© AFP - AUDU MARTE

A tiny black dot moves across the sky over Bama, in north-eastern Nigeria. The roar of an engine grows louder, drowning out all other sounds in this town some 50 kilometres from Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State.

Kachalla, who is building a wooden door frame, pauses his hammering. "It's a helicopter," sighs the carpenter.

"In the Sambisa Forest, as soon as our leaders heard a helicopter flying overhead, they thought the army was watching them from the air. So it was every man for himself, we hid under the trees until the aircraft disappeared from view."

Kachalla looks up at the sky and watches the helicopter recede into the distance, then resumes his work.

'We were taught it was the right thing to do'

In 2020, this 30-something father left the ranks of Boko Haram. "I served as a soldier. At that time, we had no choice, we were forced to work for them. Otherwise, it was death if we refused to obey."

Kachalla joined the Association of the People of the Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad – the official name of Boko Haram, which was the name given to the group by local people in north-eastern Nigeria – in 2014.

He confesses to having committed acts of torture and bloody crimes within various factions, following orders including from the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, who was killed in 2021.

"I also did it of my own free will," Kachalla admits, "because we were taught that it was the right thing to do. And our leaders kept telling us that if we died, we would go to paradise."

Jihadists in Nigeria using TikTok to spread ideology and recruit fighters

'We hear a lot of whispered insults'

Today, Kachalla expresses his regrets only in private. He has resettled in Bama with his partner Bintugana, a former Boko Haram captive whom he "married" in the Sambisa Forest, and their two children – who were born in the Sambisa "sanctuary" led by Shekau.

Bintugana says Kachalla's carpentry skills have helped them build relationships in Bama. Despite knowing the couple's history, customers come to his workshop without fear.

Nevertheless, she believes their immediate neighbours still view them with contempt.

"We hear a lot of insults whispered by people, but it doesn't bother us because they can't physically fight us. At least our families don't reject us. That's why we don't want to go back to Sambisa," she explains.

In 2016, the Nigerian government launched Operation Safe Corridor to give members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP – a breakaway faction aligned with the Islamic State group) the opportunity to disassociate themselves from these groups and reintegrate into society.

The initiative is supported by the Nigerian army and the country's security and intelligence agencies. At the same time, the state of Borno, the epicentre of the armed conflict, has also implemented a local approach: the Borno Model. Both have grown steadily alongside the mass defections from the Sambisa Forest, notably after the death of Shekau.

The Safe Corridor and Borno Model are two of the main formal mechanisms of transitional justice in the country. They are open to all repentant individuals – men, women and children – in north-eastern Nigeria.

"When we fled Boko Haram, we imagined the worst," recalls Kachalla. "Then I simply surrendered with my weapon. I was not mistreated. My family and I were officially registered."

Graffiti on a wall in Bama, Borno State. © Fati Abubakar / RFI

Displaced by Boko Haram violence, the resourceful on Lake Chad’s shores try again

'Extremist ideology is deeply rooted'

Mustapha Ali has taken in dozens of former combatants with similar profiles to Kachalla over the past few years. A theology expert, he teaches in the Department of Islamic Studies at the University of Maiduguri.

He is also one of the pillars of the Imam Malik Centre, an educational institution for children from nursery to high-school age in the capital of Borno State, founded in the mid-1990s.

"This place is not just a place to learn about Islam," says Ali. "Our director, Sheikh Abubakar Kyari, was the first at the time to confront Mohammed Yusuf [the founder of Boko Haram] and his misinterpretations of the verses of the Koran that led to this extremist ideology."

Having witnessed the devastation wrought by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin, Ali also draws on his religious knowledge as an independent consultant for the El-Amin Islamic Foundation, a Nigerian NGO involved in deradicalisation programmes.

"I work with a maximum of 20 repentant individuals," he explains. "We focus on specific verses from the Koran. My team of facilitators and I meet with them at least 15 times. This is essential, because extremist ideology is deeply rooted in the minds of the adults and children we work with."

A long-term process

To start the process of reintegrating, Bintugana and Kachalla were transferred to a rehabilitation centre in Maiduguri. Bintugana was able to see her children while following a programme more focused on professional skills.

But for Kachalla and the other former combatants he was grouped with, their programme meant six months of living without any contact with the outside world.

"Every day we were given advice: how to live in peace with others, how to endure good and bad situations, how to be patient in all circumstances," he recalls.

Chita Nagarajan is an independent analyst of armed conflicts. For five years, she headed the Centre for Civilians in Conflict in north-eastern Nigeria. The organisation has carried out numerous mediations between communities and security forces, based on human rights principles.

"Reintegration, reconciliation and healing are not one-off events," she says. "They are long-term processes in which everyone needs support and assistance – the direct victims of violence, but also the indirect victims and even the perpetrators of that violence."

Since 2021, Bintugana and Kachalla have been learning how to live as a family again in Bama, surrounded by their loved ones. But theirs is a fragile peace, with the armed conflict that began in the Lake Chad basin in 2009 far from over.

This article has been adapted from a report in French by RFI's special correspondent in northern Nigeria, Moïse Gomis.

US to slap big surcharge on foreign visitors to national parks

Washington (AFP) – Foreign tourists visiting US national parks including the Grand Canyon and Yellowstone will now pay a hefty surcharge, the Trump administration announced Tuesday.


Issued on: 25/11/2025 - RFI

The United States has 63 National Parks across the country, and under Donald Trump will charge foreign visitors hefty fees © JOSH EDELSON / AFP

The Department of the Interior, which operates the renowned US national parks, said that starting in 2026 visitors from abroad will have to pay $100 on top of the individual park fee to enter 11 of the most popular destinations in the system.

