Implications of China’s Pacific Dream for the United States, Australia, and Allies

Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 10, No. 6, June 2022

Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, and Solomons Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, Jeremiah Manele, 2019. Source: cnsphoto

Yan C. Bennett
Princeton University

John Garrick
Charles Darwin University

It is apparent that Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream now includes the Pacific Ocean where his Foreign Minister Wang Yi has undertaken a Pacific Islands tour of broad scope and ambition. While  China’s economy is stagnating, it nevertheless continues to drive for increasing its world power as Minister Wang aims to finalise the China-Solomons Security agreement and has hosted a Pacific Island Foreign Ministers meeting whilst in Fiji. Wang’s proposals have prompted strong responses from the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, in particular Australia and New Zealand.

What Wang proposed was that China and the Pacific countries jointly formulate a ‘marine spatial plan’ as a way to promote sustainable development of the blue economy. China is offering more investment in the region by mobilizing private capital and encouraging Chinese enterprises to directly invest in Pacific Island countries. What is being viewed more ominously, however, are the new security arrangements reflecting General-Secretary Xi’s “global security initiative” that involves dispatching Chinese police and other security forces to work with participating island nations at both bi-lateral and regional levels and a new emphasis on cyber security. Minister Wang’s plans also include the establishment of a network of Confucius Institutes with embedded Chinese language consultants, teachers, and volunteers on the islands. In the US, these Confucius Institutes and their teachers have been seen as vehicles of CCP propaganda and as a way to stifle academic speech on the activities of the Chinese government. A separate “five-year action plan” would appoint a Chinese special envoy to the region, institute Chinese-built crime laboratories, provide hundreds of training opportunities, and hold various high-level forums.

Wang’s proposals to cash-strapped Pacific islands place a larger PRC footprint in the Pacific, which would then challenge the existing Pacific Island Forum (PIF) that currently defends international law and maintains peace and security institutions in the region. Additionally, it puts the immediate spotlight on the island nations themselves and on American Indo-Pacific allies. Responses are coming fast and furious from the US, Australia, New Zealand, France and now Canada, which is developing a highly anticipated Indo-Pacific Strategy following its recent ban on Huawei participating in Canada’s 5G wireless network on national security grounds.

For Australia, China’s expanding interests in the Pacific Islands prompted a domestic reaction in the Australian Federal election campaign in 2022 following China’s security deal with the Solomons that would allow Beijing to deploy forces to “protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.” The Labor party and the Liberal/National Coalition acknowledged that whoever won the election would face serious challenges in the Pacific region. And so it proves to be.

As recently as April 22, a senior delegation led by Kurt Campbell, the U.S.’ National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, met with the Islands’ leadership to register their interests and concerns. While recognizing the Solomons’ sovereign decision-making, Campbell said that if steps were taken that created a potential security risk to the wider region, the U.S. would have concerns with that. The meeting launched a new high level strategic dialogue, and according to Campbell, the U.S. has to step up its game across the board in the Pacific by meeting Pacific nations’ needs. China’s intentions in the Pacific have been outlined and they make it clearer why the Sino-Solomons security agreement met with international concern, which has led to the U.S. reopening an Embassy in the Solomon Islands after a break of 30 years.

China’s Pacific dream unfolds

For China’s Foreign Minister to make such a tour of the Pacific Islands at this moment, it is reasonable to ask what are China’s primary interests in proposing a Region-wide economic/security pact with Pacific Island nations and what are the geopolitical implications of Minister Wang’s plans for the Pacific?

While world media attention has been focused on Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, China quietly completed the groundwork for the Solomons deal which had taken years to execute. It was connected to China’s campaign to convert Pacific islands from allegiances with Taiwan to the People’s Republic. The costs of converting the Solomons were expensive, but this investment now appears to have a big pay-off with a strategic window to the South Pacific opening for the PRC. Wang Yi’s tour seizes the moment to prise that window further open. Even though he has failed to win a consensus from the 10 Pacific nations to sign up to his “Common Development Vision,” at least half-a-dozen countries including Samoa, Kiribati and Niue have signed up for enhanced co-operation in Beijing’s trillion-dollar Belt and Road infrastructure investment program. So, what are China’s core interests in this Pacific expansion?

First, the example of the security agreement with the Solomon Islands to allow China to “send police, armed police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces … [and] that Beijing could send ships for stopovers and to replenish supplies”, makes explicit China’s blueprint for expansion. These elements suggest the potential establishment of a military base, although the Solomons’ government denies this will happen as does China. But similar agreements have already been made with other Pacific island nations that acceded to build dual-use, military-commercial facilities in return for money and assistance. This is precisely what China wants and what China has been working toward for decades and reflects a fully weaponized foreign-aid program conflated with dual-use (civilian/military) development along with regional cyber control.

