Kobanê, the film of a victory

The film of the Kobanê resistance will be ready in 6 months.

 Like happened in the Kobanê resistance, filmmakers and people from four parts of Kurdistan took part in the shooting of the film.

GÜNAY AKSOY
KOBANÊ
Sunday, 20 Feb 2022

Özlem Yaşar is the screenwriter and director of the film about the Kobanê resistance which will be ready in 6 months. She said that they shot the film thanks to the solidarity of the people of Kobanê and from abroad. "The main theme of the movie is the victory of Kurdish women fighters against darkness."

Medya Doz and Özlem Yaşar co-wrote the script of the movie Kobanê, produced by the Rojava Film Commune. Doz and Yaşar interviewed hundreds of witnesses and fighters to write the script and took the real heroes as the basis. The film was shot in the city of Kobanê, where the resistance took place, in Tabqa and other places where the resistance took place.

Özlem Yaşar, who is also the director of the movie, told ANF about the preparation, shooting and post-production process of the Kobanê film.

She said that the cultural and historical heritage and the great values ​​created by the resistance definitely deserved to be made more visible also through art, and added that they also try to reflect the emerging values ​​through cinema.

Yaşar said: “When we look at the last 40 years of Kurdish women, we see a struggle for self-existence. Women try to overcome the established gender roles. There is a great resistance against the masculine mentality that permeates society down to its smallest cell. An alternative life is being built against the masculine system. And this requires a long-term struggle. Kurdish women in the spotlight have a historical past of struggle. We have handled this reality in the film. We are not outside of this women's struggle; we are a part of it. As women, we are individuals who are affected by all these processes and become a part of the struggle within it. Fighting female characters are the focus of our film.”

This film is a first

Yaşar said that the long struggle for freedom in Kurdistan is fed by the gains and the price paid.

She added that the traces of the Kobanê war are still alive. “The war and resistance in Kobanê cost the whole world. Kobanê moved to the international arena. The history of Kurdistan is the history of resistance. There is enormous resistance in the four parts [of Kurdistan]. Kobanê is such a process for us. Not many years have passed since the Kobanê war. It is a subject that concerns our recent history. The traces of war and resistance are still very vivid. It was a process that we followed very closely. Our friends participated in this war and fell as martyrs. A great price was paid. A tremendous resistance ensued. All these elements actually developed the determination and idea of turning that process into a film. It will certainly be the subject of novels. Maybe it will try to find its counterpart in many more movies. Our movie is one of the first. Definitely more are to come. We set out by thinking about how we can transfer this to the cinema.”

We interviewed hundreds of witnesses

Yaşar said: “Kobanê was the people's hope for freedom. People have jumped into this hope of freedom. The hearts of millions who followed this resistance on a daily basis beat in Kobanê. The reflection of this resistance was great. For this reason, the movie Kobanê is not a chronological movie. Reality and fiction are intertwined in the film. We interviewed hundreds of witnesses before starting to shoot. We talked to the witnesses of the war, the fighters and the people, and we listened to hundreds of people who personally experienced the war at that time. We registered all this. While writing the script of the movie, we stayed true to the real stories. We portrayed martyr Gelhat, who can be called one of the indispensable war characters of that process. We portrayed Martyr Zehra (YPJ commander) and we have many more characters. In particular, Gelhat, Zehra, Abu Leyla and Masiro are our leading characters. Especially the relationship between female fighters, the comradeship is some of the impressive shots.”

We learned a lot from the places

Yaşar said that they shot the movie in Kobanê and added: “We did not spoil any of the textures of the place where the story evolves. We did not put up a set for the movie. This was important to us. But there was a drastically changed texture. There was neither pre-war Kobanê nor post-war Kobanê. A very partial region bears traces of that process. We especially tried to evaluate the places where the story takes place. Those places taught us a lot.”

The people of Kobanê supported us

Yaşar continued: “We couldn't have made this movie without the people of Kobanê. When they learned that in their own city a war movie would be shot, no one stayed away. The supporting actors, the people who have been there and fought, and many people who have worked for this film took part in the film. In fact, we got our biggest support from the people. There is no professional actor in the movie. They are all amateur players. Two of our main characters had experience in films before. But all the players except two came to the set for the first time. They tried to find out what was wanted from a character. They tried to adapt to it. It was a fruitful process. It was pretty tough for people who had never been on a movie set before. It was also difficult for us. They were motivated by their hard work. It was the spirit and effort they put into the set that made the film.”