The cost of an annual pass to all the parks will meanwhile more than triple to $250 for non-residents.

"President Trump's leadership always puts American families first," said Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum in a statement.

"These policies ensure that US taxpayers, who already support the National Park System, continue to enjoy affordable access, while international visitors contribute their fair share to maintaining and improving our parks for future generations."

Long considered a jewel of American tourism, the 63 officially designated national parks receive hundreds of millions of visitors a year -- nearly 332 million in 2024, according to the National Park Service.

The standard cost of an "America the Beautiful" pass that offers unlimited annual access is currently a flat $80 for any purchaser.

For day use, some parks charge fees by the vehicle, and others by the person -- the annual pass covers all passengers plus the passholder, or up to four adults.

Non-US residents who buy an annual pass will not be subject to the $100 surcharge on entry to the most visited parks, including Florida's Everglades, Maine's Acadia and California's Yosemite, but that fee will apply to all other foreign visitors.

The significant extra costs for most foreigners -- US citizens and permanent residents won't be impacted -- follow President Donald Trump's July executive order intended to "preserve" the parks for "American families."

"Nonresidents will pay a higher rate to help support the care and maintenance of America's parks," read the Interior Department's statement.

The department also emphasized "patriotic fee-free days" for residents that would include President's Day, Veteran's Day and Trump's birthday, which happens to fall on the annual observance of Flag Day.

© 2025 AFP

ABOLISH DRUG TESTING

Canada Olympic swimming champion Oleksiak banned two years

Montreal (AFP) – Canadian swimmer Penny Oleksiak, the country's most decorated female Olympian, has accepted a two-year suspension over her failure to report her whereabouts three times within a year, swimming officials said Tuesday.


Issued on: 25/11/2025 - RFI

Canada's Penny Oleksiak at swimming competition in the US state of Illinois in March 2025 © Michael Reaves / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA/AFP

Repeated failures by an athlete to update information about where they are amounts to a doping violation, as it obstructs drug testing.

The Aquatics Integrity Unit said in a statement that Oleksiak's period of ineligibility runs from July 15, 2025 to July 14, 2027.

The International Testing Agency said Oleksiak did not contest the proposed punishment, meaning "the case was resolved through an acceptance of consequences."

Swimming Canada said in a statement that it "respects" the ITA's decision.


"We will miss Penny on the national team and hope to see her back in the pool when she is eligible," the organization said.

Oleksiak, 25, has won seven Olympic medals, including a gold at Rio 2016 in the women's 100m freestyle.

She won a total of four medals in Rio and another three in the Tokyo Games, which were pushed to 2021 because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Oleksiak did not medal in Paris a year ago and has been eclipsed in Canadian swimming prominence by Summer McIntosh, who won three golds and a silver at the 2024 Games.

© 2025 AFP

US sanctions push Serbia’s only refinery toward shutdown

NIS' Pancevo refinery has entered “warm circulation”, a reduced operating mode ahead of a full shutdown. / NIS

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By Tatyana Kekic in Belgrade November 25, 2025

Serbia’s sole oil refinery could halt operations within days unless Washington grants a new licence to allow majority Russian-owned NIS to continue processing crude, President Aleksandar Vucic told the public on November 25.

Serbia is awaiting a decision from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on a licence for operations at the refinery after US sanctions on NIS took effect on October 9 due to the company’s majority Russian ownership. NIS previously said it could process crude only until November 25.

Vucic said that the Pancevo refinery had entered “warm circulation”, a reduced operating mode ahead of a full shutdown. “It’s not shut down yet, but it’s at a lower level of operation. We still have four days until the refinery is completely shut down if the licence is not approved by the US government,” he said in a special address.

Vucic said Belgrade had expected approval but now believes Washington wants “to see more things” before deciding. The sanctions have so far had limited impact on consumers, with no fuel shortages or queues reported at NIS petrol stations, though customers have been required to pay in cash or with local Dina cards.

Energy Minister Dubravka Dedović Handanovic met representatives of MOL, EKO and OMV on November 24 to discuss supply security. The government claimed there was “no reason for concern”, citing adequate petroleum product stocks and incoming deliveries, including 20,000 tonnes of Euro diesel and 38,000 tonnes of gasoline for mandatory state reserves in December and January.

Washington has insisted on a full Russian exit from NIS. Moscow has reportedly agreed to sell its 56.15% stake, currently held by its subsidiaries Gazprom Neft and a St Petersburg-based firm called Intelligence. Vucic said Russia was in talks with three potential buyers; Serbian media have speculated that Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and Hungary’s MOL are among those interested.

NIS filed a fresh licence request with OFAC on November 18 seeking permission to maintain normal operations at the Pancevo refinery while negotiations continue.

The uncertainty over the refinery’s future comes as the US, Ukraine and Russia engage in discussions on a new peace framework that could lead to a ceasefire in the nearly four-year-old conflict. Analysts say any link between sanctions relief and a peace deal could complicate Moscow’s willingness to sell its overseas assets.

Repairs and cleanup start after widespread flooding in Albania

The Albanian army was deployed to help communities isolated by flooding, and is now involved in the cleanup and repair operations. / Albanian defence ministry via Facebook

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By bne IntelliNews November 24, 2025

Repair works started in parts of Albania on November 24 after days of torrential rain caused widespread flooding, with damage to farmland and livestock losses, the defence ministry announced on November 24. 

The extreme rainfall has also disrupted transport links and power supplies in parts of the country. The Albanian army has been deployed to help reach communities isolated by flooding, and is now involved in the cleanup and repair operations. 

“After the nationwide coordination of recent days, in support of the affected areas and communities,  improving weather gives us the opportunity to engage all forces and capacities in the function of rehabilitation,” said a defence ministry statement on Facebook. 