Second, the Solomon Islands’ vast economic zone is resource rich, replete with timber, significant fish stocks, and a range of other natural resources both above and under the sea. With 1.4 billion people there should be no surprise to anyone that Beijing is keen to exploit the region, despite claims to the contrary.

Third, flipping the Solomon Islands from its long-term support for Taiwan in 2019 was a diplomatic success for the PRC. It mounts pressure on other nearby island nations, including the three French territories of the South Pacific: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna, and U.S. allies the Marshall Islands and Palau amongst other neighbours including Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and also Indonesia. Indeed, New Caledonia has faced intense independence activism from its indigenous Kanaks, and recent referenda voted only narrowly to remain with France.

A fourth message is conveyed internationally that U.S. (and Taiwanese) influence in the Pacific fades while Beijing’s rises. Domestically, China’s state-controlled media presents this deal as a significant strategic loss to the U.S. and Australia.

A further interest for China, and connected to its soft power push into the Pacific, is to eventually add to its collection of ‘Global South’ votes at the United Nations (UN). Although the Solomons did not follow China in recent UN votes on two key questions regarding Russia: removing Russia from the UNHRC and ending Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. China abstained and the Solomon Islands voted against Russia. Nonetheless, incentivizing South Pacific nations to vote with China at the UN benefits the Middle Kingdom’s broader plans to shape peak governance bodies.

Geopolitical implications for Pacific nations

Almost like jigsaw puzzle pieces, the Solomon Islands deal fits perfectly into China’s efforts to reframe the world order, piece-by-piece co-opting small states. It is now clear that China’s ambitions extend very broadly across the Pacific. When viewed in the context of geopolitics, including the war in Ukraine, it is clear enough that the Beijing-Moscow axis is underway at the global level. In Xi’s words, “to maintain world peace and security and upholding non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations.” But what Xi says and what he does can be two very different things. Along with Russia, the PRC certainly uses coercion, interference tactics and brute force to achieve strategic objectives.

Looking ahead, Indo-Pacific nations including the U.S. and its allies face a concerted assault on the current international rules-based order. To assume Beijing’s intentions are benign, even helpful would be naïve at best, even though some challenges are best shared, such as climate-change action and responses to natural disaster. Poorer countries like the Solomons and other vulnerable Pacific Island nations are confronted with monumental challenges. But playing one superpower off with another in pursuit of a better local deal may have unintended consequences. This potential was foreseen by David Panuelo, President of the Federated States of Micronesia, who says, Mr Wang’s “pre-determined joint communique” should be rejected [as] it could spark a new “cold war” between China and the West. However, unless the West effectively helps Pacific Islands as respectful, reliable partners, when vulnerable some Pacific forum nations may well seek alternatives. But based on previous examples, assistance agreements with China will have serious strings attached and the promise of sustainable security architecture can certainly lead to more authoritarian control.

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Yan C. Bennett is Assistant Director for the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China at Princeton University, U.S. John Garrick is a university fellow in law at Charles Darwin University in Australia. Acknowledgement: Thanks to Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, University of Ottawa, for contributing comments on an early draft relating to Canadian Indo-Pacific policy developments.

EU’s Frontex Tripped In Its Plan For ‘Intrusive’ Surveillance Of Migrants – Analysis

Frontex, the European Union’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, deployed officers in Italy and France to assist local authorities in profiling passengers, identifying document fraud and detecting illicit activities. Photo Credit: INTERPOL

 July 10, 2022  Balkan Insight  0 Comments

By Balkan Insight

By Luděk Stavinoha, Apostolis Fotiadis and Giacomo Zandonini

Frontex and the European Commission sidelined their own data protection watchdogs in pursuing a much-criticised expansion of “intrusive” data collection from migrants and refugees to feed into Europol’s vast criminal databases, BIRN can reveal.

On November 17 last year, when Hervé Yves Caniard entered the 14-floor conference room of the European Union border agency Frontex in Warsaw, European newspapers were flooded with stories of refugees a few hundreds kilometres away, braving the cold at the Belarusian border with Poland.

A 14-year-old Kurd had died from hypothermia a few days earlier; Polish security forces were firing teargas and water cannon to push people back.

The unfolding crisis was likely a topic of discussion at the Frontex Management Board meeting, but so too was a longer-term policy goal concerning migrants and refugees: the expansion of a mass surveillance programme at Europe’s external borders.

PeDRA, or ‘Processing of Personal Data for Risk Analysis,’ had begun in 2016 as a way for Frontex and the EU police body Europol to exchange data in the wake of the November 2015 Paris attacks by Islamist militants that French authorities had linked to Europe’s then snowballing refugee crisis.