Children preserve memory

Yaşar said that children also contributed to the filming process and added: “Children in Kobanê have guided us. Children were telling us which fighter fought in which place, how he resisted and where he died. Children keep their war memories alive. The efforts of the children to help with the film were unforgettable."

When the film was made, Turkey was attacking

Yaşar said that they shot the film under Turkey's attacks, and added: “Rojava is constantly threatened by Turkey. Unfortunately, these attacks never stopped. Civil areas and places were constantly hit. We shot the movie under these conditions. While we were making preparations to start shooting, the occupation of Serêkaniyê took place. We had to postpone the shooting of the movie because of the war. We had to disband the teams created to shoot the movie. We started preparations again a year ago. At that time, there were serious invasion threats against Kobanê. There were attacks on the places where we were shot. A place we built was hit a week later. The bombed places in the area near the border were fired upon by Turkey while we were filming. Those same places where the scars of the war are still alive. In addition to war and threats, the coronavirus epidemic started. All these obstacles were overcome and the filming process was completed. It took us 7 months to shoot the film because of all these problems.”

The fate of the film is like that of the resistance

The fate of the movie is similar to the resistance, said Yaşar, adding: “The fate of our movie was not so different from the fate of the Kobanê resistance. Just as Arabs, Turkmens, Kurds, Turks and internationals came and participated in the Kobanê war, filmmakers from many nations came and participated in the shooting of our film. Filmmakers from Kurdistan, international filmmakers, Arabs and Turkmen contributed to our film. There was a strong solidarity for the Kobanê movie. Everyone wanted to give something of themselves to the film. Everyone worked for the successful shooting of the film, which was completed thanks to the determination of solidarity.”

Darkness ended

Yaşar said that ISIS not only occupied a large territory, but also attacked the people's hope that 'another world is possible'. She added that the women's liberation struggle put an end to this darkness and said: “It was an attack on the system created here, on the women's system. It was an attack on women's liberation gains and history created here. What drew people to resistance here was the hope and belief that another world was possible. ISIS attacked this hope the most. The YPJ (Women’s Defense Units) resistance was attacked. It was an attack on the people's belief in self-government. In the movie, commander Zehra's killing of the ISIS amir was a symbol of the struggle and resistance against the dark mentality of ISIS. We wanted to show the women commanders who led the war in Kobanê through commander Zehra.”

A contribution to the Kurdish cinema tradition

Yaşar said that she has learned and she has been inspired by the cinema of Yılmaz Güney and Halil Dağ. “With our work we want to continue the cinema tradition of Yılmaz Güney and Halil Dağ. With our film, we aim to take this tradition to another level. If we can achieve this, we will be happy.”

Our debt to Mazdek Ararat

Özlem Yaşar commemorated filmmaker Mazdek Ararat, who contributed greatly to the scriptwriting and shooting process of the Kobanê movie and who died in a traffic accident during the film preparations in Kobanê in 2020. “Our friend Mazdek worked a lot for this movie. With his belief and determination, we shot the film and finalized it. We owe it to him.”

Who is Özlem Yaşar

She was born in Sason district of Batman in 1981. She completed her primary and secondary education there. Her interest in art began in high school. She took part in theater groups. She wrote and directed scripts for theater plays. She closely followed Kurdish music, literature, theater and cinema. She has always lived intertwined with art. She wrote poems, stories and screenplays. She acted in the movie "Dema Jin Hezbike" directed by Halil Dağ, one of the leading directors in the mountains of Kurdistan. She wrote and directed a short film script. She also directed the movie Berfîn, shot by Sine Çiya in 2017.

Swiss MP Prezioso and activist Bucher: The PKK must be removed from list of terrorist organisations

EAG parliamentarian Stefanie Prezioso and activist Flurin Bucher said that the PKK's inclusion on the EU list of terrorist organisations is a wrong and unfair decision, and drew attention to the struggle of the PKK and the Kurdish people against ISIS.


ÖNER POLAT
BERN
Sunday, 20 Feb 2022, 11:24

The petition launched to remove the PKK from the EU list of terrorist organisations continues in Switzerland as well as in the rest of Europe. EAG parliamentarian Stefanie Prezioso and activist Flurin Bucher, who were among the signatories of the campaign, told ANF about the importance of the campaign and why they supported it.