The ministry said soldiers have been sent to carry out repair works in  Saranda, Finiq, Maliq, Lac and Bovilla. 

Previously, the ministry said on November 23 that the situation was gradually stabilising “although in some districts the problems accumulated by high river flows, landslides and infrastructure damage continue. The levels of most rivers are falling, while hydropowers in the most affected areas are operating at full capacity.” 

The statement added: “Emergency Forces, Armed Forces, local structures and quick response teams remain on the ground to normalise the situation and keep the risk areas under control.” 

China: Nuclear And Missile Proliferation – Analysis


File photo of China launching a Gravity-1 rocket. 

Photo Credit: 中国新闻社, Wikipedia Commons


November 25, 2025 
 CRS The Congressional Research Service 

By Paul K. Kerr


The U.S. government has for decades expressed concerns about China’s proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related technologies to other countries, with more recent focus on the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear technology. (See CRS In Focus IF11050, New U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Exports to China, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.)

Official U.S. government sources indicate that the Chinese government has ended its direct involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related items, but China-based companies and individuals continue to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns about entities operating in China that provide other forms of support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit finance and money laundering.

Background

China did not oppose new states’ acquisition of nuclear weapons during the 1960s and 1970s, the Department of State wrote in a declassified January 1998 report to Congress. According to a 1983 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), China had exported “nuclear materials since 1981” that were not subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Beijing did so “mainly to earn hard currency,” the estimate assesses, explaining that the

Chinese became aware in 1979 that they had insufficient resources for their initially grandiose modernization program and that they needed to generate more revenue through expanded foreign trade. Accordingly, the State Council directed its subordinate ministries in late 1979 to begin selling surpluses.

Consequently, according to the NIE, Beijing ended its “abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms and nuclear materials.” During the 1980s and 1990s, China transferred nuclear and missile technology to other countries’ weapons programs. China provided assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beijing exported missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. (For more information, see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr.)

According to U.S. government reports and official statements, China significantly curtailed its nuclear- and missile-related transfers during the 1990s; Beijing also committed to improving the government’s export controls. For example, the above-cited 1998 State Department report notes China’s 1996 pledge to refrain from assisting unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, Beijing’s 1997 changes to Chinese nuclear export policy, and other Chinese nonproliferation efforts.

The United States has extensive nuclear cooperation with China, which is governed by a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, renewed in 2015. (See CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.) The above-described changes in Chinese behavior took place after the two governments concluded their first nuclear cooperation agreement in 1985. Laws subsequently adopted by Congress required, as a condition for U.S. implementation of the agreement, the President to submit to Congress certain nonproliferation-related certifications, as well as a report about Beijing’s “nonproliferation policies and practices.” President William Clinton stated in a January 1998 letter to Congress that China had “made substantial strides in joining the international nonproliferation regime, and in putting in place a comprehensive system of nuclear-related, nationwide export controls,” since concluding the 1985 agreement.

Beijing acceded in 1992 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) and has voluntary IAEA safeguards on its civil reactors. The treaty defines NWS as those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All other NPT states-parties are nonnuclear-weapon states. According to the treaty, a NWS is not to transfer nuclear weapons to “any recipient whatsoever” or to “in any way … assist, encourage, or induce any” nonnuclear-weapon state “to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.”

China is also a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—a multilateral control regime for nuclear-related exports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) performs an analogous function for missiles and related items. China is not an MTCR partner but has agreed to adhere to the regime’s export guidelines.

The Chinese government has continued to express support for the international arms control and nonproliferation regime. Fu Cong, Director General of the Department of Arms Control of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated during a December 2020 conference that “China is ready to enhance non-proliferation policy exchanges and cooperation with all countries.” More recently, China’s Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Shen Jian declared in an August 26, 2023, statement to the Conference on Disarmament that China will cooperate to “preserve and strengthen existing multilateral arms control, disarmament and Non-Proliferation institutions.”

Current Proliferation Concerns

As noted, official U.S. government reports indicate that the Chinese government has ceased direct involvement in nuclear-related proliferation and transfers of complete missile systems. However, Chinese entities have continued to engage in proliferation, according to the U.S. government, which has also repeatedly expressed concerns with regard to weaknesses in China’s export control system.

According to a 2019 Department of State report regarding governments’ compliance with nonproliferation and arms control agreements, “Chinese entities” continued in 2018 “to supply MTCR-controlled items to missile programs of proliferation concern, including those in Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan.” More recently, the United States during 2022 “raised a number of cases” with Beijing concerning Chinese entities’ missile-related transfers “to programs of concern,” according to the 2023 version of the same report, which added that, despite U.S. requests for China to “investigate and put a stop to such activities, most of these cases remain unresolved.” Neither the 2024 nor 2025 editions of the report address the issue of Chinese missile-related transfers.

According to the 2024 and 2025 editions of a different State Department report, Chinese “firms and individuals” during 2023 and 2024 “worked to supply technology and equipment that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery systems to programs of concern,” including programs in North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.

During the past several years, the United States has sanctioned China-based entities and individuals for proliferation-related activities:On March 28, 2025, the Department of Commerce announced the addition of a China-based company to the Entity List for “contributions to Pakistan’s unsafeguarded nuclear activities.” Exports to such entities are subject to requirements more stringent than those applied to other entities.
On February 26, 2025, the State Department announced sanctions on six China-based entities for involvement in “the procurement of key components by entities connected to Iran’s … ballistic missile programs.”
On September 12, 2024, the State Department announced sanctions on a Chinese entity for assisting Pakistan with procuring for Pakistan’s ballistic missile program equipment used to test “large diameter rocket motors.” The same notice also announced sanctions on three China-based entities and a Chinese individual for unspecified “ballistic missile proliferation activities.”
On April 19, 2024, the State Department announced sanctions on three China-based entities for supplying “missile‐applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program.”
On October 20, 2023, the State Department announced sanctions on three China-based entities for working to supply “missile‐applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program.”
On June 6, 2023, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on several Chinese entities for procuring items for use in Iran’s ballistic missile program.
On October 3, 2022, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on a Chinese company and a Chinese individual for transferring controlled weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, and/or Syria.