At the November 2021 meeting, Caniard and his boss, Frontex’s then executive director, Fabrice Leggeri, were proposing to ramp it up dramatically, allowing Frontex border guards to collect what some legal experts have called ‘intrusive’ personal data from migrants and asylum seekers, including genetic data and sexual orientation; to store, analyse and share that data with Europol and security agencies of member states; and to scrape social media profiles, all on the premise of cracking down on ‘illegal’ migration and terrorism.

The expanded PeDRA programme would target not just individuals suspected of cross-border crimes such as human trafficking but also the witnesses and victims.

Caniard, the veteran head of the Frontex Legal Unit, had been appointed that August by fellow Frenchman Leggeri to lead the drafting of the new set of internal PeDRA rules. Caniard was also interim director of the agency’s Governance Support Centre, which reported directly to Leggeri, and as such was in a position to control internal vetting of the new PeDRA plan.

That vetting was seriously undermined, according minutes of board meetings leaked by insiders and internal documents obtained via Freedom of Information requests submitted by BIRN.

The evidence gathered by BIRN point to an effort by the Frontex leadership under Leggeri, backed by the European Commission, to sideline EU data protection watchdogs in order to push through the plan, regardless of warnings of institutional overreach, threats to privacy and the criminalisation of migrants.

Nayra Perez, Frontex’s own Data Protection Officer, DPO, warned repeatedly that the PeDRA expansion “cannot be achieved by breaching compliance with EU legislation” and that the programme posed “a serious risk of function creep in relation to the Agency’s mandate.” But her input was largely ignored, documents reveal.

The DPO warned of the possibility of Frontex data being transmitted in bulk, “carte blanche”, to Europol, a body which this year was ordered to delete much of a vast store of personal data that it was found to have amassed unlawfully by the EU’s top data protection watchdog, the European Data Protection Supervisor, EDPS.

Backed by the Commission, Frontex ignored a DPO recommendation that it consult the EDPS, currently led by Polish Wojciech Wiewiórowski, over the new PeDRA rules. In a response for this story, the EDPS warned of the possibility of “unlawful” processing of data by Frontex.

Having initially told BIRN that the DPO’s “advisory and auditing role” had been respected throughout the process, shortly before publication of this story Frontex conceded that Perez’s office “could have been involved more closely to the drafting and entrusted with the role of the chair of the Board”, an ad hoc body tasked with drafting the PeDRA rules.

In June, the EDPS asked Frontex to make multiple amendments to the expanded surveillance programme in order to bring it into line with EU data protection standards; Frontex told BIRN it had now entrusted the DPO to redraft “relevant MB [Management Board] decisions in line with the EDPS recommendations and lessons learned.”

Dr Niovi Vavoula, an expert in EU privacy and criminal law at Queen Mary University of London, said that the expanded PeDRA programme risked the “discriminatory criminalisation” of innocent people, prejudicing the outcomes of criminal proceedings against those flagged as “suspects” by Frontex border guards.

As written, the revamped PeDRA “is another piece of the puzzle of the emerging surveillance and criminalisation of migrants and refugees,” she said.

Religious beliefs, sexual orientation

Leggeri had long held a vision of Frontex as more than simply a ‘border management’ body, one that would see it working in tandem with Europol in matters of law enforcement; to this end, both agencies have been keen to loosen restrictions on the exchange of personal data between them.

Almost six years to the day before the Warsaw PeDRA meeting, a gun and bomb attack by Islamist militants killed 130 people in Paris. It was November 13, 2015, at the height of the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.

The following month, Leggeri signed a deal with the then head of Europol, Briton Richard Wainwright, which opened the door to the exchange of personal data between the two agencies. Addressing the UK parliament, Wainwright described a “symbiotic” relationship between the agencies in protecting the EU’s borders. In early 2016, a PeDRA pilot project launched in Italy, quickly followed by Greece and Spain.

At the same time, Europol launched its own parallel programme of so-called Secondary Security Checks on migrants and refugees in often cramped, squalid camps in Italy and Greece using facial recognition technology. The checks, most recently expanded to refugees from Ukraine in Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Moldova, were introduced “in order to identify suspected terrorists and criminals” but Europol is tight-lipped about the criteria determining who gets checked and what happens with the data obtained.

Since the launch of PeDRA, Frontex officers have been gathering information from newly-arrived migrants concerning individuals suspected of involvement in smuggling, trafficking or terrorism and transmitting the data to Europol in the form of “personal data packages,” which are then cross-checked against and stored within its criminal databases.

According to its figures, under the PeDRA programme, Frontex has shared the personal data – e.g. names, personal descriptions and phone numbers – of 11,254 people with Europol between 2016 and 2021.

But the 2015 version of the PEDRA programme was only its first incarnation.

Until 2019, rules governing Frontex meant that its capacity to collect and exchange the personal data of migrants had been strictly limited.

In December 2021, after years of acrimonious legal wrangling, the Frontex Management Board – comprising representatives of the 27 EU member states and the European Commission – gave the green light to the expansion of PeDRA.