Radical Left Coalition EAG parliamentarian Stefanie Prezioso said that "it is a great mistake and injustice that the PKK is included in this list. The main reason for the PKK's inclusion in this list is the PKK's representation and value. I will continue to demand the removal of the PKK from the list and the freedom of Kurdish people's leader Abdullah Öcalan, against the wrong and unjust decision of these states that cannot reconcile these values and representation with their so-called criteria."

Bucher: Rojava is an example for everyone

Activist Flurin Bucher spoke of his admiration for ecology, women's liberation and direct democracy in Rojava.

He said that he has supported the Kurdish people's struggle since he became aware of its struggle for existence and the revolution in Rojava. Bucher said that there are enough arguments for the PKK to be removed from the list of terrorist organisations and added that international institutions, non-governmental organizations and political parties should also support the petition.

He said that he met the struggle of the Kurdish people in an action held in Switzerland for the Morio Refugee Camp in 2021, and added that he was amazed by the Kurdish people's struggle against the oppression of the Turkish state and the barbarism of ISIS. "The first thing that caught my attention was the Make Rojava Green Again project. In 2021, we organised a panel on the climate movements in Switzerland and the ecology model created in Rojava.

Ever since I learned that this ecology model was created by Kurdish fighters who resisted the massacre committed by ISIS in Shengal in 2014, my interest and admiration for the Kurdish people has increased. With the struggle of the Kurdish people against ISIS, the European states were able to secure their own peace and tranquillity. All these reasons are sufficient to remove the PKK from the terrorist organisations list."

‘Rojava Alliance’ declared in St. Gallen

Activists declared the ‘Rojava Alliance’ during a protest march in St. Gallen, Switzerland against the Turkish attacks on Kurdistan.


ANF
ST. GALLEN
Sunday, 20 Feb 2022, 17:35

A march was staged in the Swiss city of St. Gallen on Saturday under the motto “The war begins here – Solidarity with Kurdistan” in protest at the Turkish attacks against Maxmur, Shengal and Rojava.

Activists declared the ‘Rojava Alliance’, which is made up of several groups from Switzerland, Austria and Germany. The alliance announced that their goal was to establish a cross-border network.

The voice message sent by an internationalist in Rojava was played during the demonstration where a speech in the name of Young Socialists (JUSO) pointed to the alternative model built in Rojava.

Demonstrators denounced the cooperation of European governments and companies with Turkey, recalling the latest waves of deadly attacks carried out by the Turkish state against Shengal and Maxmur in southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) and Rojava (northern Syria) that directly target civilian settlements in violation of international law.

The alliance noted that three territories in Rojava have been occupied by the Turkish state since 2017, since when atrocities, exploitation and demographic changes have been executed.

Recalling the ISIS attack on al-Sinaa prison in Heseke on 20 January, the alliance said that the Turkish state carried out simultaneous air raids on Maxmur, Shengal and Rojava after this failed attempt. According to the alliance, this was an act of “retaliation” and greatly hampered the fight against ISIS.

The alliance put emphasis on the importance of solidarity with the people and the revolution of Rojava in order to protect the achievements.

The alliance listed their demands as follows:

1- The Turkish army and allies should immediately retreat from Kurdish autonomous regions.

2- Kurdish autonomous regions should be recognized and peace negotiations that include Kurdish representatives should be conducted.

3- Economic and military cooperation with Turkey should be ceased and all kinds of arms exports should be stopped immediately.

4- The criminalization of Kurdish activists in Germany, Switzerland and Austria should be brought to an end.

Luxury sector undaunted by COVID, soaring inflation

February 21, 2022

PARIS (AFP) – The pandemic and soaring inflation have done nothing to take the shine off luxury brands, from Louis Vuitton to Gucci and Cartier, as the sector hiked prices to notch up stellar profits.

The world economy began to recover from the pandemic last year but the rebound has been accompanied by rising inflation, with prices for raw materials and energy soaring.

But luxury good makers can respond by hiking their prices and actually look more desirable to their customers.

“Our advantage over many other companies and groups is a certain price flexibility, that is, we have the means to react to inflation,” LVMH Chief Executive Bernard Arnault told reporters.