Regarding government involvement in such transfers, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen told Politico in 2017 that, even if the transfers are not directly state-sponsored, “China hasn’t devoted the priority, effort, or resources to thwart” such activity, adding that “when that continues to be the case over 20 years…over time it becomes a choice.”

In addition to the above-described activities, China is helping Saudi Arabia construct facilities for possible uranium production, according to press reports. When asked about the topic during a September 2020 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale declined to provide any information, citing classification concerns.

U.S. officials have described other concerns with regard to Chinese proliferation behavior, such as money laundering, the provision of illicit financial services, and China-based entities’ illegitimate procurement. According to a 2018 Department of the Treasury report, “Chinese entities and individuals” have engaged in proliferation financing activities “for the benefit of” Iranian and North Korean WMD programs. Then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong asserted in November 2020 that “China hosts no less than two dozen North Korean WMD and ballistic missile procurement representatives and bank representatives.”

The Department of the Treasury sanctioned two North Korean nationals “involved in the procurement of equipment and materials” to support North Korea’s ballistic missile program, according to a June 15, 2023, announcement, which added that Pyongyang “continues to utilize a network of representatives” in China and other countries to obtain “restricted components necessary to conduct research and development” for North Korea’s WMD programs. On July 24, 2024, the Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on a network of China-based individuals and entities “involved in the procurement of items supporting” North Korea’s ballistic missile and space programs.

China’s construction of five civil nuclear reactors in Pakistan’s Chashma Nuclear Power Generating Station has been another source of congressional concern. The United States argues that only the first two Chinese reactor projects are consistent with Beijing’s NSG commitments; China and Pakistan concluded contracts for these reactors before China’s 2004 NSG accession. IAEA safeguards agreements are in force for all China-built power reactors in Pakistan, but NSG guidelines prohibit such projects in a state, such as Pakistan, that lacks IAEA safeguards on all of the country’s nuclear facilities.

NSG members agreed in 2004 to “grandfather” only ongoing Chinese reactor projects in Pakistan, then-Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman said during a May 2015 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. “However, there was not agreement that that was an open-ended clause,” Countryman explained, adding that additional Chinese-supplied reactors are “not consistent with the [NSG] rules.”

About the author: Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

CRS
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

Kyrgyzstan: Days Before Parliament Vote, Authorities Round Up Last Of Opposition


Kadyrbek Atambayev, former president Almazbek Atambayev’s son seen here in a mugshot released by Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, was one of the 10 people arrested during the recent roundup. (Photo: mvd.gov.kg)

November 25, 2025 
Eurasianet
By Alexander Thompson

(Eurasianet) — The raids began before dawn on November 22. Masked special forces troops broke through the doors across Kyrgyzstan, dragging off leading opposition figures from the Social Democrats, a former first lady, and an anti-corruption activist.

The State Committee for National Security arrested 10 individuals for allegedly calling for mass disorder and plotting to violently overthrow the government. They also brought in an eclectic collection of others for hours-long interrogations; among the detainees were former President Almazbek Atambayev’s wife, a candidate in the last presidential election and a prominent journalist’s ex-wife.

“All of this is theatre of the absurd, not justice,” Kadyrbek Atambayev, Almazbek Atambayev’s son and one of the arrested Social Democrats leaders, wrote in a jailhouse letter dated November 23.

The raids may have come as a surprise to their targets, but with a week left before the November 30 parliamentary elections, the timing seems calculated.

An announcement that a coup attempt has been uncovered and foiled in the weeks before an election has practically become a tradition in President Sadyr Japarov’s Kyrgyzstan. Similar scenarios played out prior to the 2021 parliamentary elections and last year’s local elections.

Though the outlines of the latest alleged plot are vague, the message is clear. Authorities want to ensure anyone who might try to foment a protest over the results of the upcoming election is either behind bars or well spooked before the balloting begins.

Japarov basically spelled it out at the end of a lengthy Facebook post November 9.

“There will be no coups,” he wrote, referencing the street protests and unrest that have toppled three Kyrgyz presidents during Kyrgyzstan’s post-Soviet history, and in 2020 brought him to power. “From now on, you’ll only see coups in your dreams.”

The November 22 security sweep kneecapped the already much diminished Social Democrats, a left-leaning successor to the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan that largely served as the personal vehicle of Almazbek Atambayev, a former president.

Authorities arrested Temirlan Sultanbekov, the outspoken 29-year-old party chairman; Kadyrbek Atambayev, the former president’s 32-year-old son; Ermek Ermatov, a party member; and Damir Musakeev, the elder Atambayev’s former bodyguard.

Two ex-MPs, Shailoobek Atazov and Kubanychbek Kadyrov, were also arrested. Kadyrov was an Almazbek Atambayev ally-turned-foe previously arrested when Atambayev was president and again under Japarov after having clashed with both. Atazov is a politician from Osh who was kicked out of parliament in 2024 over his links to an organized crime boss.

Another individual identified in local media as one of the 10 arrested is Urmat Baryktabasov, a businessman who was a prominent opposition figure between 2005 and 2011. However, he hasn’t been active in public life for more than a decade.