Under the new rules, which have yet to enter into force, Frontex border guards will be able to collect a much wider range of sensitive personal data from all migrants, including genetic and biometric data, such as DNA, fingerprints or photographs, information on their political and religious beliefs, and sexual orientation.

The agency told BIRN it had not yet started processing personal data “related to sexual orientation” but that the collection of such information may be necessary to “determine whether suspects who appear to be similar are in fact the same.”

In terms of social media monitoring, Frontex said it had not decided yet whether to take advantage of such a tool; minutes of a joint meeting in April, however, show that Frontex and Europol agreed on “strengthening cooperation on social media monitoring”.

Indeed, in 2019, Frontex published plans to pay a surveillance company 400,000 euros to track people on social media, including “civil society and diaspora communities” within the EU, but abandoned it in November of that year after Privacy International questioned the legality of the plan.

Yet, under the expanded PeDRA, Vavoula, of Queen Mary University, said Frontex officers could be tasked without scraping social media profiles “without restrictions”.

Commenting on the entire programme, she added that PeDRA “could not have been drafted by someone with a deep knowledge of data protection law”. She cited numerous violations of elementary data protection safeguards, especially for children, the elderly and other vulnerable individuals, who should generally be treated differently from other subjects.

“Sufficient procedural safeguards should be introduced to ensure the protection of fundamental rights of children to the fullest possible extent including the requirement of justified reasons of such a processing of personal data,” Vavoula said. “Genetic data is much more sensitive than biometric data,” and therefore requires “specific safeguards” not present in the text.

Vavoula also noted the absence of a “maximum retention period,” warning, “Frontex may retain the data forever.”

Internal dissent swept aside

Internal documents seen by BIRN show that the man tasked by Leggeri to oversee the drafting of the new PeDRA rules, Caniard, ignored objections raised by the agency’s own data protection watchdog.

Perez, a Spanish lawyer and Frontex’s DPO, has the task of monitoring the agency’s compliance with EU data protection laws not only concerning the thousands of migrants whose data will be stored in its databases but also of the agency’s rapidly expanding staff base, currently numbering more than 1,900 but soon to include a ‘standing corps’ of up to 10,000 border guards.

She had also been working on earlier drafts of the new PeDRA rules since 2018, only to be leapfrogged by Caniard when he was appointed by Leggeri in August 2021.

When she was shown an advanced draft of the new PeDRA rules in October 2021, Perez did not mince her words. “The process of drafting the new rules de facto encroaches on the tasks legally assigned to the DPO,” she said in an internal Frontex document obtained by BIRN. “When the DPO issues an opinion, such advice cannot be overruled or amended.”

The DPO proposed more than a hundred changes to the draft; she warned that, under the proposed rules, Frontex “seems to arrogate the capacity to police the internet” through monitoring of social media and that victims and witnesses of crime whose data is shared with Europol face “undesirable consequences” of being part of a “pan-European criminal database.”

During intense internal discussions in late 2021, as the deadline for approving the new rules was fast approaching, the DPO said that Frontex had failed to make a compelling case for the collection of sensitive data such as ethnicity or sexual orientation.

“…the legal threshold to be met is not a ‘nice to have’ but a strict necessity,” Perez wrote.

When the final draft landed on the desk of the Frontex Management Board in November 2021, it was clear that many of the DPO’s recommendations had been disregarded.

At this point, Frontex was already the target of a probe by the European Anti-Fraud Office into its role in so-called ‘pushbacks’ in which migrants are illegally turned away at the EU’s borders, the findings of which would eventually force Leggeri’s resignation in April this year.

In an initial written response for this story, Frontex said that the DPO “had an active, pivotal role in the deliberations” concerning the new rules and that the watchdog’s “advisory and auditing role was respected” throughout the process.

Minutes of the November board meeting appeared to contradict this, however. Written in English and partially disclosed following an ‘access to documents request’, they cite Caniard conceding that the DPO was “consulted twice with a very short notice” and that, since Perez issued her opinion only the day before the meeting, there “was no possibility to take stock of it”. Perez submitted her opinion on November 16 and the board meeting was held on November 17 and 18.

The DPO, for its part, urged the management board to “work on the current draft to eliminate inconsistencies” and, though not legally obliged, “to consult the EDPS prior to adoption”.

Prior to publication of this story, BIRN asked Frontex again whether the DPO’s mandate had been respected during the drafting of the new PeDRA rules. The agency backtracked, saying it should have involved Perez’s office more closely and that the DPO would rewrite the programme.

Dissent was not confined to the DPO. Danish and Dutch representatives in the meeting urged the board to delay voting on the rules given that the DPO’s opinions had not been taken on board and to “do its utmost to avoid any situation where it is necessary to amend rules just adopted just because an EDPS’ conflicting opinion is issued.”

