Friday, July 24, 2026

Some Reflections on the Water Crisis in Puerto Rico

Tuesday 21 July 2026, by Manuel Rodríguez Banchs



Thirty years ago, the Taller de Formación Política [Workshop for Political Education or TFP] [1] published the book Water in Puerto Rico: Crisis of Nature or Social Crisis? Many of the problems pointed out in that text have worsened and continue to threaten our society. Many of the criticisms, complaints, and warnings that were made have been confirmed. Unfortunately for the country, everything that was pointed out about the super-aqueduct project has also been borne out. Likewise, the proposed alternatives remain valid. A new reading of the text, with the benefit of hindsight, has prompted the following reflections.

The water crisis in Puerto Rico has been predictable, and we see its effects repeatedly. Each time the water situation worsened, proposals emerged and solutions were presented through large-scale projects involving the construction of new infrastructure, including various forms of privatisation and the diversion of public funds to private companies. A prime example is the super-aqueduct, a project that was unnecessary, environmentally damaging, and a source of corruption. Furthermore, it was warned that a pipe six feet in diameter and over 50 kilometers long would cause ruptures and breakdowns that would be difficult to repair and would present access problems. The proposed solutions have generally arisen as reactions to critical situations and have not been the product of the necessary reflection on the root causes of the problems that they are intended to solve. Planning and maintenance have been absent from water management as a vital resource and from the administration of the Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority or AAA). Although the privatisation of the AAA was a failure, this policy has persisted through outsourcing.

Government policies over the past 50 years have been aimed at ensuring the conditions for the pursuit and capture of private profit. They have promoted a reduction in the size of government, but contrary to the stated objective of this reduction, the announced savings have not been achieved, and public spending has not been reduced. Instead, neoliberal programmes have been adopted that have facilitated the diversion of public funds into private pockets.

Social Crisis

Every day, large areas of the country face the problem of a lack of drinking water. Tens of thousands of people are deprived of this vital resource daily. According to official data, the most recent crisis deprived more than 110,000 subscribers of this resource, which—according to census figures—affected more than 250,000 people. This situation was not adequately resolved due to the deep fragmentation, divisions, and power struggles within the Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party or PNP). These struggles have spread to all branches of government. The inadequate response to this crisis is also related to the ineptitude of the people that the PNP places in management positions in government agencies and departments. According to the most recent corruption scandal revealed by Sebastián Negrón Reichard, former Secretary of Economic Development, this situation is a consequence of the only criterion used for the selection of these people: their affiliation and activism in PNP campaigns, regardless of their ineptitude. According to messages released by Negrón Reichard, sent by Francisco Domenech, the governor’s secretary, the criterion for these appointments is that they be people "who screwed up" in the governor’s primary campaign and the general election. According to some of these messages, the governor’s secretary—who is also the governor’s spokesperson—does not tolerate the appointment of people "who are not members of the New Progressive Party to positions of trust."

However, the country’s water supply problems predate the most recent breakdowns in the super-aqueduct and have two main sources. On the one hand, they stem from the deterioration of infrastructure, a lack of planning and maintenance, a lack of understanding of the system by managers and contractors, and the reduced supply capacity of the reservoirs and problems at the filtration plants. It is estimated that the AAA loses approximately 65% of water produced due to leaks, breakdowns, and overflows. Infrastructure deterioration can be mitigated through planning and preventive and corrective maintenance programmes. The lack of knowledge of the system is limited to senior management and AAA contractors, as AAA workers are very familiar with the complexity of the system. They have the experience, knowledge, and ability to identify pipes, leaks, and other problems. However, neither the AAA management nor the government takes them into account or allows them the necessary participation to address the serious problems we face.