The group supposedly planned to organize protests around the country after Sunday’s elections allegedly with the intent to create mass disorder and seize government buildings, according to a Ministry of the Interior statement.

As evidence to substantiate the arrests, security forces put out a video purportedly of Sultanbekov, the Social Democrats chair, talking with an unidentified “citizen” in a dining room. In the undated video, Sultanbekov said he believed regime change would come within three years but hoped it would be sooner.

Eurasianet could not authenticate the video.

“The investigators say I predicted regime change. Have they lost their minds? What’s illegal about that?” Sultanbekov said in a message posted by his mother on Facebook November 24.

Authorities also released photos of automatic weapons, bullets and stacks of US dollars they said they found in the suspects’ homes.

“All that didn’t come out of our house. Where they got that, I don’t know,” Sultanbekov’s mother said in a November 23 video. “Authorities said it themselves that before the elections dirty games would start, and that’s exactly how it turned out.”

Sultanbekov and the younger Atambayev were among the few politicians active in Kyrgyzstan willing to publicly criticize the president and his administration. Since Japarov, along with powerful security services chief Kamchybek Tashiev, came to power in 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s ranking has plunged in annual surveys published by democracy and anti-corruption watchdog groups.

In a video posted on Instagram the day before his detention, Sultanbekov called for limits on Chinese workers and criticized Japarov’s stance on the perennial hot-button issue. Meanwhile, Kadyrbek Atambayev recently requested the prosecutor’s office investigate the country’s cryptocurrency mining firms, a Japarov pet project.

In a closed-door hearing November 23, all the alleged plotters were ordered to remain in custody until January 17, independent outlet Tandyr Media reported.

State security services representatives questioned nearly a dozen others for hours without counsel before releasing them. Atambayev’s wife, the former first lady, Raisa Atambayeva, was detained for over eight hours, family members told reporters.

Security officers also questioned Adakhan Madumarov, the veteran leader of the conservative, nationalist Butun Kyrgyzstan opposition party and a fierce Japarov critic. Madumarov garnered 7 percent of the vote in the 2021 presidential election, enough to place second to Japarov. He was arrested and booted from parliament after vehemently opposing the Uzbekistan border deal.

Others’ connections to the political opposition appear thin.

“I have nothing to do with this. [Atambayev’s] son I don’t know at all,” former anti-corruption prosecutor Syimyk Japykeev, who hasn’t been politically active for years, told journalists as he arrived at the security committee’s headquarters for questioning.

Exiled journalist Dmitry Lozhnikov’s ex-wife was also taken in for questioning. “Why is she there???,” Lozhnikov wrote on social media. “I don’t do coups. I don’t do calls [to disorder]. I do journalism.”

The Social Democrats managed to put up just a single candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Sultanbekov was arrested before the local elections last fall and convicted of vote buying, which he denied. Almazbek Atambayev, who lives in exile, was sentenced in absentia to 11 years in prison in June on charges his lawyers dismissed as politically motivated.

Atambayev himself was not afraid of employing sharp-elbow political tactics when he ran the country from 2011 to 2017. During his tenure, nearly a dozen opponents, including a prominent party leader, were jailed in the run-up to constitutional changes in 2017. That same year, Japarov received a lengthy prison sentence after being convicted in a plot to kidnap a regional governor. Yet, under the Atambayev administration, civil society, the political opposition and the press remained comparatively free compared to the present day.

Alexander Thompson is a journalist based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, reporting on current events across Central Asia. He previously worked for American newspapers, including the Charleston, S.C., Post and Courier and The Boston Globe.


Eurasianet

Originally published at Eurasianet. Eurasianet is an independent news organization that covers news from and about the South Caucasus and Central Asia, providing on-the-ground reporting and critical perspectives on the most important developments in the region. A tax-exempt [501(c)3] organization, Eurasianet is based at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, one of the leading centers in North America of scholarship on Eurasia. Read more at eurasianet.org.

MAGA CREATES MULTIPOLARITY 

As Trump Disrupts International Trade, Southeast Asia Must Look To Europe – Analysis


US President Donald Trump with Malaysia's Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. 

Photo Credit: @anwaribrahim, X

November 25, 2025 
ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

By Stephen Olson

A new trade world is gradually emerging as US President Donald Trump continues his assault on the rules-based global trade structure. The basic contours of this new world are starting to come into focus, and for Southeast Asia, the news is not good.

While ongoing efforts to deepen integration within the region and strengthen ties with other fast-growing regions could hold promise, a more European-focused external orientation offers the region the best prospects to successfully navigate this fraught transition. Pursuing closer trade ties with the EU, however, will also bring its own unique set of obstacles that will have to be skilfully managed.

A changed world requires new approaches

The strategies that have guided remarkably successful development trajectories in countries across Southeast Asia for decades now need to be fundamentally reassessed. Geostrategic assumptions that have provided stability now appear shaky.

For most of the post-war era, the US has been a reliable partner, an open export market, and a source of investment and development assistance. For better or for worse, the US has also provided strong – sometimes heavy-handed – philosophical leadership, extolling the virtues of free market economics, free trade, and governments keeping their nose out of business.

Those days are over. The US has turned dramatically inward. It now relies on protectionism, mercantilism, and statism while aggressively using strong-arm tactics to obtain the economic and strategic outcomes it desires, including domestic employment. For Southeast Asia, relations with the US now constitute a combustible source of risk that needs to be managed. The main objective is to minimise damage rather than seeking to capitalise on opportunities.

Less obviously, the region’s calculations vis-a-vis China will also shift. Over a period of decades, China has grown to become the most important economic partner for most countries in the region. The relevance of the US has been in relative decline, at least in some respects, although it remains an important investor and export market.