According to the minutes of the November meeting, the Commission representative, however, dismissed this, declaring that it considered the text “more than mature for adoption” and that there was no need to consult the EDPS because “it is not mandatory”.

Email exchanges between the Commission and Frontex reveal the urgency with which the Commission wanted the new rules adopted, even at the cost of foregoing EDPS participation.

One, from the Commission to Frontex on November 14, 2021, just days before the Board meeting said that, “while it would have been good to consult the EDPS on everything, it is more important now to get at least the two first decisions adopted.” An earlier mail, from July 2021 and sent directly to Leggeri, said it was “an absolute political priority to put in place the data protection framework of the Agency without any further delays.” That framework included the processing of personal data under PeDRA.

Asked why it supported the expansion of the Frontex surveillance programme without first having the proposal checked by EDPS, the Commission told BIRN it would not comment on “discussion held in the management board or other internal meetings.”

The EDPS, the EU’s top data protection authority, was only shown a copy of the new rules in late January 2022.

Asked for its opinion, the EDPS told BIRN it is “concerned that the rules adopted do not specify with sufficient clarity how the intended processing will be carried out, nor define precisely how safeguards on data protection will be implemented.”

The processing of highly vulnerable categories of individuals, including asylum seekers, could pose “severe risks for fundamental rights and freedoms,” such as the right to asylum, it said. It further stressed that “routine”, i.e. systematic, exchange of personal data between Frontex and Europol is not permitted and that such exchange can only take place “on a case-by-case basis.”

Collecting data with ‘religious’ fervour

Experts question the effectiveness of such extensive data collection in combating serious crime.

Douwe Korff, Emeritus Professor of international law at London Metropolitan University, decried the apparent lack of results and accountability.

“There isn’t even the absolute minimum requirement for law enforcement authorities to provide serious proof that the expansion of surveillance powers will be effective and proportionate,” said Korff, who has contributed to research on mass surveillance for EU institutions for years.

“If you ask how many people have you arrested using this data that are completely innocent, they don’t even want to know about this. They pursue this policy of mass data collection with a religious belief.”

Indeed, when the EDPS ordered Europol in January to delete data amassed unlawfully concerning individuals with no link to criminal activity, member states and the Commission came to the rescue with legal amendments enabling the agency to sidestep the order.

In May, Frontex and Europol put forward a proposal, drafted by a joint working group named ‘The Future Group’, for a new surveillance programme at the bloc’s external borders that would implement large-scale profiling of EU and third-country nationals using Artificial Intelligence.

This investigation was supported by a grant from the IJ4EU fund and carried out in collaboration with Der Spiegel in Germany, Domani in Italy and Reporters United in Greece.

Balkan Insight

The Balkan Insight (fornerkt the Balkin Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN) is a close group of editors and trainers that enables journalists in the region to produce in-depth analytical and investigative journalism on complex political, economic and social themes. BIRN emerged from the Balkan programme of the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, IWPR, in 2005. The original IWPR Balkans team was mandated to localise that programme and make it sustainable, in light of changing realities in the region and the maturity of the IWPR intervention. Since then, its work in publishing, media training and public debate activities has become synonymous with quality, reliability and impartiality. A fully-independent and local network, it is now developing as an efficient and self-sustainable regional institution to enhance the capacity for journalism that pushes for public debate on European-oriented political and economic reform.

Rising Violence In Bangladesh’s Hills Worries Christians

Ethnic tribal people sell their produce at a roadside market in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. (Photo: UCA News)

 July 10, 2022 

By UCA News

(UCA News) — Christians in Bangladesh’s restive Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region say an uptick in violence and deaths has triggered fear in the community.

In the latest violence, a group of Bengali Muslim settlers burned down 40 houses belonging to ethnic Chakma people in Mahalchhari sub-district of Khagrachhari district on July 5. At least five people were injured, locals said.

The attackers allegedly looted the houses before setting them on fire.

Church sources confirmed no Christians were among the victims of the attack.

Mohmmad Ashrafuzzaman, officer-in-charge of Mahalchhari police station said that no case has been filed over the arson attack, but law enforcers have been deployed in the area to avert further violence.

“Police and soldiers have stepped up patrols in the area to prevent any deterioration in law and order. Senior security officials have visited the area,” Ashrafuzzaman told UCA News.

Local media, quoting eyewitnesses, have reported that a group of about 120 to 150 Muslims led by local community leader Mohammad Aziz, vandalized and set fire to the houses in the Joysen para (village) area of ​​Mahalchhari.

Aziz denied the allegations.  

“The allegation that we attacked them is not true. There was a clash between two groups. The accusation of looting is totally baseless. We are keen to maintain a friendship with all,” Aziz told UCA News.

He also dismissed any communal motive behind the clash, adding that it was sparked after tribal people stopped Bengali people from growing crops in local plots.