On the other hand, water supply problems are also due to the reduction in storage capacity. Sedimentation of reservoirs seriously affects their storage capacity and limits water availability, according to the final draft of the Climate Change Mitigation, Adaptation and Resilience Plan for Puerto Rico [2] of the Committee of Experts and Advisors on Climate Change (CEACC) revised in 2024. [3] The reduction in reservoir capacity and the problems at filtration plants are a consequence of sediment buildup in both reservoirs and filters. This sedimentation, which reduces storage capacity and impairs filtration, originates from two main sources: a) erosion and b) particulate matter from construction projects. Deforestation of the forests that protect the watersheds that feed reservoirs causes soil erosion. This erosion increases sedimentation in lakes through rainwater runoff, which contributes to weathering, carries away decomposing material, and transports rocks and soil eroded from the surface into the reservoirs. But currently, environmental destruction—which also includes cases of deforestation—is primarily due to construction projects that affect forests and areas near rivers and streams, many of which feed into lakes that store water. This situation is exacerbated by the waste from these same construction projects, which is also carried by the water and contributes to increased sedimentation.

Crisis of Nature

Puerto Rico is one of the 10 countries in the world most affected by the climate crisis, according to the Climate Risk Index (CRI) published in February 2025 by the international body Germanwatch. [4] The sedimentation situation worsened with Hurricane Maria, which struck Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, exacerbating sediment accumulation. Rising temperatures, altered rainfall patterns, and the intensification of phenomena such as hurricanes and droughts directly impact ecosystems and infrastructure, and, as we have experienced in recent years, disrupt daily life.

The climate crisis is in turn accelerating the water supply crisis in Puerto Rico. Some forecasts indicate that there will be changes in rainfall patterns. [5] Between 1950 and 1980, severe droughts that led to rationing occurred every 20 to 25 years. It is important to note that under normal conditions, Puerto Rico receives enough rainfall to meet its needs if it had sufficient storage capacity. However, it’s important to recognise that the climate crisis has led to changes in the intensity and frequency of droughts, which now occur every five years. This means we will face more droughts requiring rationing, which demands planning and preparation.

The Puerto Rico Comprehensive Water Resources Plan - which has not been updated since 2016 - of the Department of Natural and Environmental Resources indicates that, historically, droughts begin with a reduction in rainfall in April and May, and when they are severe, reservoirs do not fill up sufficiently. [6] According to the document, periods of lower-than-normal rainfall in the Caribbean region coincide with variations in the El Niño phenomenon, which in turn reduces the number and intensity of hurricanes. Experts have confirmed that this meteorological phenomenon is already present, so drought conditions can be expected in the Caribbean. [7] The extreme drought of 2015 required severe restrictions that affected more than one million people and resulted in millions of dollars in agricultural losses, according to data from the U.S. Geological Survey. Another drought, in 2020, forced water rationing measures and led to the declaration of a drought emergency for all of Puerto Rico. In 2024, the most severe drought category observed in Puerto Rico was “moderate drought,” which was present in the southwest and northwest corners of the island, as well as in the eastern interior, covering between 40% and 55% of the territory between January and March, according to the National Weather Service’s annual report published in January 2025.

Another factor affecting water availability on the island is rising sea levels. Rising sea levels increase the influx of seawater into aquifers. As sea levels continue to rise, this intrusion will increase, reducing the availability of groundwater. It is essential to consider all these factors when planning and preparing to mitigate the impact on this vital resource.

A new threat

In addition to the problems with the development model adopted in the country, which prioritises the interests of capital and drives the construction of environmentally destructive projects like Esencia in Cabo Rojo, there is a new threat that also has irreversible consequences for water resources. I am referring to the data centres promoted by Big Tech. Specifically, I am referring to the demand for a new type of these structures that arises as a consequence of the massive use of generative artificial intelligence.