The prevailing hope – if not expectation – throughout most of Southeast Asia has been that this ongoing transition between superpowers could be successfully managed by maintaining close ties with both, benefiting from the formidable size and general openness of the US consumer market while also gaining from China’s unprecedented economic and technological ascent, especially given their inclusion in China-centric supply chains.

Until Trump’s return to the White House, there was little reason to doubt the wisdom of this strategy. Trump’s remaking of the US approach to trade is, however, unleashing new dynamics that will substantially complicate Southeast Asia’s relationship not only with the US but also with China.

As countries in the region reorient themselves to this changed world, the “EU factor” should figure more prominently in their revised external calculus. Managing the most significant reshuffling of the global system in 80 years will require regional leaders to understand three key dynamics: 1) the deep and longer-term ripple effects of the US rejection of rules-based trade, 2) the inevitably intensifying complications of the China relationship, and 3) the imperative – and challenges – of closer links with the EU.

RIPPLE EFFECTS REACH DEEPLY

The US’ unilateral rejection of the fundamental principles underpinning the rules-based trade system it created is not an implosion. It is not a house collapsing inward on itself. Rather, it is an explosion, launching jagged projectiles into every corner of the universe.

It will take years if not decades to fully assess the damage from this big bang, but we can already see the initial ripple effects starting to cascade throughout the system. First and foremost is the destruction of the seminal principle of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment.

Since its founding in the aftermath of the Second World War, the concept of MFN has been a cornerstone of the US-led multilateral trade system. The basic premise is that all members of the system are accorded the same level of non-discriminatory tariff treatment. So, for example, if Peru assesses a 6% tariff on wooden desks imported from WTO members, it cannot arbitrarily decide to apply a 50% tariff on wooden desks imported from Kenya.

While there are limited exceptions, the MFN principle has provided a rock-solid foundation of fairness and predictability in the trade system, while also fostering a cooperative spirit among WTO members and a belief that the system works to the benefit of all. It roots non-discrimination at the heart of trade, and establishes a clear and transparent rules-based approach to assessing and gradually reducing tariffs and generally managing trade among nations.

Perhaps most importantly for Southeast Asia, adherence to MFN puts smaller nations on an equal footing with the larger ones. Simply put, under rules-based trade and MFN, the big guys cannot bully the little guys.

A new era of “might makes right”?

The new reciprocal tariff regime put into place by the Trump administration on 7 August[i] has decimated the principle of MFN and tilted the system back in the direction of “might makes right”. This new regime throws out the old rulebook and arbitrarily “assigns” new and higher tariff rates ranging from a baseline 10% up to 41%. Some countries, such as India and Brazil, face additional tariffs for issues unrelated to trade with the US. Potentially higher sectoral tariffs have been threatened and according to President Trump could rise as high as 250% on products such as pharmaceuticals[ii].

The EU bloc and six countries opted to negotiate so-called trade “deals” with the Trump administration in order to secure a reduction in the previously threatened reciprocal tariff rate. In order to secure a break on tariffs, these countries agreed to provisions that violate the core principles of rules-based, market-driven trade.

By providing the US with lower tariff rates than those applied to other WTO members through an agreement that falls far short of the requirement that preferential agreements cover “substantially all trade”, these countries have joined the US in subverting MFN. By agreeing to purchase specified levels of US exports based not on economic efficiency but rather on government arm-twisting, they have turned away from the principles of market-based trade. In both cases, the net effect will be to displace potential exports from other WTO members around the world, further devaluing the relevance – and benefits – of the system.

Each of these countries was caught between a rock and a hard place, and concluded that its national interests were best served by acquiescing to Trump’s terms. It is difficult to second-guess or be overly critical of any of these decisions. Particularly in the case of the EU, it is clear that the principles reflected in the agreement with the US are not an accurate reflection of the bloc’s preferred approach to trade overall.

Nonetheless, Southeast Asian leaders should not entertain any hope that the US abdication can easily be contained. The US is not only the founder and historical leader of the rules-based trade system, it also continues to be the largest single economy and the world’s largest importer. The reciprocal tariff regime itself directly covers roughly 62%[iii] of global trade, but perhaps more importantly it will have contaminative effects throughout the system. We have already seen that even some of the most stalwart advocates of non-discrimination in trade have been pressured into reluctantly joining the US in diluting MFN.

The orderly, stable, and predictable global tariff regime, which has provided a framework for steadily reducing tariffs – along with the accompanying expansion in global trade and development – now lies in tatters.

This is the world Southeast Asia needs to prepare for.

The China calculus is also shifting

A traditional proverb often cited in Southeast Asia states that when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. In the context of the US-China economic and geopolitical rivalry, Southeast Asia is usually perceived to be the grass.

While there are undoubtedly aspects in which that perception of a “suffering” Southeast Asia is warranted, it belies some unique advantages that have accrued to the region as a result of its “caught in the middle” position, particularly if a critical mass of countries in the region tilted decisively in one direction or the other. As long as both the US and China view Southeast Asia as a potentially influential “swing vote” in their broader rivalry, it guarantees a certain degree of goodwill from both sides.

To varying degrees and at various times, the US and China have sought to “court” allegiance from countries in the region, perhaps partially a result of an ideological hangover from the Cold War. This has taken a multitude of forms including investment, development assistance, preferential trade concessions, and security guarantees.

This dynamic has essentially established a floor underneath Southeast Asia’s bilateral relationships with the two fighting elephants. While frictions are inevitable, neither the US nor China would allow relations to deteriorate beyond a certain point. Neither would want to run the risk of pushing any Southeast Asian nation closer to the camp of the other side.

A freer hand for China?