Earlier, on June 21, an armed insurgent group, the Kuki-Chin National Front, shot dead three ethnic Tripura people and hacked another including one Christian in the Bilachhari area of Rangamati district.

Rights groups say at least 22 members of ethnic minority groups have been killed in violence in the last year and a series of arson attacks targeted tribal houses. While the rise in violence is mostly blamed on a turf war between armed insurgent groups, arson attacks have occurred due to clashes between Muslims and tribals.

Makhonlal Tripura, 29, a Tripura Catholic from neighboring Bandarban district, said Christians are living in fear over a surge in violence in the region.

“We are the locals, but today we do not have any security, neither at home nor outside. Often, we do not know who is killing whom, when and why. The CHT has become a turbulent place,” Tripura, a father of two, told UCA News.

The hilly, forested CHT, bordering India and Myanmar, is Bangladesh’s only mountainous region. For centuries, it was an impassable territory with dozens of Tibeto-Burman ethnic tribal groups living a life of segregation. The British colonial government asserted administrative rule in the region in the 19th century.

Following Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, the region has seen a state-sponsored influx of poor and landless Bengali Muslims. Observers say the move was aimed at a demographic change as the authorities wanted to tackle a bubbling insurgency for secession.

The scheme backfired as tribals opposed Bengali settlements while Bengali people encroached on their land and livelihoods, sparking communal tension and violence.

An ethnic political party Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS or United People’s Party) formed a militia that started attacking settlers. In response, the government deployed the military and for more than two decades a bloody bush war between the army and rebels raged in the CHT, killing thousands. The war ended with the signing of a peace accord in 1997.

A JSS splinter group that opposed the peace treaty, formed another political party and vowed to fight for greater autonomy for hill tribes. Both groups have armed wings and their rivalry has left dozens killed since then. Recently, both groups have experienced further splits while new tribal militia groups have emerged.    

Tribal Christians are a tiny minority of the estimated 1.6 million people in the CHT. About two-thirds of the estimated 30,000 Catholics in Chittagong Archdiocese hail from different hill tribes, mostly the Tripura community.

A 56-year-old catechist from the region regretted that while tribals and Muslims have bitter relations, other ethnic groups don’t like him for his preaching.

“I preach the word of Christ and I’m not afraid for my life. However, the Church should try to build good relations with all indigenous peoples, not just Catholics. We also need to reach out to Muslims for peacemaking,” he told UCA News on condition of anonymity.

He pointed out that it is not wise to remain silent when other hill tribes are attacked.

“The next attack may come against me. So, the Church should protest against any kind of violence and injustice,” he added.

Violence in the CHT is a cause of concern for the Church even if Christians are not directly affected, said Father Leonard Rebeiro, vicar-general of Chittagong Archdiocese.

“We always advise our people to be friendly with others so that no bad incident occurs,” he told UCA News, adding that Catholics are organized and ready to tackle any problem.

The priest noted that tribal people have their distinct culture and are not friendly with Muslims, which has been a cause of tension. They have faced persecution from Muslims as they have grown in numbers and aim to dominate tribal people who refuse to accept their control, he said.

“This is a complex situation, yet the Church needs to make efforts for peace. We have to work better to build good relations between Muslims and ethnic groups through inter-religious dialogue,” the priest said.

UCA News
The Union of Catholic Asian News (UCA News, UCAN) is the leading independent Catholic news source in Asia. A network of journalists and editors that spans East, South and Southeast Asia, UCA News has for four decades aimed to provide the most accurate and up-to-date news, feature, commentary and analysis, and multimedia content on social, political and religious developments that relate or are of interest to the Catholic Church in Asia.

No damage to Relativity Space rocket at Cape Canaveral from fire at launch site, CEO says

Richard Tribou, Orlando Sentinel on Jul 9, 2022

New rocket company Relativity Space is gearing up for its first ever launch testing its Terran 1 rocket at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, and a fire spotted at the launch site prompted its CEO to reassure people the rocket was fine.

Images posted of flames and smoke rising from Launch Complex 16 by media outlet Talk of Titusville on Twitter had Relativity cofounder and CEO Tim Ellis commenting the rocket was well, and the launch pad damage was minimal

“This grass fire was outside the rocket, from methane flare stack,” Ellis said. “The team and rocket are all safe, and minimal to no pad damage either. Mostly grass.”

Relativity’s 3D printed rocket arrived to from its factory in Long Beach, California, to the Space Coast last month prepping for a mission dubbed “GLHF,” as in “Good Luck, Have Fun,” which won’t be carrying any customer payloads, but will aim to prove it can perform for future missions when it attempts lift off later this year. A target launch date has not been determined, but earlier company statements said it was targeting before the end of summer.

Images posted to the company’s Twitter account earlier this week showed the rocket’s first stage on the launch pad prepping for testing.