Data centres are not new. [8] These buildings have existed for decades and house the servers and other hardware necessary for the internet to function. However, since ChatGPT’s public launch in late 2022, generative artificial intelligence has experienced a dramatic boom, requiring a large amount of new, much more energy-intensive equipment. According to a Consumer Reports report [9] (CR), to meet the increased energy demand of these data centres, electric companies are investing billions of dollars in building new transmission lines and new power generation plants. [10] This is one of the main reasons why new data centres can increase electricity bills. Residential electricity costs are also rising due to the proliferation of new, larger-scale data centres that draw power from the same residential grids, increasing demand. In places where electricity generation and transmission are privately owned and therefore subject to market forces, this increased demand also leads to higher electricity prices.

The rise of generative artificial intelligence requires these large data centres to operate 24 hours a day, generating a lot of heat whilst causing them to overheat considerably. To prevent overheating, these facilities use constant water circulation systems to cool their equipment. According to estimates by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a data centre can consume up to 5 million gallons of water per day. [11] This only includes direct consumption for cooling the centre. Generating the electricity to keep data centres running requires millions of additional gallons of water—even more than is needed for cooling.

The increasing and widespread use of generative artificial intelligence comes at a growing environmental cost. In addition to the energy consumed by technology companies to operate their data centres, they also use enormous quantities of water for cooling due to the excessive heat they generate. A report published by the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health warns that by 2030, water consumption for the operation of artificial intelligence will equal the annual needs of 1.3 billion people. [12] Therefore, it is necessary to be aware of the threats to water posed by new technologies in order to organise an effective resistance.

The ecosocialist alternative

The government of Puerto Rico serves colonial capitalism, which in turn is subservient to foreign capital. It responds to interests that prioritise short-term private profit over the well-being of the country and the survival of humanity. This is confirmed by the passage of Law 82-2026, which eliminated the absolute prohibition on construction in specially protected rural areas. This legislation authorises the approval of building permits on these lands if the central government, municipalities, or the Fiscal Control Board determine that the project is strategic. Two other bills have also been introduced to further deregulate the granting of building permits, accelerating environmental vandalism. The country’s current development model is unsustainable. Addressing the crisis we face and averting climate catastrophe will only be possible if we abandon the prevailing concept of development. Instead of facilitating environmental vandalism, we must take measures to protect the environment.

It is estimated that Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused the loss of approximately 10% of the country’s forest cover. This does not include the daily deforestation caused by construction projects in areas that should be protected. Therefore, it is urgent to reforest the country, particularly the areas surrounding water basins. It is necessary to prohibit construction on the coasts while simultaneously planting dunes and mangroves. Dredging reservoirs to increase storage capacity is critical. This must be combined with a coherent programme for water conservation and consumption reduction. Adopting a permanent preventive and corrective maintenance plan for the Water and Sewer Authority’s infrastructure is essential. We need to accelerate the transition to renewable energy sources.

But to achieve these advances, a reform of the public service is essential—one that includes the recovery of privatised services—through a democratic process with the participation of workers, who have firsthand knowledge of the system’s problems and needs and how to solve them, and with the participation of users who directly face the consequences of government mismanagement. We must take all urgent and necessary measures to mitigate the social and environmental problems that afflict us and the effects of the climate crisis.

Overcoming the social and environmental problems that afflict us and reversing the reversible effects of the climate crisis is impossible under the rules of this economic system. The climate crisis is perhaps the most dramatic example. It is not possible to address the climate crisis without making the energy sector—as well as water management—public property and administering it democratically with the dual objective of satisfying our needs and reducing environmental impact. We must also reduce unnecessary, nonessential, or harmful production. But this, in turn, requires placing broad sectors of productive activity under the same social and democratic control. This demands overcoming capitalism. Therefore, we support all struggles for immediate demands that allow us to improve our situation within capitalism, while simultaneously highlighting the need to change this system and continuing to fight for a truly democratic, solidarity-based, and ecological society.

27 June 2026

Translated by David Fagan for International Viewpoint from Prensasinprisa.