The favourable aspects of this dynamic are now rapidly fraying. Under the Trump administration, the US seems inclined to exclusively use “sticks” rather than “carrots” to obtain allegiance. In Trump’s worldview, countries must line up to “court” US favour. The US “courts” no one.

Preferential access to the US market is entirely off the table, at least partially reflecting domestic antipathy towards trade and globalisation more broadly. The only question now is whether the punitive and potentially escalating US tariffs a Southeast Asian nation faces is either higher or lower than that of its competing neighbours. US security guarantees, either implicit or explicit, are now something that countries are expected to “pay” for, either in the form of granting preferential US access to raw materials, trade concessions, purchase and investment commitments, or commercial concessions that strain previous limitations on the involvement of the US government in the affairs of private companies.

With the US opting out of the competition to “court” Southeast Asian favour, China is under less pressure to “play nice”. While closer economic and strategic ties between China and Southeast Asia are entirely possible, China will feel emboldened to dictate terms more strongly in its own favour.

Other ripple effects from the US rejection of rules-based trade are already contributing to an intensification of trade frictions between Southeast Asia and China.

Dumping will become a bigger flashpoint

With China’s post-pandemic economic recovery still lagging[iv], the government has aggressively sought to boost industrial manufacturing through subsidisation and other incentives. This is in keeping with longstanding Chinese industrial policies and has created excess capacity[v] in sectors such as steel, electric vehicles, and solar panels.

Inevitably, this excess capacity ends up in export markets. With the US market closing, much of this excess capacity that would have previously found its way into the US is now ending up in Southeast Asia.

Importantly, because of the subsidisation received, already competitive Chinese companies are able to export these products at unfairly low prices that threaten to push domestic competitors in Southeast Asia out of business. This practice is known as “dumping” and is illegal under trade rules if material injury to domestic competitors can be demonstrated. In these cases, countries are permitted to apply countervailing tariffs (in the case of subsidisation) or anti-dumping tariffs (in the case of predatory pricing to gain market share) to bring the cost of the unfairly low-priced imports up to market levels.

A number of Southeast Asia countries, including Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia have either implemented or are considering antidumping tariffs[vi] against China, creating trade antagonisms with China and opening the door to potential future retaliation from China.

Trump’s reciprocal tariff regime has battered trade relations between Southeast Asia and the US for reasons that are direct and obvious. Less obviously, these tariffs are also fueling intensifying frictions between Southeast Asia and China, as a greater influx of damaging low-cost Chinese products lead to retaliation, while US disinterest in courting Southeast Asian favour leaves China with less incentive to accommodate regional concerns.

THE IMPERATIVE – AND CHALLENGES – FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE EU

Given the rocky road ahead with both the US and China, the imperative for Southeast Asia to collaborate more closely with the EU is exceedingly strong.

The synergies are self-evident: notwithstanding the strong-armed deal the EU was pressed to conclude with the US, the EU has historically been a stalwart supporter of non-discrimination, most favoured nation treatment, and progressively decreased trade barriers – the foundational principles of the rules-based system that has been so beneficial for Southeast Asia. The erosion underway in that orderly system presents the trade-dependent economies of Southeast Asia with a potentially existential threat, and the need to expand collaboration with like-minded partners.

With a $19 trillion GDP, the size of the EU consumer market is second only to the US. The EU provides a more hospitable tariff regime and a transparent and predictable trade and regulatory environment that stands in sharp contrast to the US.

While the EU could not significantly offset Southeast Asia’s reliance on China for global value chain[vii] backward linkages (Chinese inputs into Southeast Asian exports), prospects are brighter for GVC forward linkages – that is, Southeast Asian inputs that are included in an EU country’s exports. For instance, Malaysia is a critical supplier of electronic inputs[viii] for automobiles and medical devices assembled in – and exported from – the EU. EU manufacturers Infineon and Bosch include Southeast Asian inputs in finished products that are ultimately exported, including to the US and China.

The EU offers Southeast Asia economic heft, stability, and an abiding commitment to the foundational principles of free trade – a combination that neither the US nor China can match.

While the rationale for Southeast Asia to draw closer to Europe is compelling, institutional and philosophical challenges would have to be surmounted. The primary institutional challenge will be to identify the most effective platform or vehicle to operationalise a more deeply integrated trade and investment relationship.

Are more trade agreements the answer?

The EU currently has free trade agreements (FTAs) in place with Singapore and Vietnam[ix]. A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)[x] with Indonesia is expected to take effect in 2027. Previously stalled negotiations with Malaysia and Thailand have been resumed.

As has been demonstrated by the “start and stop” nature of negotiations already initiated and the impracticality of going “one by one” with each Southeast Asian country, individual FTAs are a non-starter.

The idea of an EU-ASEAN FTA[xi] has been on the table since 2007 but quickly fizzled, thanks in part to wide gaps in regulatory approach, differing viewpoints among ASEAN members, and developmental differences between the blocs. Resuscitation of these talks should be considered a worthy long-term aspiration but it holds no realistic hope to provide a short-term ameliorative to current circumstances.

A looser arrangement?

An alternative approach would be to leverage off an existing agreement: The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The CPTPP was founded in 2018 and its membership consists [xii] of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the UK and Vietnam. It is generally considered to be the highest quality plurilateral agreement in existence, with commitments in areas such as digital trade and state-owned enterprises far exceeding the WTO or other regional or bilateral accords.

Formal membership in CPTPP, at least in the short term, is not a practical option either for the EU or the Southeast Asian countries that are not already members. There is a queue of applicant countries already lined-up and even under the best of circumstances, the process does not move quickly. The lone successful applicant – the UK – endured a more than two-year wait to gain membership. This is to say nothing of the potential difficulty, especially for less developed Southeast Asian countries, in meeting some of the CPTPP’s more demanding provisions.