Smaller than SpaceX Falcon 9 rockets, but at 110 feet tall with a 7.5-foot-wide fairing, they are capable of sending 2,756 pounds of payload to low-Earth orbit of about 310 miles. Terran 1 is expendable, but a much larger reusable 3D rocket is in the works called Terran R.

The company recently announced a deal to provide launch services with satellite company OneWeb, with its Terran R rocket beginning in 2025, to add to OneWeb’s existing constellation of 648 satellites. With the agreement Relativity stated is now has $1.2 billion in booked launches.

Other customers lined up include the U.S. Department of Defense and NASA, which awarded the company $3 million as part of its Venture Class Launch Services Demonstration 2 contract.

All of Relativity’s initial launches will be from LC-16, which has not had a launch since 1988 but was used for Titan and Pershing missiles as well as test for the Apollo and Gemini programs.

The company joins SpaceX, United Launch Alliance and Astra Space, all three of which are already active from their respective Cape Canaveral launch pads while Blue Origin is expected to attempt its first launch with the New Glenn rocket by 2023.

©2022 Orlando Sentinel. Visit orlandosentinel.com. Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

India projected to surpass China as world's most populous country during 2023, says UN report

The latest projections by the United Nations suggest that the world's population could grow to around 8.5 billion in 2030 and 9.7 billion in 2050

Press Trust of IndiaJuly 11, 2022 

Representational image. AFP

United Nations: India is projected to surpass China as the world's most populous country next year, according to a report by the United Nations on Monday which said that the world population is forecast to reach eight billion by mid-November 2022.

The World Population Prospects 2022 by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, said that the global population is projected to reach eight billion on 15 November, 2022.

The global population is growing at its slowest rate since 1950, having fallen under one per cent in 2020.

The latest projections by the United Nations suggest that the world's population could grow to around 8.5 billion in 2030 and 9.7 billion in 2050.

It is projected to reach a peak of around 10.4 billion people during the 2080s and to remain at that level until 2100.

This year's World Population Day (11 July) falls during a milestone year, when we anticipate the birth of the Earth's eight billionth inhabitant. This is an occasion to celebrate our diversity, recognise our common humanity, and marvel at advancements in health that have extended lifespans and dramatically reduced maternal and child mortality rates, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said.

At the same time, it is a reminder of our shared responsibility to care for our planet and a moment to reflect on where we still fall short of our commitments to one another, he added.

The report said that "India is projected to surpass China as the world's most populous country during 2023.

The world's two most populous regions in 2022 were Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, with 2.3 billion people, representing 29 per cent of the global population, and Central and Southern Asia, with 2.1 billion, representing 26 per cent of the total world population.

China and India accounted for the largest populations in these regions, with more than 1.4 billion each in 2022.

More than half of the projected increase in global population up to 2050 will be concentrated in just eight countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines and Tanzania.

"Disparate population growth rates among the world's largest countries will change their ranking by size: for example, India is projected to surpass China as the world's most populous country in 2023, the report said.

According to the report, India's population stands at 1.412 billion in 2022, compared to China's 1.426 billion.

India, which will surpass China as the world's most populous nation by 2023, is projected to have a population of 1.668 billion in 2050, way ahead of China's 1.317 billion people by the middle of the century.

The report added that it is estimated that ten countries experienced a net outflow of more than 1 million migrants between 2010 and 2021.

In many of these countries, these outflows were due to temporary labour movements, such as for Pakistan (net outflow of -16.5 million during 2010-2021), India (-3.5 million), Bangladesh (-2.9 million), Nepal (-1.6 million) and Sri Lanka (-1 million).

In other countries, including the Syrian Arab Republic (-4.6 million), Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (-4.8 million), and Myanmar (-1 million), insecurity and conflicts have driven the net outflow of migrants over the decade.

Global life expectancy at birth reached 72.8 years in 2019, an improvement of almost 9 years since 1990. Further reductions in mortality are projected to result in an average global longevity of around 77.2 years in 2050.

Yet in 2021, life expectancy for the least developed countries lagged 7 years behind the global average.

Alternative long-term population projections have also been undertaken by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME).

In its recent projections, IHME projected that the global population will reach 8.8 billion in 2100 with a range of 6.8 billion to 11.8 billion.

The main difference between the projections released by IHME and the United Nations lies in the assumptions on the future level of fertility.

The report said that IHME projects that the global level of fertility will decline faster than under the United Nations medium scenario.

According to IHME, the average number of children per woman will decline to 1.66 children at the end of the century while the United Nations projects fertility to be around 1.84 at the same date.

In India, IHME projects a total fertility rate of 1.29 births per woman in 2100 instead of 1.69 in the United Nations medium scenario, resulting in a population that is 433 million smaller than according to the United Nations projections at the end of the century.

The share of the global population at ages 65 and above is projected to rise from 10 per cent in 2022 to 16 per cent in 2050.