UBS analysts estimate that top brands such as Louis Vuitton, which is owned by industry leader LVMH, have raised their prices two-and-a-half times higher than the inflation rate over the past 20 years.

Indeed, “pricing power remains one of the key characteristics of the luxury goods industry”, UBS analysts wrote in a research note.

LVMH bagged a record EUR64 billion in sales and EUR12 billion in net profit last year, both exceeding pre-pandemic levels.

The French company also owns a broad range of spirits, perfume, jewellery and cosmetics products.

Kering – which owns Gucci and Yves Saint Laurent – also beat its pre-Covid levels to book a net profit of EUR3.2 billion on sales of EUR17.6 billion, the group reported on Thursday.

Kering CEO Francois-Henri Pinault acknowledged that “for every new season, we create a new collection and we review all the price matrices”.

Hermes chalked up profits of EUR2.4 billion on sales of EUR9 billion.

Hermes chief Axel Dumas said his brand, which is enjoying “very strong demand”, raises its prices once a year.

“Our products have the same margins. We don’t play with our prices. They’re linked to manufacturing costs and not to desirability.”

He argued that the craftsmanship that goes into making Hermes bags means that they are “perhaps less susceptible to rising energy and raw materials prices than others”.

Swiss group Richemont, which owns Cartier and runs its business year from April to March, said it booked sales of EUR5.6 billion in the third quarter alone, an increase of 38 per cent over the corresponding period of 2019.

“In certain cases demand exceeds supply and that means consumers will both trade up and likely accept paying higher prices, which again will cushion the margin,” said analysts
at HSBC.

Rolex, for example, had largely refrained from increasing prices during the last two years.

But at the start of 2022, it raised prices by over three per cent on average “and for some models they soared as high as 12 per cent”.

Chanel “has also been in the news for its aggressive price hikes of iconic bags during the pandemic and more so recently”, the analysts said.

“While not every luxury brand can pull off this double-edged sword, we believe Chanel’s pricing actions have probably created a good space for the likes of Louis Vuitton, Hermes and Gucci to raise their price points further.”

'A truck is not a speech': Canadian official issues epic rant on 'liberty' as blockade is finally cleared

David Edwards
February 20, 2022

Ottawa, ON Canada - 01 29 2022: Freedom Convoy Truckers Protest. 

(Photo: Christopher O'Donnell/Shutterstock)

Bob Rae, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, lashed out at protesters who have clogged roads and bridges in his country for over three weeks because they object to vaccine mandates.

In a largely peaceful operation on Saturday, Canadian officials took advantage of an emergency powers law to arrest protesters and tow vehicles from the streets of Ottawa.

Rae spokes out about the protesters in a tweet on Sunday.

"A truck is not a speech," he wrote. "A horn is not a voice. An occupation is not a protest. A blockade is not freedom, it blocks the liberty of all. A demand to overthrow a government is not a dialogue. The expression of hatred is not a difference of opinion. A lie is not the truth."

Rae's tweet was shared thousands of times within minutes.

U.S.
Giuliani Claims Most 1/6 Riot Damage Done by People Working for Government

BY JASON LEMON ON 2/20/22

Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City and a former attorney for ex-President Donald Trump, continued to promote discredited conspiracy theories about the January 6, 2021 attack against the U.S. Capitol in a recent interview—claiming Antifa and the government were behind the violence.

Giuliani represented Trump in a slew of failed election challenge lawsuits in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. The former Republican mayor was, and continues to be, a key promoter of the so-called "Big Lie" that President Joe Biden only beat Trump due to widespread voter fraud and rigged voting machines. No evidence has emerged corroborating those claims, and Giuliani's license to practice law has been suspended in New York and Washington, DC.

In a Friday interview with the Joe Pags Show, he also pushed conspiracy theories that Antifa activists and the federal government were the real perpetrators behind the pro-Trump assault targeting the Capitol last year.


"Most of the damage looks like it was done by people that were working for the government," Giuliani said. Prior to that remark, he claimed that he saw John Sullivan, who was indicted by the Justice Department for his participation in the January 6 riot, on the evening of the Capitol attack. Sullivan filmed the shooting of pro-Trump demonstrator Ashli Babbitt in the legislative building that day.

Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani claimed in a recent interview that the government caused "most" of the damage at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Above, Giuliani leaves the funeral for fallen NYPD officer Wilbert Mora at St. Patrick's Cathedral on February 2 in New York City.