Short of full membership, the CPTPP could provide an already operational institutional framework in which the EU and like-minded Southeast Asian nations (some of which are already full CPTPP members) can identify and advance shared interests and a shared desire for closer trade and investment relations.

For their part, the existing members of the CPTPP have unambiguously signalled their interest in tightening bonds with both the EU and ASEAN. In a joint statement[xiii] issued in May this year, members said:

“We decided to work towards dialogues as soon as possible in 2025 with the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and tasked senior officials to work out details for these engagements…”

While reduced tariffs and market access commitments would not be part of this necessarily less-codified arrangement, meaningful work could still be accomplished. The high-quality provisions of the CPTPP would serve as a rallying point – a focus for exploratory discussions, map charting, and a deeper understanding of respective sensitivities. Importantly, the various stumbling blocks that have thus far frustrated achievement of an EU-ASEAN FTA could simply be set aside under this more flexible and loose approach.

Far from perfect, but…

Ultimately, the two regions could hope for an imperfect accommodation in which the EU and as many Southeast Asia nations that are willing and able become associate/affiliate/observer members of the CPTPP (along with the four Southeast Asian countries that already enjoy full membership). Do not waste time parsing the terminology. The exact formulation is irrelevant. The point is to create a more institutionalised platform for these two regions to advance their mutual interests in preserving orderly trade relations. Although not a panacea, it would provide the best available hedge against a trade system that is trending towards a more “Wild West” ethos.

Normative divergences create additional challenges

Irrespective of the institutional form it might take, the effort to draw the EU and Southeast Asia closer together will have to navigate a substantial normative gap. In recent years, the EU has sought to increasingly condition its trade relationships on alignment with a host of value-laden issues[xiv], including attitudes towards climate change mitigation, labour standards, press freedoms, and freedom of expression. Particularly on environmental issues, the EU has been willing to circumscribe market access when it deems there has been insufficient alignment.

While dialogues between the regions proliferate on issues such as these, Southeast Asia does not necessarily share European views on such value-laden issues. In fact, in some cases, viewpoints sharply diverge, creating tension between the desire for access to the EU market and fealty to local social sensibilities.

In these cases, practical pragmatism is needed. Both regions need to acknowledge that a convergence on societal viewpoints on all issues will not happen in the foreseeable future. With earnest effort, it should be possible to identify acceptable “middle grounds” in which neither side is required to make unacceptable compromises to their value-systems but obstacles to trade are avoided. Neither side can afford to allow these issues to form an impediment to the closer trade and investment relations that are overwhelmingly in the best interests of both the EU and Southeast Asia.

In some cases, the main problem is more practical than it is philosophical. Some of the EU’s climate-related demands would require codification and documentation of environmental conditions which are simply beyond the capacities of many companies, especially MSMEs, in the region to comply with. For example, the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR)[xv] has received significant pushback from Indonesia and others, arguing that it imposes unrealistic expectations on the ability of small farmers to provide geolocation data and traceability.

An accommodation here is long overdue. Some combination of technical and financial support from the EU along with extended phase-in periods for rigorous compliance requirements could help bridge the gap.

US AND CHINA CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT, BUT EU’S ROLE SHOULD BE EXPANDED

For better or worse, the US and China will continue to cast wide shadows and wield significant influence, both economic and strategic, in Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. Balancing between the superpowers has never been easy, but most countries in the region have been able to navigate the tightrope with skill and success. That tightrope is now growing even more narrow and the crosswinds are intensifying.

As the trade environment grows more precarious, countries in Southeast Asia should look increasingly towards Europe. The synergies are evident and provide a hedge against the erraticism of the US as well as increasingly antagonised trade relations with China.

Although the primacy of free trade principles and a belief in rules-based trade have taken a beating, both the EU and Southeast Asia have historically been among the most stalwart proponents. In this new trade era we are entering, countries that are still “true believers” in the benefits that flow from freer and more orderly trade need to stand up, and stand together.

For appendix and endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

About the author: Stephen Olson is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and a Non-Resident Fellow and Visiting Lecturer at the Yeutter Institute of International Trade. Olson is a member of the World Economic Forum Global Futures Council on Trade and co-leads a joint workstream on geopolitics and trade. He began his career in Washington DC as a US trade negotiator.

Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an autonomous organization established by an Act of Parliament in 1968, was renamed ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute in August 2015. Its aims are: To be a leading research centre and think tank dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. To stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region. To serve as a centre for international, regional and local scholars and other researchers to do research on the region and publish and publicize their findings. To achieve these aims, the Institute conducts a range of research programmes; holds conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars; publishes briefs, research journals and books; and generally provides a range of research support facilities, including a large library collection.

Afghans are the least satisfied in the world with their lives – OWID

Afghans reported the lowest life satisfaction in the world, far below any other country. / bne IntelliNews

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By Hannah Ritchie for Our World in Data November 24, 2025

Measuring happiness is difficult, but one way to understand how satisfied people are with their lives is to simply ask them, Our World in Data  (OWID) reports.

Self-reported life satisfaction is one key metric that researchers often rely on. It asks people to imagine a hypothetical ladder, where the best possible life for them is a 10, and the worst possible life is a 0. They then have to place their current position on the ladder.

The chart shows the three-year average scores from 2022 to 2024 for the four countries with the highest ratings and the four with the lowest.

Afghans reported the lowest life satisfaction in the world, far below any other country.

This incredibly low score has been replicated in other studies. Researchers recently compared Afghans’ life satisfaction with international datasets dating back to 1946 and found it was the lowest ever recorded. Two-thirds gave a score of 0 or 1 on the 10-point scale.

See self-reported levels of life satisfaction in your own country.