At that point, it is expected that the number of persons aged 65 years or over worldwide will be more than twice the number of children under age 5 and about the same as the number under age 12.

Countries with ageing populations should take steps to adapt public programmes to the growing numbers of older persons, including by establishing universal health care and long-term care systems and by improving the sustainability of social security and pension systems, it said.

The report noted that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected all three components of population change. Global life expectancy at birth fell to 71.0 years in 2021.

In some countries, successive waves of the pandemic may have produced short-term reductions in numbers of pregnancies and births, while for many other countries, there is little evidence of an impact on fertility levels or trends. The pandemic severely restricted all forms of human mobility, including international migration.

Updated Date:July 11, 2022 13:24:24 IST

OPINION

What Future for a World of 8 Billion?

By John Wilmoth

The writer is Director, Population Division of the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

School Opens in Weapons Free Zone East of UNMISS”. Credit: UN Photo/Amanda Voisard

UNITED NATIONS, Jul 11 2022 (IPS) - What does a young girl from Juba, in South Sudan, an 8-year-old boy living in the slums of Mumbai, in India, a young mother from the south of Lima, in Peru, and an 83-year-old man enjoying retirement in the suburbs of Stockholm, in Sweden, have in common?

Many things, perhaps, but here is one of the most important: they are all members of the human population, whose size will surpass 8 billion people in mid-November 2022. They are part of a common humanity that aspires to live peacefully and in dignity, that desires access to quality education, adequate living conditions and decent work, and that hopes to enjoy a long, healthy and fulfilling life.

Even though all of them are part of the same humanity, the challenges and opportunities that they face in their daily lives are drastically different.

In 2015, Member States of the United Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. At the core of this agenda are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which constitute an ambitious call-for-action to end poverty and hunger, protect the planet and improve the current lives and future prospects of all people everywhere.

Reducing social and economic inequalities is at the heart of the 2030 Agenda. Yet many inequalities persist and are deepening, both within and across countries and regions. Today, the probability of living a long, healthy and fulfilling life, and the challenges and opportunities that people encounter every day, differ vastly around the world.

In countries where deaths outnumber births, the population is increasing very little, if at all. In some cases, it has already started to decline or will do so soon. In some of these countries, immigration helps to counter the population loss due to an excess of deaths over births.

In other countries, emigration is exacerbating the loss of population linked to a low birth rate. As the proportion of the population above age 65 continues to grow, the shifting population places additional fiscal pressure on social security, public pension and health-care systems.

In low-income countries, where economic growth may struggle to keep up with population growth, alleviating poverty and countering high levels of inequality is a major challenge. Lack of access to resources deprives individuals of opportunities and choices.

Inadequate access to family planning services perpetuates high levels of childbearing, often starting early in life, and contributes to rapid population growth. Such growth generates ever-larger cohorts of children and young adults, whose experiences early in life will shape their prospects for success.

A sustained drop in the fertility level can stabilize the number of children and youth in a population, facilitating increased investments per child in health care and education. With such changes, along with measures to ensure access to decent work, a large and youthful population presents an opportunity for accelerated social and economic development—a phenomenon known as demographic dividend.

Today, less than 16 per cent of the global population lives in high-income countries, a percentage that is expected to fall to 13 per cent by 2050. By contrast, low-income and lower-middle-income countries are home to more than half of the world’s population (9 and 43 per cent, respectively).

The proportion of the global population living in these two groups of countries is projected to grow to more than 60 per cent by 2050. Indeed, the future growth of world population will take place mostly in low-income and lower-middle-income countries.

Figure 1. Distribution of the world’s population by income group, 2022, 2030 and 2050
Note: numbers may not add up due to rounding.

The higher rate of population growth in low-income and lower-middle-income countries is fueled by declining mortality, with fertility remaining at comparatively high levels. If the population of these countries continues to grow at the current rate, their combined size will double in about 26 years.

Today, in low-income countries, a woman gives birth to 4.5 children on average over a lifetime. This figure is projected to drop just below 3 births per woman in 2050. By comparison, women in high-income countries currently bear, on average, 1.6 children.

Between 1990 and 2022, improvements in health-care services in low-income countries tripled the survival prospects for children under the age of 5. Nevertheless, a baby born today in a low-income country can expect to live almost 18 years less than a baby born in a high-income country.

Despite a slight convergence that is anticipated over the coming decades, these vast differences are expected to remain largely intact.

Unequal outcomes for people across the globe call for renewed action and investment. Countries and the international community need to redouble their efforts to advance the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and to ensure that no one is left behind. Whether a girl in Juba or a boy in Mumbai will enjoy a long, healthy and fulfilling life depends on the world’s commitment to ensuring that all 8 billion inhabitants of the planet will have genuine opportunities to find success.

IPS UN Bureau