SPENCER PLATT/GETTY IMAGES

"The night of January 6 I'm walking to my hotel and the person—the two people with me—who are basically my Antifa experts, said, they point over there, they said, 'There's John Sullivan,'" Giuliani claimed. "I said, 'He got arrested.'"

The Trump ally claimed this was evidence that Sullivan was a "rat" and working for the government. He said that the police arrested Sullivan and then the FBI realized, "'He's working for us,'" saying they then quickly released him.

According to the Justice Department, Sullivan was charged and arrested on January 14. A press release at the time explained that he was "charged by complaint with one count of knowingly entering or remaining in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority, one count of violent entry and disorderly conduct on Capitol grounds, and one count of interfering with law enforcement engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties incident to and during the commission of civil disorder."

While Sullivan has previously been supportive of Black Lives Matter and left-wing causes, he has consistently denied being a member of Antifa. Black Lives Matter activists in Utah—where he resided—disavowed him in the past as well, accusing him of being an "agent provocateur." Sullivan said he does not support Trump, but entered the Capitol with rioters to document history.

Trump supporters and allies have suggested that Sullivan was a member of Antifa and working for the government since the early days after the pro-Trump riot took place. The conspiracy theory circulated widely on social media, despite a lack of corroborating evidence. A number of GOP lawmakers and other Trump supporters still claim that left-wing activists and/or the government coordinated the riot as a "false flag" operation.

House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, a California Republican, reportedly told GOP representatives to stop spreading misinformation that the attack was perpetrated by left-wing activists. He explained to them that he'd reviewed classified briefings that determined the attackers were right-wing extremists, Trump supporters and QAnon adherents.

More than 770 people have been charged in connection to the January 6 riot. Many have stated in court that they believed they were carrying out the wishes of then President Trump when they attacked the Capitol in an apparent effort to disrupt the formal certification of President Joe Biden's Electoral College victory.

Just ahead of the violence, Trump spoke at a nearby rally by the White House and urged his supporters to walk to the federal legislative building and "fight like hell" to save their country. Hundreds proceeded to do just that, although Trump and his allies have argued the demonstration was intended to be peaceful.

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Five Crucial Questions for Rudy Giuliani on Jan. 6 Capitol Attack

 

Brunei source of 3.6pc of global DDoS attacks last year

February 21, 2022

Brunei Darussalam is the third highest source of global Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in 2021, said United National Networks Sdn Bhd (UNN) in a statement yesterday.

A DDoS attack is when a party with malicious intent remotely controls a network of hijacked computers and devices infected with malware to overwhelm Internet traffic going to servers of a business, said UNN, adding that the cyberattack ultimately denies users from accessing information systems, devices, or other network resources from the targeted server.

UNN said according to a leading cloud-based provider’s DDoS attack metrics report in 2021, 3.6 per cent of global DDoS attack traffic comes from the country. “This makes Brunei the third-highest source of Global DDoS attacks, caused by infected devices located in the country,” said the telecommunications provider.

However, the company said DDoS attacks on businesses in Brunei could be carried out by bot networks originating outside of the country.

“These observations mean that local businesses are susceptible to increased risk of DDoS attacks as long as they are connected to the Internet,” said the company, adding that “DDoS attacks may lead businesses to experience financial losses, damage to their brand reputation, and even loss of business due to the unavailability of their online presence”.

UNN said they have introduced a cybersecurity service called DDoS Defence, aimed at protecting local companies from malicious threats and ensuring the lifeline for online service remains uninterrupted during DDoS attack.

The company said DDoS Defence is the first service from UNN’s curated Cyber Security related product and services portfolio to support the Brunei Government’s initiative to achieve the Digital Economy Masterplan 2025 for Smart Nation.

Those interested can contact the UNN Sales Team at digital.solutions@unn.com.bn or visit www.unn.com.bn/ddos-defence for more information.

 

Are we ready for war in the infosphere?

BY CHARLIE DUNLAP, J.D. · 20 FEBRUARY 2022

Shar

How can the U.S. and rule-of-law democracies counter increasingly sophisticated and weaponized disinformation?  How should they wage “information warfare” during period of putative peace?  What are some of the rewards – and risks – of “democratization” of intelligence that commercial satellites and advanced communications capabilities permit?  Can rule-of-law democracies compete successfully against those hyperempowered by technology?  In short, are we ready for war in the infosphere?