Footnotes

[1] The TFP was founded in August 1977. It was a historical research project and a political organisation. It studied moments from the past and intervened in the most important social and political struggles in Puerto Rico between 1977 and 2008. Former members of the Taller, along with militants from other revolutionary organisations and activists from various struggles, founded the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and later went on to found the organisation, Democracia Socialista (Socialist Democracy or DS, within which supporters of the Fourth International organise.).

[3] Law 33-2019, which tasked the Committee of Experts and Advisors on Climate Change (CEACC) with developing the plan to address the implications of climate change, stipulates that the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, after formally receiving the draft, “shall have no later than the conclusion of the next regular session to present the Plan simultaneously to both bodies of the Legislative Assembly.” However, the legislature has not acted on the Plan.

[5] https://caribbeanclimatehub.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Guia-Practica-WEB-1.pdf}] On the one hand, a reduction compared to the average is anticipated, along with an increase in heavy and torrential rain events. This presents a serious situation for our entire environment in the Caribbean. A CEACC report published in 2022 highlights that the effects of climate change have distinct nuances, including sedimentation in most reservoirs, high temperatures, and drought. According to these projections, water availability in Puerto Rico will decrease even further. Reduced rainfall could lead to more frequent and prolonged droughts.

The United States Drought Monitor recently noted that 4.6% of Puerto Rico is currently under moderate drought and 36.3% under abnormally dry conditions, according to data validated as of June 9 of this year.[[https://www.drought.gov

[7] https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/enso_advisory/ensodisc_Sp.shtml}] According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Integrated Drought Information System, Puerto Rico has faced significant droughts since 1950.[[The municipalities most prone to drought in Puerto Rico are principally: Santa Isabel, Salinas, Juana Díaz, Guayama and Coamo (south); Lajas, Cabo Rojo, Sabana Grande and Guánica (southwest); Moca and Isabela (northwest); and Las Piedras and Juncos (east interior).

[8] The data centre map indicates that there are eight data centres in Puerto Rico, none of the magnitude of those being developed by Big Tech companies in other countries. https://www.datacentermap.com/puerto-rico/

[9] Consumer Reports is an American non-profit organisation, founded in 1936, dedicated to conducting independent testing, research, and reviews of products and services. Its primary goal is to help consumers make informed, fair, and safe purchasing decisions.

Brazil

Super El Niño: Chronicle of a Tragedy Foretold

Wednesday 22 July 2026, by Israel Dutra



Brazil is set to face an unprecedented climate phenomenon with the arrival, in the second half of the year, of what meteorologists have dubbed “Super” El Niño. [1]

According to data from the Climate Prediction Center (CPC), part of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), there is an 81% probability that El Niño will fall into the “very strong” category. In other words, scientifically speaking, the conditions are in place for one of the century’s largest climate events, with significant repercussions for Brazil.

It seems strange that, in a scenario where the pre-election debate already dominates the agenda, little or nothing is being discussed regarding how to respond to this situation.

We are facing extremely serious climate events around the globe. A more serious debate is needed on the centrality of the environmental agenda in general—and within the left—regarding an ecosocialist solution in light of the upcoming programmatic and electoral debates.

Warnings and an Emergency Brake

The front page of Folha de São Paulo on Sunday, July 12, caught my attention. The headline warned of major difficulties in livestock farming and a likely delay in grain planting, which would disrupt and reduce the harvest. The threat combines excessive rainfall in the southern region—which is jeopardizing wheat planting— d with heat waves in the Midwest, which are damaging soybean crops, whose planting is scheduled for the period between September and December.

The warnings from key sectors of the press, governments, and the scientific community cannot be downplayed. The effects on Europe are devastating. The greatest heat wave in the European continent’s recent history is causing deaths and disasters, such as the wildfire that claimed 13 lives in southern Spain. Brazil experienced the climate disaster that ravaged Rio Grande do Sul in 2024. Only two years separate us from the true trauma endured by the people of Rio Grande do Sul, with hundreds of fatalities, tens of thousands affected, and entire cities destroyed.

What is most concerning is that the far right continues to advocate a denialist agenda, which not only prevents the ability to forecast and adapt to such events but also ends up amplifying their impacts, especially on the poorest. This debate will be unavoidable in the October election, given the mass support enjoyed by Bolsonarism and its various candidates across Brazil.

The Super El Niño and the Elections

The key issue is the role that agribusiness plays in the national economy. On the one hand, it is one of the main culprits behind the devastation that causes profound environmental imbalance; on the other hand, in the face of El Niño, it will seek compensation through heavy public investments.

As a base of support for the most reactionary sectors of politics, agribusiness thrives at the expense of the environment and the interests of the majority of the population. Therefore, there is no other way out but to break with the agro-export model that has led us to our current dead end.

In the elections, both Bolsonaro’s denialism and the auxiliary wing of the “centrão”—mobilized by the BBB (Cattle, Bible, and Bullets) caucus coalition—will faithfully defend the interests of agribusiness. On the other hand, the PT and parties that are part of the government are caving in and watering down their agendas in a supposed quest for greater electoral gains.

We must transform the food production system and build a new paradigm as an economic model that guarantees food sovereignty for the entire Brazilian population. The best way to address El Niño is to combine adaptation measures—both in rural areas and, above all, in cities—with the struggle for a fundamental shift in the economic model.

Take the defense of water, for example. While dozens of data centers are being installed, driven by the logic of mining and “data extractivism,” the state of São Paulo—to cite just one example—risks facing new water rationing in light of the climate events forecast for the second half of the year.

A Program for the Present and the Future

The PSOL faces an enormous challenge. Together with its alliance with Rede Sustentabilidade, it is viewed by hundreds of thousands of people as the party capable of fearlessly tackling environmental issues, bringing the need for profound change to the center of the political agenda. This challenge will play out in the upcoming elections.

A change that challenges the “development” model, advocating for the need to resume agrarian reform and reverse the direction of current food production. Thus, the PSOL platform, updated last year, incorporated parts of the MST’s platform regarding the transition to an agroecological model.

Furthermore, the renationalization of companies such as SABESP, the need for a national climate emergency plan, and the uncompromising defense of rivers are fundamental parts of the immediate platform of our candidates and leaders.

The recent discussion between the PSOL Foundations (the Lauro Campos and Marielle Franco Foundations) and the Rede Foundation regarding an ecosocialist program for Brazil was a major step in this direction. To confront the climate catastrophe—accelerated by neo-fascist denialism—the emergency brake lies in the struggle and mobilization of the social majority.

16 July 2026

Translated by International Viewpoint from Revista Movimento.

Footnotes

[1] Photo: 5 May 2024 – Aerial survey of the areas affected by the rain in Canoas.

China Hit by “Deadly Weather Events”

Thursday 23 July 2026, by Pierre Rousset



During the first ten days of July, cyclones (typhoons), tornadoes, storms, severe weather, floods, and landslides wreaked havoc in the central and southern parts of the country—and beyond. China is facing extreme weather events intensified by the climate crisis.

Natural disasters are common in China, particularly in the summer, when some regions experience heavy rainfall while others are plagued by extreme heat. However, the frequency and scale of these events are increasing as global warming accelerates—driven, in particular, by the use of fossil fuels. Among the affected regions are Guangxi, Guizhou, and Hunan in the south and center of the country, home to a population of over 150 million—more than in Russia.

In fact, a significant portion of the country is affected by this series of weather events. Maysak, the first typhoon of the season, made landfall on July 6 in the southern island province of Hainan, having originated in Vietnam. In Nanning, the capital of the Guangxi region, and its surrounding areas, floodwaters breached the dams of three reservoirs, according to local authorities. The city of Nanning and its surrounding areas were flooded, forcing many residents to take refuge on rooftops, with some 55,000 people evacuated. On the same day, a tornado struck the city of Ezhou in Hubei Province (central-east). In fact, two destructive tornadoes swept through central China that evening, when warm air from the south, driven by Typhoon Maysak, collided with cold air from the north.