These are big questions that I suspect we will revisit with some frequency in future posts but let’s get the conversation underway.

Context

Here’s some context: as things continue to heat up in the Ukraine, and the specter of war seems to be growing, Russia and its proxies are working feverishly to fabricate a pretext for military action.  The latest shenanigan seems to be artillery exchanges between the separatists who control part of eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces.  The plan apparently is to goad Ukrainian forces into a response that harms civilians.   

The New York Times reports: “As shelling intensified in the east, officials warned that Moscow might use false claims of “genocide” against Russians in the region as a pretext for an attack.”  U.S Secretary of State Antony Blinken put it bluntly:

“Russia plans to manufacture a pretext for its attack,” he said, citing a “so-called terrorist bombing” or “a fake, even a real attack” with chemical weapons. “This could be a violent event that Russia will blame on Ukraine,” he said, “or an outrageous accusation that Russia will level against the Ukrainian government.”

The information/disinformation conundrum

What we are seeing on display is a means of coercion that the Russians proven to have real expertise: information/disinformation warfare.  It is a serious mistake to underestimate their capabilities and how they have used technology to amplify them.  A 2016 RAND report pointed out that “Russia has taken advantage of technology and available media in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War.”  Importantly, RAND finds that Russia’s “tools and channels now include the Internet, social media, and the evolving landscape of professional and amateur journalism and media outlets.”  It adds:

We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as “the firehose of falsehood” because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions. In the words of one observer, “[N]ew Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience.”

We are certainly seeing much of that in the current crisis, so what can we do about it?  A little more than a week ago a reporter asked me about Russian information/disinformation war.  His questions included: was this a new form of warfare? Or is this just something that has gone on forever? Can the US succeed at information warfare or are there too many constraints?

Here’s a lightly edited and somewhat expanded version of what I said then:

The challenge

It is very difficult for any rule-of-law democracy to compete with an authoritarian regime bent upon weaponzing disinformation.  This is especially so with the Russians, who have long considered deception and disinformation to be a key stratagems, and who now have become super-empowered with the advent of cyber technology, to include advanced techniques like deep fakes, and more.

For principled reasons, countries like the U.S. are loathe to use deception and disinformation, particularly during periods of putative peace, but this means they can often be disadvantaged.  I believe these days it is challenging to get approval for an aggressive counter-disinformation campaign, even if it relies upon accurate data.  The Russians are not constrained that way, and it gives them the opportunity to get inside the decision and response loops of the U.S. and NATO countries.

It can be easier for a military commander to get approval to use deadly defensive force than it is to get the OK to respond with an aggressive, albeit non-kinetic, information strike.  The bureaucracy may insist upon multiple approvals that simply cannot be obtained in a timely manner.  Consequently, a Russian narrative laced with disinformation can stay ahead of any effort to counter it.

One way to counter the bureaucratic lag would be to assess likely Russian information offensives and to pre-position approved responses.  In the 21st century, information warfare can take place at hyper speed, and any slower response could be doomed as too little too late.  Whole societies may rapidly form adversary-inclined opinions that may be difficult or impossible to dislodge in the necessary timeframe.

“Grey zone” war and exploiting the unsettled nature of international law

The Russians are waging what is called “grey zone” war which is the use of coercive means that fall below the threshold that traditional legal analysis that permits defensive responses. It is a period of not quite peace, but also not quite “war” – at least as that term has historically been understood.

For example, a “gray zone” technique would be to exploit the unsettled nature of international law as to what can or cannot be done in cyberspace without legally constituting an “attack.” Additionally, it is unsettled as to exactly what kind of response is permissible when the disinformation campaign is not only broadcasting falsities, but also benefits from affirmatively going into U.S. and allied databases and changing data to hostile advantage.

Historically, for example, propaganda—however false it may be—has not been considered to meet the threshold that legally triggers a right to “self-defense” as that term is understood under the U.N. and NATO charters.

But the U.S. and other democracies may need to reconsider these interpretive norms given the unprecedented potential of cyber and high-tech communications to distribute highly-volatile disinformation to billions in a matter of hours.   Such disinformation/propaganda can instigate an armed conflict or other tragic event, so there is a need to know what responses and counters are internationally acceptable norms.  The answer may not appropriately be a kinetic response, but may rely on other means to, for example, stifle its distribution and effectiveness.

Regardless, highly sophisticated and possibly politically decisive disinformation operation could have a strategic impact that threatens vital American interests, and set off reactions that pose a serious threat to peace.  

Propaganda and disinformation during armed conflict

Yes, rights to expression do need to be protected, but so do innocents.  And, yes, there can be appropriate limits.  For example, there is no First Amendment right for an enemy to communicate during an armed conflict, and this is especially true with respect to propaganda and disinformation.  However, in a globalized media environment where the propaganda and/or disinformation may be reported by third party or even American news organizations, complications result.

Consequently, the challenge is to figure out how to stop such operations while respecting free speech as well as the public’s right to know during peace, war, and – yes – “grey zone’ periods.  Another complication would be an adversary’s use of proxies, including unwitting ones in friendly countries, to spread false information which could potentially have catastrophic strategic effects.

Red lines for the “grey zone”?

The U.S. and its allies need to decide exactly where it considers the international law lines to be, understanding that establishing any legal “red line” would also limit what they could do to an adversary.  Given the U.S. is reportedly the world’s premier cyber power, some may argue that the current legal ambiguity serves American interests.  I believe deterrence is better served by being clear about what the U.S. and its allies deem as legally acceptable or not.

Frankly, it is not unthinkable to imagine conflicts decided entirely in the infosphere.  Clausewitz, the great military theorist, said that war is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” but in the future, it might be possible to substitute “act of information” into that axiom.  Once a society is made to believe it cannot win, or it becomes so internally disrupted it cannot organize to fight effectively, the “war” may be over without a shot being fired.

Let’s not forget that Sun Tzu, another great theorist observed: “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Some good news…

I do think the U.S. and its NATO allies have done a good job, for example, in exposing a Russian plan to fabricate a “video showing an attack by Ukrainians on Russian territory or Russian speakers in eastern” as a “pretext for invasion.”   The Wall Street Journal observed:

Releasing information to damage or deter an enemy is an ancient tactic. What is new here is the scale of it, said Jonathan Eyal, an associate director at the Royal United Services Institute, a British defense think tank. By flagging operations early, it stops Russia’s President Vladimir Putin “resorting to the same old techniques” that Moscow used to justify incursions into Crimea in 2014 and Georgia in 2008, he said.

This is the kind of thing that the US, and its allies need to do more frequently, even if there are risks.  The Journal points out:  

The moves aren’t without risk for U.S. and U.K. intelligence agencies. They potentially expose sources in Russia. Furthermore, if war doesn’t materialize, the U.S. and U.K. governments, which have provided little evidence for their claims, could be accused of scaremongering. It could also have no effect at all.

Of course, the calculation as to whether secret intelligence ought to be used to counter disinformation is very fact-specific as it may put at risk costly sources and methods.  The New York Times reported that today that U.S. intelligence “learned last week that the Kremlin had given the order for Russian military units to proceed with an invasion of Ukraine.”  The paper also said that ‘[o]fficials declined to describe the intelligence in any detail, anxious to keep secret their method of collecting the information.” 

That concern is understandable but the disclosure was the right thing to do in this instance, even if there was price in terms intelligence sources and methods.  Operating in the infosphere is not, and will not be, a cost free endeavor, but the disclosure option must be “on the table” in situations where major war is possible. 

The emerging opportunities and challenges of “open source intelligence” 

However, not all the data used to expose Russian disinformation comes from Western intelligence agencies.  Increasingly, commercial satellites and social media users are the source.  Writing in The Conversation professor Craig Nazareth says that “open source intelligence” (OSINT) has “democratized” access to data once the sole province of the specialized government intelligence-gathering systems.  He says such as technologies as “[s]ocial media, big data, smartphones and low-cost satellites have taken center stage, and scraping Twitter has become as important as anything else in the intelligence analyst toolkit.”  Nazareth adds:

Through information captured by commercial companies and individuals, the realities of Russia’s military posturing are accessible to anyone via internet search or news feed. Commercial imaging companies are posting up-to-the-minute, geographically precise images of Russia’s military forces. Several news agencies are regularly monitoring and reporting on the situation. TikTok users are posting video of Russian military equipment on rail cars allegedly on their way to augment forces already in position around Ukraine. And internet sleuths are tracking this flow of information.