On July 9, a landslide in Gansu (northwest) occurred following violent thunderstorms and torrential rains, leaving 39 dead, 9 missing, and hundreds injured, according to press reports. It was caused by “a severe episode of atmospheric convection” (i.e., a temperature contrast) that triggered “thunderstorms and strong winds” which swept through cities such as Huangshi and Huanggang, according to state media.

In the city of Guigang, a metropolitan area in the Guangxi Autonomous Region (in the south), floodwaters turned a major road into a lake, submerging cars and rushing down a hillside as muddy torrents before pouring onto a construction site.

On July 11, Typhoon Bavi, originating in the Philippines and Taiwan, struck the coast further east, prompting the evacuation of nearly 2 million people. Shortly before that, torrential rains in the capital Beijing (in the northeast) led authorities to evacuate more than 100,000 people.

A typhoon was also expected over the weekend on the east coast, south of Shanghai, bringing with it violent gusts of wind.

In southern and central China, violent thunderstorms and torrential rains have left about 17 people dead and hundreds injured. The central province of Hubei was also affected. Tens of thousands of people were evacuated in the southern region of Guangxi, where some 40 rivers and streams burst their banks and torrents of water poured out after the dam walls of a reservoir broke, according to state television CCTV.

In an exotic twist, some 800 to 900 snakes (including cobras) escaped after a snake farm was destroyed by the floodwaters in the city of Hangzhou.

According to government authorities, torrential rains were expected in mid-July to reach certain coastal and eastern areas of Guangxi, as well as the southwest of the neighboring province of Guangdong—home to a major manufacturing hub—putting the integrity of reservoirs and dikes to the test and potentially triggering further population evacuations.

The Chinese press reports on effective prevention and relief efforts. The alerts certainly enabled preventive evacuations in some areas, but not in all, as evidenced by these accounts gathered by an Agence France-Presse correspondent who was able to visit the town of Liulan (Guangxi), where floods destroyed homes, swept away livestock, and caused the collapse of a major dam (and another, smaller one near the town of Gantang). The dam’s walls collapsed, unleashing torrents of muddy water downstream, with a preliminary death toll of 26 and seven people missing.

Many of the affected residents in this town had not fully grasped the gravity of the situation. According to Mr. Huang, “it has never been this bad before.” “We didn’t receive any warning. If we had, we wouldn’t have suffered so many losses.” Even belongings on the upper floor of his house were destroyed by the floodwaters. “In several hundred years, this is the first time the floodwaters have reached the first floor,” Bi Yunchun, another resident of Gantang, told AFP.

China’s compensation system for flood victims was expanded in 2025 to include storage areas where authorities deliberately divert floodwaters to reduce flooding downstream. The scope of compensation for people living or working in these storage areas has been expanded. Previously limited to draft animals, it now includes livestock and poultry that could not be evacuated, with the central government covering 70% of the costs and local governments covering 30%. Compensation remains conditional and does not cover all risks.

Furthermore, there can be a wide gap between the law and reality. The selection of storage zones obviously involves a political dimension (affluent residential neighborhoods or business districts related to those in power will be spared). Corruption is endemic at all levels of the administration, and repression is commonplace. In the absence of more or less independent social organizations, it is very difficult to ensure the collective defense of the rights of working-class, peasant and popular communities over the long term. Under these conditions, with every extreme weather event, new segments of the population are plunged into poverty—a situation from which they will find it all the more difficult to escape as climate disasters follow one after another.

More generally, climate-related disasters threaten to wipe out the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars in commercial activity each year due to urban flooding, halted industrial activity, submerged crops, and livestock swept away by the floodwaters—all while the Chinese economy is already sluggish.

18 July 2026

Source: ESSF.