There are at least two issues raised by this development, one of which was mentioned by the author: “sifting through terabytes of publicly available data for relevant information is difficult” particularly since “much of the data could be intentionally manipulated to deceive complicates the task.”  

An article in The Economist expands upon the cautions.  It notes that OSINT is “not a panacea” and observes that “overhead pictures, while very useful, never show everything.”  It also says that satellite images can be “beguilingly concrete in a way that can mislead the inexperienced.”

Modern armed forces appreciate the role that open sources have begun to play in crises, and can use this to their advantage. An army might, for instance, deliberately show a convoy of tanks headed in the opposite direction to their intended destination, in the knowledge that the ensuing TikTok footage will be dissected by researchers. The location signals broadcast by ships can be spoofed, placing them miles from their true locations.

The second issue involves the use of “open source intelligence” during wartime.  Russians (or, really, any military) may seek, for example, to block the acquisition and/or dissemination of “geographically precise images” of their forces, which could quite obviously be used for targeting.  They may consider the commercial satellites to be targetable, and the means the Russians (or others) use to attack them could have significant adverse collateral effects on a world much dependent upon satellite sourced-data.

Additionally, people who may think of themselves as civilians uninvolved in the conflict may find the Russians consider their activities as sufficient to make them targets.  Even the International Committee of the Red Cross concedes that “transmitting tactical targeting intelligence for a specific attack” is sufficient “direct involvement in hostilities” to make a civilian lawfully targetable under the law of war.  Some countries may have a broader interpretation of what constitute “direct involvement” as this is an area of the law that is unsettled. 

One more thought: it won’t always be friendly countries who exploit open source intelligence.  Open societies like the U.S. and bonanzas for open source intelligence gatherers.  We have to think through what this means for our military operations: do you fight they same way when an adversary, even a relatively low-tech one, can use OSINT to track your every move? 

The future of war in the infosphere

In a fascinating article in POLITICO (“‘Kill Your Commanding Officer’: On the Front Lines of Putin’s Digital War With Ukraine“), journalist Kenneth R. Rosen reports:

The Russians have for nearly a decade used Ukraine as a proving ground for a new and highly advanced type of hybrid warfare — a digital-meets-traditional kind of fighting defined by a reliance on software, digital hardware and cognitive control that is highly effective, difficult to counter and can reach far beyond the front lines deep into Ukrainian society. It is a type of high-tech conflict that many military experts predict will define the future of war. It has also turned Ukraine, especially its eastern provinces, but also the capital, into a bewildering zone of instability, disinformation and anxiety.

This echoes a phenomena raised in the 2018 book, War in 140 Characters, where the author discussed a young Palestinian woman named Farah who “armed with only a smart phone” produced tweets espousing a view of the conflict that were so effective they could defeat a militarily more powerful opponent on the “narrative battlefield.”  In the information realm this gave her power “akin to the most élite special forces unit” that could resulting nations losing wars.  He explained:

This is because when war becomes “armed politics” and the Claueswitzian paradigm becomes less relevant, one side can win militarily but lose politically.  This idea lies at the center of Farah’s power.  She cannot shoot, but she can tweet, and the latter is now arguably more important in an asymmetric conflict that Palestinians cannot hope to win militarily.  It is this newfound ability to spread narratives via tweets and posts that allows hyperempowered, networked individuals such as Farah to affect the battlefield.

As I said above, it is not unthinkable to imagine conflicts decided entirely in the infosphere. Clausewitz, the great military theorist, said that war is “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” but in the future, it might be possible to substitute “act of information” into that axiom. 

Questions to ponder: are the U.S. and other rule-of-law democracies sufficiently prepared to fight in the infosphere?  Do we have the right legal norms and policies in place to compete effectively in 21st century conflicts where a small number of individuals super-empowered by technology can potentially dominate the narrative battlespace?  Are we ready to win in the infosphere?

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire^®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!

Again, be sure not to miss LENS 27th Annual conference (livestream/no registration required)!  Agenda and links to attend virtually are found here .

 

ABOUT MAJ. GEN. CHARLES J. DUNLAP, JR., USAF (RET.)

Charles J. Dunlap Jr., the former deputy judge advocate general of the United States Air Force, joined the Duke Law faculty in July 2010 where he is a professor of the practice of law and Executive Